Opinion
October 24, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Hillery, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
According to the facts alleged by the plaintiff William Townsend, Townsend was employed by the third-party defendant Highland Sand Gravel, Inc. (hereinafter Highland) as plant superintendent of a quarry. The defendants Nenni Equipment Corp. and James McDonald were the owner and operator, respectively, of a crane leased by Highland for the purposes of installing a stone crusher. Highland provided the rigging for the crane, and Townsend supervised the preparation of the rigging by Highland employees. As the crane was lowering the stone crusher into place, one of the slings comprising the rigging broke, causing the crusher to strike Townsend in the leg.
Assuming, arguendo, that the injury falls within the scope of Labor Law § 240 (1) (cf., Schreiner v. Cremosa Cheese Corp., 202 A.D.2d 657; Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 167 A.D.2d 524, affd 78 N.Y.2d 509), we agree with the Supreme Court that the defendants cannot be considered "contractors" or "agents" within the meaning of the statute. Neither defendant was the general contractor of the project, nor did they assume the duties of a general contractor (see, Russin v. Picciano Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311; Kenny v. Fuller Co., 87 A.D.2d 183). Furthermore, neither can be considered the agent of the owner of the quarry, as the duty to inspect and provide safe rigging was never delegated to them (see, Russin v. Picciano Son, supra; D'Amico v. New York Racing Assn., 203 A.D.2d 509; Paone v. Westwood Vil., 178 A.D.2d 518). The Supreme Court therefore correctly granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action based on Labor Law § 240. Bracken, J.P., Copertino, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.