Summary
In Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Dravage, 353 A.2d 88, 89 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976), this Court held that a discharge eight months after the alleged misconduct constituted an unacceptable delay.
Summary of this case from Minton v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of ReviewOpinion
Argued January 9, 1976
March 10, 1976.
Unemployment compensation — Wilful misconduct — Burden of proof — Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897 — Scope of appellate review — Error of law — Findings of fact — Sufficient evidence — Vagueness — Insubordination.
1. The burden of proving that a claimant for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897, was discharged for wilful misconduct in violating rules or disregarding expected behavior standards is upon the employer. [637-8]
2. In an appeal from the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, review by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is to determine whether an error of law was committed and whether findings of the Board are supported by the evidence. [638]
3. General findings of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review that an employe was discharged for insubordination are too vague to support a conclusion that he was guilty of wilful misconduct. [638-9]
Argued January 9, 1976, before Judges KRAMER, WILKINSON, JR., and MENCER, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 897 C.D. 1975, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of Theodore P. Dravage, No. B-125843.
Application to Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Application denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Reversed.
Mark A. Peleak, for appellant.
Charles G. Hasson, Assistant Attorney General, with him Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for appellee.
In this unemployment compensation case, all of the compensation authorities denied benefits to Theodore P. Dravage (claimant) because they concluded that his unemployment was due to his discharge because of willful misconduct connected with his work.
See Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 802(e).
The concept of willful misconduct is now well defined in the law, and we see no reason to repeat here the concise explanations we have previously set down in our opinions. For our limited purposes, we merely note that, in order to prevent a claimant from being granted benefits, an employer must first carry the burden placed upon it of proving that the claimant has deliberately violated the employer's rules or has disregarded the standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of its employees. See Chambers v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 13 Pa. Commw. 317, 318 A.2d 422 (1974); Loder v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 6 Pa. Commw. 484, 296 A.2d 297 (1972). Our review of unemployment compensation cases concerns itself with questions of law and, absent fraud, with determinations of whether the Board's findings are supported by the evidence. MacDonald v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 17 Pa. Commw. 494, 333 A.2d 199 (1975).
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), in adopting the opinion of the referee, made the following pertinent findings of fact:
"3. The employer discharged the claimant because of insubordination.
"4. The claimant frequently acted in an insubordinate manner toward his route manager and the employer discharged the claimant when a replacement was secured."
Clearly, these findings are too vague to support an affirmative legal conclusion of willful misconduct. We find Judge KRAMER's analysis in Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Kullen, 21 Pa. Commw. 488, 346 A.2d 926 (1975), to be controlling here. In Kullen, the Board made a finding of fact that the claimant was discharged because of a generally uncooperative attitude toward his work and because he indulged in "horseplay" around the office. We concluded that neither the Board's finding that Kullen had a "refractory attitude" toward his work nor its finding that Kullen engaged in "horseplay" was sufficiently specific to justify the Board's conclusion that Kullen was discharged for willful misconduct. Likewise, the Board's finding here that the claimant was discharged because of insubordination is not a precise enough finding to be relied upon in reaching the legal conclusion of willful misconduct.
Additionally, we note that the testimony presented below on behalf of the employer is so vague as to be virtually meaningless. It certainly is insufficient to support even the inadequate findings adopted by the Board. The employer has therefore failed to carry its burden of proof. Accordingly, we enter the following:
The employer's allegations of claimant's misconduct eight months before discharge concern, under the circumstances presented here, events too remote in time to justify the subsequent discharge.
ORDER
And now, this 10th day of March, 1976, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the claim of Theodore P. Dravage is reversed.