Opinion
No. 89-13913.
Decided December 28, 1990.
Albert E. Virgil and Terry Tataru, for plaintiff.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General, and Mary J. Stepanic, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
On September 25, 1983, plaintiff, John B. Tryon, approached his sixty-four-year-old mother, Edna Tryon, on a bridge near her home. After discussions with his mother, plaintiff concluded that she was on the bridge harboring the intention of committing suicide. Plaintiff then decided that it was necessary to have his mother admitted to the Athens Mental Health Center ("AMHC") for treatment.
Mrs. Tryon was voluntarily admitted to AMHC on September 25, 1983, and seen by Dr. Sami Michael, her treating psychiatrist at AMHC, the following day. A treatment plan was formulated for Mrs. Tryon which included medications. On October 11, 1983, Mrs. Tryon was discharged at her and her family's request. Mrs. Tryon was provided with an after-care plan which included prescribed medication and a future outpatient visit at a local mental health facility. Within twenty-four hours of her release from AMHC, Mrs. Tryon committed suicide by jumping from the bridge and drowning in a river.
John Tryon brings this action for damages due to the death of his mother. On October 11 and 12, 1990, this action was heard before this court on the sole issue of liability. The parties were given an opportunity to submit post-trial briefs outlining their respective positions, which they have done. The court has duly considered the evidence and arguments of counsel and renders the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Plaintiff's action is framed as a medical negligence claim against defendant. The law of negligence requires that plaintiff prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, "the existence of a duty, the breach of the duty, and injury resulting proximately therefrom." Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 285, 21 O.O.3d 177, 179, 423 N.E.2d 467, 469. Counsel for both parties dedicated a significant portion of their respective post-trial briefs to the issue concerning the standard of care which should be applied to the agents of defendant who treated Mrs. Tryon. Defendant contends that the applicable standard of care is the standard for psychiatric care stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital Health Ctr. (1983), 39 Ohio St.3d 86, 529 N.E.2d 449. Plaintiff argues that the standard of care enunciated in Littleton does not apply to the case at bar. Rather, plaintiff maintains that defendant and its agents, during the care and treatment of Mrs. Tryon, were required to exercise the degree of skill and care that a psychiatrist, hospital and medical health professional would have exercised under the same circumstances. Without deciding the issue, the court is willing to assume for the purposes of argument that the applicable standard of care suggested by plaintiff is appropriate in these circumstances.
Plaintiff alleges that the evaluation and treatment of Mrs. Tryon during the period of September 25, 1983 to October 11, 1983, and the decision to discharge Mrs. Tryon on October 11, 1983, fell below the standard of care and degree of skill required of psychiatrists, hospitals and mental health professionals in the same or similar circumstances.
A review of the evidence indicates that Mrs. Tryon was responding well to the treatment plan formulated for her by the staff at AMHC. The court finds that she was improving on a daily basis and expressed a desire to leave the AMHC facility and return to an uncontrolled life at home with her family. Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the evaluation and treatment of Mrs. Tryon from the period of September 25, 1983 to October 11, 1983, fell below the standard of care and degree of skill required of psychiatrists, hospitals and mental health professionals in the same or similar circumstances.
The evidence presented at trial also established the fact that Mrs. Tryon did not exhibit any violent tendencies while she was a patient at AMHC and therefore the staff had no reason to suspect that she would become violent after she was released. Dr. Michael never observed any suicidal behavior by Mrs. Tryon throughout her hospitalization and Mrs. Tryon had reassured Dr. Michael and the rest of the AMHC staff that she had no intention of harming herself. Dr. Michael's belief that Mrs. Tryon would not commit suicide upon discharge was reasonable. The court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision to discharge Mrs. Tryon on October 11, 1983, fell below the standard of care and degree of skill required of psychiatrists, hospitals and mental health professionals in the same or similar circumstances. Therefore, the court concludes that defendant did not breach the duty of care it owed to Mrs. Tryon.
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant had breached its duty of care, the court would still find for the defendant on the issue of proximate cause. The evidence admitted at trial reflects that Mrs. Tryon willfully took her own life through her own actions. Therefore, the court finds that Mrs. Tryon's actions or negligence were the sole proximate cause of her death.
After considering the totality of the evidence, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was negligent during its evaluation, treatment and discharge of Mrs. Tryon. Plaintiff has also failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's actions were the proximate cause of Mrs. Tryon's unfortunate death. For all of the above reasons, judgment is rendered in favor of defendant.
Judgment for defendant.
RUSSELL LEACH, J., retired, of the Franklin County Municipal Court, sitting by assignment.