Opinion
2000-08089
Submitted October 31, 2002.
November 25, 2002.
In an action, inter alia, to recover a brokerage commission, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Costello, J.), dated June 21, 2000, as granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Mark Mensch and Peak Fitness Development, Inc., d/b/a Southampton Sports and Rehabilitation, and the defendants Harry Grey, Alice Leydon, and Charles and Maxwell Grey Trust, which were for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action insofar as asserted against them.
Thomas W. Caulfield, East Quogue, N.Y., for appellant.
Van Nostrand Martin, Amityville, N.Y. (David S. Desmond of counsel), for respondents.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., LEO F. McGINITY, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
To recover a commission, a broker must establish that he or she is duly licensed, that he or she has a contract, express or implied, with the party charged with paying the commission, and that he or she was the procuring cause of the sale or lease (see Ormond Park Realty v. Round Hill Dev. Corp., 266 A.D.2d 523). In opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that neither the plaintiff nor its agent was the procuring cause of the lease (see Greene v. Hellman, 51 N.Y.2d 197; Brown Son Realty v. Greenberg, 195 A.D.2d 583), the plaintiff's unsupported and conclusory allegation of bad faith on the part of the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Bassim v. Howlett, 191 A.D.2d 760; Symanski v. East Ramapo Cent. School Dist., 117 A.D.2d 18; cf. Gershner v. Sisca, 253 A.D.2d 785).
SANTUCCI, J.P., McGINITY, LUCIANO and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.