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Union Pacific Rd. v. Commr. of Internal Revenue

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Mar 7, 1934
69 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1934)

Opinion

March 7, 1934.

Appeal from the United States Board of Tax Appeals.

On petition for rehearing.

For former opinion, see 69 F.2d 67.

Henry W. Clark, of New York City, for petitioner.

Sewall Key and Morton K. Rothschild, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before L. HAND, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.


The taxpayer has petitioned for a rehearing as to the deduction of a loss incurred on the exchange of Navigation Company bonds in 1921. The Board held that the petitioner had not sustained the burden of proof that the Navigation Company bonds were held for investment. The petitioner complains that our opinion goes beyond an affirmance of this finding as to burden of proof and makes an affirmative finding of fact that the Navigation bonds were held for investment. Our discussion of this subject closed with the sentence: "We conclude, therefore, that the Navigation bonds were held by Union Pacific for investment; hence no loss can be `recognized' on the exchange." It was not our purpose to make any modification in the fact findings of the Board. Consequently our opinion will be modified by deleting the above-quoted sentence and substituting therefor the following: "We conclude, therefore, that the Board correctly held that the petitioner had not sustained the burden of proving that the Navigation bonds were not held by it for investment; hence no loss can be `recognized' on the exchange."

The petition for rehearing is denied.


Summaries of

Union Pacific Rd. v. Commr. of Internal Revenue

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Mar 7, 1934
69 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1934)
Case details for

Union Pacific Rd. v. Commr. of Internal Revenue

Case Details

Full title:UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL…

Court:Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Date published: Mar 7, 1934

Citations

69 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1934)