Summary
explaining that timing deadlines recommence in the district court "with the receipt of the mandate, or, if the mandate is formally spread, from the spreading [of the mandate]"
Summary of this case from United States v. IsaacsOpinion
No. 76-3008.
May 3, 1978.
Kathryne Ann Stoltz, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Susan Guberman, of Nasatir, Sherman Hirsch, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before CHAMBERS and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges, and TURRENTINE, District Judge.
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
Prior to our decision reported at 554 F.2d 938, there existed some confusion about the appealability by the government of an order granting a Rule 29(c) F.R.Cr.P., motion of acquittal. In addition, it has not been clear to some that a defendant can combine a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 with a motion for acquittal. To avoid prejudice to defendants whose trials are already completed, we adopt the following rules: In all cases where the verdict or finding of guilty occurs after June 1, 1978, defendant will be required to have made a timely motion in the district court for a new trial under Rule 33 to preserve that possibility should the granted motion of acquittal under Rule 29(c) be reversed on appeal. In earlier cases, such as the one now before us, the running times for a motion for a new trial will commence (Rule 33 F.R.Cr.P.) with the receipt of the mandate, or, if the mandate is formally spread, from the spreading.