Opinion
No. 75.
Argued May 2, 2006.
Decided June 6, 2006.
APPEAL, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, entered August 1, 2005. The Appellate Division (1) reversed, on the law and the facts, a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (W. Denis Donovan, J.), which had declared that the defendant's use of the subject property complied with the OB-CE zoning regulations of the Town of Mount Pleasant, that the defendant's use of the property was not that of a private college, and that the plaintiffs interpretation, implementation and/or enforcement of the zoning regulations violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000; dismissed the complaint; and awarded the defendant legal fees in the action pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 in an amount to be determined; and (2) declared that the defendant's use of the subject property, in part, as a private college did not comply with the zoning provisions of the Town of Mount Pleasant Code, that the defendant's use of the property was, in part, that of a private college requiring an application for a special permit, and that the plaintiffs interpretation of the zoning provisions of the Town of Mount Pleasant Code did not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.
Town of Mount Pleasant v Legion of Christ, Inc., 21 AD3d 368, modified.
Shamberg Marwell Davis Hollis, P.C., Mount Kisco ( P. Daniel Hollis, III, John S. Marwell and Diana Bunin of counsel), and Bleakley Platt Schmidt, LLP, White Plains ( Hugh D. Fyfe of counsel), for appellant. I. The Legion of Christ, Inc.'s use of the Legion II parcel is permitted "as of right" and fully complies with zoning. ( Federated Conservationists of Westchester County v County of Westchester, 304 AD2d 787; Ebenezer Mar Thoma Church v Alexander, 279 AD2d 548; Matter of Toys "R" Us v Silva, 89 NY2d 411; Matter of Allen v Adami, 39 NY2d 275; United States v Harriss, 347 US 612; People v Goodman, 31 NY2d 262; People v First Meridian Planning Corp., 86 NY2d 608; Trustees of Union Coll. in Town of Schenectady in State of N.Y. v Members of Schenectady City Council, 91 NY2d 161; Matter of Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 NY2d 508; Cornell Univ. v Bagnardi, 68 NY2d 583.) II. The Town of Mount Pleasant's unequal treatment of the Legion of Christ, Inc. and International Business Machines Corporation violates both state and federal law. ( Matter of St. Onge v Donovan, 71 NY2d 507; Matter of Dexter v Town Bd. of Town of Gates, 36 NY2d 102; Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v City of Mount Vernon, 307 NY 493; Matter of Yeshiva Mesivta Toras Chaim v Rose, 136 AD2d 710; Bright Horizon House v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Henrietta, 121 Misc 2d 703; Matter of Apostolic Holiness Church v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Babylon, 220 AD2d 740; Matter of PACER, Inc. v Planning Bd. of City of Middletown, 217 AD2d 47, 87 NY2d 810; Matter of Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 NY2d 508; Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v Town of Surf side, 366 F3d 1214; Konikov v Orange County, Fla., 410 F3d 1317.) III. The Appellate Division engaged in proscribed judicial legislation when it improperly created a new special permit use in the OB-CE zoning district. ( Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185; Matter of Anonymous, 40 NY2d 96; Bright Homes v Wright, 8 NY2d 157; Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539; Berenson v Town of New Castle, 38 NY2d 102; Matter of Retail Prop. Trust v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 NY2d 190; Matter of North Shore Steak House v Board of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Thomaston, 30 NY2d 238; Rodgers v Village of Tarrytown, 302 NY 115; Udell v Haas, 21 NY2d 463; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 71 NY2d 186.)
Thacher Proffitt Wood LLP, White Plains ( Kevin J. Plunkett, Lino J. Sciarretta and Stefanie A. Bashar of counsel), for respondent. I. The record demonstrates that the Legion of Christ, Inc. is using the property as a seminary or a private college, which is not a permitted use without a special permit. ( Four Winds Assoc. v Rachlin, 248 AD2d 352; Matter of Wilson v McGlinchey, 2 NY3d 375; Matter of Hime Y, 54 NY2d 282; Matter of Toys "R" Us v Silva, 89 NY2d 411; Matter of Allen v Adami, 39 NY2d 275; Warm v State of New York, 308 AD2d 534, 2 NY3d 703; Kiett v New York City Hous. Auth., 255 AD2d 422; BGW Dev. Corp. v Mount Kisco Lodge No. 1552 of Benevolent Protective Order of Elks of U.S. of Am., 247 AD2d 565; People v First Meridian Planning Corp., 86 NY2d 608; Trustees of Union Coll. in Town of Schenectady in State of N.Y. v Members of Schenectady City Council, 91 NY2d 161.) II. The Town of Mount Pleasant is regulating the use, not the user, of the property. ( McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, 66 NY2d 544; Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365; Matter of St. Onge v Donovan, 71 NY2d 507; Matter of Dexter v Town Bd. of Town of Gates, 36 NY2d 102; Matter of PACER, Inc. v Planning Bd. of City of Middletown, 217 AD2d 47.) III. The Appellate Division should be affirmed with respect to its finding that the Town of Mount Pleasant has not violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. ( Flanagan v Prudential-Bache Sec, 67 NY2d 500; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474; Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398; Hill v Colorado, 530 US 703; Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v Smith, 494 US 872; Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693; City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507; Elsinore Christian Ctr. v City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F Supp 2d 1083; Westchester Day School v Village of Mamaroneck, 386 F3d 183; Mayweathers v Terhune, 328 F Supp 2d 1086.) IV. The Appellate Division's interpretation of the Town of Mount Pleasant zoning code was rational and does not constitute improper "judicial legislation." ( Matter of Baker v Town of Islip Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 20 AD3d 522; Matter of Tartan Oil Corp. v Bohrer, 249 AD2d 481; Shroid Constr. v Dattoma, 250 AD2d 590.) V The Town of Mount Pleasant was denied a fair trial. ( 12-16 Arden Assoc. v Vasquez, 168 Misc 2d 475; People v Diaz, 130 Misc 2d 1024; Rudnik v Norwich Pharmacol Co., 34 AD2d 912.)
Robert L. Greene, Washington, DC, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., and Derek L. Gaubatz for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, amicus curiae. I. Because sections 2 (a) and 2 (b) of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ( 42 USC § 2000cc) operate independently, strict scrutiny analysis is misplaced under section 2 (b). ( Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v Hialeah, 508 US 520; Epperson v Arkansas, 393 US 97; New Orleans v Dukes, 421 US 297; Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v Town of Surfside, 366 F3d 1214; Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v Garrett, 531 US 356; Varner v Illinois State Univ., 226 F3d 927; Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v City of Chicago, 342 F3d 752; Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware County v Township of Middletown, 204 F Supp 2d 857; Konikov v Orange County, Fla., 410 F3d 1317.) II. Recent decisions confirm the Legion of Christ, Inc.'s position on substantial burden and strict scrutiny. ( Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v City of Chicago, 342 F3d 752; Sts. Constantine Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v City of New Berlin, 396 F3d 895; Living Water Church of God v Charter Twp. of Meridian, 384 F Supp 2d 1123.)
Before: Chief Judge KAYE and Judges G.B. SMITH, CIPARICK, ROSENBLATT, GRAFFEO and READ concur.
OPINION OF THE COURT
The Town of Mount Pleasant Code allows the use of a parcel of land for "[c]onference and training facilities." When this zoning was adopted the property was owned by International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), which used it to train its own employees, and rented it to others who made similar use of it. IBM sold the property to defendant, Legion of Christ, Inc. (the Legion), an order of the Roman Catholic Church, which uses the property for the training of future priests and for other religious education. Apart from the subject matter taught, the chief difference between IBM's use and the Legion's is that many of the people now being taught are in long-term programs and thus live on the property for a year or two. We hold that, despite this difference, the property is still being used for conference and training purposes within the meaning of the Town Code, and the Legion's use is therefore permitted as of right.
Facts and Procedural History
IBM acquired the 97-acre property sometime before 1983, when the Town created a new "Office Corporate Education" or "OB-CE" zoning district, coextensive with the property. A provision of the Town Code enacted in that year said that one of the purposes of the new district was to provide an "opportunity for private enterprise" to educate "the employees of major corporations" (Town of Mount Pleasant, Addendum to Zoning Book, June 28, 1983). IBM built a conference center on the property, which it used to train its employees.
IBM decided in the early 1990s that it wanted to rent out its conference center from time to time, and it asked for and was granted a change in the Town Code's description of the OB-CE district. A 1993 amendment eliminated the Code's reference to "private enterprise" and changed its language to refer to "the employees of major corporations and others" (see Town of Mount Pleasant Code § 218-74, as amended Feb. 9, 1993). After this zoning change, IBM rented the property to profit-making and nonprofit enterprises, including a university, a college and a church. These lessees used IBM's facility for conference and training purposes without objection from the Town.
The Town did object, however, when IBM sold the property to a tax exempt entity, the Legion, in 1996. (IBM also sold the Legion an adjacent parcel, which has been the subject of other litigation with the Town [ see Matter of Legion of Christ v Town of Mount Pleasant, 1 NY3d 406 (2004)].) Before the purchase, the Town warned the Legion that it would not be permitted to use the property at issue here for "a seminary," and after the purchase the Town began this action. The Town's complaint sought a judgment "[d]eclaring the use of the property . . . for religious purposes to be in violation of the applicable zoning," but the Town — perhaps influenced by Congress's passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ( 42 USC § 2000cc et seq. [RLUIPA]) while the action was pending — has now abandoned its claim that religious use of the property is forbidden. The Town still argues, however, that the Legion is using the property as a college or seminary, and that it may not do so without a special permit.
The Legion has referred to the facility it operates on the property as "the Seminary for Higher Studies" and as "a College of Philosophy and Theology." It has discarded these terms, however, and now describes the facility as a "conference center" or "training center." It asserts that its use of the property is not materially different from IBM's. Apart from converting two rooms into chapels, the Legion has made few physical changes in the building: it uses the same bedrooms, the same rooms for preparing and serving food, the same classrooms, even the same weight room.
Those trained on the property by the Legion include "brothers in formation" — members of the Legion who are studying philosophy as part of their lengthy preparation for the priest-hood. These men may study and live on the property for as long as two years. A brother who completes the philosophy course receives what the Legion calls an "ecclesiastical degree," though the "degrees" are not authorized by the State and are accepted at few, if any, other institutions. The Legion also offers classes of shorter duration for diocesan priests and laypeople; these programs, which could reasonably be called conferences, may be as brief as a week, or a single day. When IBM owned the property, the courses were, apparently, all short-term; the record does not show that any instructional program was longer than six weeks, though people teaching or administering such programs were there for as long as six months at a time.
Supreme Court and the Appellate Division addressed two issues: whether the Legion's use complies with the Town Code and whether the Town's interpretation of the Code to prohibit that use violates RLUIPA. Supreme Court ruled in the Legion's favor on both issues and held that the Legion was entitled to attorneys' fees; the Appellate Division reversed both rulings and denied attorneys' fees. We now hold that the Legion's use is lawful under the Town Code. We do not reach the RLUIPA issue, and we affirm the denial of attorneys' fees.
Discussion
The Town Code defines the "Permitted Principal Uses" of property in the OB-CE district as follows:
"1 . Conference and training facilities to include but not be limited to:
"a. Continuing education activities and facilities.
"b. Classroom space and teaching equipment.
"c. Offices for staff.
"2. Indoor and outdoor physical recreational facilities.
"3. Housing and dining facilities provided that such facilities are not operated as a public hotel or public restaurant as defined in § 218-74F." (Town of Mount Pleasant Code, ch 218, Schedule of Regulations, Residence Districts IIIA.)
The Legion uses the property as the Town Code specifies. It conducts brief programs that could be labeled "[c]onference[s]" and it provides "training" to its brothers in formation and others. Substantially all of its activities consist of "[c]ontinuing education," and to that end it uses "[c]lassroom space," "teaching equipment" and "[o]ffices for staff." It also uses "[i]ndoor and outdoor physical recreational facilities," and "[h]ousing and dining facilities." In short, the Town Code definition might almost have been written to describe what the Legion does on the property — and this is unsurprising, for it was written to describe what IBM did there, and the Legion does much the same thing.
The Legion provides religious training and education, while the activities of IBM and its tenants were largely secular, but the Town no longer claims that the Code forbids the Legion's use on that ground. In arguing that the Legion's use is significantly different from IBM's, the Town relies primarily on the duration of the Legion's residential programs — up to two years, in contrast to the much shorter programs run by IBM and its tenants. The Town contends that an institution offering a two-year course of study is better described as a college or seminary than as a conference and training center.
We reject the Town's argument. Nothing in the Town Code says or implies that only training programs of relatively short duration are permitted in the OB-CE district. Indeed, by specifically forbidding "hotel or public restaurant" use, the Town showed itself to be worried more about short-term than long-term visitors. We conclude that the property, as used by the Legion, is a conference and training center within the meaning of the Town Code. Whether it could also be called a college or a seminary is irrelevant.
We give a broad interpretation to the term "[c]onference and training facilities" not only because the Town Code defines the term broadly, but also because a broad reading does not injure any interest of the Town that can legitimately be protected by zoning. The longer duration of the Legion's programs appears to be completely harmless from the Town's point of view. The Town does not claim that the Legion's use of the property presents any traffic, health, safety or similar problem that was not also presented by IBM's use. Of course, there is one difference that is important to the Town — the Legion, unlike IBM, is tax exempt. But keeping property in taxpaying hands is not a legitimate purpose of zoning.
We therefore hold the Legion's use permitted under the Town Code. We do not need to, and do not, decide the RLUIPA question addressed by the courts below.
We affirm the Appellate Division's denial of attorneys' fees, which may be awarded under 42 USC § 1988 (b) to the prevailing party in an RLUIPA action. We recognize that at times, when a party asserts both state and federal claims and prevails on the former, it may be entitled either to a ruling on its federal claim for purposes of deciding the fee issue or to an award of fees even in the absence of a ruling on the federal claim ( Matter of Johnson v Blum, 58 NY2d 454, 458 n 2 [1983]). That rule does not apply here, however. When this action was brought RLUIPA had not even been enacted, and the Legion then had available to it the state-law defense that we have found dispositive. The provision of state law on which this case turns is not a state counterpart to RLUIPA, but a local zoning code. It would distort reality to hold that the Legion is the "prevailing party" in an RLUIPA case.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, with costs to the Legion, by granting judgment declaring that the Legion's use of the property is permitted as of right by the Town Code, and, as so modified, should be affirmed.
Order modified, etc.