Opinion
No. LLI CV 105007241S
April 29, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #114
The issue before the court is whether to grant the defendant's motion to strike count one of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff is asking the court to recognize a newly emerging ground of liability.
I FACTS
On October 15, 2010, the plaintiff, Torrington Health Rehabilitation Center (Torrington Health), filed a three-count complaint against the defendants, Robert Cisowski and his mother, Blanche Cisowski. The plaintiff alleges that Blanche Cisowski entered Torrington Health as a resident and from that time until the present, she continues to receive medical and residential services from the plaintiff. Count one alleges breach of contract against both defendants. Counts two and three, alleging quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, are directed solely at Blanche Cisowski.
According to the plaintiff, on June 25, 2009, Blanche Cisowski entered into a contract through her son, Robert Cisowski, wherein the plaintiff would provide general nursing home care and Blanche Cisowski would pay for the services on demand. The plaintiff further alleges that on June 25, 2009, Robert Cisowski signed a resident admission agreement (agreement) as the responsible party for his mother. Pursuant to this agreement, Robert Cisowski agreed to apply to establish and maintain eligibility for medicaid assistance for his mother, including but not limited to taking any and all necessary action to ensure that his mother's assets were appropriately reduced to, and remained within, the allowable limits for medicaid assistance. The plaintiff also alleges that Robert Cisowski, as the responsible party, agreed that if he received a transfer of assets from his mother that resulted in her ineligibility for medicaid that the assets or an equal amount of Robert Cisowski's funds would be used to pay for the costs and care of the services rendered to Blanche Cisowski by the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, on August 1, 2009, Blanche Cisowski was granted certain medicaid benefits but a penalty period was established, from August 1, 2009, through January 11, 2011, due to the transfer of assets from Blanche Cisowski to Robert Cisowski. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants have failed to make payment in the amount of $119,747.97.
On February 2, 2011, Robert Cisowski filed the present motion to strike count one of the complaint, as to himself only, on the ground that the plaintiff is asking the court to recognize a newly emerging ground of liability in which the mere relationship of child to parent grants legal authority to the child to enter into a written contract binding on the parent. According to Robert Cisowski, the complaint fails to allege that Blanche Cisowski signed an agreement with the plaintiff for services and therefore, without such an agreement, Robert Cisowski cannot be held liable as the responsible party. On February 15, 2011, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike arguing that a valid contract was formed with Robert Cisowski and that there is no requirement that a third-party beneficiary sign the contract for it to be enforceable.
The matter was heard on the April 4, 2011 short calendar.
II DISCUSSION A Motion to Strike Standard
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[The court takes] the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252-53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).
"A motion to strike is the proper procedural vehicle . . . to test whether Connecticut is ready to recognize some newly emerging ground of liability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Golden v. Hamer, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 08 5008396 (August 25, 2009, Pavia, J.).
B Analysis
Robert Cisowski moves to strike count one of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff is asking the court to recognize a newly emerging ground of liability in which the mere relationship of child to parent grants legal authority to the child to enter into a written contract binding on the parent. Specifically, Robert Cisowski argues that the complaint fails to allege that Blanche Cisowski signed an agreement with the plaintiff for services and therefore, without such an agreement, Robert Cisowski cannot be held liable as the responsible party. According to Robert Cisowski, in order for the agreement to have been duly executed and to be enforceable, the signature of the real party to the agreement, i.e. his mother, is necessary. Robert Cisowski contends that his signature, alone, on the agreement as the responsible party is insufficient because he had no authority to enter into the agreement on behalf of his mother. Robert Cisowski further argues that the plaintiff failed to attach the agreement to the complaint to clarify in what capacity Robert Cisowski signed a binding agreement on behalf of his mother. Robert Cisowski provides no case law or legal analysis, however, in support of his position.
The plaintiff objects arguing that it has alleged that a valid contract was formed. Specifically, the complaint alleges that there was (1) an offer made by the plaintiff to care for Robert Cisowski's mother; (2) acceptance in that Robert Cisowski placed his mother in the care of the plaintiff and signed the agreement as the responsible party; and (3) consideration in that the plaintiff would care for Blanche Cisowski and Robert Cisowski agreed, as the responsible party, to undertake certain obligations. According to the plaintiff, Robert Cisowski is attempting to place another element into those needed to form a valid contract — namely that a third-party beneficiary, Blanche Cisowski, must also have signed the agreement for it to be enforceable. The plaintiff contends that this is not a requirement for the formation of a binding contract. Moreover, the plaintiff also argues that the complaint alleges the remaining elements of a breach of contract claim: performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant and damages.
"The elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn.App. 550, 558, 979 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 274 (2009). "When a plaintiff pleads a cause of action for breach of contract by setting forth a specific contractual obligation and alleges that it has not been met, this is sufficient to sustain a motion to strike. It is not necessary to allege specific terms of the contract . . . Whether the terms of the contract support that allegation is a factual question to be determined by the fact finder . . ." Katcher v. 3V Capital Partners, LP, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. X05 CV 08 5008383 (February 1, 2011, Blawie, J.). "If a complaint contains the necessary elements of a cause of action, it will survive a motion to strike." Malizia v. Anderson, 42 Conn.Sup. 114, 116, 602 A.2d 1076 (1991) ( 5 Conn. L. Rptr 55).
In the present case, the complaint alleges the formation of a valid contract between the plaintiff and Robert Cisowski: (1) an offer made by the plaintiff to care for Blanche Cisowski; (2) acceptance of the offer as demonstrated by Robert Cisowski's signature of the agreement as the responsible party and his placement of Blanche Cisowski in the plaintiff's care; and (3) consideration demonstrated by the plaintiff's promise to care for Blanche Cisowski in exchange for Robert Cisowski's promise, as the responsible party, to undertake certain obligations. The complaint also alleges that the plaintiff performed under the agreement, that Robert Cisowski breached the agreement, and that the plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of this breach.
The court is "not required to review issues that have been improperly presented . . . through an inadequate brief . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Matthew S., 60 Conn.App. 127, 133, 758 A.2d 459 (2000); see Hogan v. Department of Children Families, 290 Conn. 545, 578, 964 A.2d 1213 (2009). Robert Cisowski provides no case law or legal analysis in support of his motion to strike.
Accordingly, count one of the complaint contains the necessary elements of a cause of action for breach of contract and therefore the motion to strike is denied.