Opinion
2:95-cr-00324-JAD
10-06-2021
United States of America, Plaintiff v. Barry Addison Gray, Defendant
ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE AND GRANTING GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MEDICAL RECORDS UNDER SEAL [ECF NOS. 64, 68]
Jennifer A. Dorsey U.S. District-Judge
Counseled inmate Barry Addison Gray moves for compassionate release because of his earlier COVID-19 infection and its long-term effects. In conjunction with its response to Gray's compassionate-release motion, the government provides an exhibit containing Gray's medical records and moves to seal that exhibit. The government has shown that good cause exists to seal those records because they contain Gray's confidential medical information, so I grant it that relief. But because Gray appears to have discharged his sentence imposed by this court and is currently incarcerated under a sentence imposed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider his compassionate-release motion. So I deny the motion without prejudice to Gray's ability to file it in the Northern District of Alabama. 1
ECF Nos. 64 (Gray's emergency motion), 65 (Gray's attorney's notice of non-supplementation).
ECF Nos. 68 (motion to seal), 69 (medical records to be sealed).
Discussion
Gray moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), which governs the modification of an imposed term of imprisonment. The statute suggests, and courts have reasonably interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) to mean, that only the sentencing court can address a motion for compassionate release. And it seems logical that the only court that can grant compassionate release from the sentence that an inmate is serving is the one that imposed that sentence.
ECF No. 64.
See United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 596 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the court of appeals lacked the authority to decide the inmate's compassionate-release motion because 18 U.S.C. § 3582 requires those motions to be addressed to the sentencing court); United States v. Smith, 896 F.3d 466, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (the sentencing court considers the factors in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) and decides whether to grant a sentence reduction); United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733, 749 (6th Cir. 2020) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) to apply to sentencing courts). See also United States v. Ono, 72 F.3d 101, 102 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing sentencing court's ability to modify sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
It appears that Gray's sentencing court is not this one, but rather the Northern District of Alabama. This court's records show that Gray was sentenced on May 7, 1996, to serve a 235-month (19 years, 7 months) sentence. The Northern District of Alabama's records show that, the next year, it sentenced Gray on May 22, 1997, to serve yet another 235-month sentence to run consecutive to his sentence from this court. Because Gray's sentencing occurred more than 2 235 months ago, it occurred to me that he may have satisfied his sentence from this district, leaving only his Northern District of Alabama sentence, so I obtained further information about the status of Gray's sentences from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The BOP's sentence-computation data confirms that Gray has served almost 26 years in BOP custody. He has long-since completed the 19-year, 7-month sentence this court imposed and is well into serving his consecutive sentence handed down by the Northern District of Alabama. This means that the sentence that Gray is now serving is the one from the Northern District of Alabama, and this court no longer has jurisdiction to consider his compassionate-release request because there is no sentence from this court left to modify. Gray's motion should be filed instead in the Northern District of Alabama.
ECF No. 22 at 4.
United States v. Gray, 5:96-00049 (N.D. Ala.) (docket sheet). These facts constitute undisputed matters of public record and I take judicial notice of them. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of an “adjudicative fact” that is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it “(1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2). A court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980), and of “court filings and other matters of public record.” In re Icenhower, 755 F.3d 1130, 1142 (9th Cir. 2014).
Exhibit 1 at 4 (redacted by the court for confidential information).
These facts are not disputed and can be accurately and readily determined from the BOP's records. The BOP's records on this topic cannot be reasonably disputed because it is the agency, through the United States Attorney General, that is tasked with administering sentences imposed by federal district courts. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a). So I also take judicial notice of the BOP's computation of Gray's sentence and the fact that Gray has expired the sentence imposed on him by the District of Nevada.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Dickinson, 2021 WL 4147823, *2 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 13, 2021) (“As Defendant's sentence to this Court has already been satisfied, and indeed was fully satisfied before [his] motion for compassionate release was ripe for decision, this Court has no jurisdiction to grant compassionate release.”).
Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Gray's motion for compassionate release [ECF No. 64] is DENIED without prejudice to his ability to refile that motion in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Gray, along with a copy of his motion [ECF No. 64]. 3
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the government's motion to seal medical records that it submitted in support of its response to Gray's compassionate-release motion [ECF No. 68] is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to maintain the seal on ECF No. 69. 4