Opinion
Civ. No. 96-4016 (DRD).
August 23, 1999.
Robert G. Clyne, Esq., Hill Rivkins Hayden, LLP, Jersey City, N.J., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
David S. Lafferty, Esq., Breslin McNerney, Hackensack, N.J., Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant Hartford Insurance Co.
O P I N I O N
The plaintiff, Transportes Ferreos De Venezuela II CA ("Plaintiff"), initiated this action against the NKK Corporation ("NKK"), EDC, Inc. ("EDC"), and the Sheffer Corporation ("Sheffer"), alleging that a crane boom, which was part of a self-unloading conveyor that Plaintiff contracted with defendants to manufacture and install, collapsed, causing damage to Plaintiff's ship and another vessel. Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court's June 9, 1999, order pursuant to L.Civ.R. 7.1(g). No oral argument was heard pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the owner of the merchant shipping vessels Rio Caroni and Boca Grande, both of which are ships engaged in the exportation of iron ore from Venezuela. See Complaint ¶¶ 3-7. The Rio Caroni transports the iron ore from the interior sections of Venezuela to the mouth of the Orinoco River. When it reaches that point, its sophisticated unloading system, consisting of conveyor belts and unloading equipment commonly referred to as a "material handling system," deposits the iron ore into the Boca Grande, a floating terminal and transfer station. See Clyne Decl. ¶ 2; ex. 2, 4.
In 1992, Plaintiff hired NKK, a Japanese shipyard, to convert the Rio Caroni from a bulk carrier to a self-unloader. Id. ¶ 3. NKK subcontracted the design and supply of the materials handling system to EDC, a New Jersey company. Id. ¶ 4. EDC in turn subcontracted the fabrication of the boom hoisting mechanism, known as the boom cylinder, to Sheffer. Id. ¶ 5.
On April 15, 1995, while the Rio Caroni was discharging to the Boca Grande, the self-unloading boom suddenly collapsed and fell causing substantial physical damage to both ships. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6. The boom's collapse was caused by the failure of a rod-eye, which was part of the self-unloading boom's hoisting assembly. Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff filed suit against NKK, EDC, and Sheffer on August 21, 1996.Id. ¶ 8. After obtaining EDC's policy of liability insurance issued by Hartford in discovery, Plaintiff notified Hartford of the pending action in March 1998. The Comprehensive General Liability and Business Liability Policy number 13SBA DDS328 (the "Policy") issued to EDC specifically provided for an aggregate limit of $2 million for products completed operations coverage. Id. ¶ 11. Umbrella liability coverage is also afforded under the Policy. Id. In June 1998, Hartford was joined as a third-party defendant and filed a third-party answer denying coverage and refusing to defend EDC. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11. The bases for Hartford's refusal were, among other things, late notice of claim and exclusion from coverage under the terms of the policy. Id. Ex. 8.
On August 10, 1998, all counsel and their clients, including Hartford, attended a settlement conference conducted by Magistrate Judge Joel A. Pisano. At the conclusion of the conference, a settlement had been agreed upon for the amount of $1.85 million. Of that amount, $850,000 was to be funded by NKK and Sheffer, as well as two other third-party defendants, Jorgenson Steel Aluminum and Artco, Inc. Specifically, NKK paid $200,000, Sheffer paid $500,000, and Jorgenson and Artco each paid $75,000.
The balance of $1 million represents EDC's settlement obligation. Because of EDC's size, value, and lack of insurance due to Hartford's declination of coverage, the settlement agreement provided for EDC to stipulate to a judgment for its share of the settlement obligation and assign all of its claims against Hartford to Plaintiff. In exchange for the assignment, Plaintiff agreed not to execute the judgment. Id. ¶ 12.
Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment against EDC in the amount of $1 million was signed and entered on the docket on November 5, 1998. Hartford declined to participate in the settlement.
On January 29, 1999, Hartford filed a motion for leave to file an amended answer and fourth-party complaint. Hartford sought to bring a claim for indemnification against Sheffer. On March 5, 1999, Magistrate Judge Pisano denied Hartford's motion and stated that it would be futile to assert a fourth-party complaint against its insured's co-defendant Sheffer because Sheffer had already settled with the insured.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on April 30, 1999, and Hartford filed its cross-motion for summary judgment May 13, 1999. In its motion, Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the comprehensive general liability policy issued by Hartford covers EDC's liability in this case. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that the Policy provided for operations hazard coverage and that there was no exclusion for products liability. Additionally, Plaintiff claimed that the designer and architect exclusions contained in the Policy do not exclude from coverage EDC's liability as a manufacturer or supplier. In its cross-motion, Hartford argued, inter alia, that EDC's failure to give timely notice of the accident precluded coverage under the Policy. Additionally, Hartford argued that the Policy did not cover engineering, design, or professional services rendered by EDC. In an opinion and order dated June 9, 1999, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion and granted Hartford's cross-motion.
II. DISCUSSION
A motion for reconsideration will only succeed where dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were presented to the Court but not considered. Pittston Co. v. Sedgwick James of N.Y., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 915, 918, 919 (D.N.J. 1997); Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 623, 633, 634 (D.N.J. 1996); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace Co., 849 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D.N.J. 1994) (citing Pelham v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D.N.J. 1987)). The purpose of the motion is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. In re Sharps Run Assocs., L.P., 157 B.R. 766, 785 (D.N.J. 1993).
Local Civil Rule 7.1(g), which governs this issue, limits the motion to facts and law "overlooked" in the original motion. United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994). The only proper ground for granting such a motion is that the matters or decisions overlooked, if considered by the court, might reasonably have altered the result reached. Starr v. JCI Data Processing, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 633, 635 (D.N.J. 1991); Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp. 621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986).
The standard of review for a motion for rearguement is high and relief is granted very sparingly. NL Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996); Hatco, 849 F. Supp. at 990;accord Jones, 158 F.R.D. at 314; Bakari v. Beyer, 870 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D.N.J. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 82 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 1996);Maldonado, 636 F. Supp. at 630.
A party must show more than a disagreement with the court's decision.Hatco, 849 F. Supp. at 990 (citing Panna v. Firstrust Sav. Bank, 760 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.J. 1991)). A mere recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden. Id. (citing Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989)).
In this motion, Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to reconsideration of the summary judgment order because "the Court overlooked the crucial fact that a cross-claim against Sheffer was available to Hartford when it filed its answer which was prior to settlement." See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion for Reargument, at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the Court failed to consider key facts when it held that the loss of the rod-eye constituted prejudice. Id. Hartford opposes the motion and contends that Plaintiff's arguments in this motion are identical to the ones the Court considered when rendering its original decision.
Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden under L.Civ.R. 7.1(g). Its motion for reconsideration is nothing more than a recapitulation of the arguments presented to and considered by the Court when rendering its original decision. Hatco, 849 F. Supp. at 990. Plaintiff's argument in the instant motion that Hartford could have asserted a cross-claim against Sheffer was considered by the Court and rejected in the previous opinion. By the time Hartford was aware of the occurrence and was included in this lawsuit, the time had passed in which it could have filed a cross-claim. That, coupled with the loss of the rod-eye and the three year delay in notification, amounted to appreciable prejudice.
All of Plaintiff's arguments in the present motion were considered and rejected in the opinion denying its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, therefore, amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with the Court's decision. Id. This disagreement is insufficient to warrant reconsideration of the summary judgment motion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration will be denied. An appropriate order will issue.
ORDER
Plaintiff, Transportes Ferreos De Venezuela II CA ("Plaintiff"), having moved for reconsideration of this Court's June 9, 1999, order denying its motion for summary judgment; and no oral argument having been held pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; and the Court having considered all papers submitted; and for other good cause shown; and for the reasons set forth in an opinion of even date;
IT IS this day of August 1999, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration be and hereby is DENIED.