Opinion
Civ. No. 98-2885, SECTION "C" (1).
March 8, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Belle of Orleans, L.L.C. d/b/a Bally's Casino Lakeshore Resort ("Bally's") moves this Court for summary judgment on the claims of race discrimination and defamation brought by Plaintiff Johnnie R. Triplett. After having reviewed the memoranda of the parties, the record, the applicable law, and all other relevant materials, the Court, for the reasons below, GRANTS Bally's Motion for Summary Judgment
I. BACKGROUND
Bally's hired Mr. Tripled, a black male, in March 1995 as property controller of its Lakeshore Resort riverboat casino. Bally's later promoted Mr. Triplett to the position of Assistant General Manager and Chief Financial Officer. At all times, Mr. Triplett had no employment contract with Bally's; rather his employment was on an at-will basis.
In 1996, Mr. Triplett engaged in an intimate romantic relationship with one of the Bally's employees he supervised, Andrea Thompson. During the Summer of 1996, Mr. Triplett first informed former Human Resources Director Genelle Gibson and later Senior Vice President and General Manager Lorenzo Creighton, Mr. Triplett's immediate supervisor, of the intimate relationship. Believing Mr. Triplett's relationship with Ms. Thompson showed poor judgment and being concerned about possible exposure to sexual harassment claims, Mr. Creighton ordered Mr. Triplett not to have any job-related contact with Ms. Thompson. Several months later, in May of 1997, Mr. Creighton terminated Mr. Triplett.
Bally's claims that it fired Mr. Triplett because Mr. Triplett's attitude and ability to work as part of a team deteriorated after exposure of the Thompson relationship such that Mr. Creighton no longer felt he could work effectively with Mr. Triplett. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Ex. A (Aff. Lorenzo Creighton), at 2. Mr. Triplett, however, alleges (1) that his termination was due to racial discrimination, and (2) that Bally's management planned his termination by arranging his affair with Ms. Thompson. See respectively Pl.'s Cmpl., Rec. Doc. 1, Attached Letter of Sept. 22, 1998 and Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Ex.C (Dep. Johnnie Triplett), at 8. Further, he alleges (1) that Bally's discriminated against him by compensating him at a lower wage than other employees, by offering him a lesser severance package than other employees, and by hiring a less qualified white male as his eventual replacement; and (2) that Bally's defamed him by reporting to other Bally's employees and investigating state and federal agencies that he was terminated due to misconduct. See Pl.'s Cmpl., Rec. Doc. 1.
On December 15, 1997, Mr. Triplett filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging various violations by Bally's of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. See Pl.'s Cmpl., Rec. Doc. 1, Attached EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights Letter. On June 24, 1998, the EEOC dismissed the charge as it was "unable to conclude that the information obtained establishe[d] violations of [Title VII]" and issued a Notice of Rights Letter. Id. Mr. Triplett then filed suit in this Court pro se on September 22, 1998 alleging the claims of race discrimination and defamation outlined above and asking for damages in the amount of fifty million dollars ($50,000,000). See id. While his Complaint and attached documents alleged relief only under Title VII, he has also urged elsewhere that he is entitled to relief under the laws of the State of Louisiana for his claims of defamation and that he is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 47, at 9.
Section 703 of Title VII provides, in part, that:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, or national origin.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Beck v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
After the moving party asserts that there is no genuine dispute, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Charges of Racial Discrimination as Reason for Discharge 1. Title VII
A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A prima facie case of discrimination consists of a plaintiff showing (1) that he was discharged; (2) that he was qualified for the position; (3) that he was a member of the protected class at the time of discharge; and (4) that he was replaced by someone outside the protected class. See Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1997). See also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks; 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
If established, the plaintiff's prima facie case raises an inference of intentional discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The defendant then must rebut that presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the defendant articulates such a reason, the focus then shifts to the ultimate question: whether the plaintiff can prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. See id.
The plaintiff may attempt to overcome the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason by providing evidence that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is merely pretext for racial animus. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. To establish pretext, the plaintiff must show that the evidence, taken as a whole, "(1) create[s] a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) create[s] a reasonable inference that [race] was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains." Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff, therefore, "retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the case." Faruki, 123 F.3d at 319 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093).
2. Discussion
Mr. Triplett meets the requirements necessary to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge because: (1) Bally's discharged him in May of 1997; (2) he had the training, experience, and qualifications for the position from which he was discharged; (3) he is a black man and thus a member of a protected class under Title VII; and (4) Bally's filled his position with Anthony Moore, a white male. However, Bally's has offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Mr. Triplett's discharge: his continuing affair with a subordinate employee, Ms. Thompson, and the lack of judgment it demonstrated, plus Mr. Creighton's dissatisfaction with Mr. Triplett's subsequent attitude and ability to work as part of the team. Therefore, the burden has now shifted back to Mr. Triplett to overcome Bally's proffered reasons for discharge by establishing that it was mere pretext for racial animus.
None of the evidence presented refutes Mr. Triplett's objective qualifications for the job. Mr. Triplett had been in the position he occupied at the time of discharge for over a year and with Bally's at the riverboat casino for over two years in total.
See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, at 21.
Rebutting Bally's explanation, Mr. Triplett claims that Bally's "set him up" by arranging the affair with Ms. Thompson in order to fire him. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Ex. C (Aff. Johnnie Triplett), at 8-14. Mr. Triplett generally alleges that Bally's first unsuccessfully attempted to lure him into an extramarital affair with an Anita Robinson, and then, when he did not take to Ms. Robinson's advances, Bally's arranged for Ms. Thompson to seduce him. See id. According to Mr. Triplett, Bally's was unnerved by his suspicion over certain procurement practices at the casino. See id.
Mr. Triplett, however, has yet to produce any evidence whatsoever to prove the set-up. The story Mr. Triplett has offered "is an exceedingly improbable plot," Palucki v. Sears, 879 F.2d 1568, 1570 (7th Cir. 1989). Such conjecture alone is insufficient to create a fact issue as to Bally's proffered reason for discharge. Moreover, even if there was some evidence of the alleged plot, none of these machinations point to race discrimination. Rather, as explained above, Mr. Triplett argues that Bally's wanted him fired because of his suspicions over the casino's procurement activities.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a line of age discrimination cases, has considered several disgruntled employees' unsubstantiated conspiracy theories and has rejected them. See, e.g., Konowitz v. Schandig Corp., 965 F.2d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer where plaintiff had argued that an elaborate plot of demotions and cutbacks was used to fire him because of his age); McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer where plaintiff had argued that transfer to new position was part of a larger plot to fire him ultimately); Palucki, 879 F.2d at 1571 (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff had argued that his promotion to division head, which entailed supervision of three departments, was a setup to ensure his failure and facilitate his discharge).
The Court finds it unnecessary to invoke the "same actor" inference in this case because Mr. Triplett has failed to produce any evidence of racial animus. The "same actor" inference allows an inference of nondiscriminatory motive where the person responsible for employment actions is from the same protected class as the complaining employee. See, e.g., Faruki, 123 F.3d at 320, n. 3 (age and national origin discrimination claims); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (age discrimination claim).
If Mr. Triplett had produced any evidence of racial discrimination, this Court could have considered the "same actor" inference because Mr. Creighton, Mr. Triplett's supervisor who promoted and later fired him, is also black. However, another court that considered the same situation refused to extend the "same actor inference" where the supervisor who eventually fired plaintiff had promoted her but had not hired her. See Butler v. CMC Mississippi, Inc., No. 1:96CV349-D-D, 1998 WL 173233, at *7, n. 2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 1998). Nevertheless, as stated, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach the "same actor" issue.
Mr. Triplett claims that racial discrimination is evidenced by the following Bally's actions: (1) compensating him at an allegedly lower wage than similarly situated white employees; (2) offering him an allegedly lesser severance package than other employees; and (3) hiring an allegedly less qualified white male as his eventual replacement. However, as with the alleged affair set-up, Mr. Triplett offers no evidence to support these allegations.
The evidence before the Court shows that Bally's did not compensate Mr. Triplett at a lower wage than similarly situated white employees. In fact, the only employee on the riverboat casino earning a salary higher than Mr. Triplett was his supervisor, Mr. Creighton, who is also black. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Ex. M (Schedule of 1996 Bonuses). The only other management employee that Bally's compensated at the same level as Mr. Triplett was Joseph Giamo, a white male who was the casino's table games director. See id. Mr. Giamo was highly qualified for his position in casino management having previously worked at four other casinos for a total of fifteen years prior to Bally's hiring him. See id., Ex. N (Giamo's Appl. for Employment). Mr. Giamo actually took a $57,000 pay cut when he accepted Bally's offer of employment. There is thus no evidence that Bally's improperly compensated Mr. Giamo because he was white.
Mr. Giamo had previously worked for Harrah's New Orleans Casino. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. N (Giamo's Appl. for Employment). The casino closed due to financial difficulties in 1995. In fact, Giamo had been earning more than his starting salary at Bally's since at least 1990. See id.
Additionally, Mr. Triplett points to his 1996 bonus as evidence of salary disparity. He received $5,000 as a bonus in 1996 while other employees with "less span of management control" received equal or higher bonuses. See id., at Ex. L (Response to Interrogatories, Response #3). However, Bally's awards bonuses in its sole discretion according to performance. See id., Ex. A (Aff. Lorenzo Creighton), at 2. See also Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 47 (Aff. Wallace Barr), at 27. As has been explained above, management was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Mr. Triplett's performance eventually leading to his discharge in May 1997. In fact, Mr. Creighton recommended that Mr. Triplett receive no bonus at all in 1996. See id. Mr. Triplett received a bonus only because Wallace Barr, President of Bally's in New Jersey, decided that giving no bonus would be "overly harsh and unfair." Id. Furthermore, one of the employees whose bonus Mr. Triplett complains of, Mr. Taylor, is also black. See id., at 19. Therefore, there is no evidence that Bally's offered Mr. Triplett a lower bonus because of his race.
The individuals Mr. Triplett specified were Mr. Giamo — $7,000; Joe Giaridina, marketing director — $6,000; Ken Geiger, slots director — $10,000; Allen Jenkins, property operations director — $5,000; and Artie Taylor, security director — $6,000. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Exs. L (Response to Interrogatories, Response #3) and M (Schedule of 1996 Bonuses).
Mr. Creighton, also a black man, received a bonus of $40,000 in 1996. See Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. M (Schedule of 1996 Bonuses).
The evidence also fails to support Mr. Triplett's contention that Bally's offered him a severance package not equal to previous offers to similarly situated employees. Bally's offered Mr. Triplett a three month severance package. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. R (Termination Letter). Bally's has only offered one other employee of the riverboat casino, C. Richard Cook, a white male, a severance package longer than three months. See id., Ex. S (Aff. Allison Smith-Gauf). Mr. Cook was the vice president and general manager of the casino — the most senior position on the riverboat casino, now held by Mr. Creighton. Considering Mr. Cook's position relative to that of Mr. Triplett, the two severance packages cannot be compared. Furthermore, Bally's has offered only one other employee, Karyn Christenson, a white female who held the position of financial controller, a severance package equal to the three months offered Mr. Triplett. See id. Notably, Ms. Christenson worked at Bally's six years longer than Mr. Triplett and yet received the identical severance package. There is thus no evidence that Bally's offered Mr. Triplett a severance package that was unreasonable in comparison with previous severance packages, and therefore the evidence fails to provide even an inference that Bally's offer was affected by race.
Mr. Triplett's last allegation of race discrimination — that Bally's hired a less qualified white male as his replacement — also fails. Bally's transferred Anthony Moore, a white male, from the Hilton Flamingo Casino in New Orleans, a Bally's-affiliated property, in October 1997 to fill the position left vacant after Mr. Triplett's termination. Mr. Moore's résumé at the time of his transfer to Bally's clearly refutes the contention that he was less qualified than Mr. Triplett. See id., Ex. U. Mr. Moore had over ten years of experience in finance, six specifically in the casino industry, before coming to Bally's in October 1997. See id. Therefore, there is no evidence that Bally's hired a less qualified white male to replace Mr. Triplett.
Mr. Moore was comptroller at the Hilton Flamingo before his transfer to Bally's. Before that, he had been the controller and director of casino accounting for Harrah's New Orleans, property controller for Bill's Casino in Lake Tahoe, and income control manager for Harrah's Lake Tahoe. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Ex. U.
There is thus no evidence to support any of Mr. Triplett's allegations of racial discrimination. He has therefore failed to meet his burden of overcoming Bally's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for his discharge. Accordingly, his Title VII race discrimination claims must fail.
It is also important to note that Mr. Triplett's employment with Bally's was on an at-will basis. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Ex. D (Letter Offering Employment to Triplett). Accordingly, Bally's was free to fire him at any time for any reason not barred by law while Mr. Triplett was likewise free to leave the company at any time he so desired. See Brannan v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 526 So.2d 1101, 1103-04 (La. 1988) (employees in Louisiana have no protected right to employment absent express statutory or contractual provisions to the contrary).
B. Defamation Claim
In his Complaint, Mr. Triplett alleges that Bally's defamed him by informing other employees and investigating government agencies, namely the Louisiana Department of Labor ("LDL") and the EEOC, that he was terminated for "misconduct." See Pl.'s Cmpl., Rec. Doc. 1, at 3. Mr. Triplett further clarified his allegations at his deposition by explaining that the defamatory comments made to employees were limited to one instance wherein Mr. Creighton informed Robert Martin, director of casino security, that Mr. Triplett was terminated for having an affair with Ms. Thompson, that he had arranged to have an office constructed for her, and that he had altered the organizational structure within the casino to have her report to him. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Ex. C (Dep. Johnnie Triplett), at 27.
Mr. Triplett actually entitles this charge as "slander," stating that Bally's statements were "reckless" and in "willful disregard for the truth." See Pl.'s Cmpl., Rec. Doc. 1, at 3.
Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff alleging defamation must prove the following elements to recover: (1) defamatory words; (2) publication to a person other than the one defamed; (3) falsity; (4) malice, actual or implied; and (5) resulting injury. Brannan, 698 So.2d at 1105. If even one of these elements is missing, the claim for defamation must fail. See Arledge v. Hendricks, 715 So.2d 135, 138 (La.Ct.App. 1998).
Even if Mr. Triplett brought forth evidence to establish the other elements of the tort of defamation, Mr. Creighton's communications to Mr. Martin do not meet the requirement of publication. "`[S]tatements between employees, made within the course and scope of their employment, are not statements communicated or publicized to third persons so as to constitute a publication.'" Bell v. Rogers, 698 So.2d 749, 756 (La.Ct.App. 1997) (quoting Marshall v. Circle K Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1990)). It is clear that Mr. Creighton and Mr. Martin were both employees of Bally's at the time of any alleged communication between them regarding Mr. Triplett. Further, these alleged statements, if made, were within the course and scope of the participants' employment. Mr. Creighton had to explain Mr. Triplett's termination to Mr. Martin so that Mr. Martin could secure the casino if Mr. Triplett became disgruntled over his discharge. There is no evidence that any of the information allegedly communicated went any further than Mr. Martin. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Ex. C (Dep. Johnnie Triplett), at 27 (Triplett's acknowledgment that the only communication he alleges is that which supposedly occurred between Creighton and Martin). Therefore, Mr. Triplett's allegation of defamation for statements allegedly made by Mr. Creighton to Mr. Martin concerning Mr. Triplett's termination fails.
Moreover, the alleged statement by Mr. Creighton to Mr. Martin that Mr. Triplett was having an affair with Ms. Thompson cannot be defamatory because it is true. See Bell, 698 So.2d at 755 ("Truth is an absolute defense to an action for defamation."). Mr. Triplett has admitted the relationship. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Ex. C (Dep. Johnnie Triplett), at 28.
Mr. Triplett's allegation of defamation for Bally's reports to the LDL, in its investigation of his unemployment insurance claim, and the EEOC, in its investigation of his discrimination claim, also fail. First, Mr. Triplett alleges that the reports stated that he was terminated for "misconduct." See Pl.'s Cmpl., Rec. Doc. 1, at 3. In fact, however, those reports state that Bally's terminated Mr. Triplett for "unsatisfactory performance," not "misconduct." See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 43, Exs. V (Response to EEOC's Request for Information) and W (Response to LDL's Unemployment Insurance Investigation). Mr. Triplett has brought forth no evidence, other than unsubstantiated allegations and conspiracy plots, that Bally's explanation for his termination — that his performance was unsatisfactory — is untrue. The Court thus takes Bally's explanation as true. Consequently, Bally's statements to the two investigating agencies that "unsatisfactory performance" was the reason for Mr. Triplett's termination cannot be defamation because they are true. Truth, as explained above, is an absolute defense to a charge of defamation.
Second, publication of alleged defamatory statements in response to a request from a governmental or quasi-judicial agency is subject to qualified immunity. See Boyd v. Community Center Credit Corp., 359 So.2d 1048, 1050 (La.Ct.App. 1978). In Boyd, the court explained that the "interest of public welfare and social necessity dictate that an employer not be unreasonably restricted" in responding to an investigating agency's request for information concerning an employee's dismissal. Id. Further, the court stated that
[t]he party furnishing the information must be free to make a complete and unrestricted communication, without fear that he will be held liable for defamation if the good faith communication turns out to be inaccurate, subject to the requirement that the communication be made in good faith, be relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry, and be made to a person with a legitimate interest in the subject matter.Id. While the policy argument in Boyd concerned an agency's request for information to determine a terminated employee's eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits, the reasoning is equally applicable to any other reason an agency might investigate the termination of an employee.
Bally's responses to the inquiries of the LDL and the EEOC meet the requirements for the qualified privilege for responses to agency inquiries. Mr. Triplett has produced no evidence that the responses stating that he was terminated for "unsatisfactory performance" were in bad faith. The responses also were definitely relevant to the subject matter of the requests because both agencies asked Bally's to provide the reason for Mr. Triplett's termination. Furthermore, the responses directed to a claims specialist at the LDL and an investigator at the EEOC were clearly made to a person with a legitimate interest in the investigation. Accordingly, the statements are privileged from any charges of defamation.
Therefore, as explained in this section, Mr. Triplett has failed to establish his claim of defamation. He has brought forth no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude this Court from dismissing his claim of defamation as a matter of law.
C. Section 1983 Claim
Mr. Triplett has never alleged any cause of action for deprivation of his constitutional rights. However, in his opposition memorandum, Mr. Triplett states that he is entitled to relief under "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, applicable Louisiana State statutes, and 42 USCS 1983 (Plaintiff's rights under Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutions [sic] were violated)." See Def.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. 47, at 9.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of one's constitutional rights by a person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Even if Mr. Triplett were to identify some violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by Bally's, constitutional restraints, except for the Thirteenth Amendment banning slavery, apply only to state actors. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12-15, 3 S.Ct. 18, 22-26, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18-1 (1988). Bally's is certainly not a state actor, and thus Mr. Triplett cannot state a claim under Section 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of Bally's. Mr. Triplett's claims of race discrimination, defamation, and deprivation of constitutional rights must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Belle of Orleans, L.L.C. d/b/a Bally's Casino Lakeshore Resort is hereby GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8 day of March, 2000.
MINUTE ENTRY McNAMARA, CHIEF JUDGE MARCH 8, 2000