Opinion
No. CV02 0191514 S
May 2, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
The plaintiff, Sierra Tucson, has brought this action to enforce a default judgment rendered by the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Pinal against the defendant, Adam Manjuck, for $13,297.43, plus interest. The defendant, appearing pro se, filed an answer, one special defense and one counterclaim. On January 29, 2003, the plaintiff moved to strike the defendant's special defense and counterclaim on two grounds and filed the requisite memorandum of law in support thereof. First, the plaintiff contends that the only issues that may be raised in the defense are those that object to the jurisdiction of the Arizona court to render the judgment. Second, the plaintiff maintains that the counterclaim was compulsory under Arizona law and, therefore, the defendant is barred from raising it in this action. The defendant has not filed an objection to the motion to strike.
The defense, which the defendant has entitled "Affirmative Defense," has the characteristics of what Connecticut courts commonly call a special defense and will be referred to as such herein.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39, a party may file a motion to strike to contest: "(1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . or (5) the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein . . ."
"It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 260, 765 A.2d 505 (2001). "[W]e construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, CT Page 6122 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). The trial court has the "obligation to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency." Connecticut National Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992).
The plaintiff contends that the special defense raised by the defendant is insufficient in that it impermissibly pertains to the underlying cause of action, which is entitled to full faith and credit. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the only issues that may be raised in defense to an action seeking to enforce a foreign default judgment are those objecting to the jurisdiction of the foreign court to render judgment on the underlying cause of action.
The United States Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause provides in pertinent part: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1. "[T]he interpretation of the full faith and credit clause is a question of federal law . . ." Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, 214 Conn. 52, 55, 570 A.2d 687 (1990). Therefore, this court is "bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the criteria for application of the clause. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271 n. 15, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 65 L.Ed.2d 757 (1980) (plurality opinion). . ." (Citation omitted.) Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, supra, 214 Conn. 55. "As a matter of federal law, the full faith and credit clause requires a state court to accord to the judgment of another state the same credit, validity and effect as the state that rendered the judgment would give it. Underwriters National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life Accident Health Ins. Guaranty Assn., 455 U.S. 691, 704, 102 S.Ct. 2018, 60 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982)." Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, supra, 214 Conn. 56.
"The United States Supreme Court has consistently held . . . that the judgment of another state must be presumed valid, and the burden of proving a lack of jurisdiction rests heavily upon the assailant . . . Furthermore, the party attacking the judgment bears the burden of proof regardless of whether the judgment at issue was rendered after a full trial on the merits or after an ex parte proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Kosinski, 47 Conn. App. 650, 652-53, 707 A.2d 314 (1998). In an action to enforce a California judgment, the Appellate Court explained: "The defendant is attempting to mount a collateral attack on the California judgment. To be successful, he must establish that the California judgment is void, not merely voidable . . . Broadly stated, this would require proof of the lack of a legally organized court or tribunal; lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, or both; or want of power to grant the relief contained in the judgment." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Kosinski, supra, 47 Conn. App. 653.
The defendant's special defense does not attack the organization of the Arizona court, does not assert lack of jurisdiction, and does not claim any want of power to grant the relief contained in the judgment. Rather, the special defense seems to attack the merits of the underlying claim that gave rise to the judgment. Such a collateral attack is not allowed under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's special defense is granted.
The plaintiff also seeks to strike the defendant's counterclaim on the ground that under Arizona law, the counterclaim was compulsory and is therefore barred by the Arizona judgment. As the plaintiff notes in its brief, Rule 13(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure makes the filing of certain counterclaims compulsory and provides: "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13."
While the counterclaim asserted in this case may have in fact been compulsory under Arizona's civil procedure rules, to make such a determination at this juncture would be premature. Deeming a counterclaim to be compulsory under Rule 13(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure requires a finding that the claim, among other things, "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim . . ." Only the defendant's special defense and counterclaim makes any reference to the subject matter of Arizona action. Without comparing the pleadings in the Arizona action to the defendant's counterclaim, this court cannot determine whether they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. See, for example, Bill Rodgers Realty, Inc. v. Pereira, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 94 056143 (February 14, 1997, Hammer, J.T.R.). Therefore, the motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim is denied.
In conclusion, the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's special defense is granted. The plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim is denied.
So Ordered.
D'Andrea, J.T.R.