Opinion
Civ. No. 02-3701 (RHK/RLE)
December 19, 2003
Richard T. Wylie, Wylie Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Plaintiff
John Harper and Terrance J. Wagener, Krass Monroe P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Boise Cascade Corporation's ("Boise") Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Robert Tupper commenced this action against Boise alleging that it wrongfully terminated his employment in violation of Minn. Stat. § 176.82. Boise has moved for summary judgment on grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and Tupper's claim fails as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Boise's motion.
Background
From 1991 until October 2002, Tupper worked at Boise's paper mill located in International Falls, Minnesota. (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 7.) During his employment, Tupper was counseled on numerous occasions regarding his chronic absenteeism. (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 43-50; Ex. 3, 4, 5.) On May 4, 2001, Boise required Tupper to execute a Last Chance Agreement ("the Agreement"), which provided that he could not miss any portion of scheduled workdays for the next six months. (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 50; Ex. 3.) Tupper understood that further violation of any work rules and/or failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the Agreement could result in his immediate termination. (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 39.)
On October 21, 2001, during his morning shift, Tupper broke his tooth while eating a breakfast sandwich. (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 21.) Shortly thereafter, Tupper talked with his supervisor, Susan White, and insisted upon the need for medical attention. (Id. at 22.) White expressed concern regarding Tupper leaving work and the possible consequences due to the Agreement. (White Dep. Tr. at 33.) She was uncertain as to the exact terms and time period of the Agreement. (Id.) Because of the uncertainty, White offered to let Tupper go home to check on the terms of the Agreement, and then return to work. (White Dep. Tr. at 33-34.) Tupper left work and did not return. (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 15.) He called White from home and told her that based on a conversation with another employee at Boise, he thought the Agreement had expired. (Id. at 32.) He did not seek treatment that day at an urgent care center or emergency room because his injury was "dental in nature." (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 15.) Rather, he repeatedly called his dentist's office. (Id. at 16.) Finding no one at the office on a Sunday, he visited the dentist the following afternoon over lunch. (Id. at 16, 55.)
After the incident, Tupper did not seek workers' compensation benefits to pay his dental bills or to compensate him for the day he missed work. (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 56-57.) Nor did Tupper suggest to Boise that he was considering filing a workers' compensation claim. (Id. at 59.) His medical bill from the dentist was paid for by his health insurance carrier. (M-at 56.)
On October 23, 2001, Boise terminated Tupper for leaving work during his shift in violation of the Agreement. (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 68.) Tupper filed a grievance with Boise claiming unjust termination, which Boise denied. (Id. at 73.) He also consulted with union representatives regarding the termination. (Id. at 75.) Tupper's union, however, declined to support his claim. (Id.)
Standard of Decision
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A summary judgment motion should be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The Court must view evidence, as well as reasonable inferences, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank. 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The moving party carries the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show that a disputed fact is "outcome determinative under prevailing law." Get Away Club Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992). In essence, the court determines whether there is a need for a trial in the litigation dispute. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250.
Analysis
I. Relief under Minnesota Statute § 176.82
Tupper's claim for relief is based upon Minn. Stat. § 176.82, which provides:
Any person discharging or threatening to discharge an employee for seeking workers' compensation benefits or in any manner intentionally obstructing any employee seeking workers' compensation benefits is liable in a civil action for damages incurred by the employee.
Minn. Stat. § 176.82(1) (2002). He asserts that Boise discharged him for seeking workers' compensation benefits.
Minnesota courts apply the three-step McDonnell Douglas test in retaliatory discharge cases. Phipps v. Clark Oil Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 1987). The McDonnell Douglas framework provides that: (1) the employee must first establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge; (2) the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate reasons for the discharge; and (3) if the employer shows legitimate reasons, the employee must then establish that reasons are pretextual. Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. L 472 N.W.2d 114, 119 (Minn. 1999). To survive a motion for summary judgment, an employee must show that genuine issues of material facts exist regarding whether the statutorily protected activity caused the retaliatory discharge. Dietrich v. Canadian Pacific Ltd, 536 N.W.2d 319, 327 (Minn. 1995).
Boise asserts that summary judgment is appropriate because Tupper cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. To establish a prima facie case, Tupper must establish: (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) an adverse employment action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two. Dietrich. 536 N.W.2d at 327.
In the present case, Tupper has not shown that he engaged in statutorily protected conduct. Under Minn. Stat. § 176.82(1), an employer is liable only if the employer "discharges or threatens to discharge an employee for seeking workers compensation benefits" (Emphasis added.) Thus, an actual denial or disruption in the receipt of benefits must occur to warrant recovery. Flaherty v. Lindsay. 467 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Minn. 1991). Accordingly, Minnesota courts have required the filing of a claim for workers' compensation benefits to trigger the statute. See Furrer v. Campbell's Soup Co.. 43 N.W.2d 658, 660 (Minn.App. 1987) (finding insufficient evidence to establish retaliatory discharge claim where an employee fails to file a claim for workers' compensation benefits until after the discharge); Parsons v. Westlund's Provisions Inc.. No. C9-89-1191, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 1338, at *2 (Minn.Ct.App. Dec. 26, 1989) (finding an employee's failure to file a claim for workers' compensation benefits is a basis to dismiss a retaliatory discharge claim); Morales v. Pain. Kalman Quail. Inc.. 467 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (D. Minn. 1979) (holding that because employee did not file a workers' compensation claim until nine months after discharge, the employer cannot be charged with violation of the statute).
Here, Tupper admits that he did not seek workers' compensation benefits to pay his medical bills or to compensate him for the day he missed work. (Tupper Dep. Tr. at 56-57.) Nor has he ever suggested to anyone at Boise that he was contemplating filing a workers' compensation claim. (Id. at 59.) In fact, Tupper's dental bill from the dentist was paid for by his health insurance. (Id. at 56.) Because Tupper did not "seek workers' compensation benefits," he was not engaged in the type of conduct protected by Minn. Stat. § 176.82 and thus cannot receive the relief sought in this case. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, and all files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Boise's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Robert Tupper's Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.