Opinion
C. A. 9:22-cv-01034-MGL-MHC
09-20-2022
Larry James Tyler, Plaintiff, v. Alan Wilson, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) filed by Defendant Alan Wilson (“Defendant”). ECF No. 26. After the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff Larry James Tyler (“Plaintiff”) of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition. ECF Nos. 30, 31. Defendant filed a Reply. ECF No. 36. The Motion is ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendant violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff contends his successful post-conviction relief (PCR) action-granting him a new trial on his underlying criminal convictions-shows that he was wrongfully incarcerated for over ten years.
Plaintiff is currently a detainee at the W. Glenn Campbell Detention Center in Darlington, South Carolina. It appears he is awaiting civil commitment proceedings pursuant to the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Act, SC Code. Ann. § 44-48-10, et seq.
Plaintiff was previously convicted and sentenced to terms of incarceration on charges of criminal solicitation of a minor (eight years, concurrent), sexual exploitation of a minor - second degree (eight years, concurrent), contributing to the delinquency of a minor (three years, concurrent), and disseminating harmful material to a minor (eight years, concurrent). ECF No. 11 at 3, 5. Plaintiff applied for PCR relief, which was initially denied by the PCR Court. Plaintiff appealed, and on March 16, 2022, the Court of Appeals for the State of South Carolina found that Plaintiff's trial counsel was deficient for failing to move to sever the trial of his charge for second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor from the trial of his remaining indictments, and that Plaintiff was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to seek severance. ECF No. 1-1. The case was reversed and remanded to the Court of General Sessions for a new trial. ECF No. 1-1.
Because of his successful PCR action, Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant, asserting that he was arrested on the above charges on September 26, 2011, and he has been falsely behind bars for ten years. See ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No. 21-1 at 6. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was never guilty of the above charges, and that the prosecutor in his state criminal case and police officer Eric Hodges allegedly conspired to introduce false information to a grand jury to secure indictments against him and maliciously prosecute him. ECF No. 21-1 at 6. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages against Defendant.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.” Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F.Supp.3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)); see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of [affirmative] defenses.”). Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant will have “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he facts alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not analogous to a “probability requirement,” rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the Court “need not accept the [plaintiff's] legal conclusions drawn from the facts, nor need it accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against him. The Court agrees.
To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate the Defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold criteria of a § 1983 action. Specifically, in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff argues that Defendant, as the Attorney General of South Carolina, is responsible for compensating him for any losses he has incurred over the past ten years stemming from his allegedly wrongful incarceration. ECF No. 21-1 at 6. Plaintiff complains of the actions of the prosecutor in his state criminal case and of police officer Eric Hodges, both of whom allegedly conspired to introduce false information to a grand jury to secure indictments against him and maliciously prosecute him. ECF No. 21-1 at 6. Notably absent from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is any allegation of Defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations, which is fatal to his § 1983 action. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (citation omitted)).
In addition to failing to state a claim, Plaintiff's claim in this regard may now also be moot. On June 22, 2022, while this action was pending, the South Carolina Court of Appeals withdrew its March 16, 2022, Order and issued a new Order. See Tyler v. State, No. 2016-002364, 2022 WL 791168, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2022), withdrawn and superseded by 437 S.C. 17, 876 S.E.2d 132 (S.C. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g granted (June 22, 2022). Consistent with its prior ruling, the Court of Appeals found that the evidence did not support the PCR Court's denial of Plaintiff's PCR action as it related to the charges of criminal solicitation of a minor, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and disseminating harmful material to a minor. See Tyler v. State, 876 S.E.2d 132, 141 (S.C. Ct. App. 2022). The Court of Appeals reversed those three convictions and remanded to the Court of General Sessions for a new trial. Id. However, the Court of Appeals found that the computer photographs at issue during the criminal trial were properly admitted as to the sexual exploitation charge, and affirmed Plaintiff's conviction for second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor. Id. Plaintiff's term of incarceration for second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor was eight years, concurrent, which equaled the longest of his other three terms of incarceration-criminal solicitation of a minor (eight years, concurrent), contributing to the delinquency of a minor (three years, concurrent), and disseminating harmful material or exhibiting harmful performance to minors (eight years, concurrent). See id. at 133, 135. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff argues he was wrongfully imprisoned, such a claim appears to be moot, as his sentences on all four charges ran concurrently.
Additionally, Plaintiff may be attempting to hold Defendant vicariously liable because of Defendant's status as the chief prosecuting officer of South Carolina. See S.C. Const. art. V, § 24. This claim also fails, as pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has failed to allege or plead facts sufficient to support any of these required elements. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Consequently, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendant. As a result, Defendant is entitled to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff did not indicate in his initial or Amended Complaint that he was suing Defendant in his official capacity. See ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 21-1 at 2. Indeed, Plaintiff even clarifies in his Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion that he is not suing Defendant in his official capacity. See ECF No. 31 at 2. Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiff's filings, liberally construed, could be viewed as doing so, the Court agrees with Defendant that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity as South Carolina's Attorney General. See Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually ”
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 26) be GRANTED.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).