Opinion
2:20-CR-11-FL
03-15-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DEANGELO MAURICE JOYNER, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
ROBERT B. JONES, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This matter comes before the court on Defendant Deangelo Maurice Joyner's motion to suppress. [DE-28]. The Government responded in opposition to the motion [DE-29], and the court held an evidentiary hearing on January 22, 2021. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion to suppress be denied.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A Grand Jury sitting in the Eastern District of North Carolina returned an indictment charging Joyner with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. Joyner filed the instant motion to suppress, contending that a search of his vehicle and a subsequent search of his person violated the Fourth Amendment. [DE-28] at 2-5. At the suppression hearing, the Government presented two witness and submitted two exhibits, a video clip and full-length video from the body camera of Kill Devil Hills Police Sergeant Rodney Rawls.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Testimony of Deputy Melinda Sherrod
On February 8, 2020, Deputy Sherrod of the Dare County Sheriff's Department was on routine patrol and was dispatched to investigate a hit and run. She was told that the suspect vehicle was a white work truck with ladder racks leaving Marshy Ridge Road in Collington, North Carolina. Deputy Sherrod observed a vehicle matching the description and initiated a traffic stop.
The driver was unable to roll down the window of the vehicle, so Deputy Sherrod approached slowly and gave a command to open the door. The driver cracked open the door, and Deputy Sherrod pushed it further open. Mr. Joyner was the driver and lone occupant in the vehicle. Deputy Sherrod detected the odor of alcohol and asked Mr. Joyner to step out of the truck. He moved slowly, so she assisted him out.
Deputy Sherrod took Mr. Joyner to the rear of the vehicle and asked him about the hit and run, where he was coming from, and whether he had a driver's license. Mr. Joyner said he had a driver's license but it was not on him. Deputy Sherrod later checked, and Mr. Joyner's license was revoked. According to Deputy Sherrod, Mr. Joyner was fidgety and kept reaching into his pockets. Mr. Joyner told Deputy Sherrod he was coming from Marshy Ridge. Deputy Sherrod determined that the owner of the truck was a construction company, not Mr. Joyner. She asked Mr. Joyner if he was authorized to drive the truck, and he said that he was not. Deputy Sherrod smelled the odor of marijuana on Mr. Joyner's person, so she asked him if he had anything illegal on him, and he answered that he did not. From where she was standing, Deputy Sherrod could not see anything in the cab of truck.
Deputy Sherrod ultimately charged Mr. Joyner with hit and run, driving while license revoked ("DWLR"), and open container, all of which Deputy Sherrod testified are arrestable offenses. Deputy Sherrod testified further that she would have arrested Mr. Joyner on those offenses standing alone, and he would have been searched. She also testified that in a typical hit and run investigation, there would be no need to search the interior of a vehicle because there would be no evidence located there. Deputy Sherrod stated that there were no specific facts that would have led her to believe Mr. Joyner was armed and dangerous. Deputy Sherrod said that she has discretion whether to arrest someone or issue a citation for hit and run, DWLR, and open container.
B. Testimony of Sergeant Rodney Rawls
Sergeant Rawls arrived on the scene when Mr. Joyner was still in the truck. He heard Mr. Joyner say something to the effect of "you didn't have to grab me" as he exited the truck. Sergeant Rawls saw that Mr. Joyner had a cell phone in his hand, so Sergeant Rawls took the cell phone and placed it on the seat of the truck. The interior of the cab was not illuminated, so Sergeant Rawls testified that he used a flashlight to see into the cab of the truck, but he was not leaning into the vehicle initially. He could clearly see a blue liquor bottle through the open door, and he immediately recognized it as a vodka bottle. He testified that the seal was broken on the bottle and the bottle was opened. Next to the vodka bottle, Sergeant Rawls saw a small, clear plastic bag, which he testified is indicative of possible narcotics. Sergeant Rawls could not recall whether he could see inside the bag from where he was standing outside the truck.
Sergeant Rawls reached into the truck and picked up the bag and the liquor bottle to examine them more closely. After he lifted the bag up, he thought he could see a white powder residue inside, but the bodycam footage shows that Sergeant Rawls later corrected himself and told another officer that he did not see white powder in the bag. Sergeant Rawls placed the bag back on the seat, went to the rear of the vehicle, and advised Deputy Sherrod of what he had found. Sergeant Rawls patted down Mr. Joyner and felt a firearm at his left hip area. Sergeant Rawls said, "Now I'm pissed; he has a gun," placed Mr. Joyner in handcuffs, and removed the firearm from his waistband. Law enforcement later discovered that the firearm was stolen and that Mr. Joyner did not have a concealed carry permit. Sergeant Rawls also testified that there is no protocol that would justify taking a suspect's cell phone and that he did not believe Mr. Joyner was armed and dangerous before he found the gun. Finally, Sergeant Rawls testified that at the time of the pat-down of Mr. Joyner, there was insufficient probable cause to arrest Mr. Joyner for the hit and run or driving while impaired ("DWI").
III. DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV. A search or seizure conducted without a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause is "per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One such exception to the warrant requirement for searches is the automobile exception. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); United States v. Lowing, 703 F.3d 229, 239 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. White, 549 F.3d 946, 949 (4th Cir. 2008). Additionally, an exception to the warrant requirement for seizures is the plain view doctrine. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (holding that observation of an item in plain view is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, so the plain view doctrine is "an exception that is addressed to the concerns that are implicated by seizures rather than by searches"). Accordingly, the issues here are whether a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred; whether any exception to the warrant requirement applies, such as the automobile exception or the plain view doctrine; and whether the gun found in Mr. Joyner's waistband should be suppressed.
A. Shining a flashlight into Mr. Joyner's car was not a search.
When he was standing at the open door of Mr. Joyner's truck, Sergeant Rawls shone his flashlight into the cab to better observe its contents, as the cab was not otherwise illuminated. The Government argued in its brief and at the hearing that shining a flashlight into the truck was permissible. Gov't's Resp. [DE-29] at 6. However, Mr. Joyner takes issue with Sergeant Rawls leaning into the cab of the truck rather than shining his flashlight from the doorway. Def.'s Mem. [DE-28] at 3 (contending that "When Sergeant Rawls leaned into the Defendant's truck and began shining his flashlight around, he was not in a lawful place, he was illegally searching the vehicle").
The Supreme Court has held that shining a flashlight into a vehicle is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (citations omitted) ("Maples' action in shining his flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown's car trenched upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth Amendmentthe use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection."). Accordingly, when Sergeant Rawls stood at the door of the truck and shone his flashlight inside, no search occurred.
B. Reaching into the car was a warrantless search, but it was justified by the automobile exception.
There are two definitions of a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. First, under the traditional trespassory definition, a search occurs when there is an unlicensed physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013). Second, "[a] 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) ("the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test."). If there is a physical intrusion, the question of whether the intrusion was a search is often a straightforward one under the trespassory test. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11 ("One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy").
After shining his flashlight into the truck, Sergeant Rawls placed or tossed Mr. Joyner's cell phone onto the front seat, and he saw a liquor bottle and plastic bag. He physically reached into the car to pick up the bottle and bag to better examine them. The act of reaching into a vehicle to investigate potential contraband is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, as it is a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1986) (holding that reaching into a car to move papers in order to observe the VIN was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and stating that "[w]hile the interior of an automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy that exist with respect to one's home, a car's interior as a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police. We agree with the New York Court of Appeals that the intrusion into that space constituted a 'search.'"); United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that a search occurred because the officer "entered the interior space of the vehicle when he leaned in across the plane of the door" and applying "a bright-line rule that opening a door and entering the interior space of a vehicle constitutes a Fourth Amendment search"); United States v. Taylor, 963 F.Supp.2d 580, 595 (S.D. W.Va. 2013) (holding that entering a car is a search because "law enforcement physically occupied private property-the Buick-for the purpose of obtaining information").
Because Sergeant Rawls's entry into the truck was a search, the next question is whether it was reasonable. The automobile exception justifies a warrantless search when there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found within. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (establishing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement). Probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances, and courts examine all of the facts known to the officer to see whether an objectively reasonable police officer would believe there was contraband or evidence to be found in the vehicle. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); Lowing, 703 F.3d at 239; Evans v. Griess, No. 7:13-CV-128-BO, 2013 WL 5817239, at *6 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 23, 2013).
Before Sergeant Rawls reached into the car, it appears that there was probable cause to believe that the liquor bottle was open in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.7, which prohibits transporting an open container of an alcoholic beverage. Sergeant Rawls testified that he immediately recognized the bottle as a liquor bottle, and the bodycam footage shows that the mouth of the bottle was facing towards the driver's side door. When asked if he could tell whether the bottle had been opened, Sergeant Rawls testified, "It was opened .... The seal was broken, yes." The bottle also did not appear full; it was a clear, tall, rectangular bottle with a short, thinner section at the top, and while the bodycam footage is not clear when the bottle was laying horizontally on the seat, it later shows that when Sergeant Rawls picked up the bottle and held it vertically, the short, thinner section was empty, and approximately two inches of the rectangular section of the bottle was empty. In person, Sergeant Rawls likely could have seen that the transparent bottle was not full before he picked it up, even though the video quality is not clear. In the totality of the circumstances, given the fact that Sergeant Rawls could see the broken seal of the bottle and its contents before he entered the truck, Sergeant Rawls had probable cause to believe that evidence of an open container would be found in the vehicle. See United States v. Coleman, 100 Fed.Appx. 202, 204 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that an officer had probable cause to believe there was an open container of alcohol when the officer "could see that the seal on the bottle had been broken"). Because there was probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime was in the vehicle, the entry into the truck is justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
C. The warrantless seizure of the bag was justified by the plain view doctrine.
"A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (holding that "the agents' assertion of dominion and control over the package and its contents did constitute a 'seizure'" when agents removed plastic bags of white powder from a package in order to test the substance) (citations omitted). It is not clear whether Sergeant Rawls did more than merely pick up the liquor bottle; however, the bodycam video shows that the plastic bag was eventually removed from the cab of the truck and placed in a law enforcement evidence bag. Accordingly, the plastic bag, at least, was seized without a warrant.
One exception to the warrant requirement for seizures is the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine requires three conditions: "(1) the seizing officer must be lawfully present at the place from which he can plainly view the evidence; (2) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself; and (3) it is immediately apparent that the item seized is incriminating on its face." United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37; United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 242 (4th Cir. 1994)).
First, the Government contends that Sergeant Rawls was in a lawful place from which he could plainly view the evidence because he first saw the plastic bag and liquor bottle when he was standing at the door of the truck. Gov't's Resp. [DE-29] at 6. The court agrees.
Second, Sergeant Rawls had a lawful right of access to the bag. As discussed above, he had probable cause to believe that the liquor bottle was open, so the search of the truck for evidence of an open container of alcohol was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The bag was immediately to the left of the open liquor bottle in front seat of the truck. Sergeant Rawls could lawfully enter and search the truck when he picked up the bag.
Third, the incriminating nature of the bag was immediately apparent when it was seized. The bag was transparent, so deputies could see inside it. Sergeant Rawls testified that he initially believed white powder was in the bag, but the bodycam footage shows him later correcting himself and saying to another officer that the bag did not, in fact, contain white powder. Nonetheless, the bag was a clear plastic sandwich bag with a corner missing, which is indicative of narcotics packaging in Sergeant Rawls's training and experience. See United States v. Alexander, No. 1:15CR103-1, 2015 WL 5579678, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Sept. 22, 2015); United States v. Thomas, No. 1:09CR360-1, 2009 WL 5215391, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Dec. 28, 2009) (noting that an officer found "small plastic sandwich bags with torn plastic corners" and "based on his experience and training, [he] recognized [the torn bags] to be the packaging method used by distributors of marijuana").
When Sergeant Rawls seized the plastic bag, he was lawfully present in the place from which he viewed it, he had a lawful right of access to the bag, and its incriminating nature was immediately apparent. The plain view doctrine therefore justifies the warrantless seizure of the plastic bag.
D. The gun should not be suppressed because its discovery was inevitable.
Even if the search of the truck and the seizure of the bag were unreasonable, it is recommended that the gun not be suppressed. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally precluded from use in a criminal proceeding against the individual whose rights were violated. United States v. Thomas, 908 F.3d 68, 72 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Kimble, 855 F.3d 604, 610 (4th Cir. 2017)). There are several exceptions to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (good faith); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44, (1984) (inevitable discovery); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (independent source); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006) (attenuation). Here, the Government contends that the inevitable discovery rule applies because the deputies would have found the gun regardless of the discovery of the plastic bag and vodka bottle. Gov't's Resp. [DE-29] at 10-12.
"Inevitable discovery demands that the prosecution prove by a preponderance of the evidence: first, that police legally could have uncovered the evidence; and second, that police would have done so." United States v. Alston, 941 F.3d 132, 138 (4th Cir. 2019). The inevitable discovery rule is "grounded in reasonableness" and "merely reflects the underlying purpose of the exclusionary rule: the deterrence of illegal police conduct in the search for evidence." United States v. Rodriquez, 750 F.Supp. 1272, 1277 (W.D. N.C. 1990), aff'd, 972 F.2d 343 (4th Cir. 1992).
The Government contends that the deputies would have found the gun regardless of the discovery of the plastic bag and liquor bottle because they would have arrested Mr. Joyner and conducted a search incident to arrest. Deputy Sherrod testified that she would have arrested Mr. Joyner for the hit and run, driving while license revoked ("DWLR"), and open container charges standing alone, and upon arrest, deputies would have searched Mr. Joyner's person and discovered the gun. United States v. Ruffin, 814 Fed.Appx. 741, 745 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that the search incident to arrest '"exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations,' and it permits law enforcement to search 'the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control.'" (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338-39 (2009))). Because the deputies would have arrested Mr. Joyner for charges unrelated to the seizure of the plastic bag, the discovery of the gun was inevitable, and the exclusionary rule should not apply. Accordingly, it is recommended that the gun not be suppressed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's motion to suppress [DE-28] be DENIED.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on each of the parties or, if represented, their counsel. Each party shall have until March 29, 2021 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b). Any response to objections shall be filed by within 14 days of the filing of the objections.
If a party does not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, the party will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, the party's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar the party from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).