Opinion
Case No. 5:02-cv-76
May 16, 2003
OPINION
Plaintiff, Bonnie Trznadel, is a former law student at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School. Plaintiff brings this civil action against the law school arising from her alleged dismissal in February of 2002. Plaintiff alleges that her dismissal violated her rights under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Fourteenth Amendment, and contractual rights created by law school handbooks and policy. The court has already denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction after an evidentiary hearing. (Order, docket #44). In that connection, the court found that the evidence of record clearly established that plaintiff was not dismissed from the law school or otherwise disciplined, but that she voluntarily agreed to withdraw from the law school pursuant to an arrangement with Associate Dean Amy Timmer, under which plaintiff would be readmitted upon her fulfillment of certain conditions, which she admittedly has not yet fulfilled.
Presently pending before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket #31), filed on October 11, 2002. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion on November 12, 2002 (docket #40), in which she presented the argument, among others, that she had not yet had a sufficient opportunity for discovery. The court therefore delayed adjudication of the motion for a reasonable period of time. Plaintiff has not submitted to the court any further affidavits or discovery materials. The court therefore considers defendant's motion ready for decision.
Applicable Standard
As the Sixth Circuit has noted, the federal courts have entered a "new era" in summary judgment practice. Cox v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995); Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478-81 (6th Cir. 1989). While preserving the constitutional right of civil litigants to a trial on meritorious claims, the courts are now vigilant to weed out fanciful, malicious, and unsupported claims before trial. Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); JPJ Assoc., Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 317 F.3d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 2003); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1997) ( en banc); Sable v. General Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Payne v. Board of Education, 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether `the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" See Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc., 21 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also Sommer v. Davis, 317 F.3d 686, 690 (6th Cir. 2003); Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 649 (6th Cir. 2001); Napier v. Madison County, Ky., 238 F.3d 739, 741 (6th Cir. 2001).
The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Napier, 238 F.3d at 741. The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, but need not support its motion with affidavits or other materials `negating' the opponent's claim. Moore v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993). Once defendants show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," plaintiff has the burden of coming forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To sustain this burden, plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 527-28 (6th Cir. 2002); Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 238 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2001); Cox, 53 F.3d at 150. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment has the burden to come forth with requisite proof to support his legal claim, particularly where he has had an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1994); Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d at 1478-81; Booker v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1989). In so doing, plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2000); Mounts v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 198 F.3d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 2000).
Statement of Indisputable Facts
The facts surrounding this controversy are principally established by the records of the Thomas M. Cooley School of Law, which defendant properly authenticated by affidavit as required by Rule 56 (Affs., docket #'s 24, 25). These exhibits consist in the main of the contents of plaintiff's student records at the law school, in addition to certain e-mail exchanges between the parties. Plaintiff has also submitted exhibits, principally medical records, which were not authenticated. Plaintiff has not filed a verified complaint or affidavit in response to the pending motion. The evidence properly of record establishes the following.
Thomas M. Cooley Law School is a private educational institution located in Lansing, Michigan. Plaintiff Bonnie Trznadel, an Illinois resident, applied to Cooley Law School as a freshman on April 3, 2000. (Def. Ex. 1). She was admitted on May 5, 2000, and was allowed to begin class immediately. (Def. Ex. 2).
Plaintiff ran into immediate academic trouble. In July of 2000, she made an appointment with Patricia Wilson, Ph.D., an academic counselor and the Director of the Academic Resource Center at the law school. Dr. Wilson administered a reading test, which showed that plaintiff's reading comprehension was at the fourth-grade level. During this appointment, plaintiff informed Dr. Wilson that she was an epileptic, but that she was no longer taking her medication. Plaintiff requested help in being placed in a study group but did not seek any other accommodation. (Def. Ex. 3). Shortly thereafter, on July 31, Dr. Wilson again spoke with plaintiff and counseled her to consider dropping her classes, receiving a refund, and entering the school again in the fall with accommodations. Dr. Wilson informed plaintiff that she would need to have testing done in order to qualify for accommodations. Plaintiff declined, stating that she "did not want to be labeled." (Def. Ex. 4). Dr. Wilson continued her discussions with plaintiff, who stated that she was "very much against" Dr. Wilson's plan. Dr. Wilson expressed concern that plaintiff's poor reading skills would guarantee failure. Dr. Wilson suggested that "psychological testing would help us to help her," but plaintiff did not avail herself of this option.
Plaintiff continued to have academic difficulties and was ultimately placed on grade probation. School officials continued to offer testing to establish a learning disability, but plaintiff continued to resist, fearing that she would be labeled as a failure. (Def. Exs. 12, 15). With regard to plaintiff's claim that she suffered from epilepsy, Assistant Dean Zelenski informed plaintiff that the school would be willing to accept a medical diagnosis to this effect, as long as it was rendered within the past five years. (Def. Ex. 22). Plaintiff informed the school that she was not pursuing disability status and refused to take any diagnostic tests. (Def. Ex. 24). Plaintiff emphasized that she had never asked for accommodation. ( Id.). By the end of her second term at Cooley Law School, which concluded in December of 2000, plaintiff's grade-point average was still below a C. The school placed her on a second term of academic probation. (Def. Ex. 25). However, by exercising the so-called "V-grade option," plaintiff raised her cumulative grade-point above a C average, and therefore was removed from academic probation on February 19, 2001. (Def. Ex. 27).
On February 28, 2001, plaintiff attended a counseling session at the Academic Resource Center. Dr. Wilson suggested that plaintiff submit medical records to document her claim of epilepsy, but plaintiff told her that she still owed money and therefore "won't be able to document the epilepsy, but can document the eye problems." (Def Ex. 28). There is no evidence, however, that plaintiff ever submitted to the law school any medical records documenting either an epileptic condition or eye problems.
In January of 2002, faculty members began to complain to the school's administration about plaintiff's behavior. Professor Mara Kent wrote to Dean Timmer and other faculty members concerning plaintiff's explosive and irrational behavior after the first session of a class:
She stayed after class last night, and she blew up. She was shaking, she was red in the face, she couldn't look me in the eye, and she was visibly quite upset. She just started ranting about how stupid she is (her words, not mine), how she will never pass the class, how she has the intelligence of a 4th grader (her words, again), and on and on. At first, I took pity on her and thought that she just had low self esteem. I tried to get a word in edgewise to tell her that she can do it, and she needs to have a positive attitude, but the conversation just went down hill. I had never met this woman before until last night. She was so irrational and upset, in fact, I would characterize her conversation with me as hysterical (not funny, but frantic). She had absolutely no ability to calm herself down.
* * * *
Finally at 9:30 last night I told her that I was not going to fight with her over whether she was stupid or not. I told her that if she is convinced she will never pass the class, then she should consider dropping out of law school because she will have to pass the class to graduate. I told her that if she decided she wanted to try to pass, I would do my best to help her, but it definately [sic] fell on deaf ears. I told her our conversation was over, and it was late. She followed me downstairs, and when we got to the lobby, she tried to bring it up again that she is "an idiot," and she is "stupid." I told her again that I was not goign [sic] to fight with her over whether she was stupid and that I didn't want to talk to her about it until she was willing to calm down. I just left her in the lobby of the school building, but as I walked to my car, I kep [sic] looking back to see if she followed me. She didn't follow me, but she definately [sic] scared me. She was so upset and irrational I truly felt she had the potential to do something harmful even though she never made any verbal or physical threats against me. Can anyone shed light on her situation or tell me if there is anything I can do about her?
(Def. Ex. 35).
The next day, plaintiff sent Professor Kent an e-mail which, from an objective point of view, can only be characterized as truculent and demanding. Among other unreasonable demands was the following:
In order to avoid making a fool out of myself in class, I would appreciate it if you not call on me because my answers are bound to be wrong and I don't want the rest of my classmates to know that.
(Def. Ex. 36).
These and other concerns expressed by the law school faculty concerning plaintiff's irrational behavior culminated in a meeting between plaintiff and Associate Dean Amy Timmer on January 23, 2002. Dean Timmer's goal was to persuade plaintiff to withdraw voluntarily from the law school for purposes of seeking help with her personality problems. During the meeting, plaintiff acknowledged her anger management problems. The dean informed plaintiff that in the absence of an acceptable agreement, the dean would begin disciplinary procedures to remove plaintiff from the school pursuant to the provisions of the student handbook. In lieu of such procedures, Dean Timmer offered to allow plaintiff to withdraw voluntarily without an adverse effect on her grades for the term, refund 100% of her tuition, and allow her to use certain school facilities. In exchange, the dean asked plaintiff to agree to seek professional help and to seek readmission only when a health professional certified that plaintiff could control her anger. Dean Timmer took no action at the January 23 meeting, but gave plaintiff until 5:00 p.m. on Friday, January 25, to respond to the proposal.
On the next day, January 24, plaintiff sent Dean Timmer an e-mail stating her reluctance to withdraw or to give up her dream of being an attorney. Plaintiff also opined that "if we have to litigate, I suspect I will be victorious." Plaintiff admitted, however, "that my anger is often misplaced," and stated that taking the term off might allow her the opportunity to get necessary testing. Plaintiff expressed her willingness to wait for Dean Timmer's letter memorializing the terms of the proposal. Dean Timmer responded to the e-mail on the same day, encouraging plaintiff not to give up on law school and opining that plaintiff would ultimately succeed in the future "when you are feeling more confident." Dean Timmer confirmed her agreement to extend the deadline for plaintiff's decision, at plaintiff's request, to 3:00 p.m. on Monday, January 28. She attached a draft letter summarizing the terms of her proposal. (E-mail, Def. Ex. 44; Draft Letter, Def. Ex. 47).
At 9:05 p.m. on the same day, plaintiff sent Dean Timmer another e-mail, making a single comment to the draft proposal. Plaintiff was concerned that the source of her "anger and behavior" may be purely physical. On this basis, she requested the letter be modified to allow a medical doctor, as well as a psychologist or psychiatrist, to certify plaintiff's readiness to return to school. At 10:00 a.m. on Monday, January 28, Dean Timmer sent plaintiff an e-mail accepting her proposal, so long as the medical doctor had the education and training to "make the finding that your anger and behavior were due entirely to a physical problem." The dean agreed to amend the letter accordingly. (Def. Ex. 46).
On January 28, 2002, Dean Timmer sent plaintiff a revised letter embodying their agreement. (Def. Ex. 51). The letter stated that plaintiff agreed to take a voluntary leave of absence in order "to attend to your emotional, physical, and mental well-being." Plaintiff would receive medical, psychiatric, or psychological help in order to be able to control her behavior and deal appropriately with staff, faculty and fellow students. "You also agree not to return to enrollment until you can provide documentation from a licensed, treating psychologist or psychiatrist that you have been treated for and are capable of controlling your anger, acting appropriately (specifically limiting excessive e-mailing and other communications with staff and faculty to strictly class- and school-related matters) and coping with the stresses of law school, and that you are able to and agree to refrain from harming yourself and others, and from threatening to harm yourself or others." The letter also contained a provision, as requested by plaintiff, that the certification could be provided by a medical doctor. The letter went on to set forth the concessions made by the law school in consideration for plaintiff's agreement to take a voluntary leave of absence, including a 100% tuition reimbursement, the privilege of dropping all classes without academic penalty, and the other provisions previously agreed upon. At the evidentiary hearing, plaintiff admitted entering into the agreement memorialized in Dean Timmer's letter.
The parties continued to correspond by e-mail. On February 5, 2002, however, plaintiff sent Dean Timmer an e-mail informing her that she was "in the process of consulting with an attorney regarding the terms of my withdrawal and subsequent readmission conditions." Plaintiff stated that she was "only agreeing to withdraw for the current term," but had been advised not to agree to anything else without an attorney's investigation and advice. On the same day, Dean Timmer responded by e-mail, stating her regret that plaintiff had "reneged on our agreement." The dean asked plaintiff to reconsider and to return a signed copy of the letter by Friday, February 8, 2002. In default of such action, Dean Timmer said she would "take the appropriate actions." (Def. Ex. 55).
On Monday, February 11, 2002, plaintiff sent Dean Timmer an e-mail stating in its entirety as follows:
By the way — I never said I would not comply. My obtaining an attorney is to insure [sic] that you will honor our agreement when I have completed your requirements.
(Def. Ex. 57). Two days later, plaintiff demanded from Dean Timmer certain documents concerning the school's self-assessment under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Dean Timmer responded that all further communications should be through the General Counsel's Office. (Def. Ex. 58). On February 21, 2002, Dean Timmer sent to plaintiff an e-mail memorializing events to date, including plaintiff's failure to return a signed copy of the letter of agreement. The e-mail directed plaintiff not to enter school property, including the library, and informed her that her e-mail account would be deactivated. (Def. Ex. 60).
On May 22, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights asserting that she was "permanently suspended" by Cooley Law School because of her seizure disorder. Plaintiff filed the present pro se action on May 9, 2002.
In summary, the record clearly establishes the following factual propositions:
• The law school requested that plaintiff take a voluntary leave of absence because of uncontrolled anger and erratic behavior, not because of any claimed seizure disorder.
• Plaintiff never requested any accommodation for a seizure disorder, nor was she perceived as suffering from such a disorder by the law school.
• Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to a leave of absence and was never suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined.
• Plaintiff has never complied with the conditions precedent under the agreement of January 28, 2002, for readmission to the law school.
Discussion
I. Request for More Time for DiscoveryAmong plaintiff's responses to defendant's motion for summary judgment is the repeated assertion that plaintiff has not had an adequate opportunity to complete discovery. As noted above, the court delayed adjudication of the summary judgment motion for several months in order to afford plaintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery that she deemed necessary and to present to the court supplemental submissions in opposition to defendant's motion. Plaintiff has not availed herself of this opportunity.
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment has no absolute right to additional time for discovery. See Wallin v. Norman, 317 F.3d 558, 564 (6th Cir. 2003); Lewis v. ACB Business Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 409 (6th Cir. 1998). In order to invoke the court's discretion in this regard, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a motion for additional time under Rule 56(f), which provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment and may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Rule 56(f), however, is "not a shield that can be raised to block a motion for summary judgment without even the slightest showing by the opposing party that his opposition is meritorious." Lewis, 135 F.3d at 409. Rather, the affidavit of the nonmoving party must show how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him to rebut the motion for summary judgment. See Allen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 325 F.3d 768, 775 (6th Cir. 2003). It is incumbent upon the nonmoving party to include within the affidavit a description of the discovery needed and an affirmative demonstration of how this discovery will allow the nonmoving party to rebut the motion. See Abercrombie Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 56(f). She has not filed an affidavit of any kind, as required by the rule. References in a brief to the need for more discovery do not qualify as a motion under Rule 56(f). See Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2000); State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, even if the court were to construe the statements in plaintiff's brief as a proper Rule 56 motion and affidavit, they would be insufficient. Plaintiff does not identify the discovery that she contemplates, nor does she explain how the additional discovery is likely to create a genuine issue of material fact. General pleas for more discovery, unsupported by specific facts, are insufficient. See Cacevic, 226 F.3d at 489; Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Prods., 866 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
In summary, plaintiff's vague assertion of a need for more discovery does not provide legal justification for any further delay in adjudicating defendant's dispositive motion.
II. Merits of Summary Judgment Motion
A. ADA and Rehabilitation Act
Plaintiff's principal claims arise under the Americans With Disabilities Act and section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Sixth Circuit teaches that the standards for a prima facie case under both of these acts are essentially the same. See Andrews v. State of Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 806-07 (6th Cir. 1997). "In order to set forth a prima facie case under either of these statutes, plaintiffs must allege either that they are or are perceived to be handicapped within the definitions of each of the acts, that they are otherwise qualified for the job, and that they were discriminated against on the basis of their disability." Id. at 807. In the present case, plaintiff asserts that she was dismissed (or permanently suspended) from the law school on account of her seizure disorder. The evidence does not support her assertion.First, there is no evidence to suggest that the conduct of the law school was in any way motivated by plaintiff's alleged seizure disorder. Plaintiff did claim from time to time to suffer from a seizure disorder, but she never attempted to document this claim to the school nor did she ever ask for any accommodation on account of it. The faculty and administration of the law school were clearly concerned with plaintiff's inability to control her anger, not any alleged seizure disorder from which she may have been suffering. Plaintiff's persistent repetition of her allegations in this regard are no substitute for proof. Plaintiff has not presented this court with a scintilla of evidence to suggest that any member of the faculty or staff was concerned that plaintiff may have a seizure in class or that her seizure disorder posed any risk to the students, school or faculty. Rather, the record clearly documents the school's concern about plaintiff's anger management and unstable personality.
Furthermore, plaintiff's repented assertions that she was dismissed or suspended from school are demonstrably untrue. Both plaintiff's e-mails and her testimony clearly establish that she accepted Dean Timmer's proposal for a voluntary leave of absence, in exchange for valuable concessions by the law school. Dean Timmer was not motivated to offer these concessions because of plaintiff's alleged seizure disorder. Regardless of the Dean's motivation, however, the evidence is clear that plaintiff agreed to a voluntary leave of absence. The law school therefore took no action, adverse or otherwise, with regard to plaintiff. Rather, it made an offer to plaintiff, which plaintiff was free to accept or reject.
On similar grounds, plaintiff's reliance on an ADA regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 36.208, is misplaced. This regulation provides that a public accommodation is not required to permit an individual to participate in an activity if the individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. The regulation goes on to define the term "direct threat" and sets forth criteria for an individualized assessment of the threat posed by the individual. This regulation does not apply for the simple reason that Cooley Law School never denied plaintiff participation in its programs on the basis of an allegation that she posed a direct threat of injury to others. Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to a leave of absence. Arguably, had the law school been forced to proceed with disciplinary action, it would have been required to make the individualized assessment contemplated by the regulation. Plaintiff's voluntary agreement, however, relieved the law school of this obligation.
Plaintiff cites no authority to support a contention that a covered entity violates the ADA when it enters into a voluntary agreement with an allegedly disabled person. The only case relied upon by plaintiff in this regard is S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981). This case is completely inapposite, as it was decided under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401-1415, which applies to elementary and high-school aged students. The Fifth Circuit's holding that a student who had voluntarily withdrawn from school was nevertheless entitled to a due-process hearing was based upon a specific provision of the EHCA granting parents and guardians an opportunity to present complaints with respect to matters involving the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(1); see 635 F.2d at 349. The holding in Turlington obviously has no application to the present dispute.
Furthermore, with regard to plaintiff's claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff has the threshold burden of establishing that the law school has received federal financial assistance. McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Assoc., Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) ( en banc). Federal financial assistance includes "any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract), or any other arrangement by which the department provides for or otherwise makes available assistance." Gallagher v. Groghan Colonial Bank, 89 F.3d 275, 277 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 41.3 (1995)). Student loans qualify as federal financial assistance, if the institution participates in a federal grant program providing tuition support to students. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). In the present case, defendant's motion for summary judgment was sufficient to place upon plaintiff the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact on this question. Plaintiff responds with the assertion that she is financing her education with bank loans insured by the federal government. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, this situation is not analogous to that faced by the Supreme Court in the Grove City College case, in which the Court found that a private college was subject to regulation under Title IX because some of its students received direct federal basic educational opportunity grants from the Department of Education. In the present case, plaintiff does not allege that she has received federal money, nor does she assert that the law school in any way participated in the federally insured loan that she procured from a bank. The Sixth Circuit has held that the intended recipient of a federally insured loan is the student, not the institution. See Gallagher, 89 F.3d at 277-78. The law school in this case has received no federal money whatsoever. Rather, plaintiff has received private money from a bank on the strength of the promise of the federal government to repay the loan if plaintiff defaults. In these circumstances, the law school cannot be deemed a recipient of any federal financial aid. Plaintiff's claim under the Rehabilitation Act must therefore fail under this alternative ground.
In summary, plaintiff has not shown that the law school took any adverse action against her or that the law school was motivated in any way by her alleged disability. Furthermore, she has not supported her claim under the Rehabilitation Act with proof that the law school is a recipient of federal assistance. Defendant will therefore be granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff attempts to assert claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable only to the acts of the states, and not to acts of private persons or entities. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982). The Thomas M. Cooley School of Law is a private corporation. The acts of private parties and corporations can be considered to be "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment if, and only if, there is such a close nexus between the state and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior maybe fairly treated as that of the state itself. See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to establish such a nexus between the activities of Cooley Law School and the state under any theory recognized by the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit. Plaintiff's argument that the law school should be considered a state actor because it trains lawyers who are ultimately certified for practice of law by the state is utterly frivolous. Plaintiff's claims under the Fourteenth Amendment therefore fail for want of state action.
C. Contract Claim
Finally, plaintiff asserts a contract claim arising from the provisions of the student handbook. Such a contract claim would fall within this court's diversity jurisdiction, assuming the requisite amount in controversy, as plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states. Plaintiff has not cited to the court any Michigan law that accords contractual status to the provisions of a student handbook. Under the law of most states, however, private institutions will be required to follow provisions of a student handbook that call for certain minimal process in connection with discipline, generally on a contract theory. See, e.g., Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1980). In the present case, the student handbook does indeed call for certain process surrounding discharges from the school for disciplinary reasons. Plaintiff argues that she should have been afforded written notice of the charges against her, an impartial hearing, and other process before being expelled. The record is completely devoid of evidence, however, to support plaintiff's assertions that she was expelled or otherwise disciplined. Plaintiff clearly agreed to a voluntary leave of absence. The law school handbook does not require any particular process to accompany a student's voluntary decision to take a leave of absence. If plaintiff had resisted the suggestions of the school administration that she take a leave of absence and had forced the school to take disciplinary action, she might have a contract claim if the school failed to follow its own handbook procedures. That state of affairs never came to pass, however, as plaintiff took a voluntary leave of absence. By plaintiff's own admission, she has never complied with the provisions of her agreement with the law school that would entitle her to apply for readmission.
Conclusion
The record is devoid of evidence supporting plaintiff's claims. After expressly agreeing to a leave of absence, plaintiff now attempts to recharacterize the events as a dismissal from school on the basis of her disability, a claim that is completely unsupported by any facts. Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the opinion issued this date:
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket # 31) be and hereby is GRANTED and judgment is entered in favor of defendant on all of plaintiff's claims.