Opinion
Criminal Case No. 12-cr-00113-WYD
05-22-2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOSE RUBY LOPEZ-LUNA, a/ka, Jose Lopez Luna, a/k/a Jose Avila, a/k/a Juan Luna, a/k/a Juan Lopez, a/k/a Gordo, 2. CORINA TERRONES, a/k/a Corrina Terrones, 3. ELDER GEOVANY SABILLON-UMANA, a/k/a Pablo Casillas, a/k/a Elder Umana, 4. MICHAEL ANNAY MACIEL-ALMEIDA, a/k/a Michelle, 5. YONI DIMAR MAS-CRUZ, a/k/a Emerson Josue Gonzalez-Ramires, a/k/a Yanni Cruz, a/k/a Yoni Gonzalez-Ramirez, 7. VICTOR LOPEZ LUNA, 8. MARIO TERRONES-SUAREZ, 9. NANDI EVELIO ARRAZOLA, a/k/a Nandi Arrozola-Verrella, a/k/a Freddy Lopez-Lopez, a/k/a Freddy O. Lopez-Maella, a/k/a Freddy Lopez-Marella, a/k/a Bimbo, and 10. ELVIN EDUARDO CRUZ-CRUZ, a/k/a Eduardo Arnoldo Gamez-Cruz, a/k/a Elvin Francisco Cruz-Cruz, a/k/a Elvin Crus-Crus, a/k/a Elvin Francisco Crus-Crus, a/k/a UM-216, Defendants.
Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel
ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Government's Motion for Ends of Justice Findings of Complexity and Excludable Time Pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(i), (ii) and (iv) filed April 20, 2012. The motion seeks to vacate the trial currently set to commence on Monday, June 18, 2012, and exclude ninety (90) days from the speedy trial calculation. A hearing was held on the motion on Wednesday, May 16, 2012. At the hearing, the government indicated that a 120 day exclusion of time from the speedy trial deadlines might be more realistic than a 90 day exclusion.
Turning to my analysis, the Speedy Trial Act generally requires a federal criminal trial to begin within seventy days from the filing of an information or indictment, or from the date of the defendant's initial appearance, whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). "The Act serves two distinct interests: (1) to protect a defendant's right to a speedy indictment and trial, and (2) to serve the public interest in ensuring prompt criminal prosecutions. United States v. Williams, 511 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 1985, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006) (emphasizing that the Act is intended not only to protect defendant's right to speedy trial, but also designed with the public interest firmly in mind)). "In balancing these two often-competing interests, the Act provides a detailed scheme under which a number of specified intervals are excluded from the seventy-day computation, thus tolling the speedy trial calendar." Id.
The Williams Court went on to say that the Act permits a district court to grant a continuance and to exclude the resulting interlude if it finds, on the record, that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Williams, 511 F.3d at 1048-49. "This provision affords a trial court substantial discretion to accommodate periods of delay to address the specific needs of a particular case." Id. However, the Tenth Circuit has cautioned that "ends-of-justice continuances should not be granted cavalierly." See United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir.1989) (observing that such continuances were "'meant to be a rarely used tool'") (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Tenth Circuit recently reaffirmed its holdings in Williams and Doran and emphasized that the ends of justice exception to the Speedy Trial Act "was meant to be a rarely used tool for those cases demanding more flexible treatment." United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 2009). "The requirement that the district court make clear on the record its reasons for granting an ends-of justice continuance serves two core purposes. It both ensures the district court considers the relevant factors and provides the court with an adequate record to review." Id. Toombs noted that the record "must contain an explanation of why the mere occurrence of the event identified by the party as necessitating the continuance results in the need for additional time." Id. at 1271.
Having carefully the motion and the controlling law, while I do not find the case to be complex at this time, I find that a continuance and 120-day exclusion of time from the speedy trial deadlines is appropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). The government indicates that the evidence in the case is substantial and needs organization and processing for pretrial disclosure. The underlying investigation included tracking devices that were authorized and deployed. It also included a court authorized wiretap of five telephones with hundreds of intercepted communications which were mainly in Spanish. The number of Spanish language wiretaps in this district is relatively small and far from the norm. The government represents that the pretrial disclosure burden in a case of this nature can be extensive and challenging as to the technical resources required to produce the material in an electronic format, and can take several weeks to accomplish. The government is also awaiting official forensic laboratory results from the testing of substances found in a vehicle stopped by the police wherein some of the defendants were arrested. Finally, not all of the defendants have been arrested or entered their first appearance.
Based on the foregoing, I agree with the government that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for trial or for pretrial proceedings within the Speedy Trial Act limits. Indeed, I find that a 120 exclusion of time is appropriate rather than the 90 day exclusion originally requested by the government. I find that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny Defendant and his counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective trial preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). I also find that the failure to grant a continuance in this case may result in a miscarriage of justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i). Finally, I find that the ends of justice served by a 120-day extension of the speedy trial deadlines outweigh the best interest of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial. It is therefore
ORDERED that the Government's Motion for Ends of Justice Findings of Complexity and Excludable Time Pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(i), (ii) and (iv) filed April 20, 2012 (ECF No. 53) is GRANTED. In accordance therewith, it is
ORDERED that a period of one hundred twenty (120) days is excluded from the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(i) and (iv). It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the jury trial set to commence on Monday, June 18, 2012, is VACATED. The deadlines for the filing of motions and responses set forth in the Order of April 20, 2012 are also VACATED. Finally, it is
ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer and file a proposed case management order or, in the alternative, a request for a status conference, by Monday, July 16, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
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Wiley Y. Daniel
Chief United States District Judge