Opinion
C. A. 9:22-cv-01544-MGL-MHC
07-13-2023
Larry James Tyler, Plaintiff, v. James Hudson and Diann Wilks, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, has filed this action against Defendants in their individual capacities, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C § 1983. ECF No. 1. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 51, and Defendant Hudson's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 84. Defendant Hudson filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion, ECF No. 56, and Plaintiff filed two Replies, ECF Nos. 58 and 92. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 91, and Defendant Hudson filed a Reply, ECF No. 93. The Motions are ripe for review.
Defendant Wilks has not made an appearance in the action and default has been entered. ECF No. 36. Plaintiff has a pending Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant Wilks. ECF No. 34.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), and this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant's Motion and denying Plaintiff's Motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action arises out of Plaintiff's claims that he is not receiving adequate healthcare treatment for pain he has experienced in his left thumb. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff, a registered and convicted sex offender, is housed at the Darlington County Detention Center (“DCDC”). He is not currently serving a sentence but, rather, is being held for contempt of court for refusing to participate in the required pre-release evaluations under South Carolina's Sexually Violent Predator Act, SC Code §§ 44- 48-10 etseq. ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 31:10-32:2. Plaintiff has been held in contempt since November 17, 2016, for his refusal to participate in the evaluations. Id. at 32:6-21; ECF No. 84-2, Order.
To protect the confidentiality of the Sexually Violent Predator Act proceedings, the Order was provided to the Court for in camera review.
Plaintiff filed this action on May 13, 2022, against Defendant Hudson, the Sheriff of Darlington County, and Defendant Diane Wilkes, who works for Hartsville Medical Enrichment Services, LLC (“HMES”). ECF Nos. 1; 25-2; 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 51:18-52:12; 84-3 at ¶ 2. Part of the responsibilities of the Darlington County Sheriff's Department is to staff, supervise, and operate the DCDC. ECF No. 84-3 at ¶ 4. As Sheriff, Defendant Hudson is regularly updated on the operation of the DCDC by the facility's director, Major Waddell Coe; however, he does not have day-to-day operational oversight of the DCDC.
Defendant's last name is spelled “Wilks” in the caption; however, based upon affidavits filed in this action, it appears the correct spelling of Defendant's last name is “Wilkes.” See ECF Nos. 252; 84-5.
It is undisputed that medical care at the DCDC is provided by HMES, not by DCDC employees. Id. at ¶ 7; ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 51:18-52:12. Defendant Wilkes is the Chief Executive Officer of HMES and a licensed practical nurse. ECF Nos. 25-2 at ¶¶ 2-3; 84-5 at ¶ 5.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, beginning April 4, 2022, he experienced pain in his left thumb. ECF No. 1 at 6. His claims against Defendants in this lawsuit pertain only to his thumb. ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 55:5-11. Plaintiff has provided declarations from two witnesses attesting to the pain he experiences in his thumb. ECF Nos. 19; 51-3. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he requires surgery but has been refused by Defendants. ECF No. 1 at 6.
Plaintiff made an allegation in his Complaint about fungus on his fingernails; however, he is not pursuing any claim about his fingernails and only wants to focus on the issues pertaining to his thumb. ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 54:21-55:11.
According to Defendant Wilkes, in her professional opinion, Plaintiff's thumb pain is consistent with osteoarthritis and “the normal aches and pains associated with his advanced age.” ECF No. 84-5 at ¶ 24. Moreover, it is exasperated by Plaintiff's continued use of his hand to write and draw without adequate periods of rest. Id. at ¶ 26. Defendant Wilkes attests that Plaintiff's condition does not require treatment of a specialist. Id. at ¶ 27.
Plaintiff disagrees with the diagnosis of arthritis because “confidential” medical sources told him he has carpal tunnel disease. ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 52:19-53:5. However, Plaintiff confirmed that he is not qualified to make such a diagnosis and that no doctor has ever opined he has carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. at 55:18-56:5. Plaintiff also testified that he “is not qualified to say” that he needs surgery but knows “that surgery is not necessary because there's medication to correct” the carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. at 52:19-24, 55:12-23.
It is also undisputed that Plaintiff has been seen by HMES numerous times for his thumb and provided multiple treatment options. ECF No. 25-2 at ¶¶ 13, 16-17. He has been given or offered Prednisone, anti-inflammatories, over-the-counter pain relievers, pain patches, topical creams, splint(s), hot soak remedies, physical therapy exercises and the request that he rest his hand from his normal activities for periods of time. ECF Nos. 84-5 at ¶ 21; 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 53:19-54:10. Plaintiff acknowledged these treatments, including that he was advised to rest his thumb (ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 58:5-10) and was prescribed a thumb splint, which he refused. ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 59:2-7. Nevertheless, Plaintiff disagrees with his diagnosis and his treatment of his finger because “they weren't effective.” Id. at 54:1-15.
Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment holding that the “abuse” by Defendants constitutes “assault and battery;” an injunction ordering Defendants to take Plaintiff to a specialist, without delay with pre-and post- treatment photographs; and compensatory and punitive damages. ECF No. 1 at 9-10.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. The undersigned notes that Plaintiff's sentence for his underlying conviction has been served, such that Plaintiff remains incarcerated because of his refusal to comply with the Sexually Violent Predator Act's requirements. ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 31:10-32:2. Assuming for purposes of summary judgment that, at this point, Plaintiff would be entitled to the status of a civilly committed inmate (as opposed to a convicted prisoner), his custody status, as such, would most closely resemble that of a pretrial detainee. See Tyler v. Coe, No. CV 9:16-2711-MGL-BM, 2017 WL 1102817, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2017) (noting civilly committed persons are treated as pretrial detainees (citing Lingle v. Kibby, 526 F. App'x. 665, 667 (7th Cir. Apr. 15, 2013))), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:16-CV-02711-MGL, 2017 WL 1094257 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2017); Valbert v. S.C. Dep't. of Mental Health, No. 9:12-CV-01973-RBH, 2013 WL 4500455, at *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (noting same); Treece v. McGill, No. 3:08-03909-DCN, 2010 WL 3781695, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2010) (“A civilly committed individual under the SVPA most closely resembles the custody status of a pre-trial detainee.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's medical claims are evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tyler, 2017 WL 1102817, at *4 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, n.16 (1979)), adopted, 2017 WL 1094257; see also Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001) (“[D]ue process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the [Sexually Violent Predator] Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed”).
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard for determining whether detention center officials violated a pretrial detainee's constitutional rights regarding his medical care is “deliberate indifference.” See Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of convicted prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”). Although these claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, case law interpreting the standard of “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment is instructive. See, e.g., Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that whether the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner, the “standard in either case is the same-that is, whether a government official has been ‘deliberately indifferent to any [of his] serious medical needs'” (quoting Belcher, 898 F.2d at 34)).
A. Defendant Hudson's Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant Hudson argues he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Specifically, he argues that Plaintiff has failed to show a constitutional violation and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. The undersigned agrees.
Plaintiff has sued Defendant Hudson only in his individual capacity. ECF No. 1. To the extent the claims are asserted against Defendant Hudson in his official capacity, they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Barfield v. Cunningham, No. 8:20-CV-02388-DCN-JDA, 2021 WL 1526508, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2021) (noting the Florence County Sherriff is charged with the administration of the FCDC and reasoning the employees of the FCDC are ultimately entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:20-CV-2388 DCN, 2021 WL 1526486 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2021); McIlweine v. Harris, No. CIVA 4:07-1117 CMCTE, 2008 WL 2909358, at *12 (D.S.C. July 22, 2008) (noting South Carolina Sheriffs and their employees are state agents who are not amenable to suit in federal court by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment).
1. Constitutional Claim
Plaintiff's claim, that Defendant Hudson failed to provide him adequate medical care for his thumb, is an allegation that his constitutional rights were violated. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement . . . [and] ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.'” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994))).
a. No Personal Involvement by Defendant Hudson
Initially, as a general matter, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Hudson acted personally to deny medical care or interfered with any treatment. At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff must show Defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation for liability to attach under § 1983. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171-72 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting a plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights and finding certain defendants were entitled to summary judgment because “they lacked sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations”); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Here, it is undisputed that neither Defendant Hudson, nor any other DCDC employee, provides medical treatment to inmates, including Plaintiff. Rather, all medical treatment, including but not limited to treatment for Plaintiff's thumb, is provided by HMES. DCDC's only role in Plaintiff's medical treatment is providing him access to the grievance procedure and forwarding medical complaints to HMES. Plaintiff testified he has had full access to the grievance procedure, and he has not been prevented from seeking treatment with HMES for his alleged thumb pain. Thus, Defendant Hudson had no personal involvement in the alleged refusal of medical care, and summary judgment is appropriate on this ground alone.
Plaintiff contends, however, that Defendant Hudson is liable because he is “responsible for getting healthcare to [Plaintiff.] He is the head of the sheriff's department, over [the DCDC].” ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 51: 4-17. To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hudson is liable by virtue of his role as sheriff, the claim fails. Pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). As set forth below, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence showing any constitutional violation. Moreover, he has not pointed to any other evidence in the record to support any of the other required elements for a supervisory liability claim.
Because Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that Defendant Hudson had any personal involvement in his medical care, nor otherwise pointed to evidence in the record that would support threshold essential elements of a § 1983 claim against Defendant Hudson, summary judgment is appropriate as to Defendant Hudson. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment).
b. No Deliberate Indifference
To sustain his constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that Defendant Hudson was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and (2) an objective showing that those needs were serious. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting a “plaintiff must demonstrate that the officers acted with ‘deliberate indifference' (subjective) to the inmate's ‘serious medical needs' (objective)”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (to state an Eighth Amendment claim, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [1] deliberate indifference to [2] serious medical needs” (emphasis added)).
The subjective prong of deliberate indifference is a “very high standard” and merely negligent behaviors do not meet the subjective mens rea requirement. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit has recognized two different aspects of an official's state of mind that must be shown to satisfy the subjective prong in this context: “First, actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate is required” and, second, “the officer must also have recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical needs.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable . . . for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).
As to the objective prong, a “serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 241).
For purposes of summary judgment, the undersigned assumes Plaintiff's thumb pain constitutes an objectively serious medical condition. However, Plaintiff has failed to identify evidence in the record that supports a § 1983 action against Defendant Hudson regarding the subjective component of his constitutional claim.
As noted above, to prove deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show Defendant Hudson knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health and safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Under this standard, “mere disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care are not actionable absent exceptional circumstances.” Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, despite Plaintiff's allegation in his Complaint that Defendants have consistently denied or refused to give him appropriate medical treatment for his thumb, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff has received medical care for his thumb. Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute the treatment that he has received. Instead, Plaintiff appears to disagree with his diagnosis of arthritis and the course of treatment provided. Specifically, Plaintiff disagrees that he has arthritis and believes, instead, that he has carpal tunnel syndrome and should be provided different medication, have surgery, or see a hand specialist.
In his Response in Opposition, Plaintiff appears to allege, for the first time, that after he submitted a request to see medical on April 4, 2022, Defendant Wilkes “did nothing until about six weeks later.” ECF No. 91 at 3. He further maintains that he is not complaining of a denial of medical care, but rather the “delay in time it took” for him to receive that care. ECF No. 91 at 4. Plaintiff did not allege this in his Complaint. Cf. ECF No. 1 at 6 (noting it took a “few days” for Defendant Wilkes to look at and give him medicine). Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to show any personal involvement on the part of Defendant Hudson or that Defendant Hudson was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs.
However, a “difference of opinion regarding the diagnosis and treatment provided by SCDC does not rise to a constitutional violation.” Broach v. Ozmint, No. CA 0:08-3471-HMH-PJG, 2009 WL 1956699, at *5 (D.S.C. July 7, 2009); see also Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Fourth Circuit has consistently found disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care “fall[s] short of showing deliberate indifference”); Wright, 766 F.2d at 849 (holding that “[disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care” are not sufficient to raise an Eighth Amendment claim for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ultimately affirming the order of summary judgment in favor of the doctor).
This is especially true where, as here, Plaintiff “has presented no medical opinion that the treatment he is currently receiving is inadequate or improper.” See Broach, 2009 WL 1956699, at *5 n.2. (emphasis in original); see also Green v. Senkowski, 100 Fed. App'x 45, 47 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (finding that a plaintiff's self-diagnosis unsupported by any medical evidence in the record was insufficient to defeat summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim). Plaintiff has not provided or pointed to any evidence that contradicts the medical testimony in the record that he has received full and adequate treatment for his thumb.
To the extent Plaintiff maintains more should have been done as to his thumb, that is not a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08 (reasoning that merely contending that more should have been done by the way of diagnosis and treatment failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim and noting a medical decision to not pursue an avenue of treatment does not represent cruel and unusual punishment); Wright v. Ozmint, No. CA 2:07-2515-JFA-RSC, 2008 WL 4542915, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2008) (“The mere failure to treat all medical problems to a prisoner's satisfaction, even if actual medical malpractice is involved, is insufficient to support a claim under § 1983.”). Indeed, under the Constitution, Plaintiff is entitled to receive adequate medical care, not the medical care of his choosing. Kinloch v. Myers, No. 2:15-CV-00702-MBS-MGB, 2017 WL 9471789, at *17 (D.S.C. July 27, 2017) (“[A] prisoner is not entitled to choose his course of medical treatment.” (citation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted in part, No. CV 2:15-0702-MBS, 2017 WL 4276903 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2017); see also Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Although the Constitution does require that prisoners be provided with a certain minimum level of medical treatment, it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of his choice.”).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment be granted to Defendant Hudson. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'”).
2. Qualified Immunity
Defendant Hudson is also entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claim. The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his individual capacity, as is the case with Defendant Hudson here. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether a plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If a violation of a constitutional right in fact exists, qualified immunity nonetheless shields a prison official from liability, unless the violation was of a “clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As set forth in detail above, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of his allegations of constitutional violations. Because Defendant Hudson did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, he is also shielded from liability by qualified immunity.
B. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
The undersigned has considered all the arguments set forth in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in analyzing, reviewing, and setting forth reasons why Defendant Hudson is entitled to summary judgment. For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the undersigned recommends denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 51) be DENIED; and Defendant Hudson's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 84) be GRANTED.
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).