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finding defendant's family circumstances extraordinary and compelling where the defendant's child had “multiple medical conditions” and “severe intellectual, emotional, and developmental disabilities” requiring “constant assistance,” and where the child's then-caretaker was 78 years old, often had to stay up all night to watch over the child, “suffer[ed] from several ailments,” was “in serious pain at least ‘90 percent of the time,'” and was under significant strain in caring for the child
Summary of this case from United States v. ArndtOpinion
17cr337-LAB-4
10-07-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. VANESSA ROJAS, Defendant.
ORDER: 1) GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE UNDER SEAL [DKT. 219]; AND (2) GRANTING MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE UNDER 18 U.S.C § 3582(C)(1)(A) [DKT. 218]
Honorable Larry Alan Burns United States District Judge
In 2017, Vanessa Rojas pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The Court imposed a total custodial sentence of 80 months, followed by 6 years of supervised release. Rojas is scheduled to be released from Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) custody on May 9, 2022. She now asks the Court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), for a reduction of her sentence to time served. For the reasons discussed herein, the Motion is GRANTED. Rojas's accompanying Motion for Leave to File Under Seal the supporting medical records is also GRANTED.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may modify a defendant's term of imprisonment if, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it concludes that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction. According to the Sentencing Commission's policy statement, there are four categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons, including if the defendant is “suffering from a serious physical or medical medication . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which . . . she is not expected to recover, ” or if the defendant's family circumstances include the “death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children.” U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13(1)(A), (C). The Sentencing Commission also includes a catchall provision, which provides that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons if “there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” Id. § 1B1.13(1)(D). As other district courts in this Circuit have concluded, this Court is vested with the discretion to determine whether any extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, other than those specifically delineated in U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 461 F.Supp.3d 966, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (holding that “the scenarios for compassionate release, reflected in the Sentencing Commission's policy statement codified in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, no longer limit the circumstances under which a defendant may seek compassionate release pursuant to Section 3582(c)”); United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F.Supp.3d 674, 681-82 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“This court follows the growing number of district courts that have concluded that, in the absence of applicable policy statements, courts ‘can determine whether any extraordinary and compelling reasons other than those delineated in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(C) warrant' compassionate release.”) (citations omitted).
Rojas urges the Court to modify her sentence to time served-with or without a supervised-release condition that she be under home confinement- because her aging mother is allegedly unable to continue serving as caregiver to Rojas's disabled daughter, and because her physical and medical conditions make her more susceptible to COVID-19. Rojas also claims that her other adult daughter is unable to assist Rojas's mother because of her own personal health issues. The Government opposes her motion, arguing that she doesn't have a “serious physical or medical condition” within the meaning of the Sentencing Commission's policy statement and that her mother's health is not an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that would warrant a sentence reduction. (Dkt. 221).
Rojas's physical and medical conditions aren't extraordinary and compelling reasons to modify her sentence. Her mental health conditions aren't among the health conditions known to increase risk for severe COVID-19 infection. See CDC, People with Certain Medical Conditions, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (accessed Oct. 6, 2021). And while her obesity, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), history of cigarette smoking, and hypertension may increase her risk of becoming severely ill from COVID-19, see id., her conditions aren't extraordinary. Nor has Rojas demonstrated that these conditions substantially diminish her ability to provide self-care or that she can't be effectively treated within the correctional facility. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, App. Note 1(A)(ii)(I). Ruiz likewise hasn't established that RRM Long Beach, where Rojas is currently located according to the BOP website, is unable to safeguard her health during the remainder of her sentence.
But the Court does find that Rojas's family circumstances are “extreme” and should be considered extraordinary and compelling under the catchall provision of the Sentencing Commission's policy statement. Rojas asks the Court for compassionate release so that she may take care of her child, A.R., who has multiple medical conditions, including epilepsy, congenital deafness, infantile cerebral palsy, and periventricular leukomalacia, as well as severe intellectual, emotional, and developmental disabilities. (Dkt. 218 at 10). A.R. cannot hear or speak and cannot otherwise communicate. (Dkt. 218, Ex. H ¶ 3). She requires constant assistance with eating, bathing, and getting dressed; she requires someone to change her diaper; she must be spoon-fed and burped after eating; and she is prone to seizures. (Id. ¶¶ 3-6).
A.R. currently lives with Rojas's mother, Esther Rojas, as well as Rojas's two other children. (Id. at 11). Esther Rojas, who is 78-years old, is A.R.'s primary caretaker, and as part of her caretaking responsibilities, she “must give A.R. her medications, puree her food because she does not chew, spoon-feed and burp her, get her in and out of the bath, changer her diaper, and dress her in one-piece pajamas so she cannot remove her clothes in front of others.” (Id. at 10-11). She often must stay up all night and watch over A.R., and frequently doesn't get any sleep at all. (Id. at 11). She suffers from several ailments, including COPD, asthma, chronic bilateral low back pain, degenerative disc disease, bilateral rotator cuff disease, hypertension, high cholesterol, migraines, and osteoarthritis. (Id.). She is in serious pain at least “90 percent of the time, ” (Id., Ex. H ¶ 4), and, according to her primary care doctor, “[t]he physical and emotional strain in caring for her granddaughter has exacerbated all of her health conditions and certainly exacerbated her depression, ” (Id., Ex. E at 100).
Although A.R. also lives with Rojas's two other children, Rene and Vanessa, A.R. doesn't allow others to get near her-only her mother and Esther Rojas. (Dkt. 218 at 12-13). Additionally, Vanessa suffers from her own health issues, has had to undergo surgery within the last few months, and is unable to consistently care for A.R. (Dkt. 227 at 3). Rene, who lives in the home with A.R., and Rojas's two brothers, who live nearby, are not able to provide proper care for A.R. because, as males, they aren't comfortable changing, bathing, or dressing an adult woman, and more importantly, A.R. doesn't allow them to get near her. (Dkt. 218 at 12-13). Esther Rojas is currently the only person who could care for her, and because her medical conditions continue to worsen, she is becoming increasingly unable to provide around-the-clock care for A.R.
The Government argues these circumstances are neither extraordinary nor compelling because they don't fit the categories of family circumstances defined by the Sentencing Commission. (Dkt. 221 at 18). It argues that A.R. is not a minor because she is 23-years old, Esther Rojas's medical conditions don't render her “incapacitated, ” and there are other individuals who could serve as caregiver for A.R. (Id. at 18-19). But the Court is not required to fit Rojas's family circumstances squarely into the categories outlined by the Sentencing Commission in its policy statements. Rather, the Court has discretion to consider extraordinary and compelling reasons beyond those specific categories. As previously discussed, although A.R. is 23-years old, she requires care like that of an infant, including requiring someone to feed her, bathe her, and change her diapers. And while A.R. has other family members, none are able to provide the around-the-clock care she requires. Esther Rojas's advanced age and serious health decline impose not only a significant strain on her own self-care and survival ability, but also on A.R., particularly given that no one else will be able to provide consistent care for A.R. as long as Rojas remains incarcerated. (Dkt. 227 at 3 (“As a result of her worsening health, Esther Rojas has not been able to care for A.R. as well. . . . If [Rojas's] mother injures herself during one of her frequent falls, there will be nobody in the house capable of caring for A.R.)). A.R. was previously in the care of her mother, who is the only other person with whom A.R. feels comfortable.
The Court is persuaded by other cases where courts have granted compassionate release under similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 501 F.Supp.3d 957, 959 (D. Nev. 2020) (“The Court is concerned that if not released, Morrison's children, ages fifteen and sixteen, who both have their own health considerations that need attention and ongoing doctors' appointments, will not be cared for. Their current caregiver, Morrison's 60-year-old mother, has spinal stenosis and degenerative disc disease and is . . . no longer able to take the children to their respective medical appointments and is limited in her physical ability to take care of them . . .”); United States v. Kesoyan, No. 15-CR-236-JAM, 2020 WL 2039028, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020) (granting compassionate release where the defendant's 24-year old son “ha[d] cerebral palsy, ” was “developmentally disabled, ” “need[ed] assistance with daily activities, ” and was under the care of other family members who each had medical afflictions and couldn't provide proper care); U.S. v. Reyes, No. 04-CR-970, 2020 WL 1663129 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 03, 2020) (granting compassionate release where the defendant's aunt had stage four cancer and caring for his aunt was very difficult for the defendant's family).
Finally, the Court acknowledges that Rojas is currently located at a halfway house, per the BOP website, and has only approximately seven months left of her sentence. She has gone to great lengths to rehabilitate herself, including completing various treatment and rehabilitation programs, completing a variety of offered educational and employment courses, and applying for different jobs. Given her mother's significant decline in health and ability to care for A.R., the Court finds that the time remaining in Rojas's sentence is better served at home caring for her daughter, particularly where the deterrent effect at this stage in Rojas's sentence is marginal.
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Rojas be released from custody. Her sentence is modified to allow her to serve the remaining portion of her custodial sentence under home confinement at her mother's home. See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 (“Home detention may be imposed . . . as a substitute for imprisonment”); see also, e.g., United States v. Soto, No. 16-CR-766-CAB (July 6, 2020) (reducing sentence under § 3582 by substituting home confinement for time in custody). She is to remain on supervised release for a term of six years, as provided by her original sentence, commencing on the date she successfully completes the remainder of her sentence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.