Opinion
Criminal No. 18-426 (FAB)
2019-04-15
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Félix PEÑA-FERNÁNDEZ, Defendant, v. Doctor's Associates, LLC, Subway Realty, LLC., and Magda Rodríguez-Rodríguez, Third-Party Petitioners.
Seth Erbe, United States Attorneys Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff. Osvaldo Carlo-Linares, Carlo Law, LLC, Giovanni Jose Canino-Sanchez, San Juan, PR, for Defendant. Thomas Trebilcock-Horan, Trebilcock LLC, Gregory J. Figueroa-Rosario, Jaime A. Torrens-Davila, Ferraiuoli LLC, Maria J. Marchand-Sanchez, San Juan, PR, for Third-Party Petitioners.
Seth Erbe, United States Attorneys Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Osvaldo Carlo-Linares, Carlo Law, LLC, Giovanni Jose Canino-Sanchez, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
Thomas Trebilcock-Horan, Trebilcock LLC, Gregory J. Figueroa-Rosario, Jaime A. Torrens-Davila, Ferraiuoli LLC, Maria J. Marchand-Sanchez, San Juan, PR, for Third-Party Petitioners.
OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Defendant Félix Peña-Fernández ("Peña") pled guilty to thirteen counts of bank fraud. (Docket No. 13.) On October 12, 2018, the Court issued a preliminary forfeiture order pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 853(n) (" section 853") and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 (" Rule 32.2"). (Docket No. 24.) Third-party petitioners Doctor's Associates, LLC ("Doctor's Associates") and Subway Realty, LLC ("Subway Realty") (collectively "Subway") request relief from forfeiture, asserting a superior title in the forfeited property. (Docket No. 34.) Third-party petitioner Magda Rodríguez-Rodríguez ("Rodríguez") also requests relief from forfeiture, invoking an alleged community property exemption. (Docket No. 54.) For the reasons set forth below, Subway's motion for relief from forfeiture is HELD IN ABEYANCE , and Rodríguez's motion is DENIED . (Docket Nos. 34 and 54.)
I. Background
From November 2011 to June 2015, Peña falsely represented that an individual referred to as J.P.C. "authorized and approved the issuance and negotiation of checks from accounts held by subsidiaries of Company A." (Docket No. 14 at p. 12.) Ultimately, Peña fraudulently obtained more than $3,500,000.00 from Banco Popular and other financial institutions. Id. On July 3, 2018, a grand jury charged Peña with committing bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) (counts one through thirteen), and money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (counts fourteen through eighteen). (Docket No. 3.) The indictment also provided that "[u]pon conviction of one or more" bank fraud or money laundering offenses, Peña shall forfeit the following property:
a. $5,036,960.00; b. All rights, title, interest in any Franchise Agreement and Sublease Agreement, and ongoing business assets for Subway Franchise Number 18256 and the Subway premises located at Plaza Río Hondo, Avenida Comerío Esquina Expreso de Diego, in Bayamón, Puerto Rico ["Bayamón Subway"];
c. All rights, title, interest in any Franchise Agreement and Sublease Agreement, and ongoing business assets for Subway Franchise Number 21043 and the Subway premises located at Urb. San Agustín, 1174 Máximo Alomar Street, San Juan, Puerto Rico ["San Juan Subway"].
(Docket No. 3 at pp. 7—8.)
The United States and Peña entered into a plea agreement, setting forth sentencing recommendations and a forfeiture provision. (Docket No. 14.) This provision mirrors the forfeiture allegation in the indictment, with the exception that the plea agreement refers only to the Subway properties, not the $5,036,960.00. Id. On August 24, 2018, Peña pled guilty to thirteen counts of bank fraud. (Docket No. 13.) Subsequently, the United States moved for a preliminary forfeiture order. (Docket No. 20 at p. 1; Docket No. 21.) The Court authorized the United States to seize both properties, and enjoined Peña from selling, transferring or taking "any other action ... that would reduce the value of the assets." (Docket Nos. 22 and 24; Docket No. 23 at p. 2.) The United States published notice of the preliminary forfeiture order in accordance with Rule 32.2 and section 853. (Docket No. 38.)
The United States agreed to dismiss the money laundering counts after sentencing. (Docket No. 14 at p. 6.) The sentencing hearing is scheduled for June 12, 2019. (Docket No. 75.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2, "the government must publish notice of the [preliminary forfeiture order] and send notice to any person who reasonably appears to be a potential claimant with standing to contest the forfeiture in [an] ancillary proceeding." Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(6). Section 853(n) requires that the United States publish notice of forfeiture "in such manner as the Attorney General may direct." 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(1). The United States posted "notice of its intent to dispose of the forfeited property" on the official government website, www.forfeiture.gov, for thirty consecutive days, and served notice of forfeiture to the Subway offices in Puerto Rico. (Docket Nos. 31 and 38.)
Doctors Associates and Subway Realty moved for relief from forfeiture on November 28, 2018. (Docket No. 34.) Doctors Associates "operates and franchises to others to operate sandwich shops under the trade name and service mark Subway®." Id. at p. 2. Subway Realty entered into lease agreements to secure locations for the Bayamón and San Juan Subway restaurants. Id. at pp. 5-11. Peña and his wife, Rodríguez, entered into sublease and franchise agreements with Subway Realty and Doctor's Associates, respectively. Id. Subway argues that "[Doctor's Associates and Subway Realty's] superior rights and interests in the subject properties [are] exempt from forfeiture." Id. at p. 34.
The Court refers to Doctors Associates and Subway Realty collectively as "Subway."
Rodríguez and Peña divorced before the United States commenced this criminal action. (Docket No. 54, Ex. 1 at p. 1.) Rodríguez contends that "all property [she and Peña] possessed as a matrimony became Community Property." (Docket No. 54 at p. 2.) According to Rodríguez, she is "currently a co-owner of those establishments and all contracts related to the Franchises." Id. at p. 3. The United States opposed both motions for relief from forfeiture. (Docket No. 68.)
II. Criminal Forfeiture
Because Peña committed bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the Court "shall order that [he] forfeit to the United States any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds [he] obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of [the offense]." 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(B). Criminal forfeiture is an in personam sanction "intended to directly punish persons convicted of [an] offense by forcing them to forfeit the proceeds obtained as a result of that offense." United States v. Kingsley, 851 F.2d 16, 18 n.2 (1st Cir. 1988) ; see United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 783 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that criminal forfeiture "traditionally operated as an incident to a felony conviction in personam against a convicted defendant, requiring him to forfeit his property to the crown."). The "relation back doctrine" in section 853 provides that "[a]ll rights, title, and interest in property [subject to forfeiture] vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture." 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Ultimately, forfeiture permits the United States to step into Peña's shoes, "acquiring only the rights [he possessed] at the time of the criminal acts, and nothing more." United States v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 682 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2012).
A. Ancillary Proceedings
Rule 32.2 requires that the preliminary forfeiture order issue "without regard to any third party's interest in the property." Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(2)(A). A preliminary forfeiture order becomes final at sentencing. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(4). Third-party petitioners, however, may request an ancillary "hearing to adjudicate the validity of [their] interest in the property." 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) ; see Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c) ("If, as prescribed by statute, a third party files a petition asserting an interest in the property to be forfeited, the court must conduct an ancillary proceeding."). Indeed, ancillary proceedings are the exclusive recourse for third-party petitioners to challenge the United States' seizure of specific property. See United States v. Mar. Life Caribbean, Ltd., 913 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 2019) ("As we have explained, an ancillary proceeding constitutes the sole means by which a third-party claimant can establish entitlement to return of forfeited property.") (internal citation and quotation omitted).
"[N]o ancillary proceeding is required to the extent that the forfeiture consists of a money judgment." Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c) ; see United States v. Zorilla-Echevarría, 671 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that "a money judgment is an in personam judgment against the defendant and not an order directed at specific assets in which any third party could have any interest"). In forfeiture actions for specific property, the Court "must determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense" by a preponderance of the evidence. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A). Funds acquired by committing bank fraud allowed Peña to operate the Bayamón and San Juan Subway restaurants, demonstrating a nexus between the criminal offense and forfeited property.
Third-party petitioners must assert a "legal interest" in the disputed property. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2). Property subject to forfeiture encompasses real property, "tangible and intangible personal property," rights, privileges, interests, claims and securities. 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) ; see United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989) ("Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where [ section 853 ] applied, or broader words to define the scope of what was to be forfeited."). Property interests are defined by state law. United States v. White, 675 F.3d 1073, 1078 (8th Cir. 2012) ("Because a legal interest is required to bring a claim under [ section 853 ], a court must first look to the law of the jurisdiction that created the property right to determine whether the claimant has a valid interest."). Accordingly, Puerto Rico law determines whether the forfeited property constitutes a cognizable "legal interest" within the meaning of section 853. See United States v. One Rural Lot Identified as Finca No. 5991 in Barrio Pueblo, 726 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.P.R. 2010) (Fusté, J.) (applying Puerto Rico law in determining that an unrecorded lease qualified as a legal interest pursuant to section 853 ).
Section 853 requires that third-party petitioners must establish "superior" interests in the forfeited property, or that they possess a "separate and distinct legal right to the property that is vested in [them] and [them] alone." Id.; United States v. Espada, 128 F. Supp. 3d 555, 561-62 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). The Court shall amend the preliminary forfeiture order if:
Bona fide purchasers also qualify for relief from forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(b). Neither Subway nor Rodríguez, however, claim to be bona fide purchasers.
the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right, title or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of [the offense].
21 U.S.C. § 853(n) ; compare United States v. McCollum, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1168 (D. Neb. 2006) (ordering the United Sates to return forfeited property because "Mrs. McCollum owned the gun collection outright (or at least held a superior legal interest to it) as a result of Nebraska's intestacy laws"), with United States v. Carmichael, 419 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (M.D. Ala. 2006) ("Because R & H had no vested or superior title in the Carmichael Center at the time the acts giving rise to forfeiture of the property began, R & H cannot meet its burden under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).").
III. The Property Subject to Forfeiture
The preliminary forfeiture order concerns two categories of property: (1) "rights, title and interest in any Franchise Agreement and Sublease Agreement," and (2) "any other ongoing business asset." (Docket No. 24 at p. 1.) "Congress has directed that the first step [in an ancillary proceeding] is to determine the legal interest of the petitioner in the subject property." United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, 972 F.2d 136, 138 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that the "federal forfeiture statutes do not operate to destroy the fundamental characteristics given to real property by the states"); see Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1) ("the court must determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute").
A. Rights, Title and Interest Arising from the Subway Franchise and Sublease Agreements
To acquire a Subway franchise, Peña entered into two separate but related agreements. First, Peña subleased locations for the restaurants. Second, Peña and Subway entered into franchise agreements.
1. The Sublease Agreements
Subway Realty (formerly Subway Real Estate Corp.) leased the San Juan and Bayamón Subway properties in 1995 and 1998, respectively. (Docket No. 34, Exs. 7 and 12.) Subsequently, Joan McHale ("McHale") and Lyle Swanson ("Swanson") subleased the properties from Subway Realty. (Docket No. 34. Exs. 8 and 13.) McHale and Swanson operated the Subway restaurants for approximately twenty-years. In 2015, McHale and Swanson assigned the Subway sublease agreements to Peña and Rodríguez. (Docket No. 34, Exs. 10, 15 and 16.) As of November 6, 2018, Peña and Rodríguez owe $15,287.73 in rent for the San Juan Subway restaurant. (Docket No. 34, Ex. 6.) As of November 8, 2018, Peña and Rodríguez owe $10,080.38 in rent for the Bayamón Subway restaurant. (Docket No. 34, Ex. 5.)
McHale is not a signatory on the San Juan Subway sublease agreement. (Docket No. 34, Exs. 11 and 13.)
2. The Franchise Agreements
Subway entered into franchise agreements with Peña and Rodríguez to operate the Bayamón and San Juan Subway restaurants on April 20, 2015 and August 15, 2015, respectively. (Docket No. 34, Exs. 3 and 4.) The franchise agreements are substantively identical. Id. Subway owns a "proprietary system for establishing and operating restaurants featuring sandwiches, pizza and salads" (hereinafter, "the system") (Docket No. 34, Ex. 3 at p. 3.) Subway granted Peña and Rodríguez access to the system in exchange for "eight percent (8%) of the gross sales from the Restaurant." Id. at pp. 3-4. Peña and Rodríguez assumed costs associated with "permits, equipment, furniture, fixtures, signs, advertising, insurance, food products, labor, utilities, rent, fees, customs, stamp duty, other duties, governmental registrations Sales Tax and other taxes." Id. at p. 5.
The franchise agreement designated Peña and Rodríguez as "independent franchise operators," precluding them from assigning "the profits and losses of the Restaurant directly or indirectly with any individual who is not named as a franchisee on [the] Agreement." Id. at p. 7-8. Subway reserved the right to terminate the franchise agreements in the event of default on the sublease, or failure to comply with civil and criminal laws. Id. at p. 9. Termination of the franchise agreement results in the revocation of Peña and Rodríguez's rights to the Subway restaurants. Id. On February 26, 2019, Subway terminated the Bayamón and San Juan Subway franchise agreements because Peña committed bank fraud. Docket No. 71, Exs. 1 and 2; see Franchise Agreement (Subway may terminate the agreement if Peña is "convicted or plead[s] guilty or ‘nolo contendere’ to a felony") (Docket No. 34, Ex. 3 at p. 9.) The United States maintains, however, that as of March 8, 2019 "both Subway locations are currently operating under the management of Peña, Rodríguez, and/or Healthy Way." (Docket No. 68 at p. 7.)
Healthy Way is a company that is controlled by Peña. (Docket No. 68 at p. 3.)
B. Business Assets
Peña and Rodríguez purchased business assets with illicit proceeds. See United States v. Joon Park, 825 F. Supp. 2d 644, 648 (D. Md. 2011) ("If a business is subject to forfeiture or restraint, then so are all of the assets of the business, including any funds in any account at a financial institution.") (citation omitted). On November 12, 2014, Peña and Rodríguez purchased McHale and Swanson's "rights, title and interest" in the San Juan Subway, "ongoing business assets," goodwill, and "all items of tangible personal property consisting of all furniture, fixtures, inventory, equipment, and machinery listed in Exhibit A" for $458,000.00. (Docket No. 68, Ex. 2 at pp. 1—2.) Four months later, Peña and Rodríguez purchased Swanson's "rights, title and interest" in the Bayamón Subway, "ongoing business assets," goodwill, and "all items of tangible personal property consisting of all furniture, fixtures, inventory, equipment, and machinery listed in Exhibit A" for $420,000.00. (Docket No. 68, Ex. 3 at pp. 1—2.)
The United States did not attach Exhibit A.
IV. The United States and Subway
The United States and Subway claim title over distinct property interests, obviating the need for an ancillary proceeding. Subway argues that "legal rights and interests over [the Bayamón and San Juan Subway franchises] were superior to [Peña] at the time [he committed bank fraud]." (Docket No. 34 at p. 9.) Subway's motion for relief from forfeiture, however, makes no reference to the business assets purchased by Peña and Rodríguez from Swanson and McHale, assets paid for with $878,000.00 in fraudulent funds. Id.
Although the indictment, plea agreement, and preliminary forfeiture order refer to rights arising from the franchise and sublease agreements, the United States does not claim an interest in the Subway "system," proprietary information or the properties. (Docket Nos. 3, 14 and 24.) In its opposition to the third-party petitions, the United States argues only that the ongoing business assets are subject to forfeiture. (Docket No. 68 at p. 5.) In fact, the United States asserts that it "retains the right to seek dismissal of [the Subway franchise and sublease claims] at a later date." (Docket No. 68 at p. 7.)
The United States specifies that it "does not seek the forfeiture of the real property/premises itself that was leased for the operation of the Subway franchise." (Docket No. 68 at p. 6.)
Subway and the United States both request a hearing. (Docket No. 34 at p. 14; Docket No. 68 at p. 9.) A hearing is warranted when the claims pertaining to forfeited property are adverse, not when the claims concern distinct property. See United States v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 161 (2d Cir. 2015) ("Without proceeding to a formal hearing, however, the ‘court may, on motion, dismiss the petition for lack of standing, for failure to state a claim, or for any other lawful reason") (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c)(1) ); United State v. Satava, 99 F. Supp. 3d 761, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2015) ("The Court need not conduct an ancillary hearing, however, if the Court grants a party summary judgment because there are no factual disputes as to the third party's interest in the [forfeited] property."). Because the interests claimed by the United States and Subway may not overlap, the existence of a case or controversy in this matter is uncertain. See Horizon Bank & Trust Co. v. Mass., 391 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Because the Commonwealth has not contested the distribution of funds, no case or controversy remains as required by Article III of the United States Constitution and we hold that the appeal must be dismissed as moot."). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Subway to specify whether it requests relief from forfeiture of the ongoing business assets (i.e. furniture, equipment, machinery). The Court ORDERS the United States to specify whether it seeks forfeiture of the rights, title and interests arising from the franchise and sublease agreements (i.e. the right to operate a Subway franchise using the proprietary "system"). Subway and the United States shall comply with the Court's order by no later than April 29, 2019.
"[A]lthough occurring in the context of criminal forfeiture," an ancillary proceeding "closely resembles a civil action." Pacheco v. Serendensky, 393 F.3d 348, 352 (2nd Cir. 2004). The United States, Subway and Rodríguez may move "to dismiss [a third-party] petition for lack of standing, for failure to state a claim, or for any other lawful reason." Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c) ; see Cátala, 870 F.3d at 8 ("A motion to dismiss a third-party petition in a criminal forfeiture proceeding is analyzed in the same way as motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.") (citation omitted). The Court "may permit the parties to conduct discovery in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... to resolve factual issues." Id.
V. Rodríguez
Rodríguez purports that the Subway assets are community property obtained during her marriage to Peña. (Docket No. 54 at p. 2.) Pursuant to Puerto Rico law, "property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage" constitutes community property. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3641. Following a divorce, community property "shall be divided, share and share alike, between the husband and the wife, or their respective heirs." Id. § 3697. Consequently, Rodríguez avers that "she is currently the co-owner of those establishments and all contracts related to the Franchises, location lease and other business assets." Id. at pp. 2—3.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United States v. Hooper is illustrative. 229 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2000). The United States seized property purchased with proceeds derived from drug trafficking. Id. at 819. The wives of the defendants opposed the criminal forfeiture, arguing that "as spouses they innocently acquired a fifty percent community property interest in the proceeds of their husbands' trafficking, and that this interest was not subject to forfeiture." Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that regardless of whether state law "would recognize the community property interest asserted by [the wives] ... the federal criminal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853, precludes relief." Id. at 820. Interests in the forfeited property vested in the United States upon commission of the drug trafficking offenses. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Accordingly, the wives' "legal interest, if any, must have been vested ... at the time their husbands committed their crimes." Id. at 821. The wives' motion to vacate forfeiture failed because "[t]here was no community property interest at the moment the husbands violated the drug trafficking statute." Id.
Rodríguez's motion for relief from forfeiture is unsubstantiated. Like the wives' request in Hooper, Rodríguez's request for relief from forfeiture is based on a false premise: that the interests arising from the Bayamón and San Juan Subway restaurants are community property. The United States' rights to the forfeited property vested "upon the commission of the act giving rise to [the offense]." 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Peña fraudulently obtained checks on behalf of "a company he controlled." (Docket No. 68 at 3.) The United States submitted six fraudulent checks made payable to Peña's company, corresponding to $812,000 in illicit proceeds. (Docket No. 68, Ex. 1.) These proceeds allowed Peña to purchase the "ongoing business assets, furniture, equipment, and machinery" to operate the Bayamón and San Juan Subway restaurants. Id. at p. 4; United States v. King, Case No. 10-122, 2012 WL 2261117 *6, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84278 *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012) (noting that "where a petitioner claims an interest in property purchased with crime proceeds, § 853(n)(6)(A) will likely never apply, because crime proceeds, by definition, do not precede the commission of criminal activity but instead result from that criminal activity"); United States v. Cátala, 870 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that section 853 precluded relief from forfeiture because "[a] third party cannot have an interest in proceeds that do not yet exist."). Consequently, Rodríguez cannot insulate tainted property from forfeiture by claiming a community property exemption.
See also United States v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 169 (2nd Cir. 2015) ("[T]he undisputed status of the contested funds as ‘proceeds’ of [the defendant's] criminal offense, which necessarily came into existence following the commission of that offense, precludes petitioners from establishing a superior interest in the funds under § 853(n)(6)(A)."); United States v. Brewer, 591 F. Supp. 2d 864, 870 (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("Because the proceeds used [to acquire the forfeited] property were generated by criminal activity that necessarily preceded the purchase of the property, title to the property, superior to that of [the husband] or otherwise, could not have vested in [the wife] prior to such activity.").
Rodríguez shouldered the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that she owned or held superior title to the forfeited property. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). In her unsworn statement, Rodríguez merely asserts that the two Subway restaurants are "[her] own property." (Docket No. 54, Ex. 1 at p. 2.) Congress refrained, however, from including an innocent spouse exemption in section 853. United States v. Soreide, 461 F.3d 1351, 1354 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Unlike civil forfeiture statutes, the criminal forfeiture statutes contain no provision for an ‘innocent owner’ defense for third parties."). Because Rodríguez fails to set forth any allegation that she possesses superior title to the forfeited property, or that she is a bona fide purchaser, her motion for relief from forfeiture is DENIED.
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Rodríguez's motion for relief from forfeiture is DENIED . (Docket No. 54.) Subway's motion for relief from forfeiture is HELD IN ABEYANCE . (Docket No. 34.) The Court ORDERS Subway to specify whether it requests relief from forfeiture regarding the ongoing business assets (i.e. furniture, equipment, machinery). The Court ORDERS the United States to specify whether it seeks forfeiture of the rights, title and interests arising from the franchise and sublease agreements (i.e. the right to operate a Subway franchise using the proprietary "system"). Subway and the United States shall comply with the Court's order no later than April 29, 2019.