Opinion
No. 05-02-01609-CR.
Opinion Filed July 21, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F01-60483-UJ. AFFIRM.
OPINION
A jury convicted Ben Milton Traylor of possession of one gram or more, but less than four grams of cocaine. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.102(3)(D), 481.115(c) (Vernon Supp. 2003). The trial court assessed punishment at two years confinement and a $1,500 fine. In a single point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine because it was the product of an unlawful detention. We affirm. We review a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion under the standard set forth in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). The trial court's ruling is a mixed question of law and fact, and the amount of deference we afford to the ruling depends on whether the ruling turned on the assessment of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. See Orneales v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700 (1996); see also Brown v. State, 986 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.). When the ruling turns on the witnesses' credibility and demeanor, we must defer to the trial court's application of the law to the facts. Brown, 986 S.W.2d at 51. However, when the ruling does not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we make a de novo determination of whether the facts justify the trial court's legal determination. Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 772-73 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). To justify an investigative detention, an officer must have reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). In determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, we examine the totality of the circumstances. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We look to see if the officer had specific articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences and the officer's experience and general knowledge, reasonably indicated the detained person was preparing to engage or had engaged in a crime. Francis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Gaines v. State, 99 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). We consider both the content of the information possessed by the police as well as its degree of reliability. Guevara v. State, 6 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). When information alleged to support reasonable suspicion comes from a totally anonymous source, "something more" than the anonymous tip is required to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the detention. Id. An officer may rely on an anonymous tip so long as there is some indicia of reliability and it is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge. Id. In this case, the trial court's ruling on appellant's suppression motion followed the brief, uncontroverted testimony of Dallas police officers L.T. Coddington and Andre Taylor. The officers testified that, on the day appellant was arrested, they were working undercover at the Ashton Place apartments in response to numerous anonymous complaints about illegal drug activity at the entrance to the complex. Coddington was parked outside the entrance gate, while Taylor observed from the inside. According to the officers, they saw appellant and another man identified as "Marsalis" approach incoming cars. The two men would go "to either the driver's side or passenger side window . . . make what [appeared to be] a hand-to-hand transaction, and then . . . walk away." The cars would then turn around and exit the complex and the men "would go back to standing . . . [in] the corner [of the complex]." Both officers testified this activity was consistent with the "typical" drug transactions they had observed throughout their law enforcement careers and that the apartments were located in an area known for drug activity. After observing the two men for approximately thirty minutes, the officers decided Coddington would drive into the complex and Taylor would make any necessary arrests. As Coddington entered, the men "came up to him" and "ask[ed] him what he needed." Before Coddington could respond, Marsalis, recognizing Coddington from "past [undercover] dealings," took off running and told appellant to run also. As appellant attempted to "mak[e] his way off," Taylor grabbed appellant by his arm. When Taylor asked appellant if he had "anything he should not," appellant responded he did, and Taylor seized the cocaine. Citing McKinney v. State, 761 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.), abrogated on other grounds by Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002), appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because Taylor never saw any drugs actually being exchanged and, therefore, did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. In response, the State argues McKinney is factually distinguishable and not controlling. We agree with the State. In McKinney, the detaining officer testified he and his partner were traveling in an unmarked car on "special assignment" in an area known for drug activity. Id. at 551. While stopped at an intersection, they observed McKinney exchange "something" with a taxicab driver who had pulled into a parking lot. Id. Believing a drug transaction had just occurred, the officers drove up to the taxi. Id. at 552. The detaining officer testified he smelled marijuana on McKinney's breath and, after a search, found a pistol. Id. McKinney filed a motion to suppress the pistol, arguing it was the result of an illegal seizure. Id. at 550. The trial court denied McKinney's motion but was reversed on appeal. Id. at 553. In concluding the trial court erred in denying McKinney's suppression motion, the court of appeals noted the officer did not actually see drugs being exchanged and could not even describe what he saw being exchanged. Id. The court also noted McKinney did not engage in repeated transactions, did not linger on the street "waiting for customers," and did not walk away "rapidly" upon seeing the officer. Id. Finally, the court noted there was no testimony showing drugs were normally exchanged in that manner. Id. In this case, however, unlike McKinney, the officers surveilled the entrance to an apartment complex in response to specific complaints about drug activity at that location. These tips were corroborated by Taylor's and Coddington's own observations. Taylor and Coddington testified that over a thirty minute period, they observed appellant engage in numerous hand-to-hand transactions at the entrance to the complex. After each transaction, appellant would return to the corner of the complex, where he would stand until another car entered the complex. Although Taylor did not actually observe any drugs, he and Coddington both testified appellant's conduct typified the drug transactions they had observed throughout their law enforcement careers. Applying the appropriate standard and given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude these facts justified the detention. See Gilbert v. State, 874 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) (finding officers, who were responding to specific citizens' complaints about drug activity at a particular crack house, had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant whose actions were consistent with typical drive-by transactions). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's suppression motion. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.