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dismissing a motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), for want of jurisdiction because there was "no evidence that the Director of the BOP has requested a reduction on Rios's behalf or that Rios has fully pursued administrative remedies within the BOP"
Summary of this case from Fernandez-Perez v. United StatesOpinion
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4:06-CR-14-5
2020-06-11
UNITED STATES of America v. Jesse Carlos RIOS
Ernest Gonzalez, U.S. Attorney's Office, Plano, TX, for United States of America.
Ernest Gonzalez, U.S. Attorney's Office, Plano, TX, for United States of America.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
SEAN D. JORDAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Jesse Rios's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. #313). Rios requests that the Court reduce his sentence to time served due to health concerns related to COVID-19, the respiratory disease caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2. The Government replied in opposition. (Dkt. #314). The Court, having considered the motion, the record, and the applicable law, DISMISSES the motion for want of jurisdiction.
Although Rios's letter motion does not mention 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the Court construes the motion as a request for modification of his sentence pursuant to that statute due to its requested relief. See (Dkt. #313) (stating that "I am asking that your court please treat my letter as a way to please consider a reduction in what is left of my sentence" and elsewhere invoking "compassionate release in the ‘First Step Act’ "); see also Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed[.]") (internal quotation marks omitted).
I. BACKGROUND
Jesse Rios was a member of a drug-trafficking organization responsible for selling large quantities of cocaine. Rios was arrested and later pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute or dispense or possess with intent to distribute or dispense cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (Dkt. #196). On December 6, 2006, Rios was sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Id.
Rios has moved for a reduction of his sentence to time served pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. #313). Rios contends that he is eligible for such a reduction because of the general danger presented by the COVID-19 pandemic to prison populations, his low risk of recidivism, and his medical history. Rios has not exhausted administrative remedies available through the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") prior to filing this motion.
Rios alleges, without substantiating evidence, that he only has one "good" lung and has high blood pressure.
The Government opposes Rios's request. (Dkt. #314). The Government argues that Rios's failure to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s threshold exhaustion requirement precludes relief. Exhaustion aside, the Government further argues that Rios has not shown a right to relief on the merits because his reasons for release are not "extraordinary and compelling."
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A judgment of conviction imposing a sentence of imprisonment "constitutes a final judgment and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances." Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 824, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(b), (c). One such exception arises from section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which authorizes a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment if, after considering the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it determines that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" support such a reduction and that the reduction is "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). A sentence modification under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) may be obtained only through a motion made either by the Director of the BOP or by a defendant "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf" or "the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier[.]" Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
An additional exception based on the defendant's age, time served, and danger to the community is set forth in section 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). That exception is not applicable here.
III. DISCUSSION
Rios's failure to meet section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement deprives this Court of jurisdiction to modify his sentence. Even if the Court could exercise adjudicatory authority over Rios's motion, the relief he requests would nonetheless remain precluded by section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement, as it is not susceptible to any judicially created exception. Rios's motion must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
A. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s Exhaustion Requirement Is Jurisdictional.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), district courts have authority to modify a prisoner's sentence under narrow circumstances. One such circumstance, invoked by Rios, is provided by section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). This provision allows a court to modify a defendant's sentence if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a reduction of the sentence and the reduction is "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]" Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) makes clear, however, that a court cannot consider any modification to a defendant's sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) unless a motion for such a modification is properly made by the Director of the BOP or by a defendant who has fully exhausted administrative remedies. See id. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (providing that the Director of the BOP may request a sentence reduction in court at any time and a defendant may also make such a request, but only after the defendant has fully exhausted remedies within the BOP or allowed 30 days to pass after seeking administrative remedies). Here, there is no evidence that the Director of the BOP has requested a reduction on Rios's behalf or that Rios has fully pursued administrative remedies within the BOP. Under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent, section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, and Rios's failure to meet that requirement deprives the Court of jurisdiction to consider a modification to his sentence.
It is well-settled in the Fifth Circuit that 18 U.S.C. § 3582 sets out the limited instances in which a district court has jurisdiction to modify a term of imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia , 606 F.3d 209, 212 n.5 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ("The district court's jurisdiction to correct or modify a defendant's sentence is limited to those specific circumstances enumerated by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3582.") (citing United States v. Bridges , 116 F.3d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1997) ). In an unbroken line of cases over two decades, circuit case law has reaffirmed that section 3582 provides a limited grant of jurisdiction for a district court to modify a term of imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Rene , 785 F. App'x 240, 240–41 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Bridges , 116 F.3d at 1112. Because these cases speak in terms of section 3582 as a whole, it follows that section 3582(c)(1)(A), and the limitations within, circumscribe the Court's jurisdiction.
The Court recognizes that, in a series of recent opinions, the Supreme Court has cautioned against imprecise use of the "jurisdictional" label, which can elide "the ‘critical difference[s]’ between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional limitations on causes of action." Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick , 559 U.S. 154, 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). To reinforce these critical differences, the Supreme Court has encouraged courts to use the label "jurisdictional" "not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority." Kontrick v. Ryan , 540 U.S. 443, 454–55, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) ; see also id. at 455, 124 S.Ct. 906 ("Jurisdiction" refers to "a court's adjudicatory authority"). Claims-processing rules, in contrast, "seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson v. Shinseki , 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011). Based upon this line of Supreme Court authority, some courts have determined that section 3582 is a nonjurisdictional, mandatory claims-processing rule. See, e.g., United States v. Alam , No. 20-1298, 2020 WL 2845694, *2–*3 (6th Cir. June 2, 2020) ; United States v. Taylor , 778 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2015) ; see also United States v. Calton , 900 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that the Taylor court concluded that section 3582 "is not part of a jurisdictional portion of the criminal code," and that section 3582(c) is not "phrased in jurisdictional terms").
It does not appear, however, that the Supreme Court's recent authority distinguishing jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional statutory limitations undermines the Fifth Circuit's understanding of section 3582's exceptions to the finality rule as jurisdictional conditions rather than claims-processing rules. The Supreme Court has made clear that, to determine whether a statutory prescription is a jurisdictional limitation on a court's adjudicatory authority, courts must "look to see if there is any ‘clear’ indication that Congress wanted the rule to be ‘jurisdictional.’ " Henderson , 562 U.S. at 436, 131 S.Ct. 1197. That indication, however, does not turn on Congress's use of "magic words." Id. Instead, as the Supreme Court has explained, Congress's intent must be determined through traditional tools of statutory construction by examining the "text, context, and relevant historical treatment" of the limitation at issue, Reed Elsevier , 559 U.S. at 166, 130 S.Ct. 1237 (citation omitted), and "what they reveal about the purposes [the limitation] is designed to serve," Dolan v. United States , 560 U.S. 605, 610, 130 S.Ct. 2533, 177 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010).
Both the text and context of section 3582 demonstrate that its requirements are not simply rules that "seek to promote the orderly process of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson , 562 U.S. at 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197. Instead, section 3582 is a "prescription[ ] delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) ... falling within a court's adjudicatory authority." Kontrick , 540 U.S. at 455, 124 S.Ct. 906. In this regard, "a basic principle of judicial process" is that, "once a final [criminal] judgment is issued and the court of appeals considers a case, a district court has no power to act on it further." Eberhart v. United States , 546 U.S. 12, 17, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Under this "rule of finality[,]" "[f]ederal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to ‘modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.’ " Freeman v. United States , 564 U.S. 522, 526, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ) (plurality op.); see also Dillon , 560 U.S. at 819, 130 S.Ct. 2683 (same). This limitation on federal courts' power is confirmed in the text of section 3582. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (stating that, subject to certain exceptions, a court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed").
Notably, the circumstances here are quite different than the context of the civil causes of action at issue in a number of the Supreme Court's recent cases addressing the proper scope of the term "jurisdiction." For example, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), the Court considered supposedly jurisdictional limitations on a Title VII action. In Arbaugh , and similar civil cases, the Court has cited 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the background jurisdictional rule, and noted that through section 1331 "Congress has broadly authorized the federal courts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over ‘all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’ " Id. at 505, 126 S.Ct. 1235 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ) (emphasis added). Of course, in the criminal context here, the jurisdictional landscape is precisely the opposite: under the finality rule, federal courts generally have no adjudicatory authority to modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed. Eberhart , 546 U.S. at 17, 126 S.Ct. 403.
It is fair to presume that when a court generally is "forbidden" to consider a modification of a term of imprisonment, it is without jurisdiction to undertake such a modification. However, the rule of finality "is subject to a few narrow exceptions." Freeman , 564 U.S. at 526, 131 S.Ct. 2685. Section 3582 provides such exceptions, including an exception allowing the Director of the BOP, or a defendant who has fully exhausted all administrative rights, to move for a modification of the defendant's imprisonment term based on the existence of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting a reduction of the defendant's sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). If the text of an applicable exception is met, section 3582 provides that the case now falls within the district court's adjudicatory authority to modify the defendant's term of imprisonment. If the text of an applicable exception is not met, there is no jurisdictional basis for the court to modify the term of imprisonment given the longstanding, strict application of the finality rule.
Beyond section 3582, there are additional, limited exceptions to the finality rule. For example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) authorizes a district court to "correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error," and Rule 35(b) authorizes a district court to "reduce a sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person."
Thus, the exceptions set forth in the text of section 3582 are not mere "claims-processing rules." Instead, they serve to create jurisdiction to modify a defendant's term of imprisonment where no jurisdiction would otherwise exist under the finality rule. It is therefore unsurprising that at least six circuits, including the Fifth Circuit, have treated section 3582's requirements as jurisdictional. See United States v. Denson , 798 F. App'x 605, 605–06 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Phillips , 597 F.3d 1190, 1194–97 (11th Cir. 2010) ); United States v. Carrillo , 720 F. App'x 815, 815 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Auman , 8 F.3d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1993) ); United States v. Jordan , 853 F.3d 1334, 1338 (10th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Spears , 824 F.3d 908, 909 (9th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Freeman , 659 F. App'x 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Doe , 564 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2009) ); Garcia , 606 F.3d at 212 n.5. On the other hand, the Court is aware of only two circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion. See Alam , 2020 WL 2845694, *2–*3 ; United States v. Taylor , 778 F.3d 667, 669–71 (7th Cir. 2015).
See United States v. Smith , 438 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.), overruled by Taylor , 778 F.3d at 671 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that, "[b]ecause § 3582(c) limits the substantive authority of the district court, it is a real ‘jurisdictional’ rule, rather than a case-processing requirement").
The Supreme Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012), is analogous and instructive. In the context of a habeas petitioner's request for postconviction relief, the Court construed 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which "governs appeals in habeas corpus proceedings." Id. at 140, 132 S.Ct. 641. The Court held that section 2253(c)(1) included the following "jurisdictional" language: "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals[.]" Id. at 142, 132 S.Ct. 641 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the word "jurisdiction" does not appear in the statute, the Court nonetheless affirmed that section 2253(c)(1)'s certificate-of-appealability requirement is jurisdictional. Id. Similarly here, section 3582's language that a court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed," except as provided under subsections 3582(c)(1)–(2), speaks in jurisdictional terms.
Cases addressing successive motions pursuant to section 3582(c)(2) are distinguishable. Section 3582(c)(2) does not speak to a district court's authority to grant such motions. From this silence, some circuits have held that the bar is nonjurisdictional because there is no clear statement from Congress that it is in fact jurisdictional. See, e.g., United States v. Weatherspoon , 696 F.3d 416, 421–22 (3d Cir. 2012). Others have held that courts simply have jurisdiction over such motions. See, e.g., Calton , 900 F.3d at 710–11 (collecting cases). In any event, the absence of explicit language in the statute renders these cases inapposite.
* * *
To determine this case, it is enough for the Court that the Fifth Circuit's binding precedent continues to treat section 3582 as a demarcation of jurisdiction. Because Rios has failed to meet section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirements, his motion for compassionate release must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
B. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s Exhaustion Requirement Is Mandatory.
Even if section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement did not present a jurisdictional bar, this Court could not waive or otherwise excuse its requirements through a judicially created exception. There are two types of exhaustion requirements—those created by Congress and those created by the judiciary. See McCarthy v. Madigan , 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992). This distinction carries significant weight. As the Supreme Court has explained, "because Congress is vested with the power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in federal courts," Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla. , 457 U.S. 496, 501, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), "[w]here Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required[,]" McCarthy , 503 U.S. at 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081. The Supreme Court has rejected invitations to depart from that principle, "stress[ing] the point ... that [the courts] will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where Congress has provided otherwise." Booth v. Churner , 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1825, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). It follows that where a statute specifically prescribes exhaustion, courts lack authority to apply judicially created exceptions. See Ross v. Blake , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1857, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) ("Congress sets the rules—and courts have a role in creating exceptions only if Congress wants them to.").
The jurisdictional bar to Rios's claim is no mere formality. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must have statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a claim. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison , 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Absent jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, federal courts lack the power to adjudicate claims and must dismiss an action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Id. ; Stockman v. FEC , 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). "[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction cannot be created by waiver or consent." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 243 F.3d 912, 919 (5th Cir. 2001).
Congress had good reason to include the exhaustion requirement. The procedure for exhaustion involves review and investigation of requests for compassionate release by entities expert in prison administration, who are well-positioned to consider a defendant's application. See 28 C.F.R. § 571.62(a) (prescribing the involvement of the warden of the defendant's prison, the BOP's Office of General Counsel, the Medical Director or the Assistant Director of the Correctional Programs Division, and the Director of the BOP).
Further, BOP administrative review is now guided by an expanded consideration of whether a defendant is suitable for transfer to home confinement. In a memorandum dated March 26, 2020, U.S. Attorney General William Barr directed the BOP to identify suitable inmates for home confinement with COVID-19 risk factors to minimize the risk to inmates' health due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. See Off. of the Att'y Gen., Mem. for Dir. of Bureau Prisons, Prioritization of Home Confinement as Appropriate in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic (March 26, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus. Later, when it became evident that some federal prisons were experiencing a high rate of COVID-19 infections, a revised memorandum was issued for such prisons. See also Off. of the Att'y Gen. Mem., Mem. for Dir. of Bureau Prisons, Increasing Use of Home Confinement at Institutions Most Affected by COVID-19 (April 3, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus.
Nothing in the text of section 3582(c)(1)(A) invites courts to play an additional role in the scheme Congress set forth. A well-established body of jurisprudence, therefore, settles this issue—the clear exhaustion requirement set out by Congress in section 3582(c)(1)(A) is mandatory and not susceptible to judicially created exception. Courts cannot disregard this clear congressional mandate.
The Second Circuit's decision in Washington v. Barr , 925 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2019), is not in tension with this result. In that case, the Second Circuit, reviewing a portion of the Controlled Substances Act, recognized that the Act itself "does not expressly mandate the exhaustion of administrative remedies[.]" Id. at 115. Instead, the court, taking guidance from "precedents indicat[ing] that [an exhaustion requirement] is generally to be required as a prudential rule of judicial administration," id. , derived from the Act's congressional intent a judicially created exception that is "seemingly mandated" by the Act itself, though not explicitly stated in its text, id. at 118 (quoting McCarthy , 503 U.S. at 146, 112 S.Ct. 1081 ). In short, Washington applied judicially created exceptions to a judicially created exhaustion requirement, rendering it inapposite to the statutorily mandated exhaustion requirement at issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Ogarro , No. 1:18-CR-373-9, 2020 WL 1876300, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020) (Sullivan, J., sitting by designation) (recognizing that Washington does not endorse the application of a judicially created exception to an exhaustion requirement expressly imposed by Congress).
The only circuit court decisions addressing similar compassionate-release motions, premised on unexhausted COVID-19 health concerns, have concurred with this Court's conclusion. See Alam , 2020 WL 2845694, *2–*3 ; United States v. Raia , 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) (concluding that a defendant who "failed to comply with § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement" faced a "glaring roadblock foreclosing compassionate release at this point").
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Jesse Rios's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), (Dkt. #313), is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction .