Opinion
No. 1:20-cv-01336-JRS-DLP
2021-08-05
TIFFANY P., Plaintiff, v. Kilolo KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
Eric C. Bohnet, Attorney at Law, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff. Julian Clifford Wierenga, United States Attorney's Office, Indianapolis, IN, Lindsay Beyer Payne, Social Security Administration Office of the Regional Chief Counsel, Region V, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Andrew Saul.
Eric C. Bohnet, Attorney at Law, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.
Julian Clifford Wierenga, United States Attorney's Office, Indianapolis, IN, Lindsay Beyer Payne, Social Security Administration Office of the Regional Chief Counsel, Region V, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Andrew Saul.
ENTRY REVIEWING COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
JAMES R. SWEENEY II, United States District Judge Tiffany P. ("Ms. P.") applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income ("SSI") from the Social Security Administration ("SSA") on May 3, 2016, alleging disability beginning April 1, 2000. The SSA denied Ms. P.’s claims initially on September 15, 2016, (ECF No. 13-2 at 17), upon reconsideration on December 19, 2016, (id. ), and after a requested hearing on March 27, 2019, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Roxanne Kelsey—in which Ms. P. amended her alleged onset date of disability to May 3, 2016 and the ALJ dismissed her application for disability insurance benefits, (id. at 26). The Appeals Council denied review on March 3, 2020. (ECF No. 13-2 at 2–5.) On May 7, 2020, Ms. T. timely filed this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), asking the Court to review the SSA's denial of benefits.
I. Standard of Review
The Court must affirm the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and applies the correct legal standard. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ; Biestek v. Berryhill , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019) ; Summers v. Berryhill , 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Because the Commissioner is responsible for weighing the evidence, resolving conflicts and making independent findings of fact ... this Court may not decide the facts anew, re-weigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner ...." Powers v. Apfel , 207 F.3d 431, 434–35 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the Court will not "simply rubber-stamp the Commissioner's decision without a critical review of the evidence." Clifford v. Apfel , 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). The ALJ need not provide a "complete and written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence," but she does need to "build a logical bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion." Minnick v. Colvin , 775 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
II. Five-Step Evaluation Process
The SSA applies a five-step evaluation to determine whether the claimant is disabled. Stephens v. Berryhill , 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) ; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) ). The ALJ must evaluate the following, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy.
Clifford v. Apfel , 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 13, 2000) (citations omitted). "If a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found disabled. If a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four. Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy." Knight v. Chater , 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") by evaluating "all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe." Villano v. Astrue , 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ "may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling." Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant can perform his own past relevant work and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (v).
III. Background
Ms. P. alleges that she became disabled on May 3, 2016, at the age of thirty-nine because of degenerative disc disease, anxiety, depression, a learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, asthma, high blood pressure, and back issues. (See ECF No. 13-2 at 17, 22, 24; see also ECF No. 13-4 at 9.) She has marginal education and no past relevant work experience. (ECF No. 13-2 at 24.)
On March 27, 2019, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (ECF No. 13-2 at 17–26.) In arriving at her decision, the ALJ followed the five-step process set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) for determining whether an individual is disabled. In Step One, the ALJ found that Ms. P. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after her alleged onset date of May 3, 2016. (ECF No. 13-2 at 20.) In Step Two, the ALJ found that Ms. P. had the following severe impairments under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) : degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, obesity, asthma, anxiety disorder, and depressive disorder. (ECF No. 13-2 at 20.) In Step Three, the ALJ found that no impairment or combination of impairments met or medically equaled the severity of any impairment that appears in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (ECF No. 13-2 at 20.) The ALJ further found that:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a range of sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a). She would need to change positions every fifteen minutes from sitting to standing and back again, four hours each in an eight-hour workday. The claimant could occasionally climb or stoop, and frequently balance, kneel, crouch, or crawl. She should have no more than occasional exposure to concentrated levels of fumes, odors, dusts, gases, or poor ventilation. The claimant lacks the ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions because of moderate limitations in concentration, but retains the sustained concentration necessary for simple work of a routine type.
(ECF No. 13-2 at 21–22.)
In Step Four, the ALJ found that Ms. P. had no past relevant work. (ECF No. 13-2 at 24.) In Step Five, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Ms. P. can perform. (ECF No. 13-2 at 25.) In making her finding, the ALJ asked the vocational expert ("VE") whether jobs existed in the national economy for an individual with Ms. P.’s age, education, work experience, and RFC. (Id. ) "The [VE] testified that given all of these factors[,] the individual would be able to perform the requirements of representative sedentary and unskilled (SVP 2) occupations such as: assembler ([Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT")] 732.684-062, with 130,000 jobs nationally), packer (DOT 737.587-010, with 215,000 jobs nationally), and sorter (DOT 669.687-014, with 98,000 jobs nationally)." (Id. ) The ALJ determined that the VE's testimony was consistent with the information contained in the DOT. (Id. ) Accordingly, the ALJ held that based on Ms. P.’s application for SSI filed on May 3, 2016, she was not disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 13-2 at 26.)
Further details and other evidence in the record will be discussed as necessary.
IV. Discussion
Ms. P. says the ALJ made two errors when deciding to deny her SSI: (1) the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to find disability despite the ALJ finding an RFC that did not by regulation permit work for a full eight-hour day; and (2) relying on the VE's testimony in Step Five regarding job numbers, which Ms. P. argues were mislabeled, implausible, and did not constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusions that significant jobs exist in the national economy. Ms. P. contends that the ALJ's errors warrant a remand with instructions to grant benefits.
Ms. P. argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find disability despite an RFC that did not permit work for a full eight-hour day and which was supported by VE testimony responding to a different question than that posed by the ALJ. Alternatively, Ms. P. argues that even if the VE's testimony could be read as responsive to the RFC later used in the ALJ's decision, such testimony would flatly contradict the dictates of the agency's rules. The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's assessment of Ms. P.’s abilities to sit and stand and that any error the ALJ made was at most harmless.
The ALJ found that Ms. P. had the RFC to perform a range of sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). (ECF No. 13-2 at 21–22.) The ALJ also found that Ms. P. "would need to change positions every fifteen minutes, from sitting to standing and back again, four hours each in an eight-hour workday." (Id. at 22.) Section 404.1567(a) defines sedentary work as:
work [that] involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.
Id. § 404.1567(a) (emphasis added). "Occasionally" is defined as:
occurring from very little up to one-third of the time, and would generally total no more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday. Sitting would generally total about 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Unskilled sedentary work also involves other activities, classified as "nonexertional," such as capacities for seeing, manipulation, and understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions.
S.S.R. 96-9p. "In order to perform a full range of sedentary work, an individual must be able to remain in a seated position for approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday, with a morning break, a lunch period, and an afternoon break at approximately 2-hour intervals. If an individual is unable to sit for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour work day, the unskilled sedentary occupational base will be eroded." Id. Moreover, "[a]n individual may need to alternate the required sitting of sedentary work by standing ... periodically. Where this need cannot be accommodated by scheduled breaks and a lunch period, the occupational base for a full range of unskilled sedentary work will be eroded." Id.
Ms. P. argues that the VE's testimony contradicts the ALJ's RFC finding. Specifically, Ms. P. argues that because a sedentary rating requires that "[s]itting would generally total about 6 hours of an 8-hour workday," S.S.R. 96-9p, the ALJ's finding that Ms. P. would need to change positions every fifteen minutes—that is, standing for four hours and sitting for four hours each workday—means that the ALJ's sit/stand requirement posed to the VE in hypothetical number three was a "change" from the sedentary hypothetical posed in hypothetical number two. She further claims the ALJ erred because the written decision poses the sit/stand requirement as a further "restriction" within the sedentary classification and, therefore, had the VE understood the question posed in hypothetical number three to permit only a range of sedentary work, the rulings and regulations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) ; S.S.R. 96-9p, would have foreclosed work because two hours of standing and four hours of sitting would not permit an eight-hour workday, or at least would have left more than fifteen percent of the workday off task.
A review of the ALJ's hypotheticals to the VE is necessary to understand Ms. P.’s issue with the ALJ's hypothetical questions. For the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE what, if any, work was available for a younger individual with a sixth-grade education with certain limitations who could perform light work as described by the regulations. (ECF No. 13-2 at 52.) The VE responded that the hypothetical individual could perform work as a sorter, assembler, or packer. (Id. ) For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE if there would be different jobs available for the individual in hypothetical number one if she was "able to perform sedentary instead of light work." (Id. at 53.) The VE responded that the same type of occupations would be available, such as an assembler, "DOT code number of 732.684-062," a packer, "DOT 737.587-101," or a sorter, "DOT 669.687-014." (Id. )
For the third hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE what, if any, work was available to the same individual from hypothetical number two if she had the added limitation that she would need "change position every 15 minutes from sitting to standing and back again .., [she] could sit or stand [for] a total of four hours each in an eight hour workday." (Id. ) The VE responded that his "response would be the same ... due to the fact that the major aspect of performing these types of occupations is a utilization of the bilateral upper extremities on a frequent basis[,] not necessarily the need to sit or stand throughout the course of a workday." (Id. ) The ALJ asked whether the "jobs [would] be eroded by Employers that would not allow for ... a stool or standing?" (Id. ) The VE responded, based on his experience, the jobs are "sedentary and the stool is there and no, they wouldn't mind if they individual stands as long as they're completing their work." (Id. at 53–54.) Finally, the VE testified that "any type of occupation[ ]" would be eliminated for an individual who needed an extra break of fifteen minutes a day because "there would be no substantial gainful activity," given that the maximum tolerance for time off task according to the Department of Labor is fifteen percent, and an extra break would put that individual outside of the maximum tolerance for time off tasks. (Id. at 54–55.) The Court is not persuaded by Ms. P.’s arguments. It is true, as the Commissioner concedes, that the sedentary exertional level requires standing or walking for only two hours in an eight-hour workday. (ECF No. 18 at 6.) Meaning, the ALJ's finding that Ms. P. would need to change positions every fifteen minutes, from sitting to standing and back again, four hours each in an eight-hour workday, would ordinarily foreclose work. See S.S.R 83-12 (stating that the need to alternate between sitting and standing presumes that the occupational base is eroded). But "the mere inability to perform substantially all sedentary unskilled occupations does not equate with a finding of disability, since there may be a number of occupations and jobs that exist in significant numbers that the claimant may still be able to perform even with a sedentary occupational base that has been eroded." 3 Soc. Sec. Law & Prac. § 43:188 (June 2021); cf. S.S.R. 96-9p ("The extent of the erosion will depend on the facts in the case record, such as the frequency of the need to alternate sitting and standing and the length of time needed to stand."); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2 § 201.00(h)(4) ("[A] finding that an individual is limited to less than the full range of sedentary work will be based on careful consideration of the evidence of the individual's medical impairment(s) and the limitations and restrictions attributable to it. Such evidence must support the finding that the individual's residual functional capacity is limited to less than the full range of sedentary work."). That is why, "[i]n cases of unusual limitation of ability to sit or stand, a VS should be consulted to clarify the implications for the occupational base." S.S.R. 83-12. And that is exactly what the ALJ did—she properly consulted the VE to assess what occupations were available to account for Ms. P.’s sit/stand restrictions. See Peterson v. Chater , 96 F.3d 1015, 1016 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[I]n the case of an applicant for disability benefits who cannot sit or stand indefinitely, a vocational expert, vocational dictionary, or other appropriate guide or source must be consulted to determine whether there are sufficient jobs in the national economy that the applicant is physically capable of holding to justify a conclusion that he is not disabled."). Furthermore, the ALJ was specific about the frequency of Ms. P.’s sit/stand limitations. See 96-9p ("The RFC assessment must be specific as to the frequency of the individual's need to alternate sitting and standing.").
The VE testified that, based on his experience, there were some 443,000 jobs in the national economy available to a hypothetical younger individual with a sixth-grade education, who can occasionally climb, stoop, frequently balance, kneel, crouch, or crawl; who is no more than occasionally exposed to concentrated levels of fumes, dust, odors, gases, and poor ventilation; who lacks the ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions because of modern limitations and concentration, but retains the concentration necessary for simple work of a routine type; and who has the ability to perform sedentary work with a sit/stand option, having to alternate from sitting to standing every fifteen minutes. Ms. P.’s attempt, then, to make a distinction between a "change" in the hypothetical posed to the VE and a "restriction" within the sedentary classification in the ALJ's written opinion is unavailing. The record makes clear that the ALJ was specific about Ms. P.’s sit/stand limitation and that she properly consulted the VE to determine whether there were sufficient jobs in the national economy that Ms. P. was capable of holding.
Moreover, in making the RFC finding, the ALJ considered the entire record as well as the hearing testimony of both Ms. P. and the VE. The record reflects that consultative examiner Wallace J. Gasiewicz, M.D., noted normal examination findings aside from reduced range of motion in Ms. P.’s lower back. (ECF No. 13-10 at 52–55.) Furthermore, both state-agency consulting physicians, Jerry Smartt, Jr., M.D. and Mangala Hasanadka, M.D., opined that Plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk for about six hours in a workday. (See ECF No. 13-3 at 8, 10; ECF No. 13-3 at 31, 33.) The opinions of the consultative examiner and both state-agency consulting physicians corresponded to an ability to perform a range of light work, which is defined as:
Work [that] involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) ; see also S.S.R. 83-10 ("Since frequent lifting or carrying requires being on one's feet up to two-thirds of a workday, the full range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Sitting may occur intermittently during the remaining time." (emphasis added)). But, the ALJ gave "little weight to the non-examining state agency's consultants’ opinions in developing the claimant's physical residual functional capacity," instead concluding that "[a]dditional evidence received shows that the claimant is more limited." (ECF No. 13-2 at 23.)
Notably, in making her RFC finding, the ALJ greatly credited Ms. P.’s subjective hearing testimony. At the hearing, the ALJ asked Ms. P. whether she could work a job where she could sit for ten minutes and then stand for ten minutes. (ECF No. 13-2 at 46.) Ms. P. responded: "I'm not sure if I could or not. I've not tried any kind of job like that.... I don't know if there is a job like that." (Id. at 46–47.) The ALJ also asked Ms. P. how long she could stand. (Id. at 47.) Ms. P. responded: "About 15 minutes. 20 minutes at the most." (Id. ) And the ALJ asked Ms. P. how long she could sit. Ms. P. responded: "About 15, 20 minutes." (Id. at 48.) The ALJ used this testimony in determining that a limitation on sedentary work was more consistent with the totality of the record available at the hearing. (See ECF No. 13-2 at 24 ("The undersigned has also considered the claimant's testimony regarding pain after sitting too long and the need to change positions in finding that she would need to change positions every fifteen minutes from sitting to standing and back again, four hours each in an eight-hour workday.").) Hence, "it was because of and not in spite of [Ms. P.]’s testimony that the ALJ limited her to a more restrictive residual functional capacity finding than any physician on the record." Castile v. Astrue , 617 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2010).
Therefore, Ms. P.’s argument that remand is warranted is unavailing because the record establishes that, in crediting Ms. P.’s testimony, the ALJ found Ms. P. had an even more restrictive RFC than the physicians on the record opined Ms. P. had, whose findings showed Ms. P. capable of a light work RFC. Ms. P.’s argument that the record supports a finding of an even more restrictive RFC is inapt, because the Court will not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ's to make that determination. See Summers v. Berryhill , 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017). Also, without challenging the imposed limitations, which are supported by substantial evidence, Ms. P. plea for remand seems to elevate form over substance.
The ALJ reasonably concluded that Ms. P. could perform sedentary work with a sit/stand limitation based on the careful consideration of the evidence in the record, Ms. P.’s testimony, and the testimony of the VE. See Dixon v. Massanari , 270 F.3d 1171, 1178–79 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that ALJ reasonably concluded that claimant could perform sedentary work with a sit/stand option after considering the medical and nonmedical evidence in the record, the claimant's testimony, and the VE's testimony); see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2 § 201.00(h)(4) ("[A] finding that an individual is limited to less than the full range of sedentary work will be based on careful consideration of the evidence of the individual's medical impairment(s) and the limitations and restrictions attributable to it. Such evidence must support the finding that the individual's residual functional capacity is limited to less than the full range of sedentary work."). The ALJ did not commit reversable error.
That leaves Ms. P.’s final argument: the ALJ erred by relying on the VE's testimony in Step Five regarding job numbers, which she argues were mislabeled, implausible, and did not constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusions that significant jobs exist in the national economy. The Commissioner argues that Ms. P. forfeited any challenge to the Step Five DOT code numbers by failing to inquire about discrepancies or object at the hearing. The VE testified that given Ms. P.’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, Ms. P. would be able to perform the requirements of representative sedentary and unskilled occupations such as: assembler (DOT 732.684-062, with 130,000 jobs nationally), packer (DOT 737.587-010, with 215,000 jobs nationally), and sorter (DOT 669.687-014, with 98,000 jobs nationally). (ECF No. 13-2 at 25.) The ALJ determined that the VE's testimony was consistent with the information contained in the DOT. (Id. ) However, the VE provided incorrect DOT code numbers during his testimony. For example, DOT 732.684-062, to which the VE testified corresponds to the occupation of "assembler," is the DOT code for the occupation "fishing reel assembler." (ECF No. 17 at 10.) DOT 737.587-010 is the DOT code for "bandolier straightener/stamper," not "packer." (Id. ) And DOT 669.687-014 is the DOT code for "dowel inspector," not "sorter." (Id. )
If a VE's testimony supplements and does not conflict with the DOT, a claimant "forfeit[s] [her] arguments by failing to object to the testimony during the administrative hearings." Brown v. Colvin , 845 F.3d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 2016). However, if a VE's "testimony appears to conflict with the DOT, the ALJ must obtain a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict, and [ ] a claimant's failure to object during a hearing cannot excuse an ALJ's failure to do so." Id. at 255 (quoting Overman v. Astrue , 546 F.3d 456, 462–63 (7th Cir. 2008)) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted); see also S.S.R. 00-4p (requiring the ALJ to identify and explain any conflict between the DOT and VE testimony). The ALJ's "duty to inquire arises only when the conflict between the DOT and VE testimony is apparent." Id. at 463–64.
Here, Ms. P. forfeited any argument to the VE's use of the incorrect DOT code numbers because she did not object to the discrepancy during the administrative hearing. This is because the conflict between the DOT and VE testimony was not apparent. E.g. , Tynaya P. v. Saul , No. 19 C 2067, 2019 WL 5694310, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2019) (finding that the VE's reliance on the wrong DOT code numbers during administrative hearing was not an apparent conflict); cf. Zblewski v. Astrue , 302 F. App'x 488, 494 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Because the DOT does not address the subject of sit/stand options, it is not apparent that the testimony conflicts with the DOT."). But even if the error was apparent, the ALJ's failure to obtain a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict was harmless because the ALJ was entitled to rely on other, unchallenged VE testimony. See Barrett v. Barnhart , 355 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 2004). The VE testified that based on his experience and the DOT, 443,000 jobs allowed an at-will sit/stand option. (ECF No. 13-2 at 53–54.) Ms. P. did not challenge that assertion. Therefore, even if it was error for the ALJ to not directly ask whether the VE's testimony was consistent with the DOT, these 443,000 jobs the VE identified would remain available, rendering the error harmless. See Prochaska v. Barnhart , 454 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying harmless-error analysis to violation of S.S.R. 00–4p).
Thus, the Court must affirm the ALJ's decision. The ALJ reasonably concluded that Ms. P could perform sedentary work with a sit/stand limitation. Moreover, Ms. P. forfeited any argument to the VE's use of the incorrect DOT code numbers because she did not object to the unapparent discrepancy during the administrative hearing. But even if the discrepancy was apparent and the ALJ erred by not recognizing the discrepancy between the VE's testimony and the DOT, any such error was harmless.
V. Conclusion
The Court can find no legal basis presented by Ms. P. to reverse the ALJ's decision that she was not disabled during the relevant period. Therefore, the ALJ's decision is affirmed . Final judgment will issue accordingly.
SO ORDERED .
To protect the privacy interests of claimants for Social Security benefits, consistent with the recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the Administrative Office of the United States courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to use only the first name and last initial of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial review opinions.