Opinion
Case No. 4:99-CV-11
April 20, 2000
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Opinion of the Court issued on this day;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Dkt. No. 48) is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Stipulated Judgment of March 24, 2000 is supplemented so that attorney fees in the amount of $47,355.74, and costs in the amount of $845.90, are awarded to Plaintiffs and against Defendants.
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Dkt. No. 48). On February 16, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging that Defendants had failed to pay fringe benefit contributions to various employee benefit funds ("the Funds") as required by several collective bargaining agreements and 29 U.S.C. § 1145. On January 26, 2000, the Court issued a Partial Judgment against Defendant Spray On, Inc. On March 24, 2000, the Court issued a Stipulated Judgment which granted some relief against Defendant Spray On and Defendant Rashid, dismissed remaining claims, and left the question of attorney fees to be resolved by later order. On March 28, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs.
Plaintiffs' lawsuit, brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1145, was successful. As such, the award of reasonable attorney fees and costs is mandated by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). See Michigan Carpenters Council Health and Welfare Fund v. CJ Rogers, Inc., 933 F.2d 376, 388 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that the remedies provided by § 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), including reasonable attorney fees, are mandatory).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the award of attorney fees must be reasonable as determined under the lodestar calculation. Grandview, 46 F.3d at 1401. Pursuant to this calculation, a court must first calculate the "lodestar." The lodestar is determined by multiplying the hours spent on a case by a reasonable hourly rate of compensation. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Cit. Council, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Second, the court may make adjustments to the lodestar figure under limited circumstances. Id.
In order to substantiate their Motion, Plaintiffs offer the affidavit of their attorney, Scott Graham. The affidavit asserts that from January 26, 1999 through March 16, 2000, Attorney Graham spent 254.5 hours working on the case. Graham's affidavit includes the dates on which work was performed, a description of the services rendered, and the amount of time for each entry. Defendants do not offer any specific arguments as to why this itemization is inaccurate. Instead, Defendants argue generally that 254.5 hours is excessive in light of the fact that Defendants never disputed their own liability and that the only point of controversy was the amount which Defendants owed to the Funds. Furthermore, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' ultimate victory was assured from the start, that Defendants tried to accommodate Plaintiffs every requests, and that Defendants complied with every order of the Court. Finally, Defendants argue that the amount requested is "extremely excessive" in that Plaintiffs request $48,201 in attorney fees and costs whereas the underlying judgment was for only $49,199. As a result, Defendants argue that 254.5 hours is unreasonable.
After reviewing the record the Court rejects Defendants' arguments for four reasons. First, Attorney Graham represented multiple plaintiffs in a case involving several collective bargaining agreements. As such, the case necessarily involved the dedication of extensive legal resources. Second, although Defendants now attempt to place a conciliatory face on their litigation strategy, their papers and activities since this lawsuit was initiated indicate that they have been neither accommodating nor compliant. Defendants repeatedly challenged Plaintiffs' assertions about how much money Defendants owed to the Funds. Furthermore, Defendants were held in contempt of court for failing to comply with a court order that required them to make specified payments to the Funds. Third, Plaintiffs had no way to know that the parties would agree to a Stipulated Judgment in March of 2000. Therefore, because Plaintiffs cannot be charged with predicting the future, they cannot be faulted for preparing for trial in a thorough and complete manner. See generally Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 421-422 (1978) (noting that court should not engage in post hoc reasoning when analyzing attorney fees issues); Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992); Woolridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990). The fact is that had Plaintiffs failed to engage in this type of preparation, they would have violated their fiduciary duties and principals of common sense. Fourth, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has made it clear that there is no requirement that an award of attorney fees and costs be proportional to the underlying award of damages in an action arising under 29 U.S.C. § 1145. See Building Servc. Local 47 Cleaning Con. v. Grandview, 46 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the Court concludes that 254.5 hours is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
Attorney Graham alleges in his affidavit that $175 per hour is a reasonable rate for his legal services. This is the rate which he normally charges. Defendants do not contest this figure. Therefore, the Court concludes that $175 is a reasonable hourly rate of compensation.
Plaintiffs offer the rates charged by mediators in the Western District of Michigan as evidence that $175.00 per hour is reasonable. While the Court is only minimally persuaded by this evidence, because these rates apply to mediation services as opposed to legal services, the Court has no basis for rejecting this rate in light of Defendants' failure to articulate a challenge.
Having concluded 254.5 hours of legal work was reasonable, and that $175.00 per hour is a reasonable rate of compensation, the reasonable attorney fees associated with this case are $44,537.50. In addition to this figure, however, the Court believes that Attorney Graham's expenses relating to computerized research, telephone calls, postage, facsimile charges, and mileage are properly included as attorney fees. Although Plaintiffs label these expenses as costs, as opposed to attorney fees, the Court believes that they are properly identified as attorney fees. See United States v. Merritt Meridian Const. Corp., 95 F.3d 153 (2nd Cir. 1996) (holding that expenses associated with representation, but not identified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, are taxed as attorney fees); 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (excluding computerized research, telephone calls, postage, facsimile charges, and mileage from list of expenses which may be included as costs). According to Attorney Graham's uncontradicted affidavit, these expenses totaled $2,818.24. Adding this figure to the hourly fees, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees were $47,355.74.
Although courts are allowed in some instances to make adjustments to the amount of allowable attorney fees after the lodestar is calculated, neither the Plaintiffs nor Defendants offer any compelling reason to do so in this case. See generally Del. Valley Cit. Council, 478 U.S. at 565; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Therefore, the Court concludes that no adjustments are appropriate.
Plaintiffs also request costs associated with the litigation. Attorney Graham's affidavit identifies filing fees, service fees, transcript fees, and photocopying fees totaling $845.90. These costs are identified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 as expenses which may be taxed as costs. Defendants make no credible argument as to why these costs are unreasonable or excessive. These costs were reasonably, necessarily and actually incurred as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1924. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' allowable costs are $845.90.
Pursuant to the above findings, a Supplemental Judgment shall enter approving an award of attorney fees and costs in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants in the amounts of $47,355.74 as reasonable attorney fees and $845.90 as reasonable costs.