Opinion
Record No. 1650-91-3
January 19, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE FRANK I. RICHARDSON, JR., JUDGE
Rickey G. Young (Williams, Luck, and Williams, on brief), for appellant.
Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Koontz, Judges Moon and Willis
Argued at Salem, Virginia
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
In a jury trial, Jimmy Tinsley (Tinsley) was convicted of two charges of selling cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, Tinsley contends that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor provided a race-neutral reason for striking a black member of the jury panel.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the United States Supreme Court outlined a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the equal protection clause. "First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race."Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991);Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. Once a prima facie showing has been made, "the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question." Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866;Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98. The final step in the process requires the trial court to "determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination."Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866; Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
"For purposes of this appeal we assume, without deciding, that [Tinsley] made out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the Commonwealth." Taitano v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 342, 347, 358 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1987) (footnote omitted). Thus, we must decide whether the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor articulated a race-neutral explanation for striking Collette Dandridge from the jury panel.
A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.
Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866. The prosecutor stated that he has an office policy to strike jurors "who know or are acquainted with the defendant, or any member of the [defendant's family], or indicate some personal relationship of some type with the defendant." The prosecutor stated that the policy applies without regard to the race of the juror. The prosecutor explained that Collette Dandridge had responded to the court's question, during voir dire, as to whether anyone knew Tinsley. Upon further questioning, Dandridge stated that she had seen Tinsley in church.
The prosecutor also exercised two of his peremptory strikes to eliminate from the jury panel two black women who had indicated on voir dire that they knew Tinsley. Tinsley does not challenge the exclusion of these two jurors on appeal.
The trial court found that the prosecutor's explanation was race-neutral. The trial court's findings on the issue of discriminatory intent are accorded great deference because the issue will "'largely turn on evaluation of credibility.'"Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1869 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 184, 380 S.E.2d 1, 5, aff'd en banc, 9 Va. App. 169, 384 S.E.2d 343 (1989). For this reason, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1869. We hold that the prosecutor's policy of striking jurors who are acquainted with the defendant is race-neutral and, therefore, we do not disturb the trial court's finding on appeal because it is not clearly erroneous. See Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 107-08, 409 S.E.2d 476, 483 (1991) (holding that the trial court did not err in finding no purposeful discrimination under Batson where the prosecutor stated that he struck the juror because a narcotics detective thought he recognized the juror).
Affirmed.