Opinion
5:19-CR-00176-FL
08-30-2022
United States of America, v. Lester Alexander Flores-Paz, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
Robert T. Numbers, II United States Magistrate Judge
Almost three years passed from the time a federal grand jury indicted Defendant Lester Alexander Flores-Paz to his federal arrest. He believes this significant delay violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause, and asks that the court use its authority under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) to dismiss his charge. The United States, while acknowledging the delay, claims that the circumstances of this case do not justify dismissal.
While the undersigned does not condone this lengthy and unjustified delay, the law compels a ruling in the government's favor. Flores-Paz cannot show that the delay has prejudiced his ability to defend against the government's allegation. And his argument that the delay will cause him to face a longer sentence if convicted does not provide him relief under existing precedent or the Sixth Amendment's original public meaning. As a result, the district court should deny Flores-Paz's motion.
I. Background
In March 2019, law enforcement officers in Harnett County, North Carolina arrested Flores-Paz and charged him with a state felony. After his arrest, officials submitted his fingerprints to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement database. That database tied Flores-Paz's fingerprints to those of a previously deported alien.
While he was in state custody, a federal grand jury indicted Flores-Paz in April 2019 for illegal reentry into the United States. D.E. 1. The Clerk of Court issued a warrant for his arrest the same day. D.E. 4.
In August 2019, Flores-Paz pleaded guilty to his state charge and received an active sentence of 44 to 113 months in prison. He remained in state custody until March 2022-35 months after he was federally indicted and 31 months after his state charges were resolved-when federal officials arrested him on his illegal reentry charge.
II. Discussion
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow a court to dismiss an indictment “if unnecessary delay occurs in. . .bringing a defendant to trial.” Fed. R. Cr. P. 48(b). Relying on this rule, Flores-Paz argues that the government has violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and asks the court to dismiss the charge against him. He believes there was an unreasonable delay between his indictment and arrest on his federal charge. The government argues there has been no violation because it delayed his federal arrest to allow his state case to go forward without federal interference. And it contends that the delay has not prejudiced Flores-Paz.
Courts apply a four-part test to determine whether a defendant has suffered a violation of his speedy trial rights. In this case three of those factors weigh in Flores-Paz's favor. But the final-and most important-factor, whether he suffered prejudice from the delay, does not. The passage of time has not resulted in an unduly long pretrial detention in federal custody, caused unnecessary anxiety for Florez-Paz, or impacted his ability to defend his case.
Flores-Paz tries to show prejudice by claiming he will face a longer prison sentence if convicted. But Supreme Court precedent strongly suggests that sentencing issues are not relevant to the Speedy Trial Clause. And the Sixth Amendment's original public meaning shows that lengthy pretrial detention, not increased sentencing exposure, was the principle evil the Speedy Trial Clause tried to address. Thus, Flores-Paz is not entitled to relief, and the district court should deny his motion.
A. Legal Standard
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides, among other things, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]” U.S. Const. amend VI. This right “is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.” Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
The Supreme Court has developed a four-part test to determine whether a delay in prosecution violates the Speedy Trial Clause. First, the court considers the length of the delay to see if it is long enough to justify further inquiry. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Second, the court must look at the reason for the delay. Id. Third, the court assesses whether the defendant asserted his speedy trial right promptly. Id. And fourth, the court considers whether the defendant has endured one (or more) of three evils: oppressive pretrial incarceration, excessive anxiety and concern, or an impaired ability to defend himself against the government's charges. Id. at 132.
With this framework in mind, the undersigned turns to the analysis of Flores-Paz's motion.
B. Whether the length of the delay triggers further analysis
The Speedy Trial Clause analysis begins by considering whether the length of the delay “has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial' delay.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). Whether the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial depends on the circumstances of the case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31. But generally a delay of over a year will cause the court to consider the remaining factors. See, e.g., Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1 (suggesting in dicta that post-accusation delay of one year is generally long enough for presumed prejudice); United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir. 2009) (two-year period of delay triggered further speedy trial analysis); United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 2005) (suggesting delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial).
Here, almost three years passed between Flores-Paz's indictment and arrest. The government does not dispute that this delay requires analysis of the remaining factors. Resp. in Opp. at 4, D.E. 26 (“The delay in this case meets the triggering threshold[.]”). So the court will proceed with the analysis.
C. Reason for the Delay
The analysis next turns to why it took so long for the government to arrest Flores-Paz. Different reasons for delay will be given different weights in the analysis. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Bad faith by the government will, of course, weigh heavily against the government. Id. More neutral reasons, such as negligence by the government, weigh against the government less heavily. Id. But there are also valid reasons for delay such as locating missing witnesses, tracking down the defendant, and waiting for another sovereign to conclude its prosecution of the defendant. Id.; United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 150-51 (4th Cir. 1995).
The government claims it delayed arresting Flores-Paz because it did not want to interfere with his prosecution by the State of North Carolina. Resp. in Opp. at 6, D.E. 26. As noted above, respecting another sovereign's ability to pursue a prosecution is a valid reason for a delay in prosecution. Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150 (“The need to allow Thomas to be prosecuted by the State without interference by the federal government” was an “obvious reason” for delay). So the four- month delay between Flores-Paz's federal indictment and the resolution of his state case does not support his claim for relief.
Yet the United States waited 29 months after Flores-Paz's state case ended to arrest him. And it does not have a good excuse for that delay. The government candidly admits that Flores-Paz's case was not considered a priority because he was serving a long state sentence and it effectively fell through the cracks while the government pursued other cases. Hr'g Tr. at 8:2-9:17. Flores-Paz does not challenge the government's position. Id. at 9:18-10:4. So given that the delay resulted from the government neglecting the case, this factor weighs in Flores-Paz's favor, but only slightly. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
D. Assertion of the Right
After considering the reason for the delay, the court must assess when and if Flores-Paz asserted his speedy trial rights. Failure to assert the right-or waiver of it-will weigh heavily against a defendant alleging a speedy trial violation. Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150. Flores-Paz was unaware of his federal charges until his arrest. So he could not have asserted his speedy trial rights until after his arrest. Since he did so promptly after his arrest, this factor weighs in Flores-Paz's favor. Hall, 551 F.3d at 272.
E. Prejudice
Finally, the court will consider whether the delay has prejudiced the defendant. In evaluating prejudice, the court should consider three things: whether the defendant has suffered oppressive pretrial incarceration, the amount of anxiety and concern caused to the accused by the delay, and whether the delay impaired the defendant's defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
The first two types of prejudice are not present here. Flores-Paz has been in state custody for an unrelated offense since before his federal indictment. So he has not faced oppressive pretrial detention related to his federal charge. And he was unaware of the federal indictment, which means he could have suffered no anxiety or mental anguish because of it.
That leaves the question of whether the delay has impaired Flores-Paz's defense. Sometimes a delay can be long enough for the court to presume that prejudice exists. But in other cases, the defendant must make an affirmative showing of prejudice.
The Supreme Court discussed this concept in Doggett. In that case, the court explained that “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. This is because “impairment of one's defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be shown.'” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). The Court, however, noted that “presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria[.]” Id. at 656. Only when there is a sufficiently long delay and “the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted,” is the defendant “entitled to relief.” Id. at 658 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Flores-Paz has not shown that the delay between his indictment and arrest creates a presumption of prejudice that entitles him to relief. The almost-three-year delay between indictment and arrest in this case is much shorter than the eight-and-a-half-year delay in Doggett. So Flores-Paz has not shown that the delay triggers the presumptive prejudice finding.
But even if he did, the presumption was persuasively rebutted here. Flores-Paz has conceded that, because of the nature of the charge against him, the passage of time has not impacted his ability to defend himself against the government's allegations. Hr'g Tr. At 13:7-20. So he has not shown that the government's negligence has presumptively or actually prejudiced him.
Perhaps recognizing these limitations, Flores-Paz says that he has suffered prejudice because, if convicted, he will now face a higher advisory guideline range at sentencing. Mot. to Dismiss at 5, D.E. 23. He claims that, because the government waited to arrest him until after he was sentenced for his state offense, he will have a higher criminal history category and be subject to certain harsher sentencing enhancements than he would have been if the government acted with more haste. Id. He says that, rather than face an advisory guideline range of 0 to 6 months in prison, he is now facing between 21 and 24 months of incarceration. Id. This increased sentencing exposure, he claims, establishes prejudice under the Speedy Trial Clause.
Though the parties disagree about how exactly the state conviction will factor into the sentence, both parties agree that Flores-Paz may be subject to greater penalties if convicted of the federal charge now that he has been convicted of the state felony.
But there are two serious impediments to accepting this argument. First, the Supreme Court's decision in Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 439 (2016), limits the Speedy Trial Clause's protections after a defendant has been convicted. And second, this argument seeks to expand the Speedy Trial Clause's protections in a way that appears to deviate from its original public meaning.
In Betterman, the Supreme Court addressed whether “the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee appl[ies] to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution[.]” Id. at 439. It answered this question by holding “that the guarantee protects the accused from arrest or indictment through trial, but does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges.” Id. This language strongly suggests that any sentencing-related consequences caused by a delay are not relevant when considering Speedy Trial Clause issues.
Betterman's factual underpinnings differ from the facts in this case. There, the dispute was over the more typical speedy trial issue of whether a delay in sentencing after conviction violated the Speedy Trial Clause. Id. at 440. So it did not squarely address the issue that confronts this court.
Yet the Supreme Court unequivocally disavowed any role for the Speedy Trial Clause in the sentencing context. Id. at 441 (“Today we hold that the right detaches upon conviction[.]”). And it reached this conclusion by focusing on the need to avoid undue interference with the defendant's liberty before conviction, prevent undue anxiety, and protect against the loss of evidence related to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 444. The Court noted that different constitutional interests (with different constitutional protections) are involved at sentencing. Id. at 447-48. So, based on Betterman's language, it would be inappropriate to consider sentencing-related issues to determine whether there has been a violation of the Speedy Trial Clause.
The Supreme Court, however, noted that other constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process Clause, may provide a defendant with an avenue for relief at the sentencing phase. Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 447-48. The Court noted, “After conviction, a defendant's due process right to liberty, while diminished, is still present. He retains an interest in a sentencing proceeding that is fundamentally fair” Id. at 448. No such argument has been raised here.
What's more, Flores-Paz's argument would require expansion of the speedy trial right in a manner inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment's original public meaning. Judges have a “duty to interpret the Constitution in light of its text, structure, and original understanding.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 573 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). And when a party advances a constitutional argument that is questionable “as an original matter,” the court must “tread carefully before extending” the scope of a constitutional right. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S.Ct. 738, 756 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
As has been explained in detail elsewhere, “from its origins, the core right protected” by the Speedy Trial Clause was the right of “the accused” to be free “from long detention without an adjudication of guilt.” United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 2022) (Bumatay, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). There does not appear to be any suggestion from English common law, legal commentators relied on by the founding generation, or early American legal practice that the speedy trial right concerned itself with the sentence a defendant would receive upon conviction. Id. Despite being invited to do so, July 22, 2022 Order, D.E. 27, Flores-Paz has presented no evidence to the contrary. Since the Sixth Amendment's original public meaning does not support an expansion of the speedy trial right the way Flores-Paz suggests, the undersigned declines to adopt his argument.
Having considered the Barker factors, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny Flores-Paz's motion. Although there is no good reason for the United States' delay in arresting Flores-Paz, the delay has not subjected him to oppressively long pretrial detention or any other cognizable type of prejudice. Thus, Flores-Paz has not suffered a violation of his right to a speedy trial, and his motion should be denied.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the court should deny Flores-Paz's motion to dismiss (D.E. 23).
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals.