Summary
holding that because plaintiff's complaint asked the court "to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale and award her title to the property, it [was] plain that she [was] inviting court to 'reject' the [state court] order."
Summary of this case from Talley v. Loancare ServicingOpinion
No. 07-2224-cv.
November 21, 2008.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
PAUL E. KERSON, Forest Hills, New York, for plaintiff-appellant.
JOSEPH C. SAVINO, Syosset, New York, for defendants-appellees.
PRESENT: HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, HON. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, HON. PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Nongyaw Trakansook appeals from an April 18, 2007 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gold, U.S.M.J.), dismissing her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") and denying her motion to amend her complaint to include an additional claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.
To the extent that Trakansook argues she was injured by the state court's decision foreclosing on her property, we agree with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction to hear her claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the claim "complains of injury from a state-court judgment and seeks to have that state-court judgment reversed." Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2005); see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
To the extent that Trakansook argues she was separately and independently injured by Astoria's allegedly discriminatory acts up to and including its decision to move for entry of default in state court, her claim is time-barred. A section 1983 claim must be brought within the "general or residual statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions" under state law. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). In New York, the applicable limitations period is three years. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Trakansook was required to assert her section 1983 claim within three years of when she knew or had reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of her claim. Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980). Astoria moved for entry of default on March 6, 2003, but Trakansook did not file suit in federal district court until April 7, 2006, more than three years later. The district court therefore could not grant relief on the claim because it was filed too late.
In addition, Trakansook's claim would have had to be dismissed in any event because she did not allege that Astoria is a "state actor," which is an essential requirement of any claim under section 1983. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) ("To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.").
Trakansook's federal claims also are barred by the principles of res judicata, because they stem from the same "nucleus of operative fact" as her state court claims and there was no legal impediment to bringing the federal claims in that forum. Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted); see also Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 85 (1984) ("Section 1983, however, does not override state preclusion law and guarantee petitioner a right to proceed to judgment in state court on her state claims and then turn to federal court for adjudication of her federal claims."). The state court's issuance of a decision on the merits is binding upon subsequent litigation between the parties, and in this case requires dismissal of Trakansook's federal claims, as the district court properly determined. See Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d 78, 91 (2d Cir. 2001).
With respect to Trakansook's motion for leave to amend her complaint, we agree with the district court that amendment would have been futile because her proposed ECOA claim was time-barred. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f), "[n]o such action shall be brought later than two years from the date of the occurrence of the violation." In the district court, Trakansook argued that the discriminatory act underlying her ECOA claim was Astoria's rejection of her check in October 2002. But Trakansook did not file her complaint in federal court until April 2006 and did not move for leave to amend her complaint until November 2006. Accordingly, her ECOA claim was time-barred and the district court did not err by denying her leave to amend on the grounds of futility.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.