Opinion
1:08-cr-00053
09-02-2020
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Tiran Rodez CASTEEL, Defendant.
Michael Brian Duffy, Richard E. Rothrock, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, 8 SOUTH 6TH STREET, SUITE 348, COUNCIL BLUFFS, IA 51501, 712-256-5009, 712-256-5112 (fax), michael.duffy@usdoj.gov, for Plaintiff. Andrew James Graeve, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE, 400 LOCUST STREET, SUITE 340, DES MOINES, IA 50309-2353, 515-309-9610, 515-309-9625 (fax), andrew_graeve@fd.org, for Defendant.
Michael Brian Duffy, Richard E. Rothrock, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, 8 SOUTH 6TH STREET, SUITE 348, COUNCIL BLUFFS, IA 51501, 712-256-5009, 712-256-5112 (fax), michael.duffy@usdoj.gov, for Plaintiff.
Andrew James Graeve, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE, 400 LOCUST STREET, SUITE 340, DES MOINES, IA 50309-2353, 515-309-9610, 515-309-9625 (fax), andrew_graeve@fd.org, for Defendant.
ORDER
ROBERT W. PRATT, Judge
Before the Court is Defendant Tiran Rodez Casteel's pro se Motion for Compassionate Release, filed on July 6, 2020, with multiple addendums. ECF Nos. 702, 703, 705. The Government filed its resistance on August 4. ECF No. 708. Defendant replied on August 12 and again submitted multiple supplements. ECF Nos. 709, 710, 715. Defendant has also submitted a Motion for Document Production and a Motion for Telephone Hearing, ECF Nos. 711, 712, both of which the Government resists, ECF No. 714. Finding the filings and addendums sufficient to decide the Motions, the Court declines to hold a telephone hearing. The matter is fully submitted. I. BACKGROUND
On November 20, 2009, and February 9, 2012, Defendant was convicted of six counts of an Indictment including robbery, obstruction of justice, and felon in possession of a firearm in two separate jury trials. ECF Nos. 71, 259, 470. Defendant used illegally purchased firearms to rob an elderly victim at gunpoint and then solicited others to kill the victim in order to prevent her from testifying at trial. ECF No. 708 ¶ 2. In two proceedings, this Court sentenced Defendant to a total of 319 months of incarceration to be followed by five years of supervised release. ECF Nos. 450, 502. During allocution, Defendant argued at length against his conviction, asserting, "I never did nothing wrong," and "I shouldn't even be here." ECF No. 443 at 22; ECF No. 522 at 25.
Defendant has filed numerous collateral attacks on his convictions and sentences. ECF No. 682 at 3–4. See, e.g. , ECF Nos. 541, 546 (claiming he was incompetent to stand trial in 2009, the Court incorrectly relied on a 2005 report finding Defendant's competency had been restored, and the Court erred in finding one doctor's report more credible than another in making its competency determinations). The Court has repeatedly addressed Defendant's motions, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed on multiple occasions. See Casteel v. United States , No. 4:18-cv-00167; Casteel v. United States , No. 4:14-cv-00124; Casteel v. United States , No. 4:14-cv-00123. Most recently, this Court ordered "Defendant is prohibited from filing additional motions seeking relief from his previously affirmed convictions," unless he receives authorization from the Eighth Circuit first. ECF No. 697 at 3.
In July 2020, Defendant brought his pro se Motion directly to this Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). ECF No. 702. Defendant argues the global pandemic known as COVID-19 provided an additional reason for his release, given his pre-existing health conditions. Id. at 3–4. Defendant then reiterates his previous arguments regarding his actual innocence and his competency to stand trial. ECF Nos. 708, 710.
II. ANALYSIS
Compassionate release provides a path for defendants with "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to leave prison early. § 3582(c)(1)(A). But no matter how extraordinary and compelling the reasons, a Court may only grant release "after considering the factors set forth in [ 18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable." Id. After much reflection and consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, the Court is unable to grant release. This is so because of the severity of Defendant's offenses and his total lack of remorse.
Consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is warranted, because Defendant satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A) by requesting release from the Bureau of Prisons and waiting 30 days with no response before filing the instant motion. United States v. York , No. 3:11-cr-76, 2019 WL 3241166, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2019).
It is thus unnecessary to address Defendant's argument concerning his extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.
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First, "the nature and circumstances of the offense" are among the most serious to come before a federal court. § 3553(a)(1). Defendant committed a violent offense against an elderly victim, resulting in serious and ongoing trauma. See ECF No. 443 at 15 ("These men have made my life and my family's life a living hell."). After the initial offense, Defendant conspired to kill his victim in order to avoid conviction. Id. at 32.
Meanwhile, "the history and characteristics of the defendant," § 3553(a)(1), along with the need to "reflect the seriousness of the offense [and] promote respect for the law," § 3553(a)(2)(A), give the Court great pause. Defendant has shown a shocking "lack of remorse." United States v. Almazan , 908 F. Supp. 2d 963, 972–73 (N.D. Iowa 2012). Instead, he has attributed his case to malicious prosecution, mental incompetency, conspiracy by the victim, ineffective assistance of counsel, law enforcement abuse, and professional jealousy. See ECF No. 443. Rather than accept responsibility for his actions, Defendant has repeatedly asserted his own innocence and victimization in countless motions before this Court. ECF No. 690 at 1.
To be sure, Defendant has behaved well in prison and lacked a significant record prior to his later-in-life conviction. ECF No. 702 at 5; ECF No. 498 at 7. As another federal court in our sister District noted, however, Defendant's "lack of remorse is an aggravating factor which outweighs his prior lack of a significant criminal history." Almazan , 908 F. Supp. 2d at 972–73 (collecting cases).
Defendant's lack of remorse raises doubts about whether he "respect[s] the law," § 3553(a)(2)(A), and received sufficient "deterrence," § 3553(a)(2)(B). This, in turn, suggests the public may not be protected sufficiently should he be released. § 3553(a)(2)(C). This Court made an explicit finding that Defendant is dangerous at his first sentencing. ECF No. 443 at 42. In the following years, Defendant has only continued to challenge his sentence and assert his innocence. If one has not come to terms with his past wrongs, it follows he may be more likely to repeat those wrongs than someone who has. See June P. Tangney et al., Two Faces of Shame: The Roles of Shame and Guilt in Predicting Recidivism , 25 Psychol. Sci. 799 (2014) ("Inmates prone to feelings of guilt about specific behaviors are less likely to subsequently reoffend than their less guilt-prone peers."), https://www-ncbi-nlm-nih-gov.nwulib.nwu.ac.za/pmc/articles/PMC4105017/.
Of course, Defendant has dignity, too. COVID-19 adds risks to his incarceration that the Court did not foresee when it sentenced him. This pandemic cannot be just another downside of prison one accepts in breaking the law; no person deserves such callousness. The Court does not minimize Defendant's crimes. It is "simply suggesting that [he is a] human being[ ]," one worthy of the same baseline level of respect as all involved in this case. Richard S. Arnold, Remarks Before the Judicial Conference of the Eighth Circuit: The Art of Judging (Aug. 8, 2002).
Balancing the risks of keeping a man in prison with those of releasing him back to society is "perhaps the most difficult task of a trial court judge." Jack B. Weinstein, Does Religion Have A Role in Criminal Sentencing? , 23 Touro L. Rev. 539, 539 (2007). Those who enjoy it, probably should not have the job. See Edward J. Devitt, Ten Commandments for the New Judge , 65 A.B.A. J. 574 (1979), reprinted in 82 F.R.D. 209 (1979). That said, the Court is unable to release Defendant given the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of Defendant. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's motion for compassionate release.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 702) is DENIED. Defendant's underlying Motion for Document and Motion for Telephone Hearing (ECF Nos. 711, 712) are correspondingly DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.