Summary
In Tibak v. City of New York (154 A.D.2d 313, lv denied 75 N.Y.2d 705), this Court, in a remarkably similar factual pattern, determined that the case was governed by general maritime law and that the Labor Law did "not apply since the rights and liabilities of the parties under the general maritime law cannot be enlarged or impaired by State statute" (id. at 314).
Summary of this case from Cammon v. City of New YorkOpinion
October 31, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.).
Defendant City of New York had hired third-party defendant Simpson and Brown, Inc. to rehabilitate Pier 97 at West 57th Street in Manhattan. Plaintiff's decedent, Albert Tibak, a dockbuilder employed by third-party defendant Simpson and Brown, Inc., was killed when he was struck by a steel beam which fell from a crane operated by a coemployee. The crane was located on a barge owned by Simpson and Brown, floating in the Hudson River adjacent to the pier.
Plaintiff brought this action alleging the decedent was not furnished with proper safety devices, a violation of the New York State Labor Law. The IAS court granted defendant City of New York's motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiff's claim was exclusively governed by Federal maritime law since the accident occurred on navigable waters and the renovation of the pier had a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities.
Plaintiffs' contention that the record before the IAS court was insufficient to support the court's decision is without merit. Sworn deposition testimony, as well as official city documents attached to the moving papers, provided evidentiary proof in admissible form (see, Olan v Farrell Lines, 64 N.Y.2d 1092; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 563). This was opposed by plaintiffs solely by an affirmation of an attorney without personal knowledge, which is insufficient to defeat such a motion (see, Olan v Farrell Lines, 105 A.D.2d 653, affd 64 N.Y.2d 1092, supra).
Whether Federal maritime law governs is determined by whether the accident had a maritime location and a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity (see, Executive Jet Aviation v City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249). As the IAS court found, the record shows decedent was on a barge, on navigable waters within the United States, engaged in renovating a pier for the use of Department of Sanitation barges, when the accident occurred. Thus, the case is governed by general maritime law and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.), and the provisions of the New York State Labor Law under which the action was brought do not apply since the rights and liabilities of the parties under the general maritime law cannot be enlarged or impaired by State statute (see, Robins Dry Dock Co. v Dahl, 266 U.S. 449; Cwick v City of Rochester, 107 A.D.2d 1072, 1074).
Concur — Kupferman, J.P., Ross, Asch, Kassal and Rosenberger, JJ.