Opinion
No. 2-137 / 01-0567.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Greene County, JOEL E. SWANSON, Judge.
John Tiffany appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of mandamus. AFFIRMED.
John F. Tiffany, pro se, Dana, for appellant.
Hugh Cain, of Hopkins Huebner, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and HECHT, JJ.
John Tiffany appeals from an order dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
On June 14, 2000, John Tiffany filed a petition for writ of mandamus. He alleged the Greene County Weed Commissioner, the Greene County Board of Supervisors, and the Greene County Attorney had failed to perform certain statutory duties under Iowa Code Chapter 317 pertaining to the control of noxious weeds on public land. In essence, Tiffany asserted that the Weed Commissioner failed to control the weeds; the Board of Supervisors failed to require the Commissioner to do so; and the County Attorney failed to prosecute his codefendants for their omissions. The petition sought an order directing the defendants to perform their statutory duties.
We note that appellant identifies himself as "Jack" Tiffany in the caption of his petition for writ of mandamus and "John" Tiffany in the caption of his appeal. We shall refer to him as "Tiffany" in this opinion.
All defendants joined in an answer filed by an attorney on July 3, 2000. On July 10, 2000, the defendants served upon Tiffany eleven routine interrogatories requesting rudimentary information about the claim. On August 22, 2000, defendants' counsel sent a letter to Tiffany requesting answers to the interrogatories within ten days.
On September 21, 2000, defendants filed a motion requesting the district court to compel Tiffany to respond to the discovery requests. Tiffany appeared pro se at a hearing on the motion on October 30, 2000. The district court filed an order that day directing Tiffany to provide the delinquent discovery responses within thirty days and informing him that "[f]ailure to comply will result in the imposition of sanctions." On December 28, 2000, defendants filed a motion for sanctions seeking dismissal of the action because Tiffany had failed to comply with the district court's order of October 30, 2000.
On January 4, 2001, Tiffany filed a "Combined Motion for Determination of Attorney Authority, Determination of Conflict of Interest, Determination of No Attorney Client Privilege, and For Stay of Discovery Pending Such Determinations." In this motion, Tiffany asserted defendants had conflicting interests and requested the district court to (1) require proof of defense counsel's authority to represent defendants with conflicting interests; (2) determine whether defendants had waived attorney client and work product privileges; and (3) stay discovery until the defendants' conflicts of interest were considered and resolved. The defendants filed a resistance to Tiffany's motion and a hearing was scheduled for February 19, 2001.
Tiffany's motion asserted the district court should explore the claimed conflicts of interest before the delinquent discovery responses were made so as to avoid multiple discovery requests and "potentially inconsistent" responses.
Tiffany did not appear at the hearing. The district court concluded Tiffany's motion lacked merit and overruled it. The court further concluded Tiffany's failure to make discovery responses and noncompliance with the order of October 30, 2000 were "willful and in bad faith" and imposed the sanction of dismissal.
On March 1, 2001, Tiffany filed a "Motion to Set Aside Default, For New Trial and Expanded Ruling." In this motion, Tiffany asserted he had mistakenly believed the February 19 hearing would not be held because that day was a holiday. He further claimed the February 19 ruling violated his state and federal due process rights and alternatively urged the district court to set the ruling aside, expand it under Rule 179, or grant a new trial. On March 2, 2001, Tiffany filed a motion to recuse District Judge Joel E. Swanson, who had issued the February 19 ruling.
President's Day was observed on February 19, 2001.
On March 9, 2001, Judge Swanson issued orders concluding (1) the February 19 ruling was not a default judgment and should not be set aside, (2) a new trial would not be granted because the case was dismissed before a trial occurred, (3) the February 19 ruling needed no expansion or further explanation, and (4) Tiffany's motion to recuse was moot.
Tiffany appeals, contending the district court (1) erred in failing to grant a stay of discovery pending resolution of his conflict of interest and privilege claims and (2) violated his due process rights by dismissing his claim without reaching its merits.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review orders imposing discovery sanctions for errors at law. Iowa R. App. 6.4. If supported by substantial evidence, the district court's findings of fact are binding upon us. Meyers v. Delaney, 529 N.W.2d 288, 289-90 (Iowa 1995). We apply an abuse of discretion standard in our review of orders imposing discovery sanctions. Sullivan v. Chicago Northwestern Transp. Co., 326 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1982); Suckow v. Boone State Bank Trust, Co., 314 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Iowa 1982). A district court abuses its discretion when it is exercised for clearly untenable reasons or to a clearly unreasonable extent. Bindel v. Larrington, 543 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). We review constitutional claims de novo. Perkins v. Board of Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Iowa 2001).
III. The Merits.
Although dismissal is a drastic sanction, it may be imposed against a party whose noncompliance with discovery orders is willful or in bad faith. Bindel, 543 N.W.2d at 914; Postma v. Sioux Center News, 393 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1986).
We conclude the district court's finding that Tiffany's noncompliance with the discovery rules and the October 30 order was willful and in bad faith is supported by substantial evidence. Tiffany, who is no stranger to judicial proceedings, ignored discovery requests for almost six months after they were served before filing a motion to stay discovery. Furthermore, Tiffany failed to seek a stay until more than sixty days after the district court filed its order directing him to answer defendants' interrogatories by November 30, 2000.
See Estate of Ragan, 541 N.W.2d 859 (Iowa 1995); Federal Land Bank v. Tiffany, 529 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1995); Tiffany v. Brenton Bank, 508 N.W.2d 87 (Iowa 1993); Tiffany v. Brenton Bank, 400 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1987).
Tiffany's failure to answer the defendants' interrogatories and his neglect of the court's order are not, however, the only facts supporting the district court's finding of willfulness and bad faith. The interrogatories Tiffany refused to answer were routine and few in number. No extraordinary effort would have been required to answer them. Tiffany made no claim that he was unable to provide responses to the interrogatories when he appeared at the October 30, 2000 hearing on defendants' motion to compel. Moreover, Tiffany waited until the court-imposed deadline for compliance had passed and until after defendants filed their motion for sanctions before filing his motion to stay discovery.
When he finally sought a stay of discovery, Tiffany advanced defendants' counsel's conflicts of interest as a basis for the relief he requested. We note Tiffany cites no authority for the proposition that he had legal grounds to challenge defendants' choice of counsel under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded Tiffany had no right to challenge defendants' choice of counsel.
Tiffany's only conflict of interest claim was based solely upon the alleged conflicting interests among the several defendants represented by a single attorney. Tiffany did not claim a conflict of interest between himself and defense counsel as a basis for opposing counsel's disqualification.
Tiffany also contended a stay was justified by the potential for duplication of discovery if the claimed conflicts of interest should in the future require separate defense counsel for the several defendants. However, the appropriate remedy under the circumstances was not to refuse to answer interrogatories and ignore the district court's order on discovery, but to seek a protective order against future discovery requests if they ever became burdensome. We conclude the frivolous nature of the claimed grounds for a stay of discovery is further evidence supporting the district court's finding Tiffany's conduct was willful and in bad faith. In short, we find no abuse of discretion in any of the district court's rulings in this case.
Tiffany also contends the district court's rulings deprived him of due process under the state and federal constitutions. In particular, Tiffany asserts the district court engaged in "calculated manipulation of sequence and procedure" to avoid the merits of the claim. We disagree. Tiffany's own choices and conduct controlled the outcome of the litigation. He refused to conform his conduct in the litigation to the rules of civil procedure. He failed to answer routine interrogatories after the court ordered him to do so. It was these choices, rather than a denial of due process, that precipitated the dismissal of his case before a decision on its merits. Thus, we conclude Tiffany's due process rights were not violated.
Having found no merit in any of the claims asserted by Tiffany on appeal, we affirm the district court's decision in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.