Opinion
No. 01 Civ. 4351 (RWS).
September 20, 2001
DARCY MATEO TORRES Plaintiff Pro Se 235 Elizabeth Street, #12 New York, N Y 10012.
HONORABLE ELIOT SPITZER Attorney General of the State of New York Attorney for Defendant Family Court 120 Broadway New York, N Y 10271-0332, By: CAROLYN CAIRNS OLSON, Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel.
HONORABLE MICHAEL D. HESS Corporation Counsel of the City of New York Attorney for Administration for Children's Services 100 Church Street New York, N Y 10007 By: JEFFREY S. DANTOWITZ, Assistant Corporation CounselOf Counsel.
ROSIN REINIGER Attorney for The Children's Village 630 Third Avenue, 15th Floor New York, N Y 10017 By: DOUGLAS H. REINIGER, ESQ. Of Counsel.
OPINION
This action was brought plaintiff pro se, Darcy Torres ("Torres"), by order to show cause, seeking the return of her child Christopher Ray Mateo to her custody, on numerous grounds. On May 24, 2001, the Family Court of the State of New York ("Family Court") and the Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"), responded, and by cross-motion sought dismissal of Torres' claims. For the reasons stated, Torres' complaint is dismissed, and her request for injunctive relief is denied.
Parties and Prior Proceedings
Torres is the natural mother of Christopher Ray Mateo. Christopher was removed from Torres' home by ACS in May 1997. ACS commenced child neglect proceedings against Torres pursuant to N Y Family Court Act, Article 10, in the Family Court which, by order dated May 16, 1997, placed Christopher in ACS's custody. On April 2, 1998, ACS transferred Christopher's placement to Children's Village, a foster care agency. At the conclusion of the neglect proceedings, the Family Court rendered its final decision and order dated July 7, 1998, finding that Torres had neglected Christopher and ordering that he remain in foster care.
In 1999, Children's Village petitioned the Family Court pursuant to N.Y. Social Services Law § 384-b for an order terminating Torres' parental rights that would free Christopher for adoption. Hearings were held over several days, at which Torres appeared with counsel and testified on her own behalf. By decision and order dated February 26, 2001, the Family Court (Larabee, J.) concluded that Christopher was a "permanently neglected child" within the meaning of state law and terminated Torres' parental rights.
This lawsuit followed. Torres filed a complaint with the pro se office on May 21, 2001, together with her affirmation, sworn to on May 17, 2001, in support of a motion for a preliminary injunction and seeking an order immediately returning Christopher to her custody. She also seeks monetary damages. The motions were heard and deemed fully submitted on June 6, 2001.
The Complaint is Dismissed
Torres' complaint is entitled to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 13.5.519, 520-521 (1972) (per curiam) Thus, her complaint is construed as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a ("CAPTA").
Federal courts do not generally have jurisdiction over domestic relations matters. This exception to federal jurisdiction is based on "the policy consideration that the states have traditionally adjudicated marital and child custody disputes and therefore have developed competence and expertise in adjudicating such matters, which the federal courts lack." Thomas v. New York City, 814 F. Supp. 1139, 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Torres' claims against ACS and the Family Court fall within the ambit of cases excluded by Ankenbradt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), because the gravamen of her claim involves child custody — an area at the core of the domestic relations exception. See Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1982); Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 565 (5th Cir. 1981); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1024 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Hernandez v. United States Family Court of Bronx County, No. 96 Civ. 0035 (HB), 1996 WL 529044, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1996) ("The state courts have always had an important interest in adjudicating family court matters. In contrast, the federal courts have no power to grant custody or interfere with the legitimate interest of the state in overseeing its domestic relations concerns."), aff'd, 107 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1997).
Although the domestic relations exception itself is narrow, see Williams v. Larnbert, 46 F.3d 1275, 1283-84 (2d Cir. 1995), it applies generally to issues relating to the custody of minors. See Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967). District courts in this circuit have held that the exception includes civil rights actions directed at challenging the results of domestic relations proceedings.See MacArthur v. Bell, 788 F. Supp. 706, 708-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Neustein v. Orbach, 732 F. Supp. 333, 339-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Wisenfeld v. State of New York, 474 F. Supp. 1141, 1145-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lhotan v. D'Elia, 415 F. Supp. 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see also George V. Letren, No. 97 Civ. 5991 (DAB), 1998 WL 684857, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998). Though Torres' claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Court will not intervene in ongoing state proceedings.
To the extent Torres seeks either review of previous state judicial proceedings or to compel state action, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. The Supreme Court held in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-486 (1983) (the "Rooker-Feldman doctrine"), that a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings, except for general constitutional challenges and reviews pursuant to a an application for a writ of habeas corpus. See also Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1988) (federal courts have no general power to interfere in state court proceedings or to compel action by state officials); Smith v. O'Connor, 901 F. Supp. 644, 647-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[an] individual's right to have the relevant state laws strictly obeyed is not a federal right protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1871 or the Constitution of the United States'") (quoting Taylor v. Nichols, 409 F. Supp. 927, 933 (D.Kan. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1977)).
The prohibition on district court review of state court judgments extends to cases that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court's determinations. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, n. 6. A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if the "federal district court would necessarily have to determine that the state court erred in order to find that the federal claims have merit." Khal Charidim Joel v. Village of Kiryas Joel, 935 F. Supp. 450, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)) (other citations omitted).
In Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Administration, 95 F.3d 195 (1996), the Second Circuit explained "that the Supreme Court's use of `inextricably intertwined' means, at a minimum, that where a federal plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding, subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion. Moccio, 95 F.3d at 199-200. Here, Torres' claims that her child was subject to physical abuse at The Children's Village were previously submitted to and rejected by the Family Court in continuing The Children's Village's custody and guardianship of the child.
In Rivers V. McCleod, et al., No. 00-345 (2d Cir. May 15, 2001), a § 1983 claim for denial of appropriate medical care was found not to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The stated rationale was that the claim would not have been barred under principles of preclusion since the issue was not litigated in the Family Court proceeding. Rivers, No. 00-345 (2d Cir. May 15, 2001) at 3476. Unlike that case, Torres' claim of physical abuse arises from the same set of facts that formed the basis for the Family Court proceedings. See Yonkers Contracting Co. v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 375, 380 (1999) (stating that res judicata bars claims arising out of the same transaction).
Thus, although brought as a due process claim, Torres seeks to overturn the order of the Family Court of February 26, 2001 which permanently terminated her custody and guardianship rights of her child and transferred them to The Children's Village and the Commissioner of Social Services in the City of New York pending the child's adoption. To do so, would constitute a review of the determination made by the Family Court. This is precisely what Rooker-Feldman proscribes. As Torres had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the Family Court proceeding the very issues now raised here, this Court lacks jurisdiction over her § 1983 action. Moccio, 95 F.3d at 200-202.
To the extent that Torres is claiming denial of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, she alleges no facts which would support a substantive due process claim for violations of any right to family integrity, Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 676-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997), or a procedural due process claim. Id. at 677-80; Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 49 F. Supp.2d 186, 203 (S.D.N Y 1999). Here, Torres' claim of a constitutional violation fails to transform her custody dispute into a proper federal case. See Anderson v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 1, 5 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)). Additionally, Torres cannot establish that she did not have any adequate pre- or post-deprivation remedies. Rather, these remedies were available to her in the procedures allowing her to commence proceedings in state court and to appeal decisions of the Family Court. Where plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy, she is barred from maintaining a claim for violation of due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the existence of such a remedy provides the process that is due. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
Torres cannot maintain a cause of action under CAPTA either. CAPTA governs federal grants to states for child abuse and neglect prevention and treatment programs. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) requires a state, as a precondition of federal funding, to initiate a prompt investigation into all reports of abuse or neglect and to take immediate steps to protect children whom the state believes to have suffered or are at risk of suffering abuse or neglect. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(3) requires a state to have effective administrative procedures, personnel, training procedures, facilities and related programs and services "to ensure that the State will deal effectively with child abuse and neglect cases" in order to be eligible for federal funds.
Courts have differed on the question of whether CAPTA creates a private right of action to enforce those statutes. See Marisol A. by Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (aff'd, 126 F.3d 321) (collecting cases and concluding that a private right of action exists, rejecting the argument that the discretionary nature of the regulation renders CAPTA too vague for courts to enforce). The question need not be resolved here since Torres' complaint, read liberally, does not allege facts sufficient to maintain a cause of action under CAPTA.
In her complaint, Torres alleges numerous injuries to Christopher, which have occurred while he has been in the custody of ACS and in the care of The Children's Village. All of these incidents relate to alleged injuries inflicted by other children at The Children's Village. Even when liberally construed under Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Torres' complaint cannot reasonably be interpreted as alleging facts sufficient to demonstrate that the injuries to Christopher were caused by a municipal policy or custom. Moreover, these allegations were addressed and considered by the Family Court. Judge Rhoda J. Cohen found Torres' allegations of mistreatment of Christopher by the Children's Village unsubstantiated. Neither can the complaint be reasonably interpreted as alleging that ACS or The Children's Village failed to initiate a prompt investigation into all reports of abuse or neglect and to take immediate steps to protect children whom the state believes to have suffered or are at risk of suffering abuse or neglect pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2), or failed to have effective administrative procedures, personnel, training procedures, facilities and related programs and services "to ensure that the State will deal effectively with child abuse and neglect cases" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(3)
Conclusion
Thus, according this pro se complaint the close and sympathetic reading to which it is entitled, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam), no valid cause of action can be made and the complaint is therefore dismissed. Likewise, Torres' request for injunctive relief is denied.
It is so ordered.