Opinion
No. 5-826 / 04-0930
Filed January 19, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Jeffrey L. Larson, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a defense verdict in this automobile collision case. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Don Peterson, Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Lyle W. Ditmars of Peters Law Firm, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellee.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A jury found in favor of the defendant in a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident. On appeal, the plaintiff contends the district court erred in (1) refusing to conclude that the defendant's actions amounted to negligence per se and (2) in giving a sudden emergency instruction. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On a clear winter day, a fatal accident caused authorities to divert eastbound traffic on Interstate 80 to the southbound lanes of Interstate 29. Plaintiff Cari Turner was in the right lane. A car in the left lane switched to the right directly ahead of Turner. The flow of traffic was "stop and go." During one of the stops, the car behind Turner, driven by defendant Robert Eby, struck her sports utility vehicle.
Turner sued Eby for negligent operation of his motor vehicle. The case was tried to a jury. Turner moved for a directed verdict, contending Eby's violations of the rules of the road amounted to negligence per se. The district court denied the motion.
The district court instructed the jury on sudden emergency, a doctrine that provides a legal excuse for "a defendant's failure to obey statutory law when confronted with an emergency not of his or her own making" and which has also been applied where only common-law negligence is alleged. Weiss v. Bal, 501 N.W.2d 478, 480-81 (Iowa 1993). The jury found that Eby was not at fault for the accident.
Turner moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the district court denied. This appeal followed.
II. Negligence Per Se
Turner argues Eby violated certain rules of the road and was, accordingly, presumptively negligent. See Iowa Code §§ 321.285, .288, .307 (2001). She claims she was entitled to a directed verdict.
In Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911, 915, 243 N.W. 552, 554 (1932), the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
[W]here the statute or ordinance has fixed the standard of care, the failure to observe such standard is negligence, and when in the trial of a case — the other elements being proven — it is shown that the defendant failed to observe the standard of care thus fixed, a case is made for the jury in the first instance. In such case, the defendant may offer proof excusing his failure to observe such legal standard of care. If, however, he fails to furnish proof of such legal excuse, then it is accurate to say that negligence is established as a matter of law.
The court continued,
It is to be kept in mind in this discussion that we are not considering the question of proximate cause or causal relation between the violation of a statute and the injury of which complaint is made, but we are discussing only the question whether the violation of the statute or ordinance is negligence, or only prima facie evidence of negligence.
Id. at 916; 243 N.W.2d at 554.
All three statutes cited by Turner require drivers to act reasonably. See Iowa Code §§ 321.285 ("careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than what is reasonable and proper," as well as "assured clear distance ahead"), .288 ("shall reduce the speed to a reasonable and proper rate . . ."), .307 ("shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent . . .") (emphases added). Therefore, a jury question was generated on whether Eby violated the rules of the road, and Turner was not entitled to a directed verdict.
III. Sudden Emergency
Turner raises several arguments that are all essentially challenges to the court's sudden emergency instruction. That instruction states:
A sudden emergency is a combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action or a sudden or unexpected occasion for action. A driver of a vehicle who, through no fault of his own, is placed in a sudden emergency, is not chargeable with negligence if the driver exercises that degree of care which a reasonably careful person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.
Our review of the instruction is for prejudicial error. Beyer v. Todd, 601 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Iowa 1999).
Generally, an instruction will be submitted if there is substantial evidence to support it. Id. In deciding whether there is substantial evidence, we construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the one raising the defense. Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1986).
"Whether a party is faced with a sudden emergency is ordinarily a question for the jury." Beyer, 601 N.W.2d at 39. However, certain fact scenarios are not deemed emergencies as a matter of law. Id. As noted in Prosser and Keeton's treatise on torts,
some "emergencies" must be anticipated, and the actor must be prepared to meet them when he engages in an activity in which they are likely to rise. Thus, under present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles and persons in the highway, and of other vehicles at intersections.
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keaton on Torts § 33, at 197 (5th ed. 1984).
In Beyer, the plaintiff's car stopped behind a stalled vehicle and was subsequently struck from behind by the defendant's car. The Iowa Supreme Court stated, "while [the defendant] was forced to take immediate action in response to the vehicles stopping in front of him, we believe such an event does not qualify as an emergency for purposes of submitting a sudden emergency jury instruction to the jury." Beyer, 601 N.W.2d at 39. The court continued, "A sudden stop in traffic on a divided, four-lane highway, during a busy time of day . . . is not an uncommon or unforeseen event on the traveled road-ways." Id. The court noted, "the sudden stop in traffic caused by a stalled vehicle would be no different from a stop in traffic caused by a vehicle making a left-hand turn across traffic." Id. at 40. In this type of situation, a person should be held to the statutory or common law standard of care. See Jones, 387 N.W.2d at 352 (noting that, where the sudden emergency doctrine is triggered, "the person is not held to the same standard of care as one who has had time to reflect before acting").
We see no material distinction between Beyer and the facts of this case. Both parties agreed the roads were clear and visibility was not a problem. Both parties also essentially agreed that the detour was clearly marked and was not a factor in the accident. Finally, both agreed that traffic was "stop and go," as cars attempted to make their way to the detour exit. Eby testified as follows:
Traffic was backed up. I was on the inside lane headed toward that exit. Traffic the other direction was trying to merge in. A vehicle in the left-hand lane jumped into Ms. Turner's lane in front of her abruptly causing her to slam on her brakes. I slammed on my brakes and was not able to come to a complete stop and struck the rear tire that was mounted on the back of her SUV.
Turner testified that "in the process of one of those stoppings," the back of her vehicle was hit. She introduced evidence that the car ahead of her slammed on its brakes twice.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Eby, we conclude this scenario, requiring sudden braking in the face of merging traffic, was neither "unexpected" nor "unforeseen." Beyer, 601 N.W.2d at 40.
Eby attempts to distinguish Beyer by noting that the vehicle ahead of Turner's vehicle "jumped into Ms. Turner's lane." He directs us to a Colorado opinion cited by the Iowa Supreme Court, asserting it stands for the proposition that a "sudden and unexpected reentry of a known driver into flow of traffic was sufficient evidence to support giving the second emergency instruction." Id. at 40 n. 4.
That opinion was cited by our highest court for comparison purposes only. Because the facts here are so closely aligned with the facts of Beyer, we believe the holding of Beyer is controlling. See Weiss, 501 N.W.2d at 482 ("Were we to extend the sudden emergency doctrine to cases like the one before us, it could be relied upon in nearly any traffic context to excuse `emergencies' that a reasonably prudent driver must be prepared to meet."); see also Vasconez v. Mills, 651 N.W.2d 48, 54 (Iowa 2002) (stating a litigant "is not entitled to the benefit of the emergency rule if it clearly appears [s]he had actual knowledge of a dangerous situation or in the exercise of reasonable care could have such knowledge in time to act") (citation omitted); Foster v. Ankrum, 636 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 2001) (affirming denial of sudden emergency instruction where defendants had ten to fifteen seconds to react).
We conclude the district court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. We further conclude this error was prejudicial, as it may have resulted in the finding of no fault.
We note the sudden emergency instruction was potentially applicable to each of the claimed statutory violations. Blair, 387 N.W.2d at 354.
We find it unnecessary to address Turner's remaining arguments concerning the sudden emergency doctrine, except to note that the doctrine need not be pled. See generally Townsend v. Armstrong, 220 Iowa 396, 260 N.W. 17 (1935).
IV. Disposition
We find it unnecessary to resolve Turner's remaining arguments. We reverse and remand for a new trial.