Opinion
Case No. 6:20-CR-00118-DCJ
2021-03-01
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Courtney Eugene ELLIOTT, Defendant.
Erin Cornell, US Attorney, Muskogee, OK, for Plaintiff.
Erin Cornell, US Attorney, Muskogee, OK, for Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM RULING
DAVID C. JOSEPH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is a Motion to Suppress (the "Motion") filed by Defendant, Courtney Eugene Elliott ("Elliott") in the above-captioned matter [Doc. 25]. The Government opposes the Motion [Doc. 26]. An evidentiary hearing was held on February 8, 2021, during which the Court took testimony from two law enforcement officers with the Eufaula Police Department. For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
The Eufaula Police Department is the municipal law enforcement agency for the City of Eufaula, a political subdivision in McIntosh County, Oklahoma.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the evening of May 31, 2020, Elliott was driving eastbound on State Highway 9 through Eufaula, Oklahoma when he allegedly struck the victim's vehicle almost head-on. The victim, a Native American, died at the scene of the collision. The victim's minor daughter was a passenger in the vehicle and survived but sustained injuries.
Eufaula, Oklahoma is located within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, per an 1866 treaty between the United States and the Creek Nation that established the current tribal boundaries. See McGirt v. Oklahoma , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 2452, 207 L.Ed.2d 985 (2020).
Shortly after the collision, Sergeant Josh Cummings ("Sergeant Cummings") of the Eufaula Police Department was dispatched to the scene of the accident at approximately 9:58 p.m. Upon his arrival, Sergeant Cummings observed that (i) EMS was already present, (ii) the victim's white SUV had rolled over onto the shoulder of the highway, and (iii) Elliott's white Ford F-250 truck had been driven off the roadway.
As Sergeant Cummings approached Elliott's vehicle, he spotted Elliott crawling out of the passenger side of his vehicle and noted several signs indicative of intoxication, including a staggering gait, an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and red, watery eyes. During subsequent non-custodial questioning, Elliott admitted to Sergeant Cummings that he had consumed alcoholic beverages at a bar earlier that evening. When asked about the collision, Elliott told Sergeant Cummings that he last remembered checking to make sure he was in his lane, but that he was otherwise unsure of how the collision occurred. EMS subsequently transported Elliott to Saint Francis Hospital ("Saint Francis") in Muskogee, Oklahoma for medical treatment.
After Elliott had been taken to Saint Francis, Eufaula's Chief of Police, Mark Goodwin ("Chief Goodwin"), called the Muskogee Police Department ("MPD") to inquire whether they would be willing to send an officer to obtain a blood sample from Elliott. The MPD denied Chief Goodwin's request – apparently without explanation. Chief Goodwin thereafter instructed Sergeant Cummings to leave the scene of the collision and collect a blood sample from Elliott at the hospital. Sergeant Cummings arrived at Saint Francis around midnight, placed Elliott under arrest at approximately 12:07 a.m., and read Elliott Oklahoma's Implied Consent Test Request. Thereafter, according to Sergeant Cummings' police report and his testimony at the February 8th evidentiary hearing, the following events transpired:
Elliott did not advise that he refused to take the test but did advise that he was not coherent enough to consent to the test. I advised him that I needed a yes or no answer and that if he would not supply me with a specific answer that it would be considered as a refusal. Elliott once again stated that he is not refusing to take the state's test but that he was not coherent enough to consent to the test at this time. I advised Elliott that due to him refusing to say yes or no to the question to take the State's test a refusal will be the outcome. Elliott was advised during the reading of the Implied Consent of the consequences of a refusal of the State's test. I started to complete the refusal paperwork while waiting on medical personnel to clear Elliott. I also advised my Chief of Police [of] the situation. Chief Goodwin advised me, that under advisement of District 25 District Attorney Carol Iske [sic], to go ahead and obtain a blood sample from Elliott.
[Docs. 25, 26].
Chief Goodwin likewise testified at the evidentiary hearing that, given the fact that the collision had caused a fatality, District Attorney Carol Iski ("DA Iski"), in her capacity as a legal advisor to the Eufaula Police Department, instructed the officers to proceed with the blood test notwithstanding Elliott's lack of consent. Based on this advice and Chief Goodwin's own represented familiarity with Oklahoma law authorizing involuntary blood draws in connection with traffic fatalities, Chief Goodwin directed Sergeant Cummings to ask the medical personnel at Saint Francis to conduct the blood draw. The results allegedly revealed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.18, which exceeds Oklahoma's threshold of 0.08.
On October 28, 2020, Elliott was indicted in the Eastern District of Oklahoma for involuntary manslaughter in Indian Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1151, and 1152. Elliott filed this Motion to Suppress on December 9, 2020, contending that his blood draw results should be excluded from evidence because the warrantless, nonconsensual blood test violated the Fourth Amendment. The Government filed an Opposition to the Motion on December 16, 2020, arguing that suppression is not warranted because Elliott's blood draw was justified by the exigent circumstances and good faith exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of warrantless searches. The Court set this matter for evidentiary hearing on February 8, 2021.
Elliott was originally charged by the State of Oklahoma with first degree manslaughter, DUI with BAC of .08 or greater, great bodily injury, and driving with a cancelled/suspended/revoked license. [McIntosh County Case No. CF-2020-98]. However, the state court dismissed the action after Elliott was charged federally in the Eastern District of Oklahoma pursuant to the Supreme Court precedent in McGirt v. Oklahoma. ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 2452, 207 L.Ed.2d 985 (2020). In McGirt , the Supreme Court declared that the land reserved for the Creek Nation in the 19th century remains "Indian country." Id. The federal Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, mandates that "only the federal government, not the State, may prosecute Indians for major crimes committed in Indian country." Id. at 2478. Accordingly, because the incident occurred in Indian country and the victim was Native American, the state court lacked jurisdiction over this case.
In anticipation of the hearing, the Court held a telephone conference with counsel for both parties to request additional briefing concerning the legal basis for the Government's warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw – particularly the relevancy of Oklahoma Statutes Title 47 Section 753(A) (O.S. 47:753(A)) to the issues presented in the Motion. In response, Elliott submitted a Supplemental Motion to Suppress [Doc. 40], to which the Government filed a Supplemental Response in Opposition. [Doc. 41].
At the evidentiary hearing, in addition to recounting the factual background described above, Sergeant Cummings and Chief Goodwin testified to the following facts pertinent to the Court's resolution of this Motion:
(i) Chief Goodwin was also present at the scene of the accident and took over the investigation before sending Sergeant Cummings to Saint Francis.
(ii) Chief Goodwin encountered Elliott at the accident scene while he was receiving medical attention in the back of the ambulance. Elliott emitted a strong odor of alcohol.
(iii) A breathalyzer test was never attempted because the equipment to perform the test is located at the Eufaula jail, and Elliott needed medical attention at the hospital for his own injuries.
(iv) The officers interpreted Elliott's lack of an affirmative response to Sergeant Cummings' reading of the Implied Consent Test Request as a refusal to consent.
(v) Chief Goodwin and DA Iski did not discuss whether the Eufaula Police Department should apply for a search warrant for the nonconsensual blood draw. Their conversation was limited to the facts giving rise to a probable cause determination to both arrest Elliott and obtain a BAC blood draw given Elliott's refusal to consent.
(vi) Based on Chief Goodwin's reliance on DA Iski's advice and his knowledge of Oklahoma Statutes Title 47 Section 753(A), which authorizes warrantless blood draws in the event of a fatality or great
bodily injury, Chief Goodwin did not apply for a search warrant prior to authorizing Elliott's blood draw.
(vii) The Eufaula Police Department may contact the magistrate judge directly to obtain a search warrant electronically or by telephone pursuant to Oklahoma law. However, it is the routine practice of the Eufaula Police Department for the district attorney to screen warrant applications.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." This constitutional protection applies to the search at issue in this case – the physical intrusion into Elliott's veins to obtain a blood sample for use as evidence in a criminal investigation. Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). Thus, the Court must resolve whether Elliott's warrantless, nonconsensual blood test was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. If the test constituted an unreasonable search, then the exclusionary rule – absent an applicable exception – operates to suppress Elliott's test results. See Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
I. Oklahoma Statutes Title 47 Section 753
As an initial matter, O.S. 47:753(A) prohibits officers from conducting nonconsensual BAC testing of a conscious suspect under arrest for driving under the influence of an intoxicating substance "except upon the issuance of a search warrant or unless the investigating officer has probable cause to believe that the person under arrest, while intoxicated, has operated the motor vehicle in such a manner as to have caused the death or serious physical injury of any other person or persons." Thus, Oklahoma law substantially limits the circumstances in which police officers may obtain a blood sample from a drunk driving suspect without a warrant or the suspect's consent.
O.S. 47:753(A) attempts to balance the competing interests at play in the context of warrantless, nonconsensual BAC testing. Importantly, states have a strong interest in combating drunk driving and ensuring highway safety, and prompt BAC testing is vital to further that interest. Mitchell v. Wisconsin , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2525, 2535, 204 L.Ed.2d 1040 (2019) (noting that "from the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's, ‘the number of annual fatalities averaged 25,000; by 2014 ..., the number had fallen to below 10,000.’ "). However, BAC testing, particularly in the form of a blood test, involves a compelled physical intrusion into the human body, implicating significant constitutionally protected privacy interests. McNeely , 569 U.S. at 159, 133 S.Ct. 1552. Accordingly, Supreme Court precedent holds that states' substantial interest in eradicating drunk driving does not justify warrantless, nonconsensual blood tests absent a showing of exigent circumstances making the acquisition of a warrant impractical. Id. at 160, 133 S.Ct. 1552.
To ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment and Supreme Court jurisprudence, all fifty states have enacted implied consent laws that, as a condition of using public roads, require drivers to consent to BAC testing "when there is sufficient reason to believe they are violating the State's drunk-driving laws." Mitchell , 139 S.Ct. at 2531 ; McNeely , 569 U.S. at 161, 133 S.Ct. 1552. Generally, implied consent laws impose serious consequences when a motorist refuses to consent to BAC testing, such as license suspension or revocation. McNeely , 569 U.S. at 161, 133 S.Ct. 1552. Many states also allow the government to use a drunk driving suspect's BAC refusal as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. When a motorist refuses to consent to BAC blood testing, officers may not compel a test prior to obtaining a warrant or unless exigent circumstances are present. See id. at 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558. Therefore, many states, including Oklahoma with O.S. 47:753(A), have restricted police officers' authority to obtain a warrantless, nonconsensual blood sample to cases involving an accident resulting in death or serious bodily injury – seemingly legislating these two circumstances as de jure exigent circumstances. See id.
While federal jurisprudence is clear that accidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury often occasion exigent circumstances, the Supreme Court has consistently held that exigency must be determined on a case-by-case basis in consideration of the "totality of the circumstances." See McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute a per se exigency that renders a warrantless blood test of a drunk driving suspect reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). This is because, regardless of any statutory authorization, it is clear that a nonconsensual blood draw constitutes a search within the context of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, Oklahoma courts have recognized this constitutional requirement. See Stewart v. State , 442 P.3d 158, 161 (Okla. Crim. App. 2019) (holding that "more than simple compliance with [a] statute is required in order to justify the warrantless seizure of blood from an intoxicated driving suspect" as "[t]here must be an individualized determination of probable cause by a magistrate based upon the totality of the facts of each case, and the issuance of a search warrant, unless some exigent circumstance(s) renders it impractical to obtain a warrant beforehand"). Thus, it is doubtful that statutes like O.S. 47:753(A) survive constitutional scrutiny if facially applied to all situations falling within their breadth. Accordingly, in this case the Government must establish – in addition to statutory authorization under O.S. 47:753(A) – that Sergeant Cummings' procurement of Elliott's blood sample did not violate the defendant's protections under the Fourth Amendment.
II. Compliance with the Fourth Amendment
A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a judicially recognized exception. Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). The Government submits that Elliott's blood test is justified by the exigent circumstances and good faith exceptions. For reasons that follow, the Court finds that the applicability of the good faith exception to the facts of this case obviates the need for a determination as to the exigency of the circumstances.
a) The Exigent Circumstances Exception
The exigent circumstances exception "applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). Elliott maintains that the evidence gleaned from his blood test should be suppressed because Sergeant Cummings and Chief Goodwin were not confronted with exigent circumstances precluding them from obtaining a warrant, thereby rendering his nonconsensual blood test unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's opinions in Schmerber v. California and Missouri v. Mitchell both describe circumstances deemed exigent so as to permit a warrantless blood draw. The defendant in Schmerber , who had been convicted in California state court of driving under the influence of alcohol, challenged the warrantless testing of his blood ordered by police while he was receiving medical treatment at a hospital for injuries sustained in a car accident approximately two hours earlier. 384 U.S. 757, 769, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). At the scene of the accident and again at the hospital, the arresting officer noticed several signs of intoxication upon which he made a probable cause determination. Id. The Supreme Court found no Fourth Amendment violation, reasoning that the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency" that threatened the destruction of evidence. Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Particularly, because time had been taken to bring the defendant to a hospital and to investigate the accident scene, the threat of evidence destruction – the diminishment of the percentage of alcohol in the blood shortly after drinking stops – inhibited the officer's opportunity to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Id. at 770–71, 86 S.Ct. 1826.
Similarly, in Mitchell , the defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated after a preliminary breath test registered his BAC triple the state's legal limit. ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2525, 204 L.Ed.2d 1040 (2019). When the arresting officer brought him to the police station for a more reliable breath test, he was too lethargic to take the test. Id. at 2532. The officer then brought the defendant to a nearby hospital for a blood test, but he lost consciousness by the time they arrived. Id. Nonetheless, the officer directed medical personnel to administer the blood test while the defendant remained unconscious. Id.
Affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress his blood test results, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's own medical condition created an exigency such that the warrantless blood draw was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2538. Additionally, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Schmerber and declared that "an exigency exists when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application." Id. at 2533.
Here, like the Schmerber defendant, Elliott was arrested and subjected to a warrantless blood test at a hospital while receiving medical treatment for injuries sustained in a car accident. However, Elliott attempts to distinguish his case from Schmerber by establishing that Sergeant Cummings and Chief Goodwin did not have other pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that prevented them from applying for a warrant. See id. Specifically, Elliott directs this Court to O.S. 22:1225(B), which authorizes police officers to apply for search warrants by telephone and electronic mail, and contends that the ease of applying for a warrant in Oklahoma renders the Government's argument that the officers had competing priorities untenable under the facts of this case.
At the evidentiary hearing, the officers testified that Chief Goodwin remained at the scene of the accident to complete the investigation while Sergeant Cummings went to the hospital to obtain Elliott's blood test. During the approximately two hours between the accident and Elliott's arrest, Chief Goodwin made phone calls to the Muskogee Police Department, DA Iski, and Sergeant Cummings. Additionally, Chief Goodwin testified that he had knowledge of O.S. 22:1225(B) at the time of the incident. Based on these facts, Elliott argues that the officers could have easily procured a warrant via telephone or email.
The constitutionality of warrantless, nonconsensual BAC blood draws is a dynamic and fact-intensive area of criminal law. The Court notes that Schmerber is a 1966 opinion decided in a pre-technology era when a warrant application was not nearly as convenient as it is today. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recently cast doubt on whether technological advancements expediting the warrant application process changes the exigent circumstances analysis:
Warrants inevitably take some time for police officers or prosecutors to complete and for magistrate judges to review. Telephonic and electronic warrants may still require officers to follow time-consuming formalities designed to create an adequate record, such as preparing a duplicate warrant before calling the magistrate judge.... And improvements in communications technology do not guarantee that a magistrate judge will be available when an officer needs a warrant after making a late-night arrest.
Mitchell , 139 S.Ct. at 2539 (quoting McNeely , 569 U.S. at 155, 133 S.Ct. 1552 ). The most recent case adjudicated by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that evaluated the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw under the state's statutory scheme was Stewart v. State , which, significantly, was decided about one month before Mitchell.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest court in the State of Oklahoma with appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters.
In Stewart , the defendant lost control of his vehicle, causing an accident with another vehicle that resulted in two fatalities, injuries of the defendant's passengers, and the defendant's own injuries. 442 P.3d 158, 160 (Okla. Crim. App. 2019). The defendant was airlifted to a trauma center for medical treatment. Id. At the trauma center, a nurse, at the direction of a state trooper, administered the defendant's blood test without a search warrant or consent approximately three hours after the collision. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not definitively rule on whether the exigent circumstances exception applied under the facts of that case, but it ultimately affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress his blood test results based on the good faith exception. Id. at 164.
Stewart involved the trooper's good faith reliance on O.S. 47:10-104(B), not the statute at issue in this case.
Despite the questions raised by Stewart regarding an analogous statute, Oklahoma state courts have not yet had occasion to assess how O.S. 47:753(A) fits into the framework set forth in Mitchell. Nonetheless, regardless of whether exigent circumstances were present, the fruits of Elliott's blood test need not be suppressed because the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applies to the officers' conduct.
b) The Good Faith Exception
The officers' testimony at the evidentiary hearing revealed that Sergeant Cummings obtained Elliott's blood sample at the direction of Chief Goodwin. Chief Goodwin, in turn, testified that in directing Sergeant Cummings to obtain the blood draw, he relied both on the advice of DA Iski and his own knowledge of O.S. 47:753(A). Given these facts, the Government submits that the officers' conduct was objectively reasonable and undertaken in good faith. The Court agrees.
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created mechanism to deter police misconduct. Id. Nonetheless, "where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, ‘excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that ... the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances.’ " U.S. v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 920, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3419, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (citing Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. at 539–540, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) ). Thus, "[a]n officer may make a mistake, including a mistake of law, yet still act reasonably under the circumstances.... [W]hen an officer acts reasonably under the circumstances, he is not violating the Fourth Amendment." Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 135 S.Ct. 530, 535, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014).
Here, Chief Goodwin and Sergeant Cummings acted as reasonable officers in performing their duties. According to the testimonies of the two officers, the Eufaula Police Department's practice is to consult with the district attorney prior to applying for a warrant, which Chief Goodwin did here. The officers had probable cause to arrest Elliott based on physical signs of intoxication, including slurred speech, a staggering gait, and red, watery eyes, as well as Elliott's admission to consuming alcohol prior to the accident. Chief Goodwin communicated these facts, in addition to the facts that (i) a fatality had occurred, (ii) Elliott had been transported to the hospital, and (iii) over two hours had lapsed since the accident, to DA Iski, who then advised Chief Goodwin to proceed with the blood draw.
The Court finds that Chief Goodwin's reliance on DA Iski's advice and O.S. 47:753(A) was objectively reasonable. Hence, even if O.S. 47:753(A) does not withstand constitutional scrutiny in all factual scenarios, suppression of Elliott's BAC test would serve no deterrent effect. See Illinois v. Krull , 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) ("The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute would have ... little deterrent effect on the officer's actions"). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression of the warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw at issue.
It should be noted that the blood draw in this case took place just months after important developments in the applicable law, including both Stewart v. State , 442 P.3d 158 (Okla. Crim. App. 2019), and Mitchell v. Wisconsin , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2525, 204 L.Ed.2d 1040 (2019). The Court's application of the good faith exception to these facts is influenced by the proximity of these decisions to May 31, 2020. Future cases of a similar nature will likely require an exigency analysis under the framework set forth in Mitchell , 139 S.Ct. 2525.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion.
THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 1st day of March 2021.