Opinion
7:00-CV-071-R.
November 26, 2001.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
ON THIS DATE, came on to be considered the papers and pleadings filed in this action, and the Court finds and orders as follows:
This is a complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate currently confined in the Beto I Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Tennessee Colony, Texas. Plaintiff claims that he was denied proper medical care while confined as an inmate in the James V. Allred Unit. Torres is diabetic and claims that health care personnel at the Allred Unit stopped checking his blood sugar level on a regular basis. Complaint ¶ IV; Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 4. Thereafter, he suffered a stroke and was taken to the Wichita Falls General Hospital. Complaint ¶ IV; Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 1. He claims that hospital personnel wanted him to remain hospitalized but that Allred Unit officials would not allow it. Id. He was returned to the Allred Unit's medical clinic where he stayed for about 25 days before he was transferred to the Montford Unit for further treatment Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 2. Plaintiff now seeks monetary damages from the director of the Allred Unit medical department. Complaint ¶¶ III.B V.
In order to state a colorable claim for the denial of medical care under the Eighth Amendment, "a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976). "Deliberate indifference" under the Eighth Amendment occurs only where a prison official subjectively knows of and disregards a substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). However, it is well established that negligent or erroneous medical treatment or judgment does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993). As long as jail medical personnel exercise professional medical judgment, their behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461-62 (1982). A disagreement over the appropriate medical treatment constitutes, at most, a possible claim of medical malpractice appropriately addressed under state law. E.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107-08, 97 S.Ct. at 293; Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to expound on the factual allegations of his complaint byway of questionnaire. See Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring further development of insufficient factual allegations before dismissal as frivolous is proper); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming use of questionnaire as useful and proper means for court to develop factual basis of pro se plaintiff's complaint). A review of Plaintiff's answers reflects that he has failed to allege facts which could state a colorable claim against the Medical Director. Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 6-8. Torres concedes that the Medical Director may have "had no knowledge" of the facts and circumstances surrounding his medical care at the Allred Unit. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 9. However, he seeks to hold the Medical Director liable for the conduct of his agents and staff. Id. at No. 8. Unfortunately, Plaintiff cannot recover under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. The Medical Director cannot be held responsible for the alleged acts or omissions of his subordinates under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); Thompkins v. Belt, 628 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987).
In a supplemental questionnaire issued by the Court, Plaintiff was asked to identify any additional individuals who may have denied him medical care at the Allred Unit. Plaintiff identified an unknown white male medical staff member, Dr. Story and Melvin Wright. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Supplemental Question No. 1. Although he was given the opportunity, Torres failed to articulate facts which would demonstrate a constitutional deprivation by any of these individuals. Id.
To state a valid claim, a civil rights plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the acts or omissions of a defendant and the resulting constitutional deprivation. Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1981). Torres has alleged no facts to show either active participation by these newly identified individuals in the actions causing the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights or affirmative adoption by these defendants of policies which were wrongful or illegal and which caused the constitutional deprivation. See Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 679 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to "establish a causal connection between an act of the supervisory official and the alleged constitutional violation."). Careful review of Plaintiff's answer to the Court's supplemental question reflects that he presents nothing more than conclusory allegations regarding the involvement of these new Defendants. He has failed to articulate facts which, if taken as true, would demonstrate that any of these Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need for medical care.
To the extent, if any, that Plaintiff's claims against any Defendant are grounded in negligence, the claims are without merit. Allegations of negligence do not present a cognizable basis for relief under the Civil Rights Act. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986) (holding that negligence is not actionable under § 1983); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986) (same). Therefore, Torres cannot prevail in this action.
Assuming, arguendo, that Torres had stated a colorable claim, he is still precluded from maintaining this action. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e mandates exhaustion of administrative remedies for inmates as a prerequisite to filing suit. Despite the fact that he seeks monetary damages, which are unavailable under the TDCJ grievance system, inmates are now required to exhaust such remedies prior to seeking relief in federal court. Booth v. Churner, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001). Plaintiff concedes that he did not seek relief through the TDCJ grievance procedure. Complaint ¶ II.F. Therefore, his complaint also is subject dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies.
A district court may dismiss claims filed by a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis if it determines that the claims are frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Claims are frivolous if they lack an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32 (1989); Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863 (1991). A claim is without an arguable basis in law if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Nietzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. The claims set forth in the case at bar have no arguable basis under federal law and shall be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.