Opinion
C. A. NC-2018-0067
09-01-2020
Ralph A. Tompkins, Jr., Trust A, Plaintiff, v. Frederick G. Buhrendorf, in his capacity as member of The Town of Little Compton Zoning Board; Mark Sawoski, in his capacity as member of The Town of Little Compton Zoning Board; Herbert A. Case, in his capacity as member of The Town of Little Compton Zoning Board; William Ryan, in his capacity as member of The Town of Little Compton Zoning Board; Franklin Pond, in his capacity as member of The Town of Little Compton Zoning Board; The Town of Little Compton; Christopher Hall and Katrinka Hall, Defendants.
For Plaintiff: S. Paul Ryan, Esq. For Defendant: Richard S. Humphrey, Esq.
For Plaintiff: S. Paul Ryan, Esq.
For Defendant: Richard S. Humphrey, Esq.
DECISION
CARNES, J.
Before this Court is Defendant Town of Little Compton Zoning Board's motion to dismiss pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in response to a claim for declaratory judgment asking this Court to hold that portions of the Little Compton Zoning Ordinance that define "street frontage" do not accord with Rhode Island Law. This Court entered a Decision on August 2, 2019, upholding the Little Compton Zoning Board of Review's (ZBR) decision. This Court further dismissed all claims against the Hall Defendants as untimely.
The Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment against the Town remains. As a result, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for lack of standing and mootness. Due to the pandemic, the parties have agreed to have the motion decided on the papers. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
I
Facts & Travel
A full recitation of the facts can be found in Ralph A. Tompkins, Jr., Trust A v. Frederick G. Buhrendorf, et al., C. A. No. NC-2018-0067 (Decision, Aug. 2, 2019). Briefly, this matter arises out of a contested Little Compton Subdivision Regulation in relation to the Little Compton Zoning Ordinance. Plaintiff appealed to the ZBR, seeking review of the building permit issued to Christopher and Katrinka Hall (the Halls) on November 7, 2017. The building permit authorized the construction of a residence and garage on the Halls' property located at 17B Rockbridge Drive, Little Compton, Rhode Island (the Property) pursuant to Subdivision Regulations 2.2.2(a). The matter came before the ZBR for a hearing on January 17, 2018.
Section 2.2.2(a) of the Little Compton Subdivision Regulations, titled "Two-Lot One-Time-Only Compound," allows for "the division of land into not more than two (2) lots, without the provision of a street where one would otherwise be required."
At the hearing, Mr. Tompkins, through counsel, argued that the building permit should not have been issued because the Property lacks the 175 feet of street frontage required by § 14-4.1 of the Little Compton Zoning Ordinance. Counsel asserted that the Little Compton Planning Board's (Planning Board) 2008 approval of the subdivision that created the Halls' property as a buildable lot was not valid and that the Subdivision Regulation under which the Planning Board issued its 2008 approval is illegal. Specifically, Counsel argued that the Town of Little Compton's definition of "street frontage" does not accord with Rhode Island Law.
The ZBR denied Mr. Tompkins' Appeal finding that the Appeal was ultimately an appeal of the Planning Board Decision in 2008 and was, therefore, untimely. Mr. Tompkins then appealed that decision to this Court.
This Court entered a Decision on August 2, 2019 upholding the ZBR's decision to dismiss Mr. Tompkins' Appeal. This Court further dismissed all claims against the Halls as untimely. The Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment against the Town remained. The Plaintiff's remaining claim seeks a declaratory judgment regarding the prospective application of Subdivision Regulations 2.2.2(a) of the Code and whether this regulation conflicts with the Little Compton Zoning Ordinances and the Rhode Island Subdivision Review Enabling Act.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claim and the claim is now moot. Defendants contend that there is no longer a case or controversy as required pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) since the Halls have been dismissed from the case. Plaintiff argues that he has standing pursuant to Key v. Brown University, 163 A.3d 1162 (R.I. 2017). In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that his claim falls into an exception to the standing requirement.
II
Standard of Review
'"The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint."' Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 149 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I. 1989)). As our Supreme Court has stated, '"[t]he policy behind these liberal pleading rules is a simple one: cases in our system are not to be disposed of summarily on arcane or technical grounds."' Hendrick v. Hendrick, 755 A.2d 784, 791 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 848 (R.I. 1992)). In Rhode Island, "a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is appropriate 'when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff's claim.'" Barrette v. Yakavonis, 966 A.2d 1231, 1234 (R.I. 2009). "[B]ut unless amendment could avail the plaintiff nothing, the order of dismissal should usually be with leave to amend." Robert B. Kent et al., Rhode Island Civil and Appellate Procedure § 12:9 (2019-2020 ed.).
In making its Rule 12(b)(6) determination, a court '"assumes the allegations contained in the complaint to be true and views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs."' Giuliano v. Pastina, 793 A.2d 1035, 1036 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 297-98 (R.I. 2001)). Under Rhode Island's notice pleading standard, "[a]ll that is required is that the complaint give the opposing party fair and adequate notice of the type of claim being asserted." Haley, 611 A.2d at 848. In particular, Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 8 requires that the complaint include a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Super. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Complaints need only provide the opposing party with "fair and adequate notice of the type of claim being asserted." See id.
III
Analysis
Under the UDJA, the Superior Court possesses "the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1; see also P.J.C. Realty, Inc. v. Barry, 811 A.2d 1202, 1207 (R.I. 2002) (quoting § 9-30-1). Thus, "the Superior Court has jurisdiction to construe the rights and responsibilities of any party arising from a statute pursuant to the powers conferred upon [it] by G.L. 1956 chapter 30 of title 9, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act." Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476, 478-79 (R.I. 2000). Specifically, § 9-30-2 of the UDJA provides as follows:
"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder." (Emphases added.) Section 9-30-2.
"This statute gives a broad grant of jurisdiction to the Superior Court to determine the rights of any person that may arise under a statute not in its appellate capacity but as a part of its original jurisdiction." Canario, 752 A.2d at 479 (citing Roch v. Garrahy, 419 A.2d 827, 830 (R.I. 1980)). Further, this Court acknowledges that the purpose of the UDJA is "to allow the trial justice to 'facilitate the termination of controversies.'" Bradford Associates v. Rhode Island Division of Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 489 (R.I. 2001) (citations omitted). Therefore, the plaintiff must present the Court with an actual controversy when seeking declaratory relief. Millett v. Hoisting Engineers' Licensing Division of Department of Labor, 119 R.I. 285, 291, 377 A.2d 229, 233 (1977).
It is well-established that a trial court's "decision to grant or to deny declaratory relief under the [UDJA] is purely discretionary." Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997). However, in declaratory judgment actions, "the first order of business for the trial justice is to determine whether a party has standing to sue." Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 2008).
Additionally, to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to sue, the court must focus "on the party who is advancing the claim rather than on the issue the party seeks to have adjudicated." Id. The standing inquiry is satisfied when a plaintiff has suffered some "injury in fact, economic or otherwise." Id.; Meyer v. City of Newport, 844 A.2d 148, 151 (R.I. 2004). The Supreme Court has defined injury in fact as "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). The Court has also recognized the importance of the personal nature of a plaintiff's injury and has held that a plaintiff must "demonstrate a personalized injury distinct from that of the community as a whole." Meyer, 844 A.2d at 151.
The second requirement for justiciability is that "the facts postulated yield to some conceivable legal hypothesis which will entitle the plaintiff to some relief against the defendant." Goodyear Loan Co. v. Little, 107 R.I. 629, 631, 269 A.2d 542, 543 (1970) (citing 1 Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments § 14 at 59 (2d ed. 1951)). It is well-settled that "[w]here a concrete issue is present and there is a definite assertion of legal rights coupled with a claim of a positive legal duty with respect thereto which shall be denied by adverse party, then there is a justiciable controversy calling for the invocation of the declaratory judgment action." 1 Anderson, § 14 at 62. If the court determines that there is no justiciable controversy, "the court can go no further, and its immediate duty is to dismiss the action . . . ." Id. § 9 at 49-50.
Standing
Here, Mr. Tompkins requests that this Court determine whether a municipal ordinance is valid. In Lamb v. Perry, 101 R.I. 538, 542, 225 A.2d 521, 523 (1967), the Court held that twelve of the plaintiffs, as taxpayers and residents of the City of East Providence, did not have standing to pursue a declaratory judgment action against the city challenging the validity of a city ordinance. In its reasoning, the Court stated that a "controversy must be actual and present a case for the consideration of the court wherein the plaintiff is asserting some legal or property right adverse to the defendant." Id. The Court found that the plaintiffs had no right, status or other legal relations affected by the amended ordinance, except that which they share in common with all other taxpayers and residents of the city. Id. at 524.
Here, Mr. Tompkins' request that this Court determine whether a municipal ordinance is valid lacks standing because as in Lamb, Mr. Tompkins presents no legal rights, status or other legal relations, which he does not share in common with all the other taxpayers and residents of the Town since he does not allege any specific damages against the Town. Id. He also does not allege any specific damages against the Halls, as they have been dismissed from the case, and the remainder of Plaintiff's claims have been dismissed by the ZBR and affirmed by this Court.
Additionally, the Plaintiff's reliance upon Key in supporting his assertion that he has standing is of no moment. 163 A.3d at 1171. The plaintiffs in Key alleged that Brown omitted material elements of its construction project from its Institutional Master Plan filed with the Providence City Plan Commission, thereby depriving the commission of an opportunity to review the true project. Id. As a consequence, the plaintiffs asserted that no public forums were held prior to the submission or approval of the plans with respect to the renovations of Brown's field hockey field location, design and amenities which were allegedly causing actual damage to the plaintiffs' home. Id. The Court in Key found that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue a declaratory judgment action against the City of Providence when a declaration in their favor could be used as evidence in supporting their claims of negligence and nuisance against Brown. Id.
Here, unlike in Key, there is no allegation that any application submitted to the Planning Board in 2008 or to the Building Official in 2017 was deficient. The Plaintiff had notice of the Planning Board action in 2008 and failed to object or appeal at that time. Further, here, unlike in Key, the owners of the property in question are no longer a party to this case. The Plaintiff in this matter did not file a nuisance action or a negligence action against the Halls or any other party. In fact, the Halls were dismissed from the case. The Key Court found that a declaration could be used as evidence to support additional claims against the defendant, Brown, not against the City of Providence or any other municipality. Here, no additional claims exist. Accordingly, unlike the plaintiffs in Key, there is no actual or articulable relief available to the plaintiffs since the Halls are no longer a party and there are no economic damages claims against them or the Town. Id; see also McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 227 (R.I. 2005) ("It is fundamental that, to be entitled to a declaratory judgment, a plaintiff must both demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and advance allegations claiming an entitlement to actual and articulable relief. ").
While the UDJA affords litigants the opportunity to clarify their legal rights under written contracts and statutes, it does not facilitate "the determination of abstract questions or the rendering of advisory opinions, nor does it 'license litigants to fish in judicial ponds for legal advice."' Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 751. Here, because the Halls are no longer a party, there is no available relief for the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff merely has a declaratory judgment claim against the Town seeking an advisory opinion on the validity of the Zoning Ordinance. As such, Mr. Tompkins lacks standing to sue. See, e.g., Providence Teachers Union v. Napolitano, 690 A.2d 855, 856 (R.I. 1997) (finding trial court rendered an advisory opinion where there was no present, actual controversy because both plaintiff and defendant agreed that the charter's residency requirements did not apply to the individual plaintiffs).
Exception to standing
"On rare occasions this court has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a case of substantial public interest." Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992) (quoting Sennott v. Hawksley, 103 R.I. 730, 732, 241 A.2d 286, 287 (1968) (allowing taxpayer standing because of the substantial public interest raised by the case)). In Burns, after a statewide vote was held regarding off track betting in previous general election, the plaintiff asserted the need for a public referendum before the Division of Racing and Athletics of the Department of Business Regulation could license two businesses seeking to simulcast out of state horse racing. 617 A.2d at 116. Although the Court held that the Plaintiff lacked standing, the Court found that the question of whether the public had a right to vote at a public referendum on this issue was of significant public interest and should be addressed by the Court. Id.; see also Sennott, 103 R.I. at 732, 241 A.2d at 287 (allowing taxpayer standing because of the substantial public interest raised by the adoption or rejection of a new State Constitution raised in the case).
In the above cases, the Court found a substantial public interest when the public voting rights were involved. Voting rights of the people of Rhode Island is certainly a substantial public issue. Here, the validity of a zoning ordinance regarding street frontage does not reach the same level of substantial public interest. See Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 752 (stating that "a court issuing declaratory relief is treading on thin legal ice every time it chooses to skate around the case or controversy requirement"). Therefore, this Court does not find Plaintiff's claims are justiciable as an exception to the standing requirement.
Mootness
Finally, an appeal is moot when '"a decision by this court on the merits [would] not have a practical effect on the underlying controversy."' Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning Board, 15 A.3d 1015, 1021 (R.I. 2011) (quoting In re Westerly Hospital, 963 A.2d 636, 639 (Mem) (R.I. 2009)). "[A] case is moot if the original complaint raised a justiciable controversy, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of a continuing stake in the controversy." In re Michael Derderian, 972 A.2d 613, 617 (R.I. 2009) (citing Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 753). The Court is inclined to refuse to address moot cases because "without the presence of a justiciable case or controversy, . . . judicial power . . . is at its weakest ebb." Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 752.
Here, all claims against the Halls have been dismissed, and this Court has upheld the ZBR's Decision dismissing Plaintiff's claims as untimely. While initially Mr. Tompkins had standing to bring this matter as a potentially aggrieved party and an abutter to the Halls' property, because the Halls have been dismissed, the Plaintiff is no longer an aggrieved party who can seek relief from the Halls or any other party with a ruling from this Court. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court should grant the motion to dismiss because the Plaintiff lacks standing, and his claims are moot as this Court has held that the Plaintiff's claims against the Halls are time barred and the Halls have been dismissed from the pending action.
Counsel shall submit the appropriate order and judgment for entry.