Opinion
23-1330
09-19-2023
United States of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Tommie Anderson Defendant-Appellant
Unpublished
Submitted: August 24, 2023
Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
Before SHEPHERD, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Tommie Anderson appeals the sentence imposed after he pled guilty to a firearm offense. His counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and seeks leave to withdraw.
Anderson argues the district court erred by treating his 2004 Missouri conviction for attempted second-degree robbery as a crime of violence when determining his base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("Guidelines"). See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), 4B1.2(a). We conclude the conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. See United States v. Harrison, 809 F.3d 420, 425 (8th Cir. 2015) (reviewing de novo district court's determination whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines). We have held a Missouri conviction for second-degree robbery under the relevant statute is a crime of violence under the Guidelines. See United States v. Gordon, 69 F.4th 932, 933 (8th Cir. 2023). Anderson contends that because he was not convicted of a completed robbery, his conviction is not a crime of violence under United States v. Taylor, 142 S.Ct. 2015 (2002) (holding attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)). We reject his argument because, unlike the statute at issue in Taylor, the Guidelines contain commentary specifically stating an attempt to commit a crime of violence is itself a crime of violence. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. (n.1) (explaining crime of violence includes the offense of "attempting to commit such offense").
The Honorable Ronnie L. White, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Further, having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant counsel leave to withdraw and affirm.