Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 04AS02522
HULL, J.The State Unclaimed Property Law (UPL) (Code Civ. Proc., § 1500 et seq.; further undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure) requires holders of certain unclaimed property to transfer possession of it to the State Controller, to be held until restored to the rightful owner. “The purposes of the Unclaimed Property Law are to protect unknown owners by locating them and restoring their property and to give the state the benefit of the use of it.” (Cory v. Public Utilities Com. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 522, 528.)
Effective August 11, 2003, the UPL was amended to eliminate a preexisting requirement that the Controller pay interest on any sums paid to the rightful owner of unclaimed property. (§ 1540, subd. (c); Stats. 2003, ch. 228, §§ 8, 60.)
Plaintiff Trust Realty Partners (TRP) is the rightful owner of $514,205.22 deposited with the Controller in 1996 under the UPL. TRP submitted a claim for these funds but, for various reasons, the Controller did not pay the $514,205.22 to TRP until March 2004. No interest was included in the payment.
TRP initiated this action against Steve Westly and Richard Chivaro who, at the time suit was filed, were the Controller and chief of staff/chief counsel for the Controller respectively. In addition to seeking payment of interest on the $514,205.22, TRP asserts a far-flung challenge to the practices and procedures of the Controller in handling unclaimed property and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
In this appeal, defendants challenge an order granting summary adjudication to TRP on several causes of action of the complaint. That order conferred upon TRP both declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as an accounting, that encompassed most if not all of the relief sought by TRP in this action.
Defendants contend the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication as a sanction and granting summary adjudication when TRP’s motion sought only summary judgment. Defendants further challenge the breadth of the court’s order as well as the legality of the remedies provided in it. We conclude the trial court’s order far exceeded what was at issue on TRP’s motion. We therefore reverse the order.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Our review of the present matter is hamstrung by the state of the record before us. For example, the complaint beginning on page two of the Appellant’s Appendix contains nine causes of action. However, the motion that is the subject of this appeal seeks summary adjudication of three causes of action: the first, ninth and eleventh. TRP’s supporting memorandum indicates there are 11 causes of action in the “Complaint” and identifies them. There is no mention of an amended complaint. As a further example, defendants filed their own motion for summary adjudication. In it, they listed 10 issues to be adjudicated. However, the trial court’s order granting the motion in part identified 12 issues.
It is the appellant’s burden to assure the record on appeal is sufficient to resolve the issues raised. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296; Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575.) Failure to present an adequate record will normally be held against the appellant.
Here, however, it is unclear whether the record is incomplete or the parties and trial court were simply confused. In light of the arguments raised by the parties on appeal, it appears to be the latter. We therefore proceed as best we can with the record presented.
On review of an order granting summary judgment, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) However, in this instance, defendants did not file a separate statement of disputed and undisputed facts in opposition to TRP’s motion. Therefore, like the trial court before us, we accept the facts as set forth in TRP’s motion.
In 1996, Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company (INMIC) delivered $514,205.22 of unclaimed property to the Controller. The owner of this property was identified as August Income Growth Fund (AIGF). However, the actual owner at the time was TRP.
The Controller did not provide notice of receipt of the $514,205.22 (hereafter the AIGF funds) to TRP. Instead, TRP learned of the deposit from a private investigating firm, Vanacore International (Vanacore).
On or about February 4, 2000, Vanacore submitted a claim to the AIGF funds on behalf of TRP.
On July 27, 2000, the Controller sent a letter to “(1) Vanacore, (2) Christian Riehl of CalFed, (3) Fred Neufeld, an attorney with Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, who were involved in the bankruptcy proceedings [of INMIC], (4) John Provine, claimant, (5) Ronald Marvelco, U.S. Trustee, and (6) Bob Potter, Asset Recovery Investigations” advising that: “‘[G]iven the multiple successors in interest, the past and potential future bankruptcy proceedings, the uncertainty of how the unclaimed property is affected by agreement between [AIGF] and Glenfed, and the conflicting claims, our office will retain the unclaimed property funds. We will await judicial clarification as to who the owner is of these unclaimed property funds.’”
In August and September of the following year, the Controller advised other parties of conflicting claims and issues to be resolved regarding the AIGF funds and indicated the controller would await judicial clarification.
The Controller asked TRP to provide the same information several times to support its claim to the AIGF funds. Responses were provided. TRP was sometimes given “inconsistent and sometimes bizarre instructions about how to complete TRP’s claim.”
On November 12, 2003, the Controller notified counsel for “Vanacore/Provine/AIGF” that it had been informed a competing claim by CalFed was no longer being pursued. The Controller further advised it “had not received the additional information requested on May 23, 2000, and that ‘[o]nce we receive the documentation and information requested, your client’s claim for payment will be evaluated.’”
TRP’s claim was approved for payment on March 22, 2004. TRP was paid $462,784.78 and Vanacore, as TRP’s agent, was paid $51,420.52.
The Controller has never promulgated regulations under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) (Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.) to guide the process of submitting and pursuing claims under the UPL.
On or about June 21, 2004, TRP filed this action against defendants alleging nine causes of action: (1) declaratory relief; (2) taxpayer action (§ 526a); (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (procedural due process); (4) violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (takings clause); (5) violation of the UPL; (6) breach of fiduciary duty; (7) accounting; (8) attorney fees and common fund; and (9) injunctive relief.
Defendants moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication. They sought summary adjudication of 10 issues, one for each of the nine causes of action and one for TRP’s claim for punitive damages. The trial court granted the motion on the eighth cause of action (incorrectly identified as issue 10) because “attorney’s fees and a Common Fund are remedies, not causes of action.” The court also granted the motion on the ninth cause of action (incorrectly identified as issue 11) because “injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.” Finally, the court granted summary adjudication on TRP’s request for punitive damages (incorrectly identified as issue 12). In all other respects, the motion was denied.
While defendants’ motion was pending, TRP filed its own motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. TRP sought summary adjudication of the first, ninth and eleventh causes of action. In its supporting memorandum, TRP identified the first, ninth and eleventh causes of action as those for declaratory relief, an accounting, and injunctive relief respectively.
Defendants submitted opposition to the motion which stated, in its entirety: “Plaintiff moves for summary judgment of the entire action. The motion for summary judgment cannot be granted because it does not dispose of all the material issues of plaintiff’s case. [Citations.] Plaintiff failed to establish the essential elements for liability on each of the remaining causes of action in the operative complaint. Even if plaintiff had made a prima facie showing on the issues of liability, the papers submitted in support of the motion do not establish the fact or the amount of damages. The court may not grant summary judgment under these circumstances. [Citation.] For these reasons, the court should deny the motion for summary judgment.”
On April 13, 2006, the trial court issued a tentative ruling denying TRP’s motion for summary judgment but granting summary adjudication on the causes of action for declaratory relief, accounting, and injunctive relief. Immediately thereafter, defendants requested a continuance of the hearing to file more complete opposition. Defense counsel, Deputy Attorney General Kenneth Swenson, submitted a declaration in which he indicated he had been informed that counsel for TRP, William Palmer, would be in Iraq on the date scheduled for the hearing on the motion and he expected the matter to be taken off calendar. Thereafter, Swenson took bereavement leave for two weeks and did not return to the office until March 30, the day opposition to the motion was due. When he was unable to obtain assurance that the matter would be taken off calendar, Swenson filed the “perfunctory” opposition quoted above. On April 4, Swenson learned that Palmer expected to appear on the motion telephonically. Swenson contacted Palmer about a continuance of the hearing and Palmer indicated he would pass the request on to his client. On April 10, Palmer informed Swenson that TRP would not agree to take the matter off calendar.
At the hearing on TRP’s motion, defense counsel argued further discovery was needed on the case. The trial court took the matter under submission. On April 18, the court issued its ruling on submitted matter, denying defendants’ “belated request for a continuance” and affirming the tentative ruling. The court thereafter entered an order granting summary adjudication, the details of which shall be discussed below.
DISCUSSION
I
Appealability
An order granting summary adjudication is not an appealable order. (§ 904.1; Modica v. Merin (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1073.) The order is instead reviewable on appeal from the final judgment. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 128.) However, an order granting an injunction is appealable. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(6).)
In its order on TRP’s motion, the trial court granted summary adjudication on the declaratory relief claim (the first cause of action). The court further declared that: (1) the Controller’s failure to adopt regulations in accordance with the APA violated the APA, (2) the Controller’s failure to provide publication and direct mail notice to property owners and the opportunity to recover property before it is destroyed violates due process, and (3) the Controller’s application of statutory changes to the interest payment provision of the UPL retroactively violates established California law, the takings clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the UPL.
The court also granted summary adjudication on the injunctive relief claim (erroneously identified in TRP’s motion as the eleventh cause of action). The court enjoined defendants to: (1) promulgate regulations pursuant to the APA setting forth the process by which property owners may obtain return of their property, (2) provide publication and direct mail notice to property owners and an opportunity to recover property before it is sold, destroyed or irrevocably affected, and (3) apply statutory changes to the interest provision of the UPL prospectively.
Finally, the court granted summary adjudication on the accounting claim (erroneously identified in TRP’s motion as the ninth cause of action), directing defendants to render an accounting to TRP and pay all amounts due within 15 days.
On both the accounting and injunctive relief causes of action, the trial court effectively entered a mandatory injunction requiring action by defendants within a relatively short period of time. Those portions of the trial court’s order are appealable. In addition, many of the issues raised by defendants on appeal apply to the validity of the order as a whole. Therefore, any resolution of those issues necessarily applies to the declaratory relief portion of the order as well. Finally, the matters declared in the order all relate to and support the injunctive relief granted. Therefore, to the extent we are required to consider defendants challenges to the injunctive relief awarded, we will also be required to consider the validity of the declaratory relief. In the interest of judicial economy, we conclude the order granting summary adjudication in its entirely is properly before us.
TRP contends the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to vacate the summary adjudication order to allow for filing a second opposition is not reviewable on appeal. However, there is no such motion or ruling in the record. The only motion in the record following the trial court’s summary adjudication order is an ex parte application to stay the summary adjudication order and to shorten the time for hearing a motion for relief from the order.
To the extent TRP is instead referring to the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for a continuance after the tentative ruling was issued, which is contained in the order from which this appeal is taken, we agree that ruling is not appealable. However, defendants have not appealed that ruling and so it is not before us in any event.
II
Summary Adjudication as a Sanction
Defendants contend the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication as a sanction for their failure to file a separate statement of disputed and undisputed facts in opposition to TRP’s motion. They acknowledge the trial court has discretion under section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), to impose such a sanction, but argue the court abused its discretion in this instance. Defendants misread the court’s order.
In Security Pacific National Bank v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 89 (Security Pacific), the bank sued for breach of a loan agreement and fraud and the defendant cross-complained. The bank moved for summary judgment on both the complaint and cross-complaint. The defendant opposed the motion, filing points and authorities and a separate statement of disputed facts. The trial court denied the motion, explaining that the motion sought summary adjudication of facts not issues. The court further explained to the bank how a proper motion should be presented and asked if the bank wished to re-file. The bank said it did and the court set a date for a new hearing. The bank filed a second motion and the defendant filed a response. However, this time, the defendant did not file a separate statement of facts. The trial court granted the bank’s motion based solely on the defendant’s failure to file a separate statement. (Id. at pp. 91-92.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the sole ground for granting the motion had been the defendant’s failure to file a separate statement. (Security Pacific, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 93.) Thus, the only issue on appeal was whether the court had abused its discretion. The court found such an abuse “in the trial court’s failure to give [the defendant] a further opportunity to file a separate responsive statement.” (Id. at p. 94.) While the trial court had granted the bank a second chance to file its motion, it had not given the defendant a second chance to file opposition. (Id. at p. 97.)
Defendants contend Security Pacific is directly on point. It is not. In the present matter, the trial court did not grant summary adjudication as a sanction for defendants’ failure to submit a separate statement of facts. In its order, the court first concluded the facts submitted by TRP in support of its motion met its initial burden of establishing a right to summary adjudication. The next step was to determine if defendants presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) However, because defendants presented no separate statement of facts, the court deemed TRP’s evidence undisputed. And since the court had already concluded TRP’s evidence was sufficient to support summary adjudication, there was nothing left for the court to decide.
If, as defendants contend, the trial court had entered summary adjudication as a sanction, there would have been no need to first find that TRP had established a prima facie right to summary adjudication. Instead, the court found the evidence was undisputed, inasmuch as no opposing evidence had been presented, and concluded TRP’s evidence entitled it to relief.
Defendants nevertheless argue “justice and the principle that reliance can be safely placed on representations made by counsel under oath, dictate that [defendants] should be afforded an opportunity to file a substantive opposition to TRP’s summary judgment motion and have the motion decided on the merits.”
However, defendants cite no representations by counsel for TRP “under oath” on which they relied to prevent the filing of a more complete opposition to the motion. At a hearing on February 2, 2006, counsel for TRP represented that he had just learned he would be leaving for Iraq the next month and would be asking to advance the hearing on TRP’s summary judgment motion. On February 6, counsel for TRP submitted a request to continue trial setting conference in which he represented that he would be deployed to Iraq from March through May and, therefore, would be required to reset the hearing on TRP’s motion for summary judgment. Counsel for TRP later expressed to defense counsel his willingness to seek approval of a continuance of the hearing from his client, but never represented that such continuance would be granted. Defense counsel failed to followed up and determine if TRP was going to advance or postpone the hearing on the summary judgment motion.
Under the foregoing circumstances, justice does not require that defendant be afforded an opportunity to file a more complete opposition. Despite having filed a “perfunctory” opposition and not having received confirmation of a continuance, or even assurances that approval would be forthcoming, defense counsel waited until after the court issued its tentative ruling against his clients before seeking relief. In other words, as the trial court concluded, defendants gambled on a favorable outcome and, when it did not materialize, sought a second bite at the apple.
Having concluded justice does not require that defendants be given an opportunity to file further opposition, we need not consider the declaration of John N. Gulick in opposition to defendants’ petition for writ of mandate previously filed in this court, of which TRP requests that we take judicial notice. That declaration seeks to further explain why defendants’ reliance on a continuance of the summary judgment hearing was unwarranted. The request for judicial notice is therefore denied.
III
Whether TRP’s Motion Sought Summary Adjudication
Defendants contend the trial court erroneously granted summary adjudication where TRP’s motion sought summary judgment alone. We disagree.
“It is elemental that a notice of motion must state in writing the ‘grounds upon which it will be made.’ [Citations.] Only the grounds specified in the notice of motion may be considered by the trial court. [Citations.] This rule has been held to be especially true in the case of motions for summary adjudication of issues.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1545 (Gonzales).)
Defendants contend the present matter is similar to Gonzales, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d 1542. There, the real party in interest moved for summary judgment and included in its motion a list of 21 facts supporting the motion. However, the real party did not request summary adjudication of those facts. Nevertheless, the trial court denied summary judgment but summarily adjudicated 17 of the 21 facts in the real party’s favor. (Id. at pp. 1544-1545.)
The Court of Appeal reversed because the real party’s motion had made no request for summary adjudication and, therefore, there was no obligation on the part of the opposing party to try and raise an issue of fact as to each of the 21 facts. The court explained: “The language in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f) makes it clear that a motion for summary adjudication cannot be considered by the court unless the party bringing the motion duly gives notice that summary adjudication is being sought. [Citations.] ‘If a party desires adjudication of particular issues or sub issues, that party must make its intentions clear in the motion . . . .’ [Citation.] There is a sound reason for this rule: ‘. . . the opposing party may have decided to raise only one triable issue of fact in order to defeat the motion, without intending to concede the other issues. It would be unfair to grant a summary adjudication order unless the opposing party was on notice that an issue-by-issue adjudication might be ordered if summary judgment was denied.’” (Gonzales, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1545-1546.)
The present matter is readily distinguishable from Gonzales. Although TRP’s motion was captioned as one for summary judgment alone, the body of the motion clearly requested summary adjudication as to three causes of action of the complaint. In addition, TRP’s memorandum in support of the motion argued for summary adjudication as to the three causes of action. Thus, despite defendants’ attempt to do so, there can be no claim of surprise when the trial court proceeded to consider whether summary adjudication should be granted.
Defendants contend TRP nevertheless violated California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b) (formerly rule 342(b)), which states: “If made in the alternative, a motion for summary adjudication may make reference to and depend on the same evidence submitted in support of the summary judgment motion. If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Italics added.)
TRP’s separate statement did not repeat verbatim the causes of action to be adjudicated. Nor did it set forth the undisputed facts supporting summary adjudication on those causes of action. Defendants argue this was one reason it believed TRP was seeking summary judgment alone.
TRP argues defendants have forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. According to TRP, any defect in its separate statement “was at worst, induced, or at best, waived, by [defendants’] failure to advise the Court . . . .”
We are at a loss to see how any defect in TRP’s separate statement could possibly have been induced by defendants. TRP does not explain how. Furthermore, contrary to TRP’s assertions, defendants did assert, at oral argument, that TRP’s separate statement was defective.
At any rate, we need not decide whether TRP’s incomplete separate statement warranted defendants’ asserted belief that TRP was seeking summary judgment alone or prevented the trial court from entering summary adjudication. In the following section, we explain how the trial court’s order is otherwise unsupportable.
IV
Breadth of the Trial Court’s Order
Defendants take issue with the substance of the trial court’s order granting summary adjudication. They contend, among other things, the requirements that they provide publication and direct mail notice to property owners and include interest with all claims paid conflict with the terms of the UPL. They further contend the trial court erred in granting class-wide relief where no class had been certified, granting final relief in an interlocutory order, and granting TRP summary adjudication on a cause of action for which summary adjudication had previously been granted to defendants.
TRP contends defendants may not challenge the merits of the trial court’s summary adjudication ruling because they failed to raise any such challenges below. However, as we shall explain, most of the issues now raised by defendants stem from the fact the trial court entered an order adjudicating issues that had not been tendered by TRP’s motion. Given the limited nature of TRP’s motion, defendants could not reasonably have foreseen when they filed their “perfunctory” opposition that the court would issue such a far-reaching order. Thus, defendants’ failure to raise those issues in opposition to the motion is not a bar to their consideration on appeal.
In order to address the issues raised by the parties on the substance of the trial court’s order, we begin with a review of the basic rules of summary adjudication.
“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty . . . . A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (§ 437c, subd. (f)(1).)
We review rulings on motions for summary adjudication de novo, applying the same rules as the trial court and “‘“considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.”’” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) Under “[t]he historic paradigm for our de novo review . . . [w]e first identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond. We then determine if the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to judgment in its behalf. Only if the moving party has satisfied this burden do we consider whether the opposing party has produced evidence demonstrating there is a triable issue of fact with respect to any aspect of the moving party’s prima facie case.” (Rio Linda Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 732, 734-735.)
In its motion below, TRP sought summary adjudication of three causes of action: the first, ninth and eleventh. Although there is some confusion over the identity of the particular claims, TRP adequately identified the causes of action as those seeking declaratory relief (first), an accounting (seventh), and injunctive relief (ninth).
Instead of merely granting summary adjudication on the declaratory relief cause of action, the trial court’s order went on to declare:
“(1) The Controller failed to adopt regulations, in accordance with the [APA], violates [sic] the [APA].
“(2) The Controller failed to provide publication and direct mail notice to Owners whose property the Controller holds in Custodial Trust pursuant to the UPL, and the opportunity to recover such property before it is destroyed, violates [sic] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution . . . .
“(3) The Controller failed to apply of [sic] changes to the statutory interest rate payable on Unclaimed Property Accounts, as set forth in . . . § 1540(c) prospectively, but instead applied the interest rate changes retroactively, which violates” established California law, the takings clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the UPL.
These declarations do not track the complaint. In the first cause of action, TRP sought a declaration that defendants “[f]ailed to promulgate regulations as required by California’s APA to guide the claims process.” Defendants do not dispute they did not promulgate regulations on the procedures for presenting claims under the UPL. However, the trial court’s order goes further. In addition to declaring that regulations had not been promulgated, the court declared that such failure to promulgate regulations violates the APA. But the validity of this declaration presupposes defendants were under some affirmative duty to promulgate regulations, an issue not presented to the court on TRP’s motion.
TRP contends defendants have not challenged this aspect of the trial court’s summary adjudication order on appeal. Defendants respond they have challenged that portion of the order by virtue of their challenge to “the very grant of summary adjudication for any type of injunctive relief . . . .” We also note defendants have challenged the summary adjudication order to the extent it grants relief beyond the immediate controversy between these parties. At any rate, in the interest of judicial economy, we exercise our discretion to consider the issue at this time because it is closely related to the other issues raised by the parties.
TRP also sought a declaration in the first cause of action that defendants are enforcing statutory amendments to the requirement to pay interest retroactively rather than prospectively. This again is not contested by defendants. However, the trial court’s order went further and declared such retroactive application to be a violation of California law, the takings clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the UPL.
At oral argument, TRP asserted the complaint contains claims that defendants are violating due process, the takings clause and the UPL by failing to promulgate regulations and by enforcing the statutory amendments retroactively. TRP argued it is not only pursuing an individual claim for interest but a general taxpayer claim for failure to comply with the law. TRP is correct. However, the foregoing claims are found in the second through fifth causes of action of the complaint, not those for which TRP sought summary adjudication. The trial court had no authority to rule on the issues tendered in those claims.
Finally, TRP sought a declaration that defendants are commingling funds held in the Controller’s unclaimed property fund with those held in the state’s general fund. The trial court’s order did not address this claim. Instead, the order declared defendants failed to provide adequate notice to property owners and an opportunity to recover property before it is destroyed and this failure violates due process.
It is fundamental that, on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the pleadings control the issues before the court. (Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 248, 252.) Summary adjudication may be granted only as to matters pleaded, whether they be causes of action or affirmative defenses. The trial court’s order violates this basic principle.
The order also exceeded the court’s authority on the injunctive relief granted. TRP sought summary adjudication of its injunctive relief cause of action. However, defendants had already obtained summary adjudication in their favor on that cause of action. In its earlier ruling, the court concluded “injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.”
TRP contends the earlier order did not preclude a grant of injunctive relief in the court’s summary adjudication ruling. According to TRP, “[w]hile [the earlier order] did, in fact, rule that the Ninth Cause of Action was a remedy, not a cause of action, it did not in any way determine that injunctive relief was unavailable.” This may be true. However, the fact the court granted summary adjudication to defendants on the ninth cause of action is the end of it. TRP may be entitled to summary adjudication on one or more of its remaining causes of action, and be entitled to injunctive relief on those claims, but TRP did not seek summary adjudication on those causes of action. Rather, the court granted summary adjudication on a cause of action that was no longer at issue.
Finally as to the court’s grant of summary adjudication on the accounting cause of action, the court directed defendants to render an accounting to TRP and to pay all amounts due within 15 days. However, this ruling presupposes that an amount is due TRP. In connection with the first cause of action, the court declared that defendants’ retroactive application of legislation eliminating the requirement to pay interest violated the law. However, as we have explained, this declaration exceeded what was at issue in the first cause of action. Hence, there is no foundation for ordering an accounting in connection with TRP’s summary adjudication motion, at least not at this stage of the proceedings.
A few days before oral argument, TRP submitted a request that we take judicial notice of an order by the United States District Court and other materials claimed to support TRP’s assertion that defendants are violating due process in their enforcement of the UPL. However, because these materials do not address the limited issues presented on TRP’s motion for summary adjudication, the request is denied.
Having concluded the trial court’s summary adjudication order exceeded what was before it on TRP’s motion, we need not and do not consider the merits of that order. Thus, we do not address whether (1) defendants violated the law in failing to promulgate regulations in compliance with the APA, (2) defendants violated due process in failing to give adequate notice to property owners or an opportunity to object before property is destroyed, (3) defendants violated California law, the takings clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or the UPL in connection with the withholding of interest on property claims, (4) the trial court improperly granted class-wide relief where no class had been certified, or (5) the trial court improperly granted final relief in an interlocutory order. We conclude only that the trial court’s summary adjudication order exceeded what was properly before it and, therefore, such order cannot stand.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its order granting TRP’s motion for summary adjudication and to reconsider that motion in light of the views expressed in this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., ROBIE, J.