Opinion
No. 2:14-cv-00087-KJM-EFB
10-06-2015
LEN TRAVIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ROSEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
On December 20, 2012, it was salsa night at The Station, a bar and restaurant in Roseville, California, until Roseville Police Officer William Kanada arrived on the scene and arrested Len Travis, who operates The Station. Travis has sued Kanada and the Roseville Police Department. He claims the arrest was illegal and unconstitutional.
The case is now before the court on the defendants' joint motion for summary judgment. The court held a hearing on August 21, 2015, at which Jeffrey Kravitz appeared for Travis and Amie McTavish appeared for the defendants. Having considered the parties' briefing and arguments at hearing, the motion is GRANTED.
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS
The court finds the following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. Len Travis operates The Station, located at 1100 Orlando Avenue in Roseville, California. Pl.'s Resp. Stmt. Undisp. Mat. Facts (UMF) nos. 1, 2, ECF No. 15-2. Specifically, Travis is the managing member of Steele Train Partners LP, a limited partnership that operates The Station. Travis Dep. at 14, 45. A California limited liability company, 1100 Orlando LLC (the LLC), owns the property. Id.
A. Writ of Mandate
Travis and the LLC have been involved in a longstanding dispute with the City of Roseville about the business at 1100 Orlando Avenue. On May 20, 2011, the Placer County Superior Court entered judgment in a case between the LLC and the Roseville Planning and Redevelopment Department, case number SVC-23813. Defs.' Request for Judicial Notice (Defs.' RJN) Ex. B, at COR00610, ECF No. 12-3. The superior court upheld the City's determination that dancing at 1100 Orlando Avenue violated the Roseville Municipal Code. See id. at COR000611; id. Ex. A, at 2. A few weeks later, on June 15, 2011, the superior court issued a temporary restraining order against the LLC:
The court grants the defendants' unopposed request for judicial notice of this and the Placer County Superior Court's later related orders, which are public documents whose existence is not subject to reasonable dispute. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; McVey v. McVey, 26 F. Supp. 3d 980, 984 (C.D. Cal. 2014), appeal dismissed (Apr. 22, 2015).
The City has established that operations and activities at subject property of 1100 Orlando Avenue in Roseville, California . . . exist and constitute a public nuisance as a matter of law . . .Id. Ex. A, at 2.
1100 Orlando LLC and its agents, employees, servants, successors or assigns, those acting on their behalf or in concert with them, and any occupants of the building and facilities at 1100 Orlando Avenue in Roseville California . . . are [ ] restrained and prohibited from engaging in any activities or conducting any business that is defined as a dance club, night club, or . . . permit[ting] dancing on the subject property.
. . . Cross-Defendants [the LLC] [are] restrained and prohibited from engaging in any activities or conducting any business that is defined as operating a[ ] nightclub on the subject property.
The next month, on July 5, 2011, the superior court held a hearing on the LLC's motion for reconsideration and on the City's motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. Ex. B. The motion for reconsideration was denied, and the motion for a preliminary injunction was granted on the same terms as the temporary restraining order described above. Id. In its order, the superior court reiterated that "the use of the property [at 1100 Orlando Avenue] had expanded beyond its original use, in violation of [the Roseville Municipal Code, or RMC] 19.24.020, and therefore [the LLC] had lost its legal non-conforming use." Id. at COR000611. "When [the LLC] lost its legal non-conforming use status, [it] was obligated to comply with the current municipal code." Id. The LLC did not appeal.
Approximately nine months later, on March 22, 2012, the superior court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on its claims for nuisance and declaratory relief. Id. Ex. C. The superior court found it was "undisputed that [the LLC] lost its legal non-conforming use status" and that the court's previous orders made clear the LLC "was operating its establishment as a nightclub without a valid permit, which constituted a violation of the RMC." Id. at COR000791-92. The superior court granted summary judgment despite the LLC's argument that it was "not in violation of previous versions of the RMC." Id. at COR000792. The City also requested a permanent injunction on each of its claims. Id. The superior court declined to afford that relief, but in doing so it held the City had nonetheless met its burden on this motion as to "unpermitted dancing." Id.
B. Officer Kanada's Investigation and the Arrest
In August 2011, Officer Kanada was part of an undercover operation investigating The Station. UMF no. 5. His investigation led him to the conclusion that patrons of 1100 Orlando Avenue were dancing. UMF no. 6. Kanada met with Travis in November 2012 and gave him a copy of the superior court's preliminary injunction and other paperwork. UMF no. 8. Nevertheless, Travis told Kanada he would continue operating The Station and would continue to allow his customers to dance. UMF no. 9.
On December 14, 2012, Kanada and agents from several state agencies visited The Station again. UMF no. 11. He found the bartender had served alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person, a misdemeanor. UMF no. 12; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25602. He detained two people for public intoxication. UMF no. 13. He cited Steele Train Partners LP for violation of Roseville Municipal Code sections requiring a dance permit, governing zoning violations, and related to the service of intoxicated persons. UMF no. 14. After the visit, the Deputy Labor Commissioner issued a Stop Order to The Station prohibiting further operation until it obtained workers' compensation insurance for its employees, kept payroll records, and complied with other wage laws. UMF nos. 15-16.
The next day, December 15, 2012, while driving to The Station to meet with an agent from the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), Kanada saw Travis driving away from The Station onto Riverside Avenue; Travis turned without making a signal and rolled over a limit line. UMF nos. 17-18, 20. Kanada stopped Travis and smelled alcohol, so he called another officer to conduct a DUI investigation, and Travis was arrested. UMF no. 19. On December 16, 2012, Kanada discovered that security guards working at The Station had no security guard registration cards, see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7583.3, and one had cocaine in his wallet, which led to the guards' arrests, UMF no. 21. Kanada also issued citations to Travis for violating a court order, for allowing dancing without a permit, for operating a public nuisance, and for public disturbance. UMF no. 22.
The Station was closed December 17-19, 2012, but opened again on December 20, 2012. UMF no. 24. As noted above, that was salsa night. UMF no. 25. Kanada drove by and noticed The Station was open and saw ABC agents escorting Travis out of The Station. Kanada Decl. ¶¶ 21-22. The agents were investigating violations of the Labor Code and Stop Order. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. Based on his earlier interactions with Travis, patrons of The Station, and security guards, Kanada also believed Travis was operating The Station in violation of the Business and Professions Code. Id. ¶ 27. Travis did not want to speak to Kanada and produced no proof of workers' compensation insurance, UMF no. 33, but Kanada did not ask specifically for proof of insurance, see id.; Travis Decl. ¶ 5. Kanada placed Travis under arrest, read him his Miranda rights, and led him to the back of his patrol car. UMF nos. 32, 34; see also Kanada Decl. ¶¶ 29-31. The parties confirmed at hearing that Kanada had no warrant for the arrest.
"Every licensee, or agent or employee of a licensee, who keeps, permits to be used, or suffers to be used, in conjunction with a licensed premises, any disorderly house or place in which people abide or to which people resort, to the disturbance of the neighborhood, or in which people abide or to which people resort for purposes which are injurious to the public morals, health, convenience, or safety, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25601.
Travis argues several of the foregoing facts are disputed because he has insufficient knowledge to admit or deny them. See, e.g., Pl.'s Resp. Statement of Material Facts no. 17, ECF No. 15-2. At the pleadings stage, a party must admit or deny each allegation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1). But a party opposing summary judgment must "set forth specific facts" in the record to show a trial is necessary to resolve genuine disputes. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, notes of advisory comm. on 2010 amendments (noting that although Rule 56 was amended, effective December 1, 2010, "[t]he standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged"). In addition, because Travis bears the burden of proof at trial, the defendants may succeed on summary judgment by illustrating the absence of any evidence to support his case. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010); see also E.D. Cal. L.R. 260(b) ("Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication shall . . . admit those facts that are undisputed and deny those that are disputed, including with each denial a citation to the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or other document relied upon in support of that denial.").
Although Travis and two other employees received misdemeanor notices to appear for violations of a court order, they were never prosecuted. Travis Decl. ¶¶ 7-9. Travis has produced a certificate of liability insurance issued to Spirited Investments, LLC, with a policy period from December 20, 2012 to December 20, 2013. Travis Decl. Ex. 1. He avers Spirited Investments, LLC employed everyone who was working at The Station on December 20, 2012. Id. ¶ 3. He did not identify or produce this certificate of insurance during discovery, although it was responsive to the defendant's request for production of documents. See McTavish Decl. ¶¶ 2-6, Ex. B, ECF No. 17-3. The document also postdates the arrest. See Travis Decl. Ex. 1 (dated Dec. 28, 2012).
C. Administrative Appeal
In the meantime, beginning in mid-2011, the city of Roseville had issued Travis several other citations for violations of the municipal code. See Travis Dep. at 45-46; Pl.'s Request for Judicial Notice (Pl.'s RJN), Ex. 1, at 3-4, ECF No. 15-3. Travis challenged these citations in an administrative appeal process, but the City of Roseville Board of Appeals upheld the citations. See id. Ex. 1, at 1-5.
The court grants Travis's unopposed request for judicial notice of these public documents. See supra note 1.
Travis appealed the board's decision to the Placer County Superior Court, and a referee of that court held a two-day hearing in late February 2013. See id. Ex. 1, at 1. In a written decision filed on March 7, 2013, the superior court held that the City had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Travis was required to have a dance permit or that he was operating a "nightclub" at 1100 Orlando Avenue. Id. Ex. 1, at 12. The court did not address any decision in the earlier superior court case, number SVC-23813. The citations were overturned.
The City appealed to a three-judge panel of the Superior Court's appellate division. See id. Exs. 2, 3. It argued the 2011 decisions in case number SCV-23813 barred any relitigation of whether the property at 1100 Orlando Avenue could be used for dancing without a permit, and also argued the referee's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. See generally id. In two opinions issued in April 2014, the appellate division upheld the referee's decision. Id. After noting the dismal state of the record on appeal and chiding the City for its failure to cite that record, the appellate division concluded the City had not carried its burden to show collateral estoppel applied: several of the citations were issued before any court order enjoined dancing at 1100 Orlando Avenue; the July 5, 2011 order in Case No. SVC-23813 was not a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel; and the issue of collateral estoppel had not been addressed at the February 2013 hearing before the referee. Id. Ex. 2, at 7-13; id. Ex. 3, at 8-15. The appellate division also concluded that the referee's decision was supported by substantial evidence: the decision in Case No. SVC-23813 was not binding, and the record on appeal led to "considerable contradictory inferences as to the scope of the nonconforming use status that remained along with its applicability to [Travis]." Id. Ex. 2, at 14-15; id. Ex. 3, at 15-16. The appellate division therefore affirmed the referee: "Where conflicting inferences may reasonably be drawn, the determination of the trial court will be accepted on appeal even though a contrary determination would likewise be upheld." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
This court must grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A motion for summary judgment calls for a "threshold inquiry" into whether a trial is necessary at all, that is, whether "any genuine factual issues . . . properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The court does not weigh evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses; rather, it determines which facts the parties do not dispute, then draws all inferences and views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the party opposing summary judgment bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only illustrate the "absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 387. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate specific facts" in the record to show a trial is necessary to resolve genuine disputes of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.
III. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Rule 56 allows objections to evidence when "the material cited . . . cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). As this language suggests, at summary judgment, the evidence's propriety depends not on its form, but on its content. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Block v. City of L.A., 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001). The court addresses objections here only to the extent it relies on the evidence that is the subject of the objection.
Travis objects to Kanada's reliance on the statements of ABC agents, arguing these statements are hearsay. See Objections, ECF No. 15-4. Hearsay statements are those "(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible. Id. R. 802. But the definition of hearsay does not encompass statements offered to show something other than the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801, 1972 advisory comm. note; United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 659 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1981). Travis also argues Kanada lacked any personal knowledge of any Labor Code violation. See generally Objections. As a general matter, a lay witness "may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." Fed. R. Evid. 602.
The evidence here is admissible. Kanada does not seek to establish the truth of the agents' statements, only that he had information at his disposal that would have led a reasonable person to conclude Travis had violated the Labor Code and Stop Order on the night of December 20, 2012. See Fed. R. Evid. 602, 701, 801. Moreover, Kanada was entitled to reliance on the statements and knowledge of other officers in the context of determining probable cause. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985) ("[Effective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 704-05 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Where law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation, the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all. The rule exists because, in light of the complexity of modern police work, the arresting officer cannot always be aware of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to arrest a suspect is based on facts known only to his superior or associates." (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted)).
IV. DISCUSSION
Travis advances three claims against Kanada and the Roseville Police Department: violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; state-law false arrest and imprisonment; and negligence. Compl. ¶¶ 16-25, ECF No. 1. Here, however, he does not oppose the defendants' motion with respect to his claim for negligence, and agrees to dismissal of that claim. See Opp'n at 9. At hearing, the parties confirmed this stipulation. The negligence claim is therefore dismissed.
A. Federal Claims
1. Fourth Amendment: Officer Kanada
"The Fourth Amendment safeguards '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (quoting U.S. Const. Am. XIV). But if Travis's arrest was supported by probable cause, the arrest did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, and the motion must be granted. Id. at 354; Harper v. City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008); Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470-71 (9th Cir. 2007).
"Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested." United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991); Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The standard is not susceptible to a precise, percentage-based definition "because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003); Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432 (9th Cir. 2010). Conclusive evidence of guilt is not necessary to create probable cause, but "mere suspicion, common rumor, or even strong reason to suspect are not enough." Harper, 533 F.3d at 1022 (citation, alteration, and quotation marks omitted). It does not matter whether the suspect is later proved innocent. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
Probable cause does not depend on the officer's subjective state of mind. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996); Tatum v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 441 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006). The officer may believe the person has committed "only a very minor criminal offense," Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354), and the officer may subjectively believe the person is guilty of a different offense and yet have probable cause to arrest, see Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) ("[The officer's] subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause."). But some particular criminal statute must make the person's conduct unlawful. Torres v. City of L.A., 548 F.3d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153-56, and Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008)).
Federal courts have also adopted the "collective knowledge doctrine" of probable cause. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231. "Under the collective knowledge doctrine, in determining whether probable cause exists for arrest, courts look to 'the collective knowledge of all the officers involved in the criminal investigation.'" Harper, 533 F.3d at 1022 (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007)). Officers may rely on their peers: they "cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231. In addition, "evidence supporting probable cause need not be admissible in court," but "it must be 'legally sufficient and reliable.'" Crowe, 608 F.3d at 432-33 (quoting Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 438 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Here, first, Kanada had reasonably trustworthy information to conclude, with reasonable caution, that Travis had committed a criminal act at the time of arrest. He knew there was dancing at The Station, and as of December 20, 2012, the Placer County Superior Court had enjoined dancing at The Station without a permit. California law prohibits violations of court orders as criminal contempt. See Cal. Penal Code § 166(a)(4). Although a finding of criminal contempt cannot rest on a void court order, People v. Gonzalez, 12 Cal. 4th 804, 816-17 (1996), Travis's administrative appeal was unresolved in December 2012, and the Placer County Superior Court's 2011 orders remained in effect.
Second, Kanada had reasonably trustworthy information at his disposal to conclude The Station was operating in violation of a Stop Order and without workers' compensation insurance. Private employers must "secure the payment of compensation" by either insurance against liability or a certificate of consent to self-insure. Cal. Lab. Code § 3700. And when an employer does not secure that insurance, a stop order may issue, "prohibiting the use of employee labor . . . until the employer's compliance with the provisions of [Labor Code] Section 3700." Cal. Lab. Code § 3710.1. And the "[f]ailure of an employer, officer, or anyone having direction, management, or control of any place of employment or of employees to observe a stop order issued and served upon him or her pursuant to [Labor Code] Section 3710.1 is a misdemeanor . . . ." Cal. Lab. Code § 3710.2. On December 20, 2012, Kanada knew a Stop Order had issued, knew The Station was under investigation for Labor Code violations, saw state ABC agents at The Station investigating violations of the Labor Code and Stop Order, and heard reports from them that Travis had violated the Labor Code and Stop Order. Travis produced no proof of insurance.
The City also argues Kanada had sufficient information at his disposal to conclude Travis had operated The Station in violation of Business and Professions Code 25601. See Mot. Summ. J. at 7-8. The most recent published California appellate decision to cite this statute is more than twenty years old. See Yu v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd., 3 Cal. App. 4th 286 (1992). In addition, the California Supreme Court has observed section 25604 "has been applied to . . . public displays of and attempts to gratify sexual (usually homosexual or lesbian) desires." Boreta Enters. v. Dep't Alcoholic Beverage Control, 2 Cal. 3d 85, 97-98 (1970). The court need not and does not reach the question of probable cause on the basis of a possible violation of section 25601.
Because Kanada had sufficient information at his disposal to meet the probable-cause standard, the arrest was constitutional. Travis may not prevail by showing he was never prosecuted for Labor Code or municipal violations, or that the Placer County Superior Court later overturned his citations for violating the municipal code. At the time of the arrest, Kanada had reliable information that dancing at 1100 Orlando Avenue violated the municipal code and a court order, and that Travis was operating The Station in violation of the Stop Order. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555 (later legal victory does not nullify probable cause per se). And although the superior court's 2011 orders technically applied to the LLC rather than Travis or The Station, those orders spoke broadly of dancing at 1100 Orlando Avenue. See Def.'s RJN Ex. A, at 2 ("The City has established that operations and activities at subject property of 1100 Orlando Avenue in Roseville, California . . . exist and constitute a public nuisance . . . . [The LLC] and its agents, employees, servants, successors or assigns, those acting on their behalf or in concert with them, and any occupants of the building and facilities at 1100 Orlando Avenue in Roseville California . . . are [ ] restrained and prohibited from engaging in any activities or conducting any business that is defined as a dance club, night club, or . . . permit[ting] dancing on the subject property.").
The motion is granted on this claim.
2. Fourth Amendment: Roseville Police Department
Municipalities may be held liable as "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), but not if a plaintiff establishes no federal statutory or constitutional violation, City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007).
Even were the court to conclude Kanada lacked probable cause to arrest Travis on December 20, 2012, Travis has not established the Police Department's liability. "[A] municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). A plaintiff asserting a claim under Monell must "identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury." Id. "Locating a 'policy' ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality." Id. at 403-04.
A plaintiff may establish municipal liability by demonstrating "the constitutional tort was the result of a 'longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.'" Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)). To establish liability for governmental entities under a practice-or-custom theory, a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff "possessed a constitutional right of which [he or she] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation." Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Travis argues the Roseville Police Department and City of Roseville had a policy "to harass him and the Station" by "engag[ing] in a pattern or practice of issuing administrative citations for dancing when they knew that dancing was allowed on the premises." Opp'n at 8. Putting aside for the moment that this allegation appears nowhere in the complaint, the evidence here establishes that at the time of the arrest, the Placer County Superior Court had found any dancing at The Station without a dance permit was a nuisance and violated the municipal code.
The motion is granted on this claim.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process
In addition, although Travis cites the Fourteenth Amendment in his complaint, the Fourth Amendment provides "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection" for his claims here; for this reason summary judgment is granted as to any claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-44 (1998) (holding that if a plaintiff challenges a search or seizure, the Fourth Amendment applies, not the Fourteenth (citing, inter alia, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989))).
The motion is granted on this claim.
The defendants' memorandum of points and authorities includes no argument addressing Travis's state law claims. Their notice of motion, however, requests summary judgment on his state law claims, ECF No. 12, and at hearing, he and the defendants agreed the matter may be submitted for decision on the basis of the existing briefing.
"Under California law, the elements of a claim for false imprisonment are: '(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.'" Young v. Cnty. of L.A., 655 F.3d 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Easton v. Sutter Coast Hospital, 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (2000)). False arrest and false imprisonment are the same tort. Asgari v. City of L.A., 15 Cal. 4th 744, 753 n.3 (1997). A police officer is not immune from liability for false imprisonment. Id. at 752. But Section 847 of the California Penal Code provides,
There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer . . . acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest [if] . . .Cal. Penal Code § 847(b).
. . . [t]he arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.
"Reasonable cause" or "probable cause" is a "well-established" legal standard under California law. People v. Adair, 29 Cal. 4th 895, 904 (2003). "Reasonable or probable cause means such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused." People v. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th 457, 473 (2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "Reasonable and probable cause may exist although there may be some room for doubt." Id. It is an objective standard; the defendant need not show the officers had enough information to conclude the plaintiff actually committed a crime. Adair, 29 Cal. 4th at 904-05; Levin v. United Airlines, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1002, 1018 (2008). A person may be factually innocent, yet an officer have probable or reasonable cause to arrest him. Buckheit v. Dennis, No. 09-5000, 2012 WL 1166077, at *28-29 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (citing Adair, 29 Cal. 4th at 905), aff'd in relevant part, 573 F. App'x 662 (9th Cir. 2014). This is essentially the same standard as the federal constitutional standard. Davis v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. 08-1262, 2009 WL 3838287, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009) (citing, inter alia, Mower, 28 Cal. 4th at 473, and Adair, 29 Cal. 4th at 904-05), aff'd, 442 F. App'x 300 (9th Cir. 2011).
Here, for the same reasons described above with respect to Travis's federal constitutional claims, the motion must be granted. Kanada had facts at his disposal that would have led a reasonable person to believe that on December 20, 2012, Travis was operating The Station in violation of a court order and the Stop Order. Because Kanada had probable or reasonable cause, the Police Department is likewise not liable under a respondeat superior theory.
The motion is granted as to this claim.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's negligence claim is DISMISSED. Defendants' motion for summary judgment otherwise is GRANTED. This order resolves ECF No. 12. CASE CLOSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: October 6, 2015.
/s/_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE