Opinion
6 Div. 490.
June 1, 1948.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Tuscaloosa County; W. C. Warren, Judge.
William Turner, Jr., was convicted of arson in the first degree, and he appeals.
Reversed and rendered.
Davis Bealle, of Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
An extra-judicial confession not corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus delicti will not support a conviction for felony. Matthews v. State, 55 Ala. 187, 28 Am.Rep. 698; Johnson v. State, 59 Ala. 37; Morris v. State, 23 Ala. App. 255, 123 So. 280; McNeel v. State, 25 Ala. App. 36, 140 So. 185. In arson, the corpus delicti consists not alone in a building burned, but also of its having been wilfully fired by some responsible person, and burning by accidental and natural causes must be satisfactorily excluded to constitute sufficient proof of the crime. Carr v. State, 16 Ala. App. 176, 76 So. 413; Colvin v. State, Ala.App., 22 So.2d 544.
A. A. Carmichael, Atty Gen., and Richard S. Brooks, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.
Proof of corpus delicti in arson case need not necessarily be direct and positive, but may be proved by circumstantial evidence. It may be established by inference. Cunningham v. State, 14 Ala. App. 1, 69 So. 982; Davis v. State, 141 Ala. 62, 37 So. 676; Webb v. State, 26 Ala. App. 241, 157 So. 262; Balkum v. State, 28 Ala. App. 557, 190 So. 290; Savage v. State, 12 Ala. App. 116, 68 So. 498; Winslow v. State, 76 Ala. 42; Granison v. State, 117 Ala. 22, 23 So. 146. Where there is evidence, though circumstantial, that fire was of incindiary origin, such is sufficient for the jury on the question of corpus delicti. Hence, defendant's confession was admissible. Worrell v. State, 26 Ala. App. 577, 163 So. 901; Rutland v. State, 31 Ala. App. 43, 11 So.2d 768; Crofton v. State, 27 Ala. App. 589, 176 So. 832; Rowe v. State, 243 Ala. 618, 11 So.2d 749; Hill v. State, 207 Ala. 444, 93 So. 460; Stewart v. State, 18 Ala. App. 92, 89 So. 391. Whether defendant made a confession and whether his alleged confession was a true statement of fact, were for the jury. Grimes v. State, 31 Ala. App. 336, 17 So.2d 288; Johnson v. State, 242 Ala. 278, 5 So.2d 632.
From a judgment of conviction for arson in the first degree, this appeal was taken, and is rested upon the one proposition to the effect that the State failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to a conviction. This proposition is presented in every possible manner.
This court, as the law requires, has given careful and attentive study and consideration to the entire record, including all the evidence adduced upon the trial, and also the almost countless exceptions reserved to the rulings of the court.
The manner in which the case was tried manifests a wonderful and unparalled degree of patience upon the part of the learned trial Judge. The examination of the two principal witnesses, the alleged injured parties, consumed forty-four typewritten pages of the transcript. And the examination of the other witnesses for the State was bad in like manner.
At the conclusion of the State's case, the defendant also rested, and offered no evidence.
The dwelling house in question, purportedly owned by the named injured parties, was, without dispute, totally destroyed by fire on the forenoon of January 17, 1947.
The only incriminating fact adduced upon the trial was a statement alleged to have been made to the two named injured parties (as testified to by them) by the defendant, wherein in answer to a statement by State witness Vick, viz.: "You and Bill done a nice job on burning those houses," to which defendant is alleged to have replied: "Yes, we sure did."
The insistence by the State is that said statement was a confession. If it could be so properly termed, yet it would not be admissible in the absence of sufficient legal evidence of the corpus delicti; and after a consideration of the entire evidence, as stated, we are unable to find any evidence tending to show that this defendant, or anyone else had wilfully set fire to, or burned, or caused to be burned, the building in question. This being true, even if the quoted statement could properly be termed a confession, this alone would not suffice, or be sufficient to establish the corpus delicti.
The law and established rules involved in this case are so well settled and understood, we see no necessity to restate, or reiterate these simple propositions. Carr v. State, 16 Ala. App. 176, 76 So. 413; Colvin v. State, 247 Ala. 55, 22 So.2d 548; Jones v. State, 18 Ala. App. 609, 93 So. 230; Matthews v. State, 55 Ala. 187, 28 Am.Rep. 698; Johnson v. State, 59 Ala. 37.
Human liberty is too sacred and has been too dearly bought to authorize a conviction except upon legal evidence connecting the defendant with the commission of a crime, and that beyond a reasonable doubt. Facts which would warrant a suspicion however strong do not overcome the presumption of innocence. In this case, under the evidence, the defendant should have been acquitted and the court erred in overruling defendant's motion to exclude the State's evidence, and also in refusing to defendant the affirmative charge which was duly requested.
The judgment of conviction, from which this appeal was taken, is reversed, and a judgment here rendered in favor of the appellant discharging him from further custody in this proceeding.
Reversed and rendered.