Opinion
FSTCV155015033S
07-11-2016
Daniel Traisman v. Gaetano Barresi
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#116.00)
Kenneth B. Povodator, J.
Nature of the Proceeding
This is a proceeding commenced by the individual and corporate plaintiffs, directed to five individual and three corporate defendants. The plaintiffs claim to have given to certain identified defendants the sum of $120,000, which is claimed to have served multiple purposes--a loan for which a promissory note (with guaranties) was provided, an inducement to hire the individual plaintiff, and consideration for an 8% interest in certain business ventures. The plaintiff's claim, in 12 counts, a variety of causes of action, including fraud, misrepresentation, breach of employment contract, breach of promissory note, CUTPA, RICO, etc.
Currently before the court is a motion to strike filed on behalf of all of the defendants, attacking the legal sufficiency of most of the claims; due to the number of claims and the number of parties, it is hard to summarize the nature of the challenges, and therefore the court will address them sequentially.
The court will not recite, in any detail, the well-established standard for a motion to strike. The court is required to accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and interpret the allegations in such a manner as to give the plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable-favorable inferences, but the court is not required to accept conclusory statements.
More generally, it is often stated that the pleadings are to be read in a practical and commonsense fashion rather than in an overly technical manner, but at the same time, the court must recognize that the purpose of a complaint is to put the defendants on fair notice of the claims being asserted against them. In this case, as discussed below, there appears to be a great deal of tension between these considerations.
Discussion
Preliminary
Before addressing the individual counts, the court must express its concerns about the overall approach taken in the operative complaint. The plaintiffs correctly note that the defendants could have filed a request to revise but didn't. Nonetheless, to the extent that the court must attempt to interpret the complaint, and has general authority to control the pleadings, certain observations and concerns need to be expressed/identified.
Since the individual defendants collectively are referred to as the " individual defendants" in the introductory portion of the complaint (prior to ¶ 1), the court initially had assumed (while reading the numbered paragraphs) that a separate collective designation--" Doppio defendants" --referred to the LLC entities as a way of distinguishing the entities from the individuals. Instead, the court soon realized that " Doppio defendants" may actually be an unnecessary collective term meaning " all defendants" --except that the usage, at times, strongly suggests that the term does refer only to the non-individual defendants (and even then, inconsistently.) The court cannot understand why it was perceived to be necessary to create a nonintuitive (and potentially misleading) term for something as simple and self-explanatory as " all defendants" (unless the emphasized language set out in footnote 1 was inadvertent).
" Daniel Traisman and YT Holdings, LLC, through undersigned counsel, allege for their Complaint against Gaetano Barresi, Loretta Barresi, Joseph Barresi, Louis Barresi, Thomas Pescuma, Jr., (sometimes, the 'Individual Defendants'), Doppio, LLC, Timeless Hospitality, LLC and 26 Clinton Management, LLC (collectively, with the Individual Defendants, the 'Doppio Defendants') as follows" (emphasis added). (Or was the emphasized language not intended, or otherwise out of place?)
The plaintiffs seemingly-needlessly incorporated all allegations of all previous counts into each subsequent count. For example, ¶ ¶ 54-60, the paragraphs specifically directed to the sixth count alleging a breach of an employment agreement involving plaintiff Traisman, are incorporated into the seventh count which asserts a claim of breach of promissory note asserted by the plaintiff YT Holdings (and also into the eighth count, asserting a breach of a related guaranty). Paragraphs 47-53, first asserted in connection with the fifth count alleging a failure to pay wages to plaintiff Traisman, also are incorporated into the promissory note claim (and the guaranty claim). All of the allegations prior to the ninth count, asserting a violation of CUTPA, are incorporated into that ninth count--are plaintiffs claiming that a failure to pay wages, a failure to pay a promissory note, and a failure to honor a guarantee on a promissory note, all are parts of the CUTPA violations being alleged? See, e.g., Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn.App. 660, 669-71, 613 A.2d 838 (1992) (employment relationship not within scope of CUTPA, affirming granting of motion to strike such a claim). Are plaintiffs contending that part of the defendants' trade or business is borrowing money (issuing promissory notes and related guarantees)?
The pre-first-count allegations, incorporated into all of the counts, seem to attempt to establish a background claim that each and all defendants are responsible for all of the conduct of each and all defendants; see, especially, paragraph 11. But if that is the case, what is the purpose served by the 11th and 12th counts, explicitly claiming a right to pierce the corporate veil?
The court will return to some of these problems in more specific contexts, as appropriate.
First Count
The first count asserts a claim of " fraud in the inducement" directed to all of the defendants. The first count describes, in some detail, how defendants Louis Barresi, Joseph Barresi, and Thomas Pescuma are alleged to have fraudulently induced the individual plaintiff to invest $120,000, ostensibly for the purpose of purchasing new restaurant equipment for restaurants they controlled through various corporate entities. The money also would be a basis for employment of the individual plaintiff, enabling him to learn the restaurant business (with compensation over a two-year period at $50,000 per year).
All of the representations are alleged to have been made by the three individuals identified in the preceding paragraph. Paragraph 28 is the only first-count-specific paragraph that makes any mention of the other defendants, and does so in a conclusory fashion--" Louis Barresi, Joseph Barresi, Thomas Pescuma and the Doppio Defendants have committed fraud on Traisman and YT Holdings and are jointly and severally liable in the amount of $120,000, plus interest, punitive damages and attorneys fees."
As reflected in footnote 1, the individual defendants are supposedly encompassed by the term " Doppio Defendants" --either the plaintiffs are confused by their own terminology or the language quoted in footnote 1 erroneously included the individual defendants in the term " Doppio Defendants." The only logical interpretation for purposes of this paragraph is that " Doppio Defendants" is a reference to the entity defendants--otherwise, the plaintiffs would be asserting that " Louis Barresi, Joseph Barresi, Thomas Pescuma" and " Louis Barresi, Joseph Barresi, Thomas Pescuma" (and others) had engaged in fraud.
Further, although the initial allegations applicable to all counts discusses the interlocking nature of the corporate entities, and therefore those allegations are incorporated into the first count, there is no claimed basis for disregarding separate corporate entities until the last three counts wherein there are claims based on piercing the corporate veil. In other words, this count, directed to all entity defendants, does not articulate facts, or even a theory, under which any entity might be responsible for a liability of another entity. While it is true that individual agents of an entity can create liability for that entity, no attempt has been made to identify the entity for which the three individuals were actually/supposedly speaking/acting, when they allegedly made their fraudulent statements. Quite simply, the three individuals may have been agents for one or more of the entities, but absent a claim that an individual was acting for a specific corporate entity, there can be no agency and vicarious liability.
Related, the first count makes no attempt to identify the corporate entity to which the money was loaned (or in which it was invested). Thus, for example, the plaintiffs describe one of the LLC entities (Doppio, LLC) as the parent, head or umbrella of all of the other LLC entities (¶ 8)--the potential liability of the various LLC defendants would require identification of the entity actually receiving the money, coupled with factual allegations as to why the other entities would also be liable. It is legally insufficient simply to allege an amorphous relationship where everybody is liable for everything anyone did, without factual support. (It is hardly unique for there to be a parent corporate entity and subsidiary corporate entities, all of which are entitled to recognition of their legal separateness, absent a valid basis for disregard of individual existence.)
Later counts and paragraphs, however, do contain allegations of this nature, e.g., ¶ 62 in the 7th count asserts that the money was given to defendant Timeless Hospitality (in exchange for a promissory note on which Timeless was the maker).
Further demonstrating the problem with the amorphous nature of these allegations is that there is absolutely no mention of the other individual defendants in this count (Gaetano Barresi and Loretta Barresi). They are not mentioned by name and only to the extent that they are deemed to be encompassed by the plaintiffs' collective reference to the Doppio defendants--which itself is a term of uncertain meaning, as discussed above--could there be any perceived claim against them. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs argue that they have alleged legally sufficient claims against them: " As to Gaetano Barresi and Loretta Barresi, the Complaint properly alleges that the fraudulent statements and misrepresentations were made on their behalf, therefore the claim of fraud in the inducement was properly pled . . ." Again, if someone was acting as their agents, there needs to be some identification of the agency relationship in a factual rather than conclusory fashion.
After the quote immediately above, the plaintiffs cite a trial court decision for the proposition that a principal can be liable for the conduct of its agent. The proposition may be basic, but the issue is not whether a principal may be liable for the conduct of an agent, but rather the absolute absence of any factual claim that any individual is an agent for another individual or a specific entity. The complaint does seem to state that the three individuals were speaking on behalf of all defendants, if in an unnecessarily confusing and obscure manner. But the conclusory statement that Louis Barresi, Joseph Barresi, and Thomas Pescuma were speaking for all defendants is all there is--there is nothing of a factual nature that supports an otherwise purely conclusory (self-serving) implication that any individual was an agent for any other individual, that any of the three was authorized to speak on behalf of Gaetano Barresi or Loretta Barresi, for any purpose.
Again, the first count does not even identify the " primary" defendant with respect to the alleged fraudulent inducement--the recipient of the investment funds. The complaint states that the funds were provided to the " Doppio Defendants" (¶ 25), but as noted earlier, that is but an obscure way of saying that the money was provided to all defendants (or maybe just the entities, collectively). There is no identification of the payee as designated on a check or the owner of the account to which money was electronically transferred or otherwise indicating the actual recipient of the funds (but see footnote 2 relating to allegations in paragraphs in later counts). But without knowing the identity of the recipient, how can the court or a factfinder determine the identity of the principal under this claim, necessarily making it impossible to determine the identity of any possible agent of that principal--and how are the appropriate defendants put on notice of those essential factors? The court finds legally insufficient the generalized everyone-is-responsible-for-everything approach taken, relying on claimed interrelationships between the entities and the individuals.
A further layer of confusion--in the early counts, the $120,000 paid by one or both plaintiffs is identified as an investment; but later counts refer to a promissory note in that same amount, indicating that the money was in the nature of a loan. A loan or an investment could be consideration, but they generally are quite distinct.
Further, although not directly identified in the motion to strike, and therefore not properly addressed in the context of legal sufficiency, the vagueness of allegations implicates a potential standing issue (which the court can identify sua sponte). Paragraph 25 states that the individual plaintiff, through an LLC that he controlled (plaintiff YT Holdings, LLC), transferred the $120,000 to the " Doppio Defendants" (all defendants). Unless the plaintiff is suggesting that the court should disregard the separate corporate existence of YT Holdings, which plaintiff is the one that was induced to part with the funds by the allegedly fraudulent conduct of some or all of the defendants? Certainly, the sixth count suggests that it was the LLC that provided the funds, as that count seeks to recover on a promissory note in favor of YT Holdings for $120,000. But if it was the LLC that provided the funds, and was tortiously induced to do so, where is the standing of the individual plaintiff to assert a claim of fraudulent inducement, based on that transfer of funds? If he had been the agent of YT Holdings who was allegedly duped, it is the principal who was harmed, not Mr. Traisman.
Based on the existence of non -incorporated allegations later in the complaint, the court will read this count as alleging that Timeless Hospitality was the alleged " beneficiary" of the fraudulent inducement--the actual recipient of the funds, with the necessary implication that the individual defendants named as actively inducing the payment were acting as its agents. There is nothing beyond conclusory language and assertions, however, as to the other entities and the " passive" individual defendants. The motion to strike, then, is granted as to the first count, with respect to defendants Gaetano Barresi, Loretta Barresi, Doppio, LLC, and 26 Clinton Management, LLC.
Second Count
The plaintiffs claim that they were the victims of fraudulent representations, relating to the 8% interest they claim in two of the LLC entities. Much of the discussion, above, is applicable here. That includes the court's concern about standing to assert fraudulent misrepresentation, but now it is even broader.
Paragraph 18 asserts that the individual plaintiff was told that if he invested funds he would receive an 8% interest in two of the defendant entities, but ¶ 30 states that both plaintiffs were given the 8% interests but the later allegations make it clear that only the plaintiff entity actually provided the funds for the investment/loan. So who relied on the representations and who has standing to assert harm resulting from reliance?
The defendants also point out that the plaintiffs have not identified the nature of their 8% interest. (Is it an interest in profits or does it also include assets?) That, however, does not go to the question of legal sufficiency--and it is something that could (or should) have been addressed via request to revise.
And again, there is the everyone-is-responsible-for-everything approach, without any facts to support it. There are allegations in the complaint that the interest of the plaintiff (or plaintiffs) was in Timeless Hospitality, LLC and 26 Clinton Management, LLC, and to the extent that there seems to be a claim that the plaintiffs did not get any proceeds from sale/liquidation of the assets of those entities, the court will deem that legally sufficient.
The motion to strike, then, is granted as to the second count, with respect to defendants Gaetano Barresi, Loretta Barresi and Doppio, LLC.
Third Count
The plaintiffs next claim intentional misrepresentation, returning to the $120,000 investment. It is not clear how this differs from the first count, given the focus on the investment--is there a meaningful distinction between fraudulent inducement and intentional misrepresentations intended to induce an investment, in the context of this case? Whatever difference there may be, the analysis, above, is applicable here, and the same result applies, i.e. the motion to strike is granted as to the third count, with respect to defendants Gaetano Barresi, Loretta Barresi and Doppio, LLC.
Fourth Count
As with the observation relating to the third count, this count alleges negligent misrepresentations which reflects a different mental-state-oriented modifier but the analysis is similar. There is no difference with respect to lack of factual allegations and reliance on conclusory characterizations. Therefore, again, the result must be the same, i.e. the motion to strike is granted as to the fourth count, with respect to defendants Gaetano Barresi, Loretta Barresi and Doppio, LLC.
The fifth count invokes (only invokes) General Statutes § 31-71a (without an " et seq." or equivalent)--but that statute is a definitional provision. Because the plaintiff is seeking, inter alia, double damages, the court has interpreted the count as asserting a claim under § 31-72 (or the equivalent--Part II of Chapter 558 of the General Statutes, wherein § 31-72 is the principal remedial tool).
The fifth count asserts a statutory wage claim by plaintiff Traisman, and the required analysis is different but again made more difficult by the plaintiff's everyone-is-responsible-for-everything approach. Paragraph 48 alleges (or seems to allege) that Doppio, LLC was the employer. That is consistent with most of the checks submitted as exhibits--but if the claim is that the other entities also are liable (see, ¶ ¶ 51-53), what are the alleged facts supporting such a contention? And to the extent that the phrase " Doppio defendants" is defined as including the individual defendants, which individuals actually asserted employer-type control over the work (or payroll), and how? Again, an " everybody is responsible for everything done by anyone" approach does not constitute a statement of facts establishing the relationship necessary for a statutory claim, however broad the notion of employer may be.
In later paragraphs (i.e. in the sixth count), the individual plaintiff alleges that the employment agreement was with Timeless (alleged to be acting as an assetless instrument of " Doppio, LLC and the Doppio Defendants"; see, ¶ 55). Therefore, trying to interpret the complaint realistically, Timeless is a proper defendant for this count. To the extent that the exhibits to the complaint appear to demonstrate a pattern of Doppio, LLC as paying plaintiff Traisman for his work, it, too, appears to be a proper defendant.
See footnote 1 and related discussion on page 2. Does " Doppio defendants" now mean the entities other than Doppio, LLC? Or. does it mean all defendants, entities and individuals, other than Doppio, LLC?
In Butler v. Hartford Technical Institute, Inc., 243 Conn. 454, 704 A.2d 222 (1997), the court recognized that an official of a corporate employer might be liable as an employer under the statute of concern (§ 31-72) if he/she had sufficient control over the hours, wages, etc. of the employee. That appears to require at least some level of specificity--and in this case, there is no identification of any specific individual who engaged in specific predicate acts. Instead, there is the amorphous everyone-is-responsible-for-everything without identifying any root source of such a claim.
Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted as to the individual defendants and as to 26 Clinton Management, LLC.
Sixth Count
This count asserts a breach of employment contract claim, again claiming that all defendants or all entity defendants are liable. Paragraph 55 asserts that the agreement was made between plaintiff Traisman and all entity defendants--through " their assetless subsidiary, Timeless Hospitality Group, LLC, wherein Traisman was to provide service and marketing service for Doppio, LLC and the Doppio defendants at any of their restaurants." No facts are alleged explaining why anyone other than Timeless Hospitality would be liable for an agreement between the individual plaintiff and Timeless Hospitality. To the extent that the plaintiff relies on the conclusory characterization " assetless, " the court is not bound by conclusions, and the complaint asserts that Timeless Hospitality appears to have owned (through intermediaries) one restaurant and part of another (¶ 9), each of which the plaintiffs allege was sold for $300,000 (¶ ¶ 32-33), factually incompatible with a conclusory allegation of assetless status.
See preceding footnote.
More precisely, ¶ 9 asserts that Timeless Hospitality owned three separate subordinate entities, which had ownership interests in one or two restaurants, and the three subordinates were responsible for operation of three restaurants (including any that were owned).
Further, other than owning restaurants, there are allegations that the entity defendants managed or operated restaurants. It is not clear how or why entities engaged in service-related functions--operation or management of restaurants--would be expected to have significant assets such that limited or no assets might be cause for concern (or some favorable-to-plaintiff inference).
Again, to the extent that there are facts alleged that (very liberally) could be construed as asserting a role of Doppio, LLC in the employment contract realm (see, preceding discussion), the court will construe the pleadings to assert, if minimally, a claim of liability on the part of Doppio, LLC. Also analogous to the treatment above, the motion to strike is granted as to the individual defendants and as to 26 Clinton Management, LLC.
Seventh Count
The seventh count seeks to recover on the promissory note, on which Timeless is the maker/borrower. Alleging that Timeless is " a mere fiction and all Defendants are intertwined" (¶ 64), the plaintiff YT asserts that all defendants are therefore liable. There are no factual assertions supporting such an everyone-is-responsible-for-everything approach, and the circumstances make such all-inclusiveness affirmatively unreasonable.
What is it that 26 Clinton Management, LLC, as a fellow-subsidiary of Doppio, LLC, did or might have done, that might make it liable on a note issued by Timeless? What is it that was done or might have been done by defendants Louis Barresi and Thomas Pescuma that might warrant ignoring the separate existence of Timeless as an independent entity--when they are guarantors of this very liability (as asserted in the next count)?
Merely reciting an incantation of interconnectedness does not suffice even for a more formal claim of piercing the corporate veil (also as alleged in later counts)--what is the factual and legal basis for liability relied upon here, for defendants other than the actual maker of the note?
The motion to strike the seventh count is granted as to all defendants other than Timeless.
Ninth Count
The ninth count asserts a claim under CUTPA against all defendants. Although a principal of an entity may be liable, under CUTPA, for acts taken by the individual, the everyone-is-responsible-for-everything approach lacks anything approaching the necessary factual basis for such a claim. More fundamentally, how does any aspect of the facts alleged in the prior eight counts--all incorporated by reference--implicate CUTPA?
The individual defendant's involvement seems to be limited to an employment--type relationship with some of the defendants-he did not invest/lend his own funds but rather it was the entity-plaintiff that loaned or invested funds. It is well-established, however, that CUTPA does not address the inner workings of the employer-employee relationship.
That also provides a segue to the YT Holdings claim. CUTPA is directed to the marketplace for goods and services, and the employment relationship does not impact that market. The claim of YT Holdings, however, is based on a loan or investment--there is nothing in the complaint suggesting that any of the defendants is involved in the business of soliciting loans or investments. From an alternate perspective, CUTPA focuses on vendors of goods and services, but the defendants were not vendors of goods or services with respect to YT--any involvement with YT was as a customer/consumer, i.e. a borrower. To the extent that the loan also was claimed to have been consideration for YT Holdings (or the individual plaintiff) to acquire an interest in some of the businesses, there is no suggestion that any defendant entity was in the business of selling interests in itself or that any individual was in the business of selling interests in any of the entity-defendants. Although the more generalized aspect of this issue is not especially well-developed in the defendants' motion and brief, it is identified in connection with the discussion of the inapplicability of CUTPA to the employment relationship (see, especially, page 19 of #117.00).
Other than stories (apocryphal or real) of dot-com excesses where stock was being sold for companies without any actual business or business model and/or a real-life equivalent of the scenario in " The Producers, " it is hard to imagine scenarios where the sale of interests in a company, itself, might be deemed a trade or commerce for purposes of CUTPA liability (further ignoring the heavy regulation of the sale of interests in businesses and the exception in § 42-110c(a) for activities otherwise regulated by the state or federal government).
" There is no allegation in the complaint that the Defendants advertised, sold, leased or distributed any services to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts to establish that the conduct alleged to violate CUTPA occurred in the course of trade or commerce."
To approach the issue from a different perspective: assuming/accepting that all of the defendants did precisely what the plaintiffs claim, how did that (how might that) implicate the proverbial marketplace? How would/could a fraudulent inducement to make a loan to a business or reliance on ulterior motives to hire someone distort or corrupt the interests sought to be protected by CUTPA--a minimal level of fairness in commercial transactions?
The motion to strike is granted as to the CUTPA claims.
Tenth Count
The tenth count attempts to assert a claim under RICO, 18 USCA § 1961 et seq., claiming that the defendants are engaged in racketeering through a criminal-type enterprise. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs have not alleged adequate predicate acts, and that in any event, the allegations are only directed to some of the defendants. The plaintiff contends that the complaint asserts sufficient predicate acts, and that the notion of an enterprise inherently (and here) implicates a collective activity.
For purposes of a motion to strike, the court is limited to the claimed defects identified by the moving party. Therefore, the court must limit its attention to the issue of predicate acts--have they been alleged adequately and if so, which defendants are implicated in the alleged enterprise.
As something of a recap, the court has been unable to find any allegation of misconduct by defendants Gaetano Barresi and Loretta Barresi. There is no individualized allegations of misconduct by 26 Clinton--only in aggregate allegations which seem to conflict with detailed allegations. Thus, in ¶ 31, there are general assertions of ownership of restaurants, but ¶ 9, focusing on defendant Timeless, makes it clear that Timeless (directly or through a non-party intermediary) owns two of the three identified restaurants, and the third is partially owned by Timeless through an intermediary but with no mention anywhere that 26 Clinton is the other owner of the intermediary.
The plaintiffs do assert that there were transmissions of a fraudulent promissory note and guaranty, emails, etc.; see ¶ 83; seemingly sufficient for the purpose of identifying required predicate acts. But again, the court must return to the standing issue--the promissory note and guaranty had nothing to do with plaintiff Traisman in a legal sense--the promissory note transaction (including guaranty) did not involve him personally, and therefore he seems to lack standing to assert any harm resulting from that transaction. From an alternate perspective, there are no predicate acts asserted relating to any harm claimed to have been suffered by plaintiff Traisman (assuming, for purposes of this motion, that a termination of an employment relationship might come within RICO).
Accordingly, the motion to strike as relates to the Tenth Count is granted as to defendants Gaetano Barresi, Loretta Barresi and 26 Clinton; and is granted as to the remaining defendants with respect to plaintiff Traisman.
Eleventh and Twelfth Counts
The eleventh count attempts to assert a claim of piercing the corporate veil directed to the individual defendants. Although the eleventh count seems to focus on claimed liability of the individual defendants for the conduct of the entities (¶ ¶ 87 and 88) it also refers to Doppio, LLC as an alternate controller of 26 Clinton and Timeless (¶ 91)--but Doppio, LLC is the focus of the twelfth count and the claim of piercing the corporate veil to impose liability on Doppio, LLC.
The concept of piercing the corporate veil is not intended to be a " gotcha" for isolated departures from corporate regularity--it is intended to address systematic departures such that the reliance on separate corporate identities amounts to a fraud. To the extent that the plaintiff alleges any particular acts, they do not have any such systematic quality but rather relate to the personal relationship between plaintiff Traisman and the defendants--itself the genesis of the transactions at issue.
There are no factual allegations concerning improper control or aspects of improper dominance. The conclusory allegations could be asserted with respect to any entity owned by one individual or only a few individuals--if a handful of people agree to form an entity, why would/should it be surprising if the conduct of the entity is determined by the owners, consistent with their commonality of purpose? If the plaintiff were intended to be a trainee in restaurant operations, within a small group of commonly-controlled restaurants, is it at all surprising that he would have worked at various locations? (Indeed, under the circumstances, it probably would have been surprising if he had not.)
The court already has addressed the imprecision of employer-status as between Timeless and Doppio by allowing the employment claims to proceed against both entities. The court does not find that there to be sufficient particularity of factual allegations to permit the broader piercing the corporate veil claims to proceed--as repeatedly recited, there is an inadequate factual basis for the everyone-is-responsible-for-everything theme that pervades the complaint and is the explicit purpose of these two counts. The court finds insufficient the allegations in the eleventh and twelfth counts, and the motion to strike is granted as to those counts.
Conclusion
As should be apparent, the court has trouble accepting the sufficiency of allegations asserting an everyone-is-responsible-for-everything approach as advanced by the plaintiffs. Perhaps ironically, there also are problems relating to the failure to distinguish between claims properly advanced by the individual plaintiff and the claims properly advanced by the plaintiff YT Holdings, LLC. The wholesale incorporation of irrelevant paragraphs, and the " delayed" assertion of necessary allegations until later counts, only complicated the ability of the court to analyze the claims being presented.
The motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part:
The first count is stricken with respect to claims directed to defendants Gaetano Barresi, Loretta Barresi, Doppio, LLC, and 26 Clinton Management, LLC;
The second, third and fourth counts are stricken with respect to claims directed to defendants Gaetano Barresi, Loretta Barresi and Doppio, LLC; The fifth and sixth counts are stricken with respect to claims directed to all individual defendants and 26 Clinton Management, LLC;
The seventh count is stricken with respect to claims directed to all defendants other than defendant Timeless;
The ninth, eleventh and twelfth counts are stricken;
The tenth count is stricken with respect to claims of plaintiff Traisman, and it is stricken with respect to the claims of plaintiff YT Holdings as directed to defendants Gaetano Barresi, Loretta Barresi and 26 Clinton Management, LLC.