Opinion
Crim. No. 19-3579-MV
2022-08-30
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Michael BAULDWIN, Defendant.
Eva Mae Fontanez, Sarah Jane Mease, United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff. Daniel Benjamin Snyder, Emily P. Carey, Public Defenders, Federal Public Defender - District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, Angelica M. Hall, Public Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.
Eva Mae Fontanez, Sarah Jane Mease, United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff. Daniel Benjamin Snyder, Emily P. Carey, Public Defenders, Federal Public Defender - District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, Angelica M. Hall, Public Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER MARTHA VÁZQUEZ, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Mr. Bauldwin's Opposed Motion to Waive Jury Trial [Dkt. 80]. The government filed a response in opposition [Dkt. 83]. Mr. Bauldwin filed a reply [Dkt. 111]. Having carefully considered the motion, relevant law, and being otherwise fully informed, the Court finds that the motion is not well-taken and will be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On October 9, 2019, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Bauldwin with two counts of Production of a Visual Depiction of a Minor Engaging in Sexually Explicit Conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), (e), and 2256. Dkt. 1. Mr. Bauldwin pleaded not guilty to both counts on December 2, 2019. Dkt. 9. Mr. Bauldwin is scheduled for trial commencing on September 26, 2022.
Pursuant to Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Mr. Bauldwin advised the government that he intended to waive his right to a jury trial and requested consent to such a waiver. The government declined to grant consent. Dkt. 80 at 1. Mr. Bauldwin then filed the instant motion, Dkt. 80, asking the Court to allow him to waive his right to a jury trial despite the government's refusal to consent to such a waiver. The government objects to Mr. Bauldwin's request. Dkt. 83.
DISCUSSION
"Trial by jury has been established by the Constitution as the normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases," and indeed, a "defendant's only constitutional right concerning the method of trial is to an impartial trial by jury." Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35-36, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has "long permitted defendants to waive their right to jury trials if they do so expressly and intelligently and if the government consents and approves." United States v. Macken, No. 20-CR-23-KJM, 2021 WL 698204, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2021). That principle is codified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a), which states:
(a) Jury Trial. If a defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless:
Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a). "In effect, Rule 23 grants the government a veto of a defendant's proposal to conduct a bench trial." Macken, 2021 WL 698204, at *2.(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing;
(2) the government consents; and
(3) the court approves.
In Singer, the Supreme Court considered and rejected "the argument that requiring the defendant's waiver to be conditioned upon the consent of the government and the trial judge violated the defendant's right to a fair trial or due process." United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). Specifically, the Court found "no constitutional impediment to conditioning a waiver of this right on the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses to consent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by jury - the very thing that the Constitution guarantees him." Singer, 380 U.S. at 36, 85 S.Ct. 783. The Court further clarified that "Rule 23(a) does not require that the Government articulate its reasons for demanding a jury trial at the time it refuses to consent to a defendant's proffered waiver." Id. at 37, 85 S.Ct. 783.
In dicta, however, the Court "left open a potential exception to Rule 23(a)." Macken, 2021 WL 698204, at *2. Specifically, the Court wrote: "We need not determine in this case whether there might be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence on a trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial." Singer, 380 U.S. at 37, 85 S.Ct. 783. The Court quoted the defendant's suggestion that "passion, prejudice, public feeling, or some other factor may render impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by jury," but determined that because the defendant "gave no reason" for waiving his right to a jury trial "other than to save time," the matter before it was "not such a case." Id. at 37-38, 85 S.Ct. 783.
"The Supreme Court has never determined whether the circumstances alluded to in Singer actually existed - i.e., where requiring a defendant to undergo trial by jury would infringe his constitutional right to a fair trial - nor has it ever decided what circumstances would create such an unusual situation." E.D. Cal., 464 F.3d at 1070. Indeed, "[t]o the contrary, in at least one post-Singer opinion, the Court has characterized the requirement of government consent as absolute." Id. (citing Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979)); see also Macken, 2021 WL 698204, at *2 ("When [the Supreme Court] has cited Singer, it has given no reason to believe that Rule 23(a) permits any exception at all.") (collecting cases). Further, "no United States Court of Appeals appears to have approved a defendant's waiver of a jury over the government's objection." E.D. Cal., 464 F.3d at 1070. "Indeed, the circuits that have considered this issue have uniformly upheld the trial courts' refusals to grant such waivers without governmental consent." Id. (collecting cases). And several circuit decisions "suggest that the dangers mentioned in Singer - passion, prejudice, and public feeling - can be mitigated by thorough voir dire, careful limiting instructions, vigorous evidentiary objections, and other tools often used in federal district courts." Macken, 2021 WL 698204, at *3 (citing, inter alia, E. D. Cal., 464 F.3d at 1071-72); see also United States v. Ceja, 451 F.2d 399, 402 (1st Cir. 1971) ("[V]oir dire examination and challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are safeguards designed to make a fair trial by jury possible.").
In only five cases decided since Singer, "federal district courts have allowed defendants to try their cases to a judge alone without the government's consent," finding compelling reasons to do so either because of "the impossibility of a fair jury trial" or the existence of "conflicting constitutional rights." Macken, 2021 WL 698204, at *3 (citing United States v. Cohn, 481 F. Supp. 3d 122, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (defendant, whose age and health conditions made him especially susceptible to complications of COVID-19, could not safely testify on his own behalf without a mask, but proper cross-examination would be impossible with masks, and as a result, "the pandemic effectively pit defendant's right to a jury trial against his right to testify at that trial"); United States v. Lewis, 638 F. Supp. 573, 575 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (defendants' sincerely held religious beliefs forbade them from submitting to judgment of lay jurors such that government's refusal to consent to a bench trial set up a conflict between the constitutional right to free exercise of religion and the right to a fair jury trial); United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D.R.I. 1976) (finding that there were so many charges, defendants, witnesses, and exhibits that it would have been impossible for any jury to fairly evaluate evidence); United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 13-14 (D.N.J. 1978) (same); United States v. Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding that it would have been impossible for a jury to consider the evidence impartially because defendant's "entire way of life . . . reek[ed] with the odor of organized crime")).
On the instant motion, Mr. Bauldwin asks the Court to follow this handful of district court cases and, under the dicta in Singer, allow him to waive his right to a jury trial over the government's objection. Dkt. 80. In support of his request, Mr. Bauldwin advances three primary arguments. First, he argues that Singer allows for an exception to the requirement that the government consent to a bench trial. Id. at 1. Second, he argues that Rule 23(a)'s consent requirement does not categorically rule out a bench trial. Id. at 2. Finally, Mr. Bauldwin proposes that this Court apply a four-factor test articulated in Cohn to analyze his bench-trial request. See Cohn, 481 F.Supp.3d at 129. Those four factors are: 1) whether a governmental objection is made for an improper purpose; 2) whether the government's insistence on a jury trial unfairly interferes with the defendant's exercise of a separate constitutional right; 3) whether the government's insistence on a jury trial implicates the public's right to a speedy trial; and 4) whether case-specific factors, such as the nature of the evidence or the predominance of legal issues over factual issues, would render obtaining an impartial jury trial difficult or unworkable. While the Court recognizes that situations may arise justifying the granting of a jury trial waiver over the government's objection to preserve core constitutional protections, the Court finds that Mr. Bauldwin's arguments under each of the Cohn factors are unconvincing.
Mr. Bauldwin's first-factor argument suggests that the government is being unreasonable, coercive, and arbitrary by not consenting to a bench trial. Dkt. 80 at 5-6. Mr. Bauldwin's second proposes that his right to a fair and impartial arbiter would be threatened because "jury deliberations on the elements of alleged 'production' and issues of intent and federal jurisdiction will be overwhelmed by the sexual acts depicted and the relationship of Defendant and Jane Doe." Id. at 7. Additionally, Mr. Bauldwin argues—without explanation—that a jury trial would interfere with his right to testify in his own defense. Id. at 8. His third-factor analysis speculatively argues that the government's insistence on a jury trial would implicate the public's right to a speedy trial. Id. In his view, a jury trial would take longer and is more likely to be delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These arguments are not compelling enough, even in the aggregate, to justify granting this motion.
The Court reminds Mr. Bauldwin's attorneys that they have asked for, and received, continuances on eight occasions in the nearly three years that this case has been pending. See Dkts. 16, 21, 23, 26, 31, 36, 38, 63.
Mr. Bauldwin's fourth argument—on whether case-specific factors exist that would render obtaining a fair and impartial jury trial difficult or untenable—again relies on the likelihood that a jury trial would subject additional people, including the alleged victim, to discomfort or trauma. The Court is deeply sensitive to how it adjudicates the matters before it, but reality is unavoidable: what comes before the Court often involves very disturbing alleged harms. While the Court must do what it can to minimize the unfair prejudice that some evidence may cause an accused person, it cannot prevent the adjudication of a case by jury trial—"the normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases"—simply because the allegations and proposed evidence are distressing. Singer, 380 U.S. at 35-36, 85 S.Ct. 783 (citation omitted). Moreover, concerns surrounding a jury's ability to correctly understand "an almost exclusively legal" defense can always be addressed by filing Rule 29 motions at the close of the government's case and at the close of the entire case. Dkt. 80 at 9.
Mr. Bauldwin's Reply to the Government's Response, Dkt. 111, makes clear what is really animating his concern: the proposed testimony of Janes Doe currently pending before this Court. See Dkts. 72, 73, 89, 107 (government reply forthcoming; oral argument anticipated at Sept. 1, 2022 Pretrial Conference). In fact, Mr. Bauldwin's argument for a bench trial appears to be based primarily on the anticipation of a worst-case scenario regarding the out-come of these matters before any such ruling has been made. As such, his argument is premature.
For better or for worse, this Court is in the business of adjudicating the kinds of harm alleged here. Our Constitution places great weight on juries to do the sometimes-exceedingly difficult work of resolving factual disputes. Accordingly, the Court has full faith in the jury to meet its obligations in the matter at hand; indeed, it is "fully capable of ensuring [Mr. Bauldwin] an impartial trial" using, inter alia, the tools afforded to it by the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure. E.D. Cal., 464 F.3d at 1071. Moreover, the Court has full faith in itself to weigh the concerns expressed by both parties and determine what evidence should be presented to the jury at trial.
Mr. Bauldwin has failed to demonstrate that requiring him to undergo trial by jury would infringe his constitutional right to an impartial jury. Falling short of demonstrating a constitutional violation, Mr. Bauldwin has also failed to demonstrate that a "thorough voir dire, careful limiting instructions, vigorous evidentiary objections, and other tools often used in federal district courts" could not adequately address any potential issues related to jurors' ability to evaluate the matter at hand fairly. Macken, 2021 WL 698204, at *3. It thus follows that Mr. Bauldwin's arguments regarding what he perceives as potential jury unfairness cannot form a valid basis for the Court to apply the dicta of Singer to overrule the government's objection to his jury-trial waiver.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Bauldwin has failed to advance a sufficiently compelling reason, or set of reasons, for the Court to allow him to waive his right to a jury trial over the government's objection.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mr. Bauldwin's Opposed Motion for a Bench Trial [Dkt. 80] is DENIED.