Opinion
CV176068899S
04-10-2019
Alfredo TORRES v. Pedro PUJOLS
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Sybil V. Richards, Judge
This matter arises from the defendant’s filing of a motion to enforce an oral settlement agreement that was purportedly reached by the plaintiff, Alfredo Torres and the defendant, Pedro Pujols, in connection with a slip and fall lawsuit that the plaintiff filed against the defendant. On January 11, 2019, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the court heard testimony from the plaintiff and admitted exhibits into evidence. For contextual clarity, the court will begin by providing a brief description of the relevant factual and procedural history of the case. On March 13, 2017, the plaintiff initiated this action by filing a writ, summons and complaint alleging, inter alia, that he slipped and fell while walking down a handicap access ramp at the defendant’s premises due to an accumulation of snow and ice. The defendant responded on February 15, 2018 by filing an answer and special defenses in which he denied liability for the plaintiff’s alleged injuries and damages and asserted that the plaintiff himself was negligent and that if any defective condition existed on said premises, it was open and notorious. In his motion to enforce the settlement agreement, the defendant argues that the parties reached the terms of a settlement agreement in the amount of $ 13, 000 on July 12, 2018 and that the plaintiff has refused to honor it by failing to execute a written release and settlement agreement that was drafted by counsel for the defendant. In his claims for relief, the defendant avers that the settlement terms are clear and unambiguous and, as such, should be enforced by the court in accordance with the seminal case of Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 626 A.2d 729 (1993).
General Principles of Law
I. Bench Trials— Court as the Trier of Facts
"The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005).
It is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony ... It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981). "[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testimony." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977). "The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party." Smith v. Smith, supra, 183 Conn. at 123. "That determination of credibility is a function of the trial court." Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, 61 Conn.App. 329, 333, 763 A.2d 199 (2001).
"[T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible ... It is the trier’s exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses ... The trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness ... The trier can, as well, decide what— at all, none, or some— of a witness’ testimony to accept or reject." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osborn, 41 Conn.App. 287, 291, 676 A.2d 399 (1996).
The trial court’s function as the fact finder "is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 508 A.2d 769 (1986).
II. Settlement Agreements
"A trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous." Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811, 626 A.2d 729 (1993). Consequently, "a trial court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement within the framework of the original lawsuit as a matter of law when the parties do not dispute the terms of the agreement." Id., at 812. "[T]he court’s authority in such a circumstance is limited to enforcing the undisputed terms of the settlement agreement that are clearly and unambiguously before it, and the court has no discretion to impose terms that conflict with the agreement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waldman v. Beck, 101 Conn.App. 669, 673-74, 922 A.2d 340 (2007), citing Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1986) ("In determining the details of relief, the judge may not award whatever relief would have been appropriate after an adjudication on the merits, but only those precise forms of relief that are either agreed to by the parties ... or fairly implied by their agreement ...").
Oral settlement agreements entered into in contemplation of avoiding a trial are enforceable as a matter of law. Sicaras v. Hartford, 44 Conn.App. 771, 778, 692 A.2d 1290, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 916, 696 A.2d 340 (1997) (noting that "[p]arties are bound to the terms of a contract even though it is not signed if their assent is otherwise indicated"). Nor is there a requirement that agreements be placed on the record before they can be enforced. See, e.g., Customers Bank v. Aryeh, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-12-6008983-S (November 13, 2013, Shaban, J.); White v. Branchini, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-95-0377336-S (March 1, 1996, Licari, J.) (16 Conn.L.Rptr. 264, 265); Montgomery v. Smith, 40 Conn.Supp. 358, 359-61 (1985). The fact that a party disputes some or all of the terms of the purported agreement does not, as a matter of law, prevent the court from enforcing it provided that the court is satisfied that, at the time of the alleged agreement, the parties gave their consent to terms that were clear and unambiguous. "[T]he test of disputation ... must be applied to the parties at the time they entered into the alleged settlement ... Whether the parties in fact concluded a settlement agreement is determined by the intention of the parties manifested by their words and acts ... In determining whether to enforce a settlement agreement, the intention of the parties is controlling and is the key consideration." (Citations omitted; internal citations omitted.) Customers Bank v. Aryeh, supra, citing DAP Financial Management Co. v. Mor-Fam Electric, Inc., 59 Conn.App. 92, 96-97, 755 A.2d 925 (2000); see also Nanni v. Dino Corp., 117 Conn.App. 61, 66, 978 A.2d 531 (2009) ("[A] determination of what the parties intended to encompass in their oral agreement is a question of the intention of the parties and an inference of fact").
Discussion
The court’s articulation of additional findings of fact is a prerequisite to the court’s disposition of the instant motion. It is undisputed by the parties that they reached an oral agreement to settle the underlying action in the amount of $ 13, 000 on July 12, 2018. The court notes that this understanding is confirmed by the evidence in the record. According to the court’s examination of the full exhibits, the court observed an email communication between the defendant’s counsel and the plaintiff’s then-attorney of record confirming the plaintiff’s acceptance of the offer to compromise for said amount on said date. There are also email exchanges that indicate that the attorneys for the parties planned to reduce the oral agreement to writing by having their respective clients execute a written release and settlement agreement. Both counsel further intended to work cooperatively to draft acceptable Medicaid lien language, a no liability clause and a so-called standard confidentiality clause. Several days later, the evidentiary record, however, shows that the plaintiff expressed a "change of heart" about the amount of the settlement because he claimed that was still experiencing pain associated with his injuries. At the hearing, the plaintiff testified that he also had regrets about the $ 13, 000 settlement because it would have only netted him $ 110 in his pocket after disbursements were deducted for litigation fees and expenses.
Applying the rules of law cited above to the facts found by the court, the court reaches the following conclusions. On July 12, 2018, the parties entered into an oral agreement to settle the present action for $ 13, 000. The oral agreement was clear and unambiguous when the parties came to that final understanding on said date. The parties intended that the terms and conditions of said oral agreement would be binding. On that date, the parties manifested their intent to settle the case through their words and actions as expressed through their respective attorneys. Although said attorneys anticipated that they were going to subsequently memorialize the oral agreement by having their clients sign a written agreement, the court further concludes that the unexecuted written release and settlement agreement was unnecessary to bind the parties to the oral agreement on the ground that their mutual consent of all of the elements of the settlement agreement was obviously manifested on July 12, 2018.
Conclusion
For the reasons cited above, the court grants the defendant’s motion to enforce the oral settlement agreement.