Summary
concluding that defendant's diabetes and hypertension considered in context of COVID-19 pandemic established extraordinary and compelling circumstance
Summary of this case from United States v. MarreroOpinion
1:12-CR-0308 (LEK)
2020-05-18
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Benjamin A. ROUNTREE, Defendant.
Daniel Hanlon, Office of United States Attorney, Albany, NY, for Plaintiff. James E. Gross, Office of James E. Gross, Albany, NY, for Defendant.
Daniel Hanlon, Office of United States Attorney, Albany, NY, for Plaintiff.
James E. Gross, Office of James E. Gross, Albany, NY, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Lawrence E. Kahn, Senior U.S. District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Citing his health conditions and his exemplary prison record, defendant Benjamin A. Rountree, currently incarcerated at Federal Prison Camp, Schuylkill ("FPC Schuylkill") in Minersville, Pennsylvania, has filed a motion asking for release from prison in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Dkt. Nos. 175 ("Motion"); 190 ("Reply"). The Government opposes the Motion. Dkt. No. 183 ("Opposition"). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Rountree's Motion. II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On May 16, 2013, Rountree pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 846. Dkt. Nos. 29, 30. The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSIR") determined that Rountree qualified as a career offender because he had two prior convictions for fifth degree criminal sale of a controlled—one in 1997 and one in 2004—in violation of New York Penal Law § 220.31.1. Dkt. No. 52 ("PSIR") at ¶¶ 56, 59, 96. Accordingly, the PSIR recommended a guideline sentence of 262 to 327 months. Id. ¶ 96. On January 7, 2015, the Court adopted the PSIR's criminal history calculation but sentenced Rountree to 188 months of incarceration, authorizing the downward departure on the Government's motion based on Rountree's substantial assistance to the Government. Dkt. Nos. 96 ("Sentencing Minutes"); 97 ("Judgment"); 98 ("Statement of Reasons").
"A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a).
To date, Rountree has served about 85 months of his sentence. Dkt. No. 25 (April 8, 2013 docket entry remanding Rountree to the custody of the U.S. Marshal); Opp'n at 1. He is due to be released on January 6, 2025. See Find an inmate , FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS , https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited May 17, 2020). For the past two years, Rountree has been imprisoned at FPC Schuylkill. See Mot. at 6. FPC Schuylkill is a minimum security satellite camp, associated with medium security Federal Correctional Institution Schuylkill ("FCI Schuylkill"). See FCI Schuylkill , FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS , https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/sch/ (last visited May 17, 2020).
B. Procedural History
On April 20, 2020, Rountree filed the instant Motion pro se, requesting transfer to home confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3624 in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and Attorney General William Barr's recent memoranda to the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") regarding home confinement. See Mot. at 1–2 (citing Memorandum from Att'y Gen. William Barr to Dir. of Bureau of Prisons (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1266661/download; Memorandum from Att'y Gen. William Barr to Dir. of Bureau of Prisons (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1262731/download ). In support of his Motion, Rountree cited two factors that increase his risk of contracting a severe case of COVID-19: his preexisting medical conditions—diabetes and hypertension—and the inability to socially distance while in prison. Id. at 4–11. Additionally, Rountree pointed to his exemplary prison record to justify his request. Id.
Construing Rountree's pro se Motion as a request for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582, the Court ordered the Government to brief the § 3582 request in its response to the Motion. Dkt. No. 180 ("Apr. 27, 2020 Text Order"). The Government did so, filing its Opposition on April 29, 2020 and arguing that the Court should deny Rountree's § 3582 request because: (1) Rountree failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his Motion; (2) Rountree has not established that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" support a sentence reduction as required under § 3582 ; and (3) the relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) —which a court must evaluate when considering a § 3582 request—weigh against Rountree's Motion. Opp'n at 9–18.
The Court construes Rountree's Motion in this manner because, as explained more fully below, the Court has no authority to order an inmate transferred to home confinement under § 3624. See § 3624 ; United States v. Vigna, No. 16-CR-786, 2020 WL 1900495, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2020) ("Mr. Vigna's application ... was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) —an entirely different statutory scheme [from compassionate release under § 3582 ] for which judicial review is not permitted.").
Upon the filing of his Motion, the Court also appointed the office of the Federal Public Defenders ("FPD") to represent Rountree in these proceedings. See Dkt. No. 178 ("April 21, 2020 Text Order"). The FPD filed the Reply on Rountree's behalf, addressing the Government's § 3582 arguments. Thus, Rountree's § 3582 request is fully briefed and ripe for review.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
As amended by the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes courts to modify terms of imprisonment:
upon motion of the Director of the [BOP], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, after considering the factors set forth in [ 18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction
***
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ....
Section 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines contains the only policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pertaining to compassionate release. This policy statement, which has not been amended since the passage of the First Step Act, states, in relevant part:
Upon motion of the Director of the [BOP] under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment) if, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable, the court determines that—
(1) (A) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction;
...
(2) the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) ;
and (3) the reduction is consistent with this policy statement.
§ 1B1.13.
Section 1B1.13 provides that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist in the following situations:
(A) Medical Condition of the Defendant.—
(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.
(ii) The defendant is—
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.
(B) Age of the defendant.—The defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.
(C) Family Circumstances.—
(i) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children.
(ii) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.
(D) Other Reasons.—As determined by the Director of the [BOP], there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).
§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.1.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant's Request Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624
As described above, Rountree's initial Motion papers—filed pro se—requested release from prison and a transfer to home confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3624. However, the Court has no authority to grant release or a transfer to home confinement under § 3624. See § 3624 (granting authority to BOP); see also Vigna, 2020 WL 1900495, at *4 ("Mr. Vigna's application ... was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) —an entirely different statutory scheme [from compassionate release under § 3582 ] for which judicial review is not permitted."); United States v. Ogarro, No. 18-CR-373, 2020 WL 1876300, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020) ("[T]he [BOP] Director is authorized to place a prisoner in home confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2)."). More generally, the Court likewise has no authority to direct BOP as to where a prisoner should serve her or his term of incarceration. See United States v. Kanagbou, 726 F. App'x 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2018) ("[I]t is well established that the district court does not control how the Executive Branch carries out a defendant's sentence.") (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) ("The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment.")). For these reasons, the Court cannot grant Rountree the relief he seeks under § 3624.
However, because Rountree filed his Motion pro se, the Court is duty-bound to construe it liberally and "interpret [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) ; see also United States v. Pilcher, 950 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2020) ("It is well established that courts liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants."); Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005) ("We leave it for the district court to determine what other claims, if any, [plaintiff] has raised. In so doing, the court's imagination should be limited only by [plaintiff's] factual allegations, not by the legal claims set out in his pleadings."). Under the circumstances, where Rountree's Motion addresses many of the factual considerations germane to a compassionate release request brought under § 3582, and requests substantially the same remedy, the Court thinks it warranted to construe his Motion as bringing a § 3582 compassionate release request. See, e.g., United States v. Petrossi, No. 17-CR-192, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1865758, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2020) ("Recognizing that only the BOP has authority to release a prisoner to home confinement [under] § 3624(c)(2), we construed the motion as a request for sentence reduction and compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 ...."); United States v. Howard, No. 15-CR-18, 2020 WL 2200855, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.C. May 6, 2020) ("Defendant seeks relief under ... 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2).... [Since this statute] does not authorize the court to order defendant's placement in home confinement ... the court construes the motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A).") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
B. Exhaustion of Remedies
Rountree submitted a request for compassionate release to the Warden of FPC Schuylkill on April 23, 2020, over twenty days ago. See Reply at 2–3; Dkt. No. 190-1 ("O'Brien Affidavit") ¶ 6. The Government points out that this means Rountree has not yet exhausted his administrative remedies and argues that Rountree's compassionate release request should be denied on this basis. Opp'n at 7, 9–13. The Court declines the invitation and finds that, under the circumstances presented by Rountree's case, his failure to exhaust should be excused.
The Court recognizes that several of its sister courts have ruled that § 3582 ’s exhaustion requirement cannot be excused due to the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, No. 18-CR-528, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, –––– – ––––, 2020 WL 1700032, at *2–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2020) ; United States v. Pereyra-Polanco, No. 19-CR-10, 2020 WL 1862639, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020) ; United States v. Hernandez, No. 18-CR-834, 2020 WL 1445851, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2020). However, as the Government acknowledges, numerous other courts have determined that the exhaustion requirement is excusable under certain circumstances. See Opp'n at 11–12 (citing United States v. Colvin, No. 19-CR-179, 2020 WL 1613943, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2020) ; United States v. Perez, 17-CR-513, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1546422, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2020) ; United States v. Zukerman, No. 16-CR-194, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1659880, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2020) ).
As it did in its previous compassionate release decisions, and for the same reasons, the Court "joins others in this Circuit" that have found that the exhaustion requirement is excusable. See United States v. Logan, No. 12-CR-307, Dkt. No. 140, at 6 (N.D.N.Y. April 22, 2020) (Kahn, J.); United States v. Salvagno, No. 02-CR-51, Dkt. No. 1166, at 7 (N.D.N.Y. April 23, 2020) (Kahn, J.). As an initial matter, the Court agrees with its peers who have determined that § 3582 ’s exhaustion requirement is a claims-processing rule, rather than a jurisdictional requirement. A rule qualifies as jurisdictional only if "Congress has clearly stated that the rule is jurisdictional." Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153, 133 S.Ct. 817, 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013). But § 3582 "does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the [federal] courts." United States v. Haney, No. 19-CR-541, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1821988, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) ). Moreover, the provision is "not part of a jurisdictional portion of the criminal code but part of the chapter dealing generally with sentences of imprisonment." Id. (quoting United States v. Taylor, 778 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2015) ). Rather, the exhaustion requirement "seek[s] to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." United States v. Scparta, No. 18-CR-578, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1910481, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020) (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) ). It governs the process by which a compassionate release claim may be brought, by specifying who may bring such claim, and when. See id. For these reasons, the rule is not jurisdictional in nature. See United States v. McIndoo, No. 15-CR-142, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 2201970, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. May 6, 2020) ("[ Section] 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite."); United States v. Gentille, No. 19-CR-590, 2020 WL 1814158, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2020) ("[ Section] 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather is a claims-processing rule.").
Although § 3582 ’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, whether the Court can excuse a defendant's failure to comply with this statutory requirement is a separate question, one the Court answers in the affirmative. "Even where," as here, "exhaustion is seemingly mandated by statute ... the requirement is not absolute." Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2019). "Congressional intent is ‘paramount’ to any determination of whether exhaustion is mandatory." See United States v. Haney, No. 19-CR-541, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1821988, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) ). In amending § 3582(c)(1)(A) via the First Step Act, Congress sought to "expand compassionate release" and "expedite[ ] compassionate release applications." 164 Cong. Rec. S7314-02, 2018 WL 6350790 (Dec. 5, 2018); see also Hearing on Compassionate Release and the Conditions of Supervision Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (2016) (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, Department of Justice) ("The First Step Act—and the critical 30-day lapse route it provided [in § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement]—directly responded to a compassionate-release system so plagued by delay that prisoners sometimes died while waiting for the BOP to make a decision."). These concerns are reflected in the statute, which instructs courts to consider whether any of a variety of exigent circumstances constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that merit release. See United States v. Soto, No. 18-CR-10086, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1905323, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 17, 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) ; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1). What's more, "Congress necessarily recognized that time is of the essence for determining whether compassionate release is appropriate." Id.; see also United States v. Russo, No. 16-CR-441, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1862294, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020) (noting that the 30-day rule was intended "as an accelerant to judicial review").
Prisons are "powder kegs for infection" and have allowed "the COVID-19 virus [to] spread[ ] with uncommon and frightening speed." United States v. Skelos, No. 15-CR-317, 2020 WL 1847558, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2020) ; see also An Ohio prison is now the largest source of virus infections in the country , THE N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/us/coronavirus-live-news.html#link-52cdb996 (noting that "four of the 10 largest-known sources of infection in the United States were correctional facilities"). In light of the dangers posed by the prison environment, the need to expedite consideration of requests for compassionate release premised on potential exposure to COVID-19 takes on even new urgency. See Haney, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1821988, at *4 (noting that "under present circumstances, each day a[n] [inmate] must wait before presenting what could otherwise be a meritorious petition threatens him with a greater risk of infection and worse"). Hence, the Court concludes that Congressional objectives underlying the First Step Act not only permit, but compel, courts to waive § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement in the face of the pandemic. See id. (concluding that "Congressional intent not only permits judicial waiver of the 30-day exhaustion period, but also, in the current extreme circumstances, actually favors such waiver, allowing courts to deal with the emergency before it is potentially too late."); Russo, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1862294, at *1 ("It would ... certainly [be] inconsistent with congressional intent[ ] for the thirty days to serve as a substantial obstacle to effective judicial relief.").
BOP's response to the COVID-19 threat underscores this conclusion. Alarmingly, and despite the demonstrated danger COVID-19 poses in the prison environment, "[i]t does not appear that the BOP has updated [its] regulations [governing compassionate release requests] since the First Step Act was passed, let alone made any attempt to suspend them or otherwise accelerate the process during the pandemic." Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, No. 20-CV-569, 2020 WL 2405350, at *25 (D. Conn. May 12, 2020). As a result, if BOP responds at all to an inmate's initial compassionate release request—itself no guarantee, cf. id. (describing how, in at least one federal prison, the prison administration had "not made even an initial response to some 44% of compassionate release requests")—it is virtually impossible for the inmate to appeal a denial through the multiple stages of review required by BOP regulations. This has turned "[t]he 30-day period under the statute [into] simply dead time[,] during which there is no prospect the BOP will come to the defendant's aid," id., and no likelihood that BOP will provide the Court with the benefit of its "considerable expertise concerning both the inmate and the conditions of confinement," Opp'n at 12 (arguing that the exhaustion requirement facilitates BOP's ability to provide "value" to the Court). Under the circumstances, where "Congress understood that some requests for relief may be too urgent to wait for the BOP's process," Soto, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1905323, at *5, "judicial waiver [of the exhuastion requirement] is permissible in light of the extraordinary threat certain inmates face from COVID-19," see United States v. Smith, No. 12-CR-133, 2020 WL 1849748, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020).
The Martinez-Brooks court summarized those regulations:
"[A]n initial response from the Warden—when it arrives—is only the first step in a multi-tiered administrative remedy process the inmate must follow to ‘fully exhaust[ ]’ administrative remedies. That process requires each inmate to appeal the denial by the Warden to a BOP Regional Director, followed by an appeal to the BOP General Counsel. For each level of appeal, the inmate must use a different form and mail it to a different reviewing official. Even if the inmate's request to the Warden is approved ... that approval must go through at least three more layers of review involving the BOP General Counsel, the Medical Director or an Assistant Director, and, finally, the Director."
Martinez-Brooks, 2020 WL 2405350, at *25 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, Rountree's particular circumstances justify excusing his failure to exhaust. Rountree has a variety of medical conditions including, most saliently for the purposes of this Motion, diabetes and hypertension. See Dkt. Nos. 183-3 ("Government's Medical Records") at 65 (confirming that Rountree suffers from type-II diabetes and benign essential hypertension ); 190-3 ("Defense Medical Records") at 6 (same). The CDC recognizes these conditions as increasing an individual's risk of developing a severe, or life-threatening, case of COVID-19. See Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness , CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION , https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html, (last visited May 12, 2020) (diabetes ); Interim Clinical Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease , CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION , https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-management-patients.html (last updated May 12, 2020) (hypertension ). In line with this guidance, numerous courts have found that defendants with underlying health conditions such as these do not need to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing a compassionate release request before the Court. See, e.g., United States v. Pena, No. 15-CR-551, 2020 WL 2301199, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2020) (excusing a failure to exhaust because hypertension heightened his risk of contracting a severe case of COVID-19); Colvin, 2020 WL 1613943, at *2 ("waiving the exhaustion requirement" because of potential "serious health consequences" resulting from the defendant's diabetes ).
By the time the Court issues this opinion, Rountree's 30-day waiting period will nearly be up. There is no indication from the parties that BOP has responded to Rountree's request in the intervening period. Under the circumstances, one might wonder why the Court does not just wait another week, allow BOP a final opportunity to bring its expertise to bear, and ensure that Rountree has unobjectionably satisfied the strictures of § 3582. But because of Rountree's medical conditions, "each day [he] wait[s] [in prison] ... threatens him with a greater risk of infection and worse." See Haney, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1821988, at *4. In light of congressional intent to put an end to incidents of inmates dying "while waiting for the BOP to make a decision," see Horowitz Statement, and because the Court is presented with a sufficiently developed factual record upon which to base its decision, cf. United States v. Douglas, No. 16-CR-302, Dkt. No. 111, at 3 (N.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020) (Kahn, J.) (requiring exhaustion where "there are crucial contested factual issues regarding Defendant's prison record with respect to which BOP may provide useful guidance on appeal"), the Court excuses Rountree's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Zukerman, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1659880, at *3 (concluding that exhaustion was not required given the defendant's "unique circumstances and the exigency of a rapidly advancing pandemic").
C. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Despite the Government's arguments to the contrary, Opp'n at 13–16, the Court finds that granting Rountree's release request is consistent with § 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and warranted by extraordinary and compelling reasons.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that Rountree's medical conditions and susceptibility to contracting a deadly case of COVID-19 satisfy the requirements of § 1B1.13. As described above, § 1B1.13 authorizes release where a defendant is "suffering from a serious physical or medical condition ... that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover," or, under the "catchall" provision, where there are "extraordinary and compelling reason[s] [for release] other than, or in combination with," the defendant's medical condition. § 1B1.13. Here, in line with numerous other courts to have considered this issue, the Court finds that Rountree's diabetes and hypertension, in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, satisfies either § 1B1.13 ’s specific "medical condition" provision or its "catchall" provision. See, e.g., Zukerman, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1659880, at *5 ("Zukerman's age, combined with his diabetes, hypertension, and obesity, satisfy [ § 1B1.13 ’s medical condition provision]."); Colvin, 2020 WL 1613943, at *4 ("Defendant has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying her immediate release under ... U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. She has diabetes, a ‘serious ... medical condition,’ which substantially increases her risk of severe illness if she contracts COVID-19 ... [and for which she would be] ‘unable to provide self-care within the [prison] environment.’ "); United States v. Resnick, No. 14-CR-810, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1651508, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020) ("Resnick's high susceptibility to COVID-19 falls within the purview of this catchall."); Logan, No. 12-CR-307, Dkt. No. 140, at 8 (" § 1B1.13 ’s catchall provision ... covers the high risk of contracting a life-threatening case of COVID-19.").
Though the catchall provision technically requires the director of the BOP, rather than the courts, to determine what constitutes extraordinary and compelling circumstances, because the Sentencing Commission has been unable to amend § 1B1.13 since the passage of the First Step Act, "the most natural reading of the amended § 3582(c) ... is that the district court assumes the same discretion as the BOP Director when it considers a compassionate release motion properly before it." United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 451 (S.D. Iowa 2019).
Turning to the issue of whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant Rountree's release, the Court finds that they do. First and foremost, as the Court has already explained, Rountree's diabetes and hypertension place him at high risk for developing a severe case of COVID-19, and therefore support his request for compassionate release. See Colvin, 2020 WL 1613943, at *2 (defendant's diabetes and high blood combined with potential exposure to COVID-19 constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying compassionate release); United States v. Sawicz, No. 08-CR-287, 2020 WL 1815851, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2020) (finding that "the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with" hypertension, constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant compassionate release); United States v. Rivernider, No. 10-CR-222, 2020 WL 2393959, at *1 (D. Conn. May 12, 2020) (extraordinary and compelling reasons justified release where defendant was "54 years of age with diabetes, heart disease and hypertension"); United States v. Lewis, No. 16-CR-302, 2020 WL 2081374, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) (finding extraordinary and compelling reasons for release because "[i]t [was] beyond dispute that Mr. Lewis is at high risk from COVID-19, as ... [his] diabetes is one of the most significant comorbidity factors and that is no doubt heightened by Mr. Lewis's high blood pressure."); United States v. Lucas, No. 15-CR-143, 2020 WL 2059735, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2020) (extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted release where defendant suffered from diabetes).
While the Government acknowledges that Rountree "suffers from conditions that make him more vulnerable to becoming seriously ill should he contract COVID-19," it argues that the Court should deny Rountree's request, notwithstanding his medical conditions, because FPC Schuylkill "continue[s] to maintain zero positive tests for COVID-19 for inmates and staff." Opp'n at 16. However, whether an individual BOP facility has reported a positive test is not dispositive, for several reasons. First, BOP's self-reported numbers "must be treated with great caution, as the BOP has so far only tested for COVID-19 those prisoners who seem to be sufficiently unhealthy as to be in need of possible hospitalization." Haney, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1821988, at *6 ; see also United States v. Esparza, No. 07-CR-294, 2020 WL 1696084, at *2 (D. Idaho Apr. 7, 2020) ("[T]esting inside prisons has been scant except for people who self-report symptoms—which means that statistics about the number of infections already in BOP facilities are largely meaningless."). While "[o]nly 2,700 of approximately 150,000 federal inmates in this country have been tested, ... of those tested 70% have COVID-19," highlighting the inadequacy of a testing regimen which fails to acknowledge and account for asymptomatic transmission. United States v. Pabon, No. 17-CR-165, 2020 WL 2112265, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2020).
Second, even if BOP were testing for COVID-19 consistently enough that its statistics could be relied upon, prison still poses a significant threat to individuals with health conditions like Rountree's because they serve as incubators that accelerate the spread of the disease. See Skelos, 2020 WL 1847558, at *1 ("Jails and prison are powder kegs for infection ... [because] the COVID-19 virus spreads with uncommon and frightening speed in carceral settings."); United States v. Sanchez, No. 18-CR-140, 2020 WL 1933815, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 22, 2020) ("[C]orrectional and detention facilities present unique challenges for control of COVID-19 among incarcerated/detained persons, staff, and visitors ... [because] recommended social distancing and hygiene precautions are more difficult to practice."). While the Court commends BOP's efforts to stem the course of the virus, see Opp'n at 2–5, the ease of transmission within the prison environment, coupled with a dearth of testing, results predictably in deadly outbreaks of the disease. For instance, "when Montgomery County, Pennsylvania tested every inmate in custody, it discovered a rate of infection more than 30 times greater than what Montgomery County had identified before it began its mass testing." Pabon, 2020 WL 2112265, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, "when a prison in North Carolina tested all of its inmates, it discovered that it had not 39 cases—as it had previously thought—but 444 cases." Id.; see also Coronel v. Decker, No. 20-CV-2472, 2020 WL 1487274, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020) ("Individuals in carceral settings are at a ‘significantly higher’ risk of spreading infectious diseases."). Recognizing these dangers, several courts have granted compassionate release to prisoners who—like Rountree—had health problems that made COVID-19 especially dangerous to them, even where the prison where they were held reported no cases of the virus. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, No. 18-CR-188, 2020 WL 2092617, at *4 (D. Conn. May 1, 2020) (ordering defendant release from FCI Schuylkill); United States v. Echevarria, No. 17-CR-44, 2020 WL 2113604, at *2 (D. Conn. May 4, 2020) (ordering defendant released from FCI Allenwood, which at the time reported no cases of COVID-19).
Similar considerations support Rountree's request for compassionate release in this case. Rountree describes how the layout at FPC Schuylkill makes it impossible for inmates to maintain adequate social distancing. Mot. at 5–6, 10; see also United States v. Davis, No. 20-CR-09, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1529158, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2020) ("The inability to practice social distancing in jails makes transmission of COVID-19 more likely.") (internal quotation marks omitted). In his section of FPC Schuylkill, "100 inmates live together in one building. They share one water fountain, two phones, one ice machine, two hot water dispensers, and five computer terminals. They also share a communal TV room and communal bathrooms (sinks, urinals, showers, toilets)." O'Brien Aff. ¶ 8. Moreover, Rountree reports that "in his prison job he has frequent contact with 15 to 20 staff members" and is worried that "one of them might carry the coronavirus in from outside" because "the facility is no longer screening staff when they enter the complex for work." O'Brien Aff. ¶¶ 4, 8. The Government does not contest these assertions. See Opp'n.
Circumstances like these are self-evidently hazardous, see Basank v. Decker, No. 20-CV-2518, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1481503, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020) ("The risk of contracting COVID-19 in tightly-confined spaces, especially jails, is now exceedingly obvious."), as "[t]he combination of Mr. [Rountree]’s health conditions and his incarceration compounds the risk COVID-19 poses to him," see United States v. Gross, No. 15-CR-769, 2020 WL 1673244, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020). "[N]ot only is he at a higher risk of serious illness if he contracts COVID-19 due to his underlying health conditions, but he is also at a higher risk of contracting COVID-19 due to his incarceration." Id.; see also United States v. Campagna, No. 16-CR-78, 2020 WL 1489829, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020) (granting compassionate release request where "staff at the facilities leave and return daily, without screening" and "residents ... sleep in bunk beds in close proximity, ... [and] share[ ] two bathrooms [among] sixty men"). "If the Court waits to act until the BOP confirms its first case of COVID-19 at [FPC Schuylkill], it may be too late for vulnerable inmates like Mr. [Rountree]." See Pabon, 2020 WL 2112265, at *5. The Court is not willing to take that risk, and therefore finds that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant Rountree's compassionate release request. See Peters, 2020 WL 2092617, at *4 (granting compassionate release request from inmate incarcerated at FCI Schuylkill).
D. Danger to the Community and Others Under Section 3142(g)
Section 1B1.13 provides that a sentence should be reduced only if releasing the inmate will not pose a danger to the safety of others or the community. § 1B1.13 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) ). Section 3142(g), in turn, sets out various factors that help courts assess whether releasing an inmate will pose a danger to others and the community, including (1) "the nature and circumstances of the offense charged;" (2) "the history and characteristics of the person," including "the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, ... community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, [and] criminal history;" and (3) "the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release." § 3142(g). While the Government argues that "Defendant would pose a danger to public safety if released," Opp'n at 17, the Court's own assessment of these factors suggests the opposite.
First, regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense, while Rountree's conviction involved a controlled substance, there was never any allegation or evidence that it involved any violence or weapons. PSIR ¶¶ 7–20; see also Sawicz, 2020 WL 1815851, at *3 (finding that "the defendant d[id] not pose ... a danger to the public" in part because "neither the violation on which the defendant is currently serving his prison sentence nor the conduct involved in the underlying crime involved violence"); United States v. Rodriguez, No. 03-CR-271, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1627331, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2020) ("Mr. Rodriguez's criminal history involves a series of convictions for drug dealing as well as the firearm offenses in this case. While this history is serious, I find that Mr. Rodriguez does not pose a danger to others. Nothing in his record suggests that he has been violent."). And Rountree demonstrated remorse for his conduct. Id. ¶ 24; Scparta, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1910481, at *8 (noting approvingly that "Mr. Scparta pled guilty and has accepted responsibility for his conduct"). These circumstances suggest that this factor tips in Rountree's favor. See Logan, No. 12-CR-307, Dkt. No. 140, at 12; United States v. Sedge, No. 16-CR-537, 2020 WL 2475071, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2020) (noting that the defendant "pled guilty to possessing and distributing narcotics, and promptly accepted responsibility" as a point in favor of granting the defendant's compassionate release request).
As for the second factor, Rountree's exemplary record during this period of incarceration testifies to his character and weighs heavily in his favor. While in prison, Rountree has attained his GED. O'Brien Aff., Ex. A. He has completed over a dozen educational courses, including coursework on horticulture, personal finance, and computer skills, see id.; see also United States v. Marks, No. 03-CR-6033, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1908911, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020) (citing defendant's record of educational achievement in prison as an example of his rehabilitated character), and has been tutoring fellow inmates with special needs in his spare time, see O'Brien Aff. ¶ 5; see also United States v. Park, No. 16-CR-473, 2020 WL 1970603, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2020) (defendant's "steps to rehabilitate herself while incarcerated over the past 16 months, including by tutoring other women at the prison for six to eight hours a day" supported her request for release). He holds down a job in FCP Schuylkill's dog handler program, O'Brien Aff., Ex. A, and states that he has been taking correspondence courses in theology, Mot. at 9. Additionally, while Rountree has some history of substance abuse, PSIR ¶¶ 82–87, he has since completed the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program, O'Brien Aff., Ex. A. Finally, Rountree has a clean disciplinary record through his nearly eight years of incarceration. Id.; see also Sedge, 2020 WL 2475071, at *4 (explaining that the defendant's prison record supported granting his compassionate release request because "he has participated in the RDAP program, completed coursework through Columbia University and been an otherwise exemplary inmate"); United States v. Haynes, No. 93-CR-1043, 2020 WL 1941478, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2020) (finding that defendant would not be a danger to the community because he "ha[d] been a good prisoner and then some, having completed hundreds of hours of coursework and having discharged his job duties impressively").
The Court notes as well that when the Federal Public Defenders contacted FCP Schuylkill to obtain Rountree's prison records, Rountree's unit manager stated that he wanted to go out of his way to help Rountree because of Rountree's work with the prison's special needs inmates. O'Brien Aff. ¶ 5.
Further, Rountree has described a plan for release that indicates his ties to the community. He plans to live with his wife of thirty years at their home in Troy, New York, where his mother also lives. Mot. at 8–10; O'Brien Aff. ¶ 4; see also United States v. Wen, No. 17-CR-6173, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1845104, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) (counting in defendant's favor his "supportive family with whom he will reside once released"). He also has a church community in Troy where he will volunteer with at-risk youth and continue his bible studies. Mot. at 8–9; see also Rodriguez, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1627331, at *11 ("I also find that Mr. Rodriguez is not a danger to the community during this pandemic because he ... an adequate reentry plan.").
Weighing against Rountree on this factor is his somewhat lengthy criminal history. See PSIR ¶¶ 36–60. However, that history is ameliorated somewhat as, other than a disorderly conduct misdemeanor charge in 2012, it involves offenses that occurred over fifteen years ago. Id.; see also United States v. Castillo, 763 F. App'x 67, 69 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting that § 4A1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines "exclude[es] convictions imposed fifteen years prior to a defendant's commencement of the instant offense from a defendant's criminal history calculation"). The Government leans heavily on this record, pointing out that Rountree was sentenced as "a career offender." Opp'n at 17. This is true, but as Rountree notes in his Reply, he would not qualify as a career offender if he were sentenced today because the two prior felony convictions that rendered him a career offender at the time of his sentencing—both for Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree—are no longer qualifying offenses. Reply at 5 (citing United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018) ). In light of this change in the law, the Court thinks it reasonable to discount somewhat its prior adjudication of Rountree as a career offender. Cf. Rodriguez, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1627331, at *11 (finding that a sentence reduction was warranted in part because "[t]he predicate offenses to [the defendant's] mandatory minimum sentences were non-violent").
The Government also argues that a parole revocation in 2004 and a violation of the terms of his release in this case in 2013 demonstrate that Rountree is dangerous. Opp'n at 17. But the Court is unpersuaded, given that the parole revocation occurred over 15 years ago, cf. Sanchez, 2020 WL 1933815, at *6 (discounting defendant's prior violation of a protective order that was "more than nine years in the past"), and the Government has provided no further details about the 2013 violation with which the Court can gauge its seriousness, see Haynes, 2020 WL 1941478, at *17 n.10 (discounting a violation of prison disciplinary regulations because "the Court has no information as to the circumstances"); see also Sawicz, 2020 WL 1815851, at *3 (ruling that, even though "defendant ha[d] already once violated the conditions of a term of supervised release," this "d[id] not justify keeping the defendant in prison amidst an outbreak of a potentially deadly virus to which he is particularly vulnerable").
On the whole then, the Court finds that Rountree's stale criminal record is outweighed by his more recent record of rehabilitation while in prison, and thus determines that this second § 3624 factor also supports release. See Echevarria, 2020 WL 2113604, at *3 (granting compassionate release where defendant's "substantial criminal record" was counterbalanced by his "substantial rehabilitative efforts" and the fact that "his only violent offense was committed over 18 years ago").
"With respect to the final factor, the Court finds that [Rountree] will not pose a danger to the community given his stale and mostly non-violent criminal history." See Logan, No. 12-CR-307, Dkt. No. 140, at 13. Also buttressing this conclusion is Rountree's impressive record of rehabilitation while in prison, Marks, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1908911, at *16 ("[G]iven Marks's clean disciplinary record for many years past, and his demonstrably successful efforts at rehabilitation, I conclude that upon release, he will not pose a danger to the community."), the fact that the BOP characterizes his recidivism risk as "low," see Mot. at 8; Dkt. No. 183-2 ("Manbeck Declaration") ¶ 21; see also United States v. Bess, No. 16-CR-156, 2020 WL 1940809, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2020) (finding that defendant would not be a danger to the community if released even though he was classified as a "medium" recidivism risk), and the eight years of supervised release Rountree the Court imposed at sentencing, see Sedge, 2020 WL 2475071, at *4 ("[T]he public will be protected from any further crimes by the conditions of release."); Marks, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1908911, at *15 ("Beyond the low risk that Marks now presents, whatever risk there is can be further mitigated by supervised release."); United States v. Hunt, No. 18-CR-20037, 2020 WL 2395222, at *7 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2020) (stating that the "conditions of [the defendant's] release" would help ensure the safety of the public).
E. Section 3553(a) Factors
The Court "must ‘consider[ ] the [sentencing] factors set forth in [S]ection 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.’ " Rodriguez, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1627331, at *11 (quoting § 3582(c) ). Under § 3553(a), the Court must consider what is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of [sentencing]." § 3553(a). Potentially relevant factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the defendant's crimes; (3) the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence to comparable criminal conduct; (4) the need for the sentence to protect the public from further crimes by the defendant; (5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants. See § 3553(a). These factors are "largely duplicative" of those found in § 3142(g), see Sawicz, 2020 WL 1815851, at *3, and the Court adopts the relevant portions of the above discussion here. In addition, the Court adds the following points to the analysis.
The Government argues that "the § 3553(a) factors strongly disfavor a sentence reduction," in part because "releas[ing] the defendant almost five years before he is eligible for release is a windfall that is not warranted." Opp'n at 17. The Court admits that granting Rountree's compassionate release request when he has about 55 months remaining on his sentence would be at the long end of the cases granting release. Cf. Perez, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1546422, at *4 (less than one month remaining); Colvin, 2020 WL 1613943, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2020) (eleven days remaining). But it would not be unprecedented. See Echevarria, 2020 WL 2113604, at *3 (granting compassionate release to an inmate who had more than three years left to serve); United States v. Ben-Yhwh, No. 15-CR-830, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––– – ––––2020 WL 1874125, at *2, 4–7 (D. Haw. Apr. 13, 2020) (granting compassionate release to a defendant who had about 50 months remaining on a 5-year sentence); see also Rivernider, 2020 WL 2393959, at *1 ( Section 3553(a) factors "weigh[ed] in [defendant's] favor" where he had "served over 50% of the sentence (65% with credit for good time) with no disciplinary issues").
And while the Court acknowledges that, at the time of Rountree's sentencing, his 188-month sentence fairly reflected the seriousness of his offense, it "cannot ignore the present circumstances when determining whether [Rountree's] sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of [sentencing]." United States v. Levy, No. 16-CR-270, 2020 WL 2393837, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing § 3553(a) ). The Court never "intend[ed] for [Rountree's] sentence to include incurring a great and unforeseen risk of severe illness or death brought on by a global pandemic." See Zukerman, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1659880, at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pena, 2020 WL 2301199, at *4 ("Mr. Pena has now served more than two-thirds of his sentence[.] ... [his] continued detention now poses him imminent danger of serious injury and death—a circumstance that the Court never considered when imposing its sentence.... [T]he Court thus concludes that the[ ] [ § 3553(a) factors] entitle Mr. Pena to compassionate release."). Under the circumstances, the Court cannot agree with the Government's assertion that "[t]he factors militating against a sentence reduction, such as the seriousness of the defendant's offense, outweigh the medical concerns related to COVID-19." Opp'n at 17.
The Government also claims that "defendant has not established that he would be less vulnerable to COVID-19 if he were released." Opp'n at 17. But given the growing number of journalistic accounts and judicial opinions—cited above—that confirm the dangers of COVID-19 in our nation's jails, prisons, and detention centers, such an assertion is not credible.
To further "ensure that Mr. [Rountree] will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community," for the first two years of the eight years of supervised release imposed at sentencing, the Court adds an additional condition of home confinement. See United States v. Gileno, No. 19-CR-161, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1916773, at *5 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2020) (imposing home confinement as a condition of supervised release to protect the community). Thus, Rountree will spend the first two years of his eight-year term of supervised release on home confinement. He will be subject to electronic monitoring and must remain in his home except that he may leave to obtain medical care and treatment, seek and maintain employment, participate in religious services, perform community service, and at such other times as may be approved by the U.S. Probation Office. See Rivernider, 2020 WL 2393959, at *1 (imposing similar conditions); Echevarria, 2020 WL 2113604, at *3 ("[Defendant] shall remain inside the home at all times during the [term of] of home confinement, except for medical reasons, searching for employment (i.e., actual job interviews), or maintaining employment."). Finally, to the extent that Rountree may be a carrier of SARS-CoV-2, which causes COVID-19, the Court orders him to remain in home quarantine at all times, except for medical reasons, for the first fourteen days of his supervised release, so that he does not infect others in the community. See Sedge, 2020 WL 2475071, at *4 (ordering defendant to quarantine at home upon release to further safeguard the public).
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED , that Rountree's request for compassionate release (Dkt. No. 175) is GRANTED ; and it is further
ORDERED , that Rountree's term of imprisonment is reduced to time served; and it is further
ORDERED , that Rountree be IMMEDIATELY released; and it is further ORDERED , that Rountree comply with the terms and conditions of supervised release previously ordered by this Court; and it is further
ORDERED , that in addition to the terms and conditions of release previously ordered by this Court, Rountree will spend the first two years of his period of supervised release on home confinement, subject to electronic monitoring by the U.S. Probation Office, and must remain in his home except that he may leave to obtain medical care and treatment, seek and maintain employment, participate in religious services, perform community service, and at such other times as may be approved by the Probation Office; and it is further
ORDERED , that Rountree, as part of his supervised release, must also remain in home quarantine for a period of at least fourteen days , leaving only for medical reasons; and it is further
ORDERED , that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.