Summary
holding that extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release were not established where, although Defendant "was previously diagnosed with COVID-19, the record demonstrates that he has fully recovered from his viral infection and now suffers no health consequences as a result of that infection"
Summary of this case from United States v. TaylorOpinion
No. 4:16-CR-00019-14
08-11-2020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. TIMOTHY B. MOSES, JR., Defendant.
()
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Currently pending before the Court is Timothy B. Moses, Jr.'s motion for compassionate release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Moses contends that he is entitled to release to home confinement due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as he previously tested positive for the virus. The Government opposes the motion.
Doc. 1483.
Id.
Doc. 1497.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2016, Moses was indicted in a superseding indictment for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Moses later pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, and was sentenced to 71 months' imprisonment. He is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Ray Brook, New York ("FCI Ray Brook").
Doc. 25.
Doc. 337.
Doc. 555.
Moses has now filed a motion for compassionate release. Moses does not assert that he suffers from any illness that would elevate his risk of serious illness or death should he contract COVID-19 but, instead, bases his motion on his prior COVID-19 diagnosis. The Government responds that Moses has not exhausted his administrative remedies and, in any event, no extraordinary and compelling basis exists to grant the motion, and the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors militate against releasing Moses to at-home confinement. This motion is ripe for consideration and, for the following reasons, Moses' motion will be denied.
Docs. 1483, 1492.
Id.
The Government asserts that Moses did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies because he filed his motion with this Court prior to filing a request with the Bureau of Prisons. (Doc. 1497 at 23-24). The Court need not decide whether prisoners may properly exhaust their administrative remedies after filing a motion for compassionate release with the district court because, even assuming that they may, Moses' motion fails on its merits.
Doc. 1497.
II. DISCUSSION
"[A]s a general matter, a court cannot modify a term of imprisonment after it has been imposed without specific authorization." Congress has provided courts with the authority to modify sentences through its enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). That statute permits courts to reduce an inmate's sentence if the inmate has exhausted his administrative remedies and if, as relevant here, "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." Courts must also consider the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors and whether "the defendant is . . . a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)."
McMillan v. United States, 257 F. App'x 477, 479 (3d Cir. 2007).
Id.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13(2).
Congress has not defined the term "extraordinary and compelling." However, the Sentencing Guidelines define the term to include a terminal illness, or any non-terminal illness "that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover." This definition is not, however, authoritative, as "[t]he Commission has not updated its policy statement to account for the changes imposed by the First Step Act, and the policy statement is now clearly outdated." Thus, while "the Policy Statement provides useful guidance for district courts in assessing a defendant's eligibility for compassionate release, . . . it does not constrain a court's independent assessment of whether 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' warrant a sentence reduction under § 3852(c)(1)(A)."
USSG § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A).
United States v. Rodriguez, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, ___, No. 2:03-CR-00271-AB-1, 2020 WL 1627331, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2020).
United States v. Guzman, No. 3:16-CR-85, 2020 WL 4515476, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2020) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
The relevant sentencing factors to consider under § 3553(a) include, inter alia, (1) "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant"; (2) "the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant"; (3) "the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct"; and (4) "the need for the sentenced imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense." "The burden rests with the defendant to show that a reduction in sentence is proper."
United States v. Rengifo, No. CV 1:13-CR-00131, 2020 WL 4206146, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 22, 2020).
Here, Moses has not met his burden of establishing that extraordinary and compelling reasons weigh in favor of compassionate release. First, although Moses was previously diagnosed with COVID-19, the record demonstrates that he has fully recovered from his viral infection and now suffers no health consequences as a result of that infection. Thus, Moses' prior COVID-19 diagnosis is not a proper basis for granting his motion.
Doc. 1497-2 at 98; see id. at 2-36.
Second, Moses does not suffer from any ailments that render him more susceptible to serious injury or death should he again contract COVID-19. In the absence of any comorbidity that would render Moses especially vulnerable to COVID-19, the Court simply cannot conclude that compassionate release is appropriate. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
We do not mean to minimize the risks that COVID-19 poses in the federal prison system, . . . But the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release, especially considering BOP's statutory role, and its extensive and professional efforts to curtail the virus's spread.
United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020).
The Court also notes that, despite FCI Ray Brook housing approximately 1,827 inmates, there are currently no active COVID-19 cases among either the inmates or staff members at that facility, as all previous cases of COVID-19 have resolved. It appears that, as a general matter, FCI Ray Brook has "respond[ed] to and defend[ed] against the threats of the virus in a vigorous and generally effective manner," which further emphasizes that Moses is not entitled to compassionate release based solely on the existence of COVID-19 or his already-resolved infection.
Doc. 1497 at 13-14; see COVID-19 Coronavirus, Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus (last visited Aug. 10, 2020). Specifically, twelve inmates and ten staff were previously infected, but have since recovered.
United States v. Rae, No. CR 15-432, 2020 WL 4544387, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2020); see Doc. 1497 at 10-14 (detailing steps BOP has taken to protect inmates from COVID-19). --------
The Court is sympathetic to Moses' situation, and the risk of harm or death from COVID-19 is a serious issue. However, under these circumstances, the Court simply cannot find that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to grant Moses' motion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Moses' motion for compassionate release will be denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/_________
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge