Opinion
No. 4003463.
January 5, 2007.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #121
The four plaintiffs, Cynthia Townsend, Jacob Townsend, Nancy Boclair, and Richard Boclair, filed their complaint on June 14, 2005, against the defendants Donald Boclair, Brac Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. (Brac), and Cendant Car Rental Group, Inc. (Cendant). The four plaintiffs were passengers in a car driven by Donald Boclair and rented from Brac and Cendant. In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that on April 16, 2004, Donald Boclair lost control of the car and crashed, causing their injuries. The plaintiffs bring twelve counts of negligence, one from each of them against each of the three defendants. Their action against Brac and Cendant, is being brought pursuant to General Statutes § 14-154a, which renders the owner-lessor of a motor vehicle vicariously liable for damages arising out of the tortious conduct of the operator-lessee.
On May 2, 2006, Brac and Cendant filed their answers and special defenses. As one of their special defenses, they asserted that a Maine statute; 29-A M.R.S.A. § 1652(3); which precludes claims by passengers in a rental car against a rental car company, should govern this dispute.
Brac and Cendant filed a motion for summary judgment on June 8, 2006 as to counts five through twelve on the grounds that Maine law should apply because Maine has the most significant relationship to these claims and Maine law does not permit a cause of action by passengers in a rented car against the rental car company. Brac and Cendant submitted a memorandum of law and some evidence in support of their motion. On September 13, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition. The court heard the matter at short calendar on September 18, 2006.
Brac and Cendant submitted the following evidence: (1) An affidavit of Michael F. Casey, Senior Casualty Claims Examiner for Budget Rent-A-Car System, Inc.; (2) a rental car agreement, authenticated by the affidavit; (3) and uncertified transcript of Cindy Townsend's interview with Jeff Lee, from Custard Insurance Adjuster, Inc., dated May 28, 2004; (4) an uncertified transcript of Donald Boclair's interview with Jeff Lee, also dated May 28, 2004; and (5) an uncertified transcript of Donald Boclair with Lynn Gilmore, from State Farm Insurance, dated April 21, 2004. On August 14, 2006, Brac and Cendant filed a supplemental memorandum of law wherein they attached admissions of fact by Donald Boclair. Since the plaintiffs did not object to this evidence and submitted the same evidence in support of their opposing memorandum, the court may consider all of it.
DISCUSSION
"Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 756-57, 905 A.2d 623 (2006). "Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is properly granted if the defendant in its motion raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the [plaintiffs'] claim and involves no triable issue of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 424, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999).
The threshold issue that the court must determine is whether Maine law rather than Connecticut law applies to the facts of the present case. Brac and Cendant argue that the most significant relationship, not the place of the accident, should determine the choice of law, which is Maine. The plaintiffs argue in response that Connecticut law should apply because Connecticut is the place where the injury and the conduct causing the injury (losing control of the vehicle) occurred.
In O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 649-50, 519 A.2d 13 (1986), the Supreme Court abandoned the traditional approach of strict adherence to the place of injury to resolve the conflicts of law question. O'Connor replaced the traditional system with the "most significant relationship" test of § 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 649-50. "The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6." 1 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (1971). When analyzing a conflict of laws issue under the most significant relationship test, the court must consider the contacts between the occurrence and the two competing states in conjunction with the relevant state interests. Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 801-03, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
In the present case, the court must first examine what contacts each of the two states has with the occurrence. The contacts the court should consider include "(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue." 1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 145(2). "[I]t is the significance, and not the number, of § 145(2) contacts that determines the outcome of the choice of law inquiry under the Restatement approach." O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 652-53.
Maine has more significant contacts to this case. On the one hand, the place of the injury and the conduct causing the injury, the driver's loss of control of the vehicle, occurred in Connecticut. On the other hand, because the plaintiffs are suing the rental car companies on a vicarious liability theory, the conduct causing the injury is not as important as the relationship between the driver and the lessors. The evidence shows that the parties entered into the rental agreement in Portland, Maine; the rental companies provided the vehicle to Donald Boclair at the Portland office and contractually required the car to be returned to that same location; Donald Boclair rented the car for a trip from Maine to Florida; with a planned stop in North Carolina, then back to Maine; he planned no stops in Connecticut until the accident on Interstate 84; and, lastly, all the plaintiffs and Donald Boclair were residents of Maine on the date of the accident. In addition, although Brac is a Delaware corporation with offices nationwide, only the Maine office is relevant in this analysis, since the parties rented the car from that office.
Next, the court must examine the relevant state interests. In the absence of constitutional restrictions or a statutory directive, the court should consider the following factors: "(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability arid uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied." 1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 6.
As to the first factor, a lawsuit concerning an automobile accident does not implicate the needs of the interstate and international systems. See Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 359, 373 n. 16, 641 A.2d 783 (1994) (finding automobile accident in New York involving Connecticut driver not to implicate interstate and international systems).
The second factor looks at the policies of the forum state, i.e., Connecticut. "Connecticut has a strong interest in assuring that the [plaintiffs] may avail [themselves] of the full scope of remedies for tortious conduct that Connecticut law affords." O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 657. Nevertheless, Connecticut has applied another state's law even where Connecticut law would provide greater recovery for the injured person, where the other state did provide some recovery. Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra, 229 Conn. 375 (applying New York law to automotive accident where accident occurred in New York between Connecticut resident plaintiff and nonresident defendant, where plaintiff received recovery to defendant's insurance maximum limits that were lower than plaintiff's uninsured motorist policy limits). If Maine law applied, the plaintiffs could still seek recovery against Donald Boclair. See, e.g., Downing v. Jameson, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV96 0323910 (November 13, 1998, Radcliffe, J.) ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 358) (applying Connecticut law to automobile accident in England involving Connecticut driver because English law provided no remedy to injured plaintiff).
The third factor for the court to consider is the policies of the other interested state. Maine places the burden of highway safety on the operators, not the owners, of motor vehicles. "The general rule in Maine and elsewhere is that an owner of a vehicle is not liable for the torts of vehicle operators who are not employees or agents." Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 838 A.2d 1157, 1159 (Me. 2003). The Maine statute that grants a cause of action against rental car companies is a limited exception to that general policy. Id.
The fourth factor, the protection of justified expectations, weighs in favor of applying Maine law. A rental car company that does business in Maine expects Maine law to govern its business. See Cruz v. Teto, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV 02 0079025 (April 4, 2003, Lager, J.) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 414, 415) ("Generally, a rental company has an interest in the predictability that the law of the state in which its vehicle was registered and rented will apply in the event of an accident").
Regarding the fifth factor, in the field of law related to motor vehicle liability, the plaintiffs argue that underlying all motor vehicle law is the policy of ensuring a full and fair recovery for the injured persons. The plaintiffs assert that Connecticut law requires all drivers to carry insurance coverage, even nonresident drivers. See General Statutes §§ 14-112(a), 38a-334(a), 38a-371(a). Requiring insurance coverage, however, does not conflict with an exemption to this one type of suit between passengers and rental car companies. Maine law also mandates that car rental companies maintain insurance for their operators' acts 29-A M.R.S.A. § 1611. The requirement of insurance does not conflict with the passenger exception to liability. See Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, supra, 838 A.2d 1161. Similarly, applying Maine law in this case will not violate Connecticut's policy mandating insurance for all drivers on Connecticut roads.
In Connecticut, § 14-154a is intended to impose liability on its rental car groups. "[T]he purpose of [§ 14-154a] was not primarily to give the injured person a right of recovery against the tortious operator of the car, but to protect the safety of traffic upon highways by providing an incentive to him who rented motor vehicles to rent them to competent and careful operators by making him liable for damage resulting from the tortious operation of the rented vehicles." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fojtik v. Hunter, 265 Conn. 385, 391-92, 828 A.2d 589 (2003). This policy does not apply where the rental car company conducted the relevant business transaction outside Connecticut. Connecticut law does not give incentive to Maine rental car companies, nor is it intended to do so.
The sixth factor listed in § 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws is predictability in the law and uniformity of results. Other superior court decisions have weighed the parties' domiciles more heavily than the place of injury when determining the appropriate law to apply. Chang v. Chang, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 04 0198722 (December 10, 2004, Lewis, J.) ( 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 371, 372) ("Upon evaluating the relative importance of each factor, this state has the greater contact with the parties in this case because of the domiciliary of the plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasor and also because their relationship is centered in this state"); Aponte v. Baez, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 00 0802893 (January 30, 2002, Wagner, J.T.R.) ( 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 329, 330) ("Applying the Restatement approach, Connecticut has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties . . . The operator of the vehicle is a Connecticut resident; the relationship between the parties arose in Connecticut; and the vehicle was rented to [the operator] in Connecticut." (Citations omitted); Ficarra v. Akers, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 97 0345685 (August 30, 1999, Nadeau, J.) ( 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 336, 337) ("Although the injury and the conduct causing [the accident] occurred in Virginia . . . that is an entirely fortuitous happening . . . Here, the plaintiffs and the defendant . . . are domiciliaries of Connecticut." (Citations omitted). To be consistent with these prior decisions, the court should apply Maine law to the facts of the present case.
As to the final factor, while it is generally easier for a Connecticut court to apply Connecticut law, the Maine statute at issue is also easy to apply. The Maine statute bars an action brought by a passenger against a rental car company. See Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, supra, 838 A.2d 1157. In the present context, Maine law would require this court to grant judgment in favor of Brac and Cendant. The court finds the Maine statute easy to apply in the present case.
An analysis of these seven factors leads to the conclusion that Maine has a more significant interest in having its law applied to the present case than Connecticut. As a result, the court will apply Maine law. Since it denies a right of action for a passenger injured in a rented car to sue the rental car company; 29-A M.R.S.A. § 1652(3); the plaintiffs in this case may not sue Brac and Cendant. The court, therefore, grants their motion for summary judgment.