Opinion
No. 19-7882
05-26-2020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DARRELL TODD MAYS, Defendant - Appellant.
Darrell Todd Mays, Appellant Pro Se.
UNPUBLISHED
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District Judge. (1:03-cr-00726-MBS-2) Before AGEE and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Darrell Todd Mays, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Darrell Todd Mays appeals the district court's order denying his motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, ("FSA"), 115 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 134 Stat. 5194. In 2005, Mays pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2018), and the district court imposed a life sentence.
Section 404(a) of the FSA defines a "covered offense" as "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . , that was committed before August 3, 2010." The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine but not the penalties for possession with intent to distribute powder cocaine. See United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2020). Without the benefit of our recent decision in Gravatt, the district court concluded that Mays' conviction was not a covered offense because the statutory penalties for the cocaine conspiracy were unchanged by the Fair Sentencing Act.
In Gravatt, we held, as a matter of first impression that a defendant—like Mays—who "was charged conjunctively with conspiring to distribute both powder cocaine and crack cocaine" was convicted of a covered offense under § 404(a). 953 F.3d at 264. Because Mays' sentence involved a covered offense under § 404(a), and the additional limitations in § 404(c) of the FSA do not apply, we vacate the district court's order and remand to allow the district court to address Mays' motion on the merits. See Gravatt, 953 F.3d at 264.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED