Summary
In Tri-State Transit Co. v. Mobile Ohio Transp. Co., 191 Miss. 364, 2 So.2d 845, 847, the court used this language in discussing this question: "The sole question presented to us for the decision is whether or not the action of the Commission was arbitrary, not supported by substantial evidence, or was manifestly against the evidence."
Summary of this case from Tri-State Transit Co. v. Dixie LinesOpinion
No. 34644.
June 14, 1941.
1. AUTOMOBILES.
Where applications of motor carrier and of railroad's subsidiary for certificates of convenience and necessity were copending, the facts that railroad's subsidiary proposed to render a coordinated service between trains and busses through the means of interchangeable tickets involving a reduction in railroad fares, that such service was a new and distinct type of service to that being rendered or proposed to be rendered by motor carrier, and that the railroad would be able to serve public by reducing its railroad fares to correspond with bus rates were considerations addressed to judgment and discretion of Public Service Commission.
2. AUTOMOBILES.
Where applications for certificates of convenience and necessity were copending and there was ample evidence offered by each of the applicants to justify the Public Service Commission in deciding for either applicant, court would not be justified in substituting its judgment for that of the Commission.
3. AUTOMOBILES.
Where motor carrier and railroad's subsidiary sought certificates of convenience and necessity to furnish motor transportation over certain route, two links of which were already being served by the motor carrier, judgment of the Public Service Commission in granting certificate to motor carrier was not arbitrary but was supported by substantial evidence.
4. AUTOMOBILES.
Where motor carrier and railroad's subsidiary sought certificates of convenience and necessity to furnish motor transportation over certain route, two links of which were already being served by the motor carrier, order of the Public Service Commission denying right of railroad's subsidiary to duplicate service on links of highway already being served by the motor carrier should not have been reversed by the circuit court in absence of proof in record made before the Commission that public convenience and necessity required such duplication (Laws 1938, chap. 142).
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Whether railroads should be given a preference and allowed to operate busses over highways paralleling their railway lines, through subsidiary bus companies, before issuance of any certificate of public convenience and necessity to other motor bus companies was a "legislative question" and not a "judicial question" (Laws 1938, chap. 142).
6. AUTOMOBILES.
Where motor carrier and railroad's subsidiary sought certificates of convenience and necessity to furnish motor transportation over certain route, two links of which were already being served by the motor carrier, and where Public Service Commission granted application of the motor carrier, it was not necessary that order denying application of railroad's subsidiary should have recited more than the fact that the rival application had been granted over the proposed new route and that the duplication of certificate rights over the existing routes was unjustified (Laws 1938, chap. 142).
7. APPEAL AND ERROR.
Contention that full and fair hearing on applications for motor carrier certicates of public convenience and necessity had not been had before Public Service Commission because only one of the commissioners was present at intervals during the hearing and only two of them at other intervals could not be considered where the fact did not appear from the record before Supreme Court and no bill of exceptions was taken in regard thereto.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Hinds county, HON. J.F. BARBOUR, Judge.
Stevens Stevens, of Jackson, for appellant.
The reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the commission and disturb its finding, where there is any substantial basis in evidence for such finding or where the ruling of the commission is not capricious or arbitrary, but is reasonable and lawful. Under some statutes the orders of the commission in such cases are prima facie evidence of the reasonableness and correctness thereof, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests on the one attacking them.
42 C.J. 692; Dixie Greyhound Lines v. Miss. Public Service Com., 190 Miss. 704, 200 So. 579; Magee Truck Lines, Inc., v. Bond, 190 Miss. 428, 200 So. 586; Hammond Lbr. Co. v. Public Service Com. of Oregon, 9 A.L.R. 1223; State v. Great Northern R. Co., 130 Minn. 57, P.U.R., 1915D, 467, 153 N.W. 247, Ann. Cas., 1917B, 1201; State v. Great Northern R. Co., 135 Minn. 19, P.U.R. 1917B, 413, 519 N.W. 1089; Grand Rapids I.R. Co. v. Michigan R. Com., 188 Mich. 108, P.U.R. 1915F, 805, 154 N.W. 15; Mill Creek Coal Coke Co. v. Public Serv. Com. (W. Va.), 7 A.L.R. 1081; Norfolk W. Railroad Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 8 A.L.R. 1055; A.T. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ill. Commerce Com., 335 Ill. 70, 166 N.E. 466; Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 132 Kan. 459, 295 P. 668, P.U.R., 1931B, 442; Kansas Gas E. Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 122 Kan. 462, P.U.R., 1927A, 562, 569, 251 P. 1097, 1099; Deppman v. Dept. of Public Works, 151 Wn. 78, 275 P. 70; Palmyra Tel. Co. v. Modesta Tel. Co., 336 Ill. 158, 167 N.E. 860, P.U.R. 1930A, 295; San Diego Co. Ferry Co. v. R.R. Com. (Cal.), 292 P. 640, P.U.R., 1930E, 644.
A certificate of convenience and necessity is not a mere license, but is a franchise and property right to be protected under the Federal Constitution.
Frost v. Corporation Com. of Okla., 278 U.S. 515; Teche Lines, Inc., v. Bd. of Sup'rs, Forrest County, 163 Miss. 594, 142 So. 24; Adams v. Bullock, 94 Miss. 27, 47 So. 527; Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., v. Public Serv. Com., 190 Miss. 704.
Tri-State therefore being a certificated carrier North, East, South, and West, and having filed a prior application to connect up the link between Brooksville and Tupelo was entitled to be preferred and protected. An existing carrier must be called upon to render any needed service before the Commission would be justified in duplicating franchise rights.
Jarrell v. Orlando Transit Co., 167 So. 664, 667; 42 C.J. 689; Stark Electric Ry. Co. v. P.U. Com. of Ohio, 161 N.E. 210; State, etc., v. Dept. of Public Works of Washington et al., 250 P. 1088; In re Finance Salters, P.U.R. 1926A, 112; Public Utilities Reports, 1926A, p. 180; Public Utilities Reports, 1927B, p. 163; Public Utilities Reports, 1927E, p. 333; Pond, Public Utilities, p. 10; Superior Motor Bus Co. v. Community Motor Bus Co., 150 N.E. 668; West Suburban Trans. Co. v. Chicago West Towns Ry. Co., 140 N.E. 56, 309 Ill. 87; Central Truck Lines v. R.R. Com. (Fla.), 160 So. 26.
The general rule is that a certificate may not be granted where there is existing service in operation over the route applied for unless the service is not adequate or additional service would benefit the general public or unless the existing carrier has been given an opportunity to furnish such additional service as may be required.
Chicago Ry. Co. et al. v. Commerce Commission, 336 Ill. 51, 167 N.E. 840, 67 A.L.R. 938, 957; Fulmer v. R.R. Com'rs et al. (Mont.), 28 P.2d 849; Cardinal Bus Lines v. Cons. Coach Corporation, Inc., et al. (Ky.), 72 S.W.2d 7; Public Service Inter-state Trans. Co., Inc., v. Public Serv. Com., 251 N.Y. Supp. 351; Pa. R.R. Co. et al. v. Public Utilities Com. of Ohio, 176 N.E. 573; Egyptian Trans. Co., v. L. N.R.R. Co. (Ill.), 152 N.E. 510; Cons. Coach Co. v. Ky. River Coach Co. et al. (Ky.), 60 S.W.2d 127; Fla. Motor Bus, Inc., v. State R.R. Com. (Fla.), 132 So. 851; Re City Cab Service, Inc. (Conn.), P.U.R. 1930A, 113.
Counsel for appellee present this cause to this court as if the application of the M.O. Transportation Company was the one and only application presented to the Public Service Commission. The primary issue was which bus company should be accorded certificate rights. The Commission chose that company which already had a network of bus operations and which in fact had certificate rights over part of the route here involved. There is absolutely no evidence which would justify duplication of franchise rights or the operation of two bus lines over the same highway.
Counsel for appellee cite several cases of the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing railroads to supplement their service by the use of motor vehicles in coordination with its rail operation. This to a limited extent has been authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Most of the cases involve "furnishing a less-than-carload or merchandise freight service" between stations to relieve the railroad from the expensive operation of trains and to facilitate faster and more efficient transportation of freight by carloads. Even in those cases the right is limited to motor vehicle operation over routes paralleling the rail lines and limited to a service "auxiliary or supplementary to rail service to points which are stations on the rail line" and in practically all of the cases the right to compete with existing motor carriers had been denied.
The Rock Island Motor Transit Co., MC-29130; Kans. City Southern Transport Co., Inc., No. MC-61438; Chicago, Rock Island Pac. Ry. Co., No. MC-48602; The Barker Motor Freight case, No. MC-F-3, 1 Fed. Carriers Cases, p. 8; Toms Extension of Operations — Americus — Fort Gaines, Ga., Motor Carrier Cases, Vol. 23, No. MC-86042; La., Ark. Tex. Ry. Co. Motor Carrier Application, 22 Motor Carrier Cases, Vol. 22, p. 213, No. MC-75495.
The minutes of the Commission show the presence of all three Commissioners throughout the entire hearing. They fully understood everything that was being said or done. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the Commission had any jurisdiction to entertain a petition for rehearing. It is our understanding that the attorney general has so ruled and so advised the Commission. Certain it is that when the petition for rehearing was presented the personnel of the Commission had changed. Two new members had come on the Commission, and if these two members had been at all convinced that there was any merit in the petition for rehearing they had an opportunity in some way at least so to indicate.
Counsel for appellee say that the order here appealed from is void and should be set aside because it did not make specific findings of fact. The true rule is that if the Commission grants the certificate it should recite that the Commission has given due consideration to all those things which the statute requires them to consider before granting a certificate. So says the statute. To illustrate, the statute requires the Commission to give due consideration "to the present transportation facilities over the proposed route of the applicant, the volume of traffic over such route, the financial condition of the applicant, and the condition of the highway over the proposed route, or routes," etc. If the commission is of the opinion that the application should be denied, it is not required to recite anything other than the finding that the proposed operaton is not justified. The order denying the application conforms to the statute and is therefore sufficient.
Creekmore Creekmore, of Jackson, Y.D. Lott, Jr. and M.F. Wilhelm, both of Mobile, Ala., for appellee.
The circuit judge is authorized to enter such order as, from the record, appeared to be right and just.
G.M. O.R.R. Co. v. Luter Motor Express, 190 Miss. 523, 1 So.2d 231.
The order of the Mississippi Public Service Commission denying the application of the Mobile Ohio Transportation Company for a certificate was void and was properly set aside by the circuit court, because said order did not make findings of basic and essential facts.
U.S. v. B. O.R.R. Co., 239 U.S. 454, 79 L.Ed. 587; U.S. v. C., M., St. P. P.R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 504, 79 L.Ed. 1023; A.T. S.F.R.R. Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 193, 79 L.Ed. 382; Visceglia v. U.S., 24 F. Supp. 355; 51 C.J. 60, sec. 111; Sec. 7038, Code of 1930; Motor Carrier Act of 1938 (Chap. 142, Laws of 1938), sec. 8(a); M. O.R.R. Co. v. Miss. Public Serv. Com., 188 Miss. 698, 195 So. 305.
An applicant is not required to show that there be urgent need or necessity for his services before he may be granted a certificate. The words "convenience" and "necessity" are used conjunctively and are not synonymous but must be given separate and distinct meanings. That "necessity" must be somewhat liberally construed is supported by decisions of the Commission and the Supreme Court. The question is whether the new operation or service will serve a useful public purpose responsive to a public demand or need and whether it will endanger or impair operations of existing carriers contrary to the public interest.
Pan-American Bus Lines, 1 M.C.C. 190; Minneapolis Van Warehouse Co., Application, 6 M.C.C. 480.
Any improvement which is highly important to the public convenience and desirable for the public welfare may be regarded as necessary.
Wabash C. W. Ry. Co. v. Commerce Com., 309 Ill. 412, 141 N.E. 212.
The Mississippi Act is modeled after the Federal statute, and decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission construing that statute are particularly valuable to this court in construing the Mississippi statute.
Dixie Greyhound Lines v. Public Serv. Com., 190 Miss. 704, 200 So. 579; G., M. O.R.R. Co. v. Luter Motor Express, 190 Miss. 523, 1 So.2d 231.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has construed the Federal Act in numerous cases with special reference to applications of railroad-owned subsidiaries for authority to inaugurate coordinated rail-motor service. That Commission has consistently held that it is the policy of Congress to encourage the coordination of transportation by highways and by rails; that coordinated rail-motor service is a new and a different service utilizing both the rails and the highways to advantage, and that, where the motor operation for which a certificate is sought is confined to stations already served by the Railroad, authority to engage in the operation should be granted.
Kansas City Southern Transport Co., Inc., 10 M.C.C. 221; Frisco Trans. Co. Application, 11 M.C.C. 763; I.C.R.R. Co., Common Carrier Application, 12 M.C.C. 785; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., Motor Operation, 17 M.C.C. 413; G.M. N.R.R. Co., Application, 18 M.C.C. 725; C.R.I. P. Ry. Co., Extension of Operations, 19 M.C.C. 702; Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc., Application, 21 M.C.C. 725; L.A. T. Ry. Co., Application, 22 M.C.C. 213; Gulf Transport Co., Extension of Operations, 23 M.C.C. 114; K.C. So. Trans. Co., Application, Docket No. MC-61438; Motorbus and Motortruck Operation, 140 I.C.C. 685, 748; Coordination of Motor Trans., 182 I.C.C. 263, 379.
Appellant's position is that it is entitled to a monopoly on bus transportation in this particular territory. We think it is clear that no such intention may be imputed to the Legislature from the Motor Carrier Act of 1938, but the contrary is clearly expressed. Section 5 of the Act, in part, read ". . . Nothing in this Act shall confer any proprietary or property rights in the use of the public highways."
Teche Lines v. Bd. of Sup'rs, Forrest County, 163 Miss. 594, 142 So. 24; Pan American Bus Lines, 1 M.C.C. 190.
We do not believe the development of this new form of service will seriously endanger the operation of protestants, but in any event the public ought not to be deprived of the benefit of an improved service merely because it may divert some traffic from other carriers.
K.C. So. Trans., Application, 10 M.C.C. 237; K.C. So. Trans. Co., MC-61438; Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc., Application, 21 M.C.C. 725; Chesapeake O. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 283 U.S. 35; Construction of Lines in Eastern Oregon, 111 I.C.C. 3, 37; Construction of Lines by Kenatchee So. Ry., 90 I.C.C. 237, 257.
Where the Commission has acted capriciously, or in an arbitrary manner, or where its findings are contrary to the evidence, or are not supported by substantial evidence, the order of the Commission will not be upheld.
Dixie Greyhound Lines v. Miss. Public Serv. Com., 190 Miss. 704, 200 So. 579.
The three commissioners were not present during all or any substantial part of the hearings.
Argued orally by J. Morgan Stevens, for appellant, and by Rufus Creekmore and Y.D. Lott, Jr., for appellee.
This appeal is from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Hinds County reversing and setting aside an order whereby the Mississippi Public Service Commission had granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity to the appellant, Tri-State Transit Company of Louisiana, Inc., to operate as a common carrier of passengers, baggage, light express, newspapers and other mail from Brooksville to Tupelo and north from Corinth to the state line, all within the State of Mississippi, and which said judgment of the circuit court also ordered and directed the Commission to issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity to the appellee, Mobile Ohio Transportation Company, so as to authorize it to operate a transportation bus line for said purposes between Mayhew and Corinth so as to duplicate the certificate rights already held by the appellant between Tupelo and Corinth, and further directing the issuance of such a certificate so as to duplicate the service which was then being rendered by the appellant as such common carrier between Starkville and Columbus.
The ground for reversal and setting aside of the order of the Commission whereby it had granted to the appellant the certificate to operate as such a common carrier between Brooksville and Tupelo via Mayhew, Muldon, Prairie, Okolona and Shannon is recited in the judgment rendered by the circuit court to be that the action of the Commission in that behalf was arbitrary and not supported by substantial evidence, but manifestly against the evidence taken before the Commission at the hearing.
The application of the appellant for the certificate between Brooksville and Tupelo along the route aforesaid was filed with the Commission prior to the application of the appelleee for a certificate over that route as between Mayhew and Corinth, and the two applications were heard together by the Commission, with the consent of the two respective applicants, and also along with the application of the appellee to duplicate the service then being rendered by the appellant under certificates of public convenience and necessity between Starkville and Columbus and between Tupelo and Corinth. After a three-day hearing in the premises, on which a great number of witnesses testified in support of the respective applications, the Commission entered its order granting the certificate to the appellant as applied for, and denied the certificate applied for by the appellee.
Instead of the order of the Commission being without substantial evidence for its support, or being manifestly against the evidence, it is abundantly supported by the proof adduced at the hearing. In fact, there was no conflict in the evidence on the question as to whether the public convenience and necessity required motor bus transportation over the route applied for by the appellant, since the territory to be served was thickly populated and was without adequate and necessary transportation facilities, and no busses were operating over the route.
Therefore, the primary issues before the Commission were (1) the question of which of the applicants was entitled to the certificate, insofar as that portion of the proposed new route between Mayhew and Tupelo was concerned; and (2) whether or not the public convenience and necessity required the duplication of the service already being rendered by the appellant under certificates formerly issued by the Commission over the two links of highway between Starkville and Columbus, and Tupelo and Corinth, respectively.
The basis of the contention by the appellee on both issues above mentioned was that it proposed to render a coordinated service between its trains and busses through the means of interchangeable tickets involving a reduction in railroad fares; that this was a new and distinct type of service to that being rendered or proposed to be rendered by the appellant. This was explained to mean that a passenger would be granted the privilege of traveling part of his journey by bus and the remainder by train, or to go by bus and return by train and vice versa, and that railroad fares would be reduced so as to conform to the rates charged by the bus transportation line. The answer to this contention in the main is that a passenger can now select such a method of travel over the two links in the highway, over which the appellant already has certificate rights and is operating busses parallel to the line of the Mobile Ohio Railroad Company; that he could do likewise over the proposed new route for which the Commission granted the certificate to the appellant; and that there could be a mutual interchange of tickets to that end if the railroad company was willing to cooperate in that behalf. The remaining consideration, therefore, is that the Mobile Ohio Railroad Company, (which advanced out of its receivership funds the $8,000 of paid-in capital with which the appellee was organized as its subsidiary, and which railroad company had been merged with the Gulf, Mobile Northern Railroad at the time of the hearing before the Commission so as to constitute the existing Gulf, Mobile Ohio System) would be able to serve the public convenience and necessity by reducing its railroad fares to correspond with bus rates, as heretofore stated, and could coordinate its railroad and its subsidiary bus company schedules in the interest of public travel. This consideration, however, while it may be a public convenience, cannot be said to be a necessity which could not be otherwise provided for.
The foregoing and other considerations were addressed, however, to the judgment and discretion of the Public Service Commission, and the sole question presented to us for decision is whether or not the action of the Commission was arbitrary, not supported by substantial evidence, or was manifestly against the evidence. After a careful reading of the transcript of the evidence adduced at the hearing, we are unable to so hold, although we must view with sympathetic interest the plight in which the railroad company finds itself by reason of its loss of passenger traffic, as well as baggage and light express business to the bus companies. Insofar as the two links of highway over which the appellant had already acquired certificate rights, and had been rendering satisfactory service according to all of the proof, are concerned, the application of the railroad company's subsidiary bus line comes too late, since the proof fails to disclose that the action of the Commission was arbitrary in holding that the public convenience and necessity did not require a duplication of the service already being rendered over those routes. As to the proposed new route, it was within the province of the Commission to determine from the proof which of the two applicants was best equipped to render the service needed, and as to whether the public convenience and necessity would be best served by the granting of the certificate to the appellant, the first to apply therefor. There was ample evidence offered by each of the applicants to justify the Commission in deciding that question either way. Therefore, the courts would not be justified in such case to substitute their judgment for that of the Commission. Dixie Greyhound Lines v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 190 Miss. 704, 200 So. 579; and Magee Truck Lines, Inc., v. Bond, 190 Miss. 428, 200 So. 586.
On the question of whether or not the action of the Commission was arbitrary and not supported by any substantial evidence, or was manifestly against the evidence, the proof not only disclosed without conflict that the people in the territory proposed to be served by the new route were badly in need of bus transportation for passengers, etc., but that the public convenience and necessity required that the transportation system of the appellant should be coupled up from Brooksville and Tupelo so as to better serve the territory in question. It already had certificate rights from Mobile, Alabama, to Brooksville, Mississippi, from Tupelo to Corinth, and from Tupelo it had a line extending west to Oxford and other points. From Gulfport, it had a line extending to Jackson and from there to Starkville, and other lines forming an important network for passenger transportation throughout the state. The immediate territory involved along the proposed new route was greatly in need of bus transportation to Mississippi-State College at Starkville, the M.S.C.W. at Columbus, and the University of Mississippi at Oxford. These institutions draw heavily from that territory for students, where they are visited by parents, relatives and friends, and, as heretofore stated, the people generally along the proposed route were in need of the transportation facilities offered. The proof on behalf of both applications clearly established the fact that the public convenience and necessity required the granting of a certificate to one of them, and we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Commission in granting the certificate to the appellant should not be disturbed as being arbitrary, nor should its order denying the right of the appellee to duplicate the service on the link of highway between Starkville and Columbus and between Tupelo and Corinth have been reversed by the circuit court in the absence of proof in the record made before the Commission that the public convenience and necessity required such duplication. To have allowed such duplication, on the ground that a new and distinct type of service would be thereby afforded, would perhaps have been very beneficial to the interest of the appellee, and would to some extent have served the convenience of the public by furnishing more busses over the route, more convenient schedules and a possible reduction in railroad fare, but it cannot be said that the Commission acted arbitrarily in denying the application from the standpoint of both convenience and necessity. Moreover, if the Commission is required by judicial mandate to allow the inauguration of the proposed new type of service over the routes here involved, so as to duplicate the service now being rendered by the existing carrier, even though the proposed service may be supplementary thereto, the decision would constitute a precedent for allowing at least a duplication of the service now being rendered by existing certificated carriers by bus transportation over all routes paralleling lines of railway throughout the state, to the impairment of existing bus franchises, and contrary to the declared public policy contained in Chapter 142, Laws of 1938, as interpreted in the case of Dixie Greyhound Lines v. Public Service Commission et al., hereinbefore cited. Whether the railroads should have been given the preference and allowed to operate busses over the highways paralleling their lines of railway, through subsidiary bus companies, before any certificates of public convenience and necessity were ever issued to other motor bus transportation companies over these routes, was a legislative question and is not now a judicial one. An application to now be granted such right comes too late, after the other bus companies have acquired their franchise rights over the routes, involving the investment of enormous sums of money in modern bus stations and transportation equipment, unless the Legislature should, acting within constitutional bounds as to due regard for existing franchise bus rights over such highways, amend the public policy heretofore declared by requiring the Commission to allow such duplication of service, without regard to its own judgment on conflicting evidence as to whether the public convenience and necessity so demands.
The order of the Commission from which the appeal was taken to the circuit court fully adjudicated the existence of all of the necessary conditions and requirements under Chapter 142, Laws of 1938, to entitle the appellant to the certificate over the proposed new route applied for, and it was unanimously adopted in the first instance and was thereafter adhered to upon an application for a rehearing, after a change in the personnel of the Commission. It was not necessary that the order denying the application of the appellee should have recited more than the fact that the rival application of the appellant had been granted over the proposed new route and that the duplication of certificate rights over the existing routes, as applied for by the appellee, was unjustified.
Finally, it is said that the action of the circuit court in reversing the judgment of the Commission was proper for the reason that there was not a full and fair hearing had before the Commission on the applications in that only one of the Commissioners was present at intervals during the hearing and only two of them at other times. This fact, however, does not appear from the record before us and no bill of exceptions was taken in regard thereto. Hence, we are unable to consider the point here on appeal.
From what we have said, it necessarily follows that the judgment of the circuit court, whereby the order of the Public Service Commission was reversed and set aside, which had granted the application of the appellant over the proposed new route applied for from Brooksville to Tupelo and from Corinth to the Mississippi-Tennessee State Line, be reversed and that the judgment of the Commission be reinstated, and that said judgment of the circuit court, wherein it ordered and directed the Commission to issue the proper certificate to the appellee as applied for from Starkville to Columbus and from Mayhew to Corinth via Tupelo, must be likewise reversed; and that judgment be rendered here in favor of appellant on the issues involved.
Reversed and judgment here for the appellant.
Alexander and Anderson, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.