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finding the defendant was not deliberately indifferent where the plaintiff filed grievances following his fall in the shower and the "responses to these grievances reveal that after plaintiff's fall, the cleaning procedures were modified, strips were welded over the sharp edges of the metal plates to address the cut hazard, and a plan was implemented to address the shower shoe issue"
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No. 09-35444.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, and we therefore deny Townsel's request for oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Filed March 5, 2010.
Eric R. Townsel, Walla Walla, WA, pro se.
Sara Olson, Assistant Attorney General, AGWA-Office of the Washington Attorney General, Olympia, WA, Stephen L. Henley, Sr., Esquire, Law Offices of Stephen L. Henley, Sr., P.S., Ltd., Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00482-JLR.
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Washington state prisoner Eric R. Townsel appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison officials failed to maintain safe conditions in the shower area and were deliberately indifferent to his resulting medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.
The district court properly determined that the allegations in Townsel's complaint failed to demonstrate that prison officials' conduct in maintaining the prison shower area violated the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (requiring a successful Eighth Amendment claim based on inhumane conditions of confinement to show that prison officials knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable measures to avoid the harm); Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that allegations describing slippery prison floors, without more, "do not state even an arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment"), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile).
The district court properly dismissed Townsel's due process claim that he was entitled to a custody and classification hearing prior to his transfer because he failed to allege that his transfer imposed an atypical and significant hardship upon him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Munk because Townsel failed to raise a triable issue as to whether Munk was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, or a difference in opinion between the inmate and prison medical staff over proper medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference).
Townsel's pending motions are denied.