Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1084 Section "K" (5).
December 16, 2004
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)(6) filed by Boomtown, L.L.C., Louisiana-I Gaming, APIC, Madeline Maunoir, Thomas Jones, and Joseph Robertson, (Boomtown employees) (Rec. Doc. No. 20). Also before this Court is a Motion to Adopt And Incorporated Memorandum In Support filed by defendants, Greg Champagne, Michael Maunoir, and Officer Finn, requesting the Court to allow them to adopt the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Boomtown employees. Oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss were heard on September 29, 2004. The Court has reviewed the pleadings, memorandum, and the relevant law and finds as follows.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiffs' Civil Rights Case
Plaintiffs, Tate and Cindy Troyer, filed suit against several defendants for damages "arising out of an unlawful use and publication of private and confidential information" of Tate Troyer. (Plaintiffs' First Supplemental and Amended Complaint Doc. No. 11). Tate Troyer was an employee of Boomtown Casino from September 2002 through July 2003. During his employment, plaintiff had to "write up" employee, Madeline Maunoir, whose husband, Office Maunoir, works as a police officer with the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office. (Rec. Doc. No. 11 ¶ 19, 25). After this incident, Madeline Maunoir and other Boomtown employees conspired along with Office Maunoir and Officer Finn, St. Charles Parish Deputy, to have Troyer fired. (Rec. Doc. No. 11 ¶ 24). Plaintiffs claim the conspiracy involved the officers performing an illegal and unauthorized search of Tate Troyer by running a background check via the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"). (Rec. Doc. No. 11 ¶ 26). The NCIC report contained a record of a 1982 indictment of Tate Troyer which was dismissed in 1984; thus, no arrests or convictions exist. (Rec. Doc. No. 11 ¶ 28). After obtaining the records, Boomtown employees, Madeline Maunoir, Thomas Jones, and Joseph Robertson provided this information to Troyer's superiors. (Rec. Doc. No. ¶ 30). Thereafter, Boomtown gave Troyer the option of being fired or quitting. Troyer chose to quit, resulting in a constructive discharge. (Rec. Doc. No. 11 ¶ 29). Following the termination, Troyer suffered a stroke claimed to be related to the stress and depression he suffered from the wrongful termination. (Rec. Doc. No. 11 ¶ 33). Cindy Troyer, wife of Tate Troyer, suffered damages including loss of support from her husband, loss of affection and society, and continues to suffer stress and depression. (Rec. Doc. No. 11 ¶ 36).
Plaintiffs' complaint includes twenty-two different claims against the Boomtown defendants and defendants associated with St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office and the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office. These claims include violation of Constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1988, conspiracy to violate Constitutional and statutory rights, violation of rights under the Louisiana Constitution, respondeat superior liability, independent liability, wrongful conversion and publication of private facts, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and RICO claims. Plaintiffs seek $5 million in damages for their federal claims, RICO claims, and state law claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim "`admits the facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges plaintiff's right to relief based upon those facts.'" Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ward v. Hudnell, 366 F.2d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 1996)." The district court may not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) `unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Conley v. Givson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). "In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, however, a plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations." Id. see also Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1982). That being said, it is well established that courts do not have to accept every allegation in the complaint as true in considering its sufficiency. Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1357, at 311; see also Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974) (conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted as true). Courts do not have to accept "legal conclusions," "unsupported conclusions," "unwarranted references," or "sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." Wright Miller at 315-318.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs provided no authority for a federal cause of action pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Nor did plaintiffs provide any authority for a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983) for a discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The Court finds these claims are without merit under the law and facts pleaded in plaintiffs' case.
Plaintiffs allege a deprivation of their due process rights. In order to establish a claim of denial of procedural due process, they must prove that there was a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest that has been infringed by the defendant. Plaintiffs allege that their liberty interest at stake is Troyer's employment. The Court finds this claim without merit as Troyer was not a public employee. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). See Wallace v. Shreve Mem. Library, 97 F.3d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (public employees with protected property interest in their jobs are those who may be fired only for cause and those who are permanent classified employees); Moore v. Mississippi Valley State University, 871 F.2d 545, 548. Plaintiffs also allege that Troyer was denied equal protection of the laws under the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs have provided no authority to potentially state a federal cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs have not identified two separate classes in order for the Court to properly analyze the claim. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiffs' federal claims other than their right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment are without merit and, therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
As stated in the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs seek "damages arising out of violations of the civil rights of Tate Troyer resulting in his wrongful termination, loss of employment, personal injuries, pain and suffering, and other unconstitutional policies and actions, and state law claims arising out of an unlawful use and publication of private and confidential information." (emphasis added). Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss stated that while plaintiffs alleged violations of rights under the United States Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution, laws of the United States and the State of Louisiana, "all of these claims revolve around the alleged violation of Troyer's right to privacy through the improper accessing of his rap sheet." Moreover, during oral argument, the Court addressed the right to privacy in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 tort claim. Thus, the issue appropriately before the Court is whether the plaintiffs have a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment sufficient to establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 tort claim. In the second part of this opinion, the Court will consider plaintiffs' RICO claims against defendants.
A. Plaintiffs' Civil Rights Claims
To state a claim under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the defendants "deprived him of a right secured by the `Constitution and laws' of the United States" and that they did so "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State." Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981) (citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966)). Plaintiffs have alleged enough facts for the requisite state action on the part of all defendants. Acting "under color" of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State if the accused is a willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents. Fadjo, 633 F.2d at 1175 ( citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S. at 794).
The question then becomes whether there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. Fadjo, 633 at 1175. As stated in their complaint, plaintiffs' claims are based upon the alleged "unlawful use and publication of private and confidential information" which implicates the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" as described in the Supreme Court decision Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). In Whalen, the Supreme Court separated the right to privacy into two separate strands: "[o]ne is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Id. This case involved a New York statute which required that prescriptions for certain dangerous drugs be prepared on official forms to be sent to the state health department. Id. at 592-94. A group of patients who were being treated with drugs covered by the New York statute challenged the act as a violation of their constitutional right to privacy because it required disclosure of the patient's name, address, age, drug and dosage, and prescribing physician. Id. The Supreme Court held that this record of information did not "establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 606. This Court will focus on the first strand of privacy as established in Whalen to determine whether the dissemination of plaintiff's rap sheet revealing a 1982 indictment that was dismissed two years later constitutes "an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Plaintiffs rely upon the Fifth Circuit case in Tosh v. Buddies Supermarket, Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973). In Tosh, plaintiffs, union organizers, sought relief under Section 1983 because a detective of the police department provided rap sheets to the security personnel of Buddies supermarket who disseminated this information to the public. Id. at 330. The Court held that the "records" released to the store personnel was "devoid of any evidence" to support that plaintiffs were deprived of constitutional rights. Id. at 332. Three years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). In this case, plaintiff brought a 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because two police officers distributed to local merchants fliers containing mug shot photos and naming them as active shoplifters. Id. at 695. The plaintiff had been arrested on a charge of shoplifting when his name and mug shot were disclosed; shortly after the circulation of the flyer, the charge was dismissed. Id. The Court held that publicizing "a record of an official act such as an arrest" was not recognized by any of their substantive privacy decisions. Id. at 713.
The Fifth Circuit recently discussed the second branch of privacy established in Whalen in Zuffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2002). This case is instructive in terms of its analytical framework and the clear limits placed upon claims of this nature. In Zuffuto, police officer Zuffuto placed a call from his private office to his wife expressing his approval of a department re-structuring adversely affecting his superiors. Id. at 487. The conversation was surreptitiously taped and was played for two police officers. Id. Subsequently, Zaffuto was listed as a witness in a co-worker's sex discrimination lawsuit and was suspended 240 hours for allegedly failing to accurately report an officer assault. Id. Among other complaints, Zaffuto filed a 1983 action, claiming that his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated. Id. at 489.
The Fifth Circuit held that "the disclosure in this case, though deliberate, did not reveal the type of intimate facts to constitute a constitutional violation." Id. at 490. The Fifth Circuit has never explicitly determined what types of disclosures are "`personal' enough to create a constitutional cause of action," but turned to other courts that "have clearly been limiting the scope of confidentiality branch actions." Id. The Court discussed Davis III v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1988) in which a corrections officer showed nude photos of an inmate's wife to at least two other inmates. Zaffuto, 308 F.3d at 490. The Fifth Circuit, citing Davis III, stated the following: "The court said that the case presented `two isolated instances of poor judgment' and that `elevating them to constitutional dimension would tend to trivialize the Fourteenth Amendment by making it a magnet for all claims involving personal information, state officers, and unfortunate indignities.'" Id. The Court noted further that "`[t]he constitutional right to privacy is generally limited to only the most intimate aspects of human affairs.'" Id. ( citing Wade v. Goodwin, 843 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1988). The Court concluded that the "substance" of the Zaffuto's conversation revealed only that "Zaffuto disliked some of his bosses," and "[t]he disclosure in this case, though deliberate, did not reveal the type of intimate facts to constitute a constitutional violation." Zaffuto, 308 F.3d at 490-491.
In Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1008, 117 S.Ct.510, 136 L.Ed.2d 400 (1996), the Sixth Circuit considered a 1983 claim for improper disclosure of arrest records. Plaintiff alleged that a private citizen obtained his arrest record from the sheriff's department via the NCIC database and that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 178. The Court stated, "there is no violation of the United States Constitution in this case because there is no constitutional right to privacy in one's criminal record." Id. at 179. The Court cited Paul v. Davis in proposing that one's criminal history is arguably "not a private `personal matter' at all, since arrest and conviction information are matters of public record. Id. The following cases involve disclosure of criminal convictions in which the courts held there was no constitutional right to privacy and no 1983 claim: Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[G]overnment disclosure of arrest records and information contained in police reports do not implicate the right to privacy (citations omitted) . . . An expungement order does not privatize criminal activity."); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Far from being `inherently private,' the details of Eagle's prior guilty plea are by their very nature matters within the public domain. Accordingly, we decide without hesitation that Eagle has no legitimate expectation of privacy in this material."); Hatch v. Town of Middletown, 311 F.3d 83, 85 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that there is no right to privacy under plaintiff's state law claims when police officers revealed child abuse arrest report to tabloid publication; federal law claims which held same were not appealed). The holdings of these cases grant this Court little room to find a constitutional right to privacy in Tate Troyer's situation when the substance of the rap sheet, a 1982 indictment, concern a public matter. Morever, the defendants' counsel on the day of oral argument produced a copy of the indictment which was obtained in the Clerk of Court's office that morning at the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Plaintiffs argue that there is a substantial right to privacy in the disclosure of rap sheets based upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee For Freedom Of The Press, 489 U.S. 749, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989) which held that a third party's request for law enforcement records concerning a private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade the citizen's privacy within the context of 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(C) of the Freedom of Information Act. The case clearly states that the privacy interest in a person's rap sheet will always be high. Id. at 780. However, the Supreme Court noted that the meaning of privacy under the FOIA is not applicable to claims brought under Section 1983: "[t]he question of the statutory meaning of privacy under the FOIA is, of course, not the same as the question whether a tort action might lie for invasion of privacy or the question whether an individual's interest in privacy is protected by the Constitution." Id. at 1476 n. 13. It is also significant that following this statement, the Supreme Court cited Paul v. Davis "(no constitutional privacy right affected by publication of name of arrested but untried shoplifter)." Id.
Thus, based on the cases discussed above, the 1982 indictment, regardless of the time that has elapsed since its dismissal, does not contain information that includes the "most intimate aspects of human affairs" or "intimate facts to constitute a constitutional violation." Zaffuto, 350 F.3d at 490-491. Nor does the indictment contain a "pledge of confidentiality." As the Davis III case noted and the Fifth Circuit cited, a tort action under the Fourteenth Amendment does not cover those claims that involve "personal information," "state officers" and "unfortunate indignities." Id. at 490.
The Court is referring to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981). In this case, plaintiff brought a 1983 claim based on his constitutional right to privacy. Id. The state of Florida, as part of an investigation, used its subpoena power, under a pledge of confidentiality, to obtain information from the plaintiff concerning "the most private details of his life." Id. This information did not remain confidential, as it was passed onto insurance companies. Id. The Court held that this case is distinguishable from Paul v. Davis, infra, "since it involves the revelation of intimate information obtained under a pledge of confidentiality." Id. at 1176. This case is distinguishable from the facts in Troyer. There was no pledge of confidentiality and an indictment does not involve "the most private details" of plaintiff's life.
Plaintiffs urge this Court to apply the balancing test weighing the invasion of privacy against the legitimate purpose in disclosing the information as employed by the Fifth Circuit in Tosh v. Buddies, 482 F.2d at 332 and other cases in the Fifth Circuit. The Court notes that Zaffuto analyzed this strand of privacy in the context of a 1983 claim without a balancing test. 308 F.3d 485, 489-491 (5th Cir. 2002). In Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1342-1343 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868, 115 S.Ct. 189, 130 L.Ed.2d 122 (1994), the Fifth Circuit used the balancing test on one Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim involving one set of facts, but not on another. The plaintiff claimed an infringement of his right to privacy when the names and addresses of the men depicted in a sexual video with him were released by an investigator for the DA's office. Id. at 1340. The Court stated, "[t]he release of this information alone does not involve intimate details . . . thus, these facts . . . are insufficient to state a claim for a deprivation of his constitutional right to privacy." Id. at 1342. However, when the Court considered the disclosure of sexually oriented materials found in the plaintiff's room, the Court considered the government's interest. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Cinel and Zaffuto declined to engage in the balancing test when the alleged invasion did not meet the constitutional threshold. This Court finds that the alleged invasion here does meet the constitutional threshold of a constitutional tort under the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, there is no duality of fundamental rights to balance.
For the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses all claims under the federal laws and the United States Constitution with prejudice. Plaintiffs also raise a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 which allows the recovery of attorney's fees; having dismissed plaintiffs' claims, this statute is not applicable.
B. Plaintiffs' RICO Claims
Plaintiffs' RICO Case Statement
Plaintiffs allege violations of 18 U.S.C.A 1962(a)(b)(c) and (d) against Boomtown Casino, Madeline Maunoir, Joseph Robertson, and Tom Jones and possibly others. Plaintiffs allege that these defendants engaged in a pattern of illegal conduct soliciting public employees to illegally access the NCIC database of employees. (Rec. Doc. No. 11 ¶ 101). Plaintiffs allege that Michael Maunoir illegally retrieved criminal background reports from the FBI, through the NCIC, and sold information for various individuals and entities, including, but not limited to Boomtown Casino.
RICO Generally
"Congress enacted . . . RICO . . . for the purpose of seek[ing] the eradication of organized crime in the United States." Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 496 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). RICO has eight sections, four of which apply directly to the case before this Court. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) sets forth the four activities prohibited by the statute. "Subsections (a), (b), and (c) were designed to work together to deal with the three different ways in which organized crime infiltrates and corrupts legitimate organizations." David B. Smith Terrance G. Reed, Civil RICO, § 5.02, p. 5-2 (Matthew Bender Co. 2000). Subsection (d) is an inchoate offense, prohibiting conspiracy to violate sections (a), (b), or (c). Plaintiffs allege violations of Section 1962(a)-(d).
"Common elements are present in all four [RICO] subsections." Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 204 (5th Cir. 1995). "These common elements teach that any RICO claim necessitates "(1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct or control of an enterprise." Id. ( citing Delta Truck Tractor, Inc. v. J.L. Chase Co., 855 F.2d 241, 241 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also Keith A. Langley Mark Chevallier, Civil RICO, 21 Tex.Tech. L.Rev. 185 (1990). Once those fundamental prerequisites are satisfied, the court "may then continue to the substantive requirements of each respective subsection." St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Willimson, 224 F.3d 425, 439 (5th Cir. 2000).
A RICO person is the defendant. Crowe, 43 F.3d at 204. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) defines a RICO person as "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." Recognizing that the statute provides a very broad definition, the Fifth Circuit has clarified the definition, requiring that "the RICO person must be one that either poses or has posed a continuous threat of engaging in the acts of racketeering." Crowe, 43 F.3d at 204 ( quoting Delta Truck Tractor, 855 F.2d at 242. The panel in Crowe expounded upon the requirement by stating that "[t]he continuous threat requirement may not be satisfied if no more is pled than that the person has engaged in a limited number of predicate racketeering acts." Id. In Plaintiffs' Opposition, they state that defendants, Thomas Jones, Joseph Robertson, Does 1-3, and Madeline Maunoir (all Boomtown employees) are the RICO persons. In their RICO Case Statement, plaintiffs alleged that on April 25, 2003 and on May 16, 2003 police officers at St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office performed NCIC searches on Troyer. Plaintiffs also alleged that on June 26, 2003 and August 6, 2003, police officers searched records for another Boomtown employer, Troyer's successor. Plaintiffs name the Boomtown employees as the RICO person, but use the acts of the police officers to establish a "continuous threat." Furthermore, performing a search on two separate persons only shows a limited number of "predicate acts." Thus, based on this sparse evidence, the Court finds there is no RICO person who poses a "continuous threat."
The final element common to all RICO claims is the existence of an enterprise. Thus, "[a] plaintiff asserting a RICO claim must allege the existence of an enterprise." Crowe, 43 F.3d at 204. A RICO enterprise is "a group of persons associated together for a common purpose" and "is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). The statute defines an enterprise as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Thus, a RICO enterprise can either be a legal entity or an association in fact. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 224 F.3d at 439; Manax v. McNamara, 842 F.2d 808, 811 (5th Cir. 1988). "While a RICO enterprise can be formal or informal, some type of organizational structure is required." Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit has determined that an "association in fact" "enterprise (1) must have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering, (2) must be an ongoing organization, and (3) its members must function as a continuing unit as shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision making structure." Crowe, 43 F.3d at 205.
Plaintiffs claim that an "association in fact" enterprise exists. Plaintiffs state that the officers at St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office and certain employees at Boomtown Casino comprised the RICO enterprise. Plaintiffs state that the "enterprise is two fold." Plaintiffs allege that Officers Maunoir, Finn, and Richard provided illegal information to Boomtown employees for profit and Boomtown Casino, through certain employees, profited from the illegal enterprise and gained an unfair advantage over employees and other casinos by soliciting the illegally obtained information.
Upon reviewing plaintiffs' description of the enterprise in the RICO Statement, the Court finds that the plaintiffs fail to satisfy even the first element required for an "association in fact" — an existence separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering. The question of whether the enterprise has a "separate existence" from the pattern of activity through which it is conducted ought to be the focus of inquiry in every illegitimate enterprise case." David B. Smith Terrance G. Reed, Civil RICO, § 3.06, p. 3-50 (Matthew Bender Co. 2000). The United States Supreme Court has instructed that "[t]he "enterprise" is not the "pattern of racketeering activity"; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583; see also Elliot v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1989). Therefore, proof of a pattern of racketeering does not necessarily prove the existence of an enterprise, and vice versa. Id. Moreover, "the plaintiff must plead specific facts which establish that the association exists for purposes other than simply to commit the predicate acts." Id. If the association has as its raison d'etre a single, discrete goal toward which all its energies are directed, the association is not a RICO enterprise." Household Bank FSB v. Metro Associates, 1992 WL 350239 (E.D.La. 1992). Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence that the enterprise exists for purposes other than to commit the alleged acts. It appears that the alleged single goal in mind of this "two fold enterprise" is the production of NCIC reports for a gainful advantage over other employees in the casino business. The plaintiffs fail to establish that this enterprise made up of Boomtown Casino employees and officers at St. Charles Parish is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of illegal activity. Because the first element of an "association in fact" enterprise is not satisfied, the Court finds that there is no enterprise.
The Court need not investigate the validity of the alleged predicate acts because plaintiffs fail to meet two of the three elements common to all RICO claims. The Court finds that there are no RICO person and no established enterprise. Thus, plaintiffs' RICO claims are dismissed with prejudice.
The Court notes that there are federal claims pending against Terry Richard and Paul Connick. Therefore, any dismissal of state claims would be premature. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants Greg Champagne, Michael Maunoir, and Officer Finn's Motion To Adopt And Incorporated Memorandum In Support is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' federal law claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against defendants Boomtown L.L.C., Louisiana I-Gaming, APIC, Madeline Maunoir, Thomas Jones, Joseph Robertson, Greg Champagne, Michael Maunoir, and Officer Finn.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' RICO claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against defendants Boomtown Casino L.L.C., Louisiana I-Gaming, APIC, Madeline Maunoir, Thomas Jones, and Joseph Robertson.