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Thurber v. Masanari

United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Nov 8, 2001
NO. 01-132 (ADM/JMM) (D. Minn. Nov. 8, 2001)

Opinion

NO. 01-132 (ADM/JMM)

November 8, 2001


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION


The above matter is before the undersigned upon Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 16] and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 18]. The matter is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation to the District Court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Upon the following Findings of Fact/Report, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 16] be denied, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 18] be granted.

FINDINGS OF FACT/REPORT

Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income on February 25, 1998, alleging that she became disabled on February 2, 1998. (R. 106). The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 121). Pursuant to Plaintiff's request on October 7, 1998, a hearing was held before Administrative Law ("ALJ") Judge John K. Kraybill on June 3, 1999. (R. 41). Testimony was taken from Plaintiff, impartial medical expert ("IME") Andrew Steiner and vocational expert ("VE") William Villa. On July 19, 1999 the ALJ issued a decision which was unfavorable to Plaintiff. (R. 32). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on November 20, 2000 thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of Defendant. (R. 8-9). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ's decision by filing a Complaint with this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Parties now appear before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 20, 2001 [Docket No. 16] and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 10, 2001 [Docket No. 18].

I. PROCESS FOR REVIEW

Congress has prescribed the standards by which Social Security disability benefits may be awarded. "The Social Security program provides benefits to people who are aged, blind, or who suffer from a physical or mental disability." 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a); Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992). The Social Security Administration shall find a person disabled if the claimant "is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant's impairments must be "of such severity that [the claimant] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The impairment must last for a continuous period of at least twelve months or be expected to result in death. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, 416.909.

A. Administrative Law Judge Hearing/Five-Step Analysis

If a claimant's initial application for benefits is denied, he or she may request reconsideration of the decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.909(a)(1), 416.1409(a). A claimant who is dissatisfied with the reconsidered decision may obtain administrative review by an ALJ. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1), 1383(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.929., 416.1429, 422.201 et seq. To determine the existence and extent of a claimant's disability, the ALJ must follow a fivestep sequential analysis, requiring the ALJ to make a series of factual findings regarding the claimant's work history, medical condition, and ability to perform work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920; see also Locher, 968 F.2d at 727. The Eighth Circuit described this five-step process in Morse v. Shalala, 16 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 1994):

The first step asks if the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the second step inquires if the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the ability to do basic work activities. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the third step is whether the impairments meet or equal a listed impairment; if they do, the claimant is disabled. The fourth step asks if the claimant's impairments prevent her from doing past relevant work. If the claimant can perform past relevant work, she is not disabled. The fifth step involves the question of whether the claimant's impairments prevent her from doing other work. If so, the claimant is disabled.

B. Appeals Council Review

If the claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ's decision, he or she may request review by the Appeals Council, though review is not automatic. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967-404.982, 416.1467-416.1482. The decision of the Appeals Council (or of the ALJ if the request for review is denied) is final and binding upon the claimant unless the matter is appealed to Federal District Court within 60 days after notice of the Appeals Council's action. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 1383(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981, 416.1481.

C. Judicial Review

Judicial review of the administrative decision generally proceeds by considering the decision of the ALJ at each of the five steps. The Court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and to consider

1. The credibility findings made by the ALJ.

2. The Plaintiffs vocational factors.

3. The medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians.
4. The Plaintiff's subjective complaints relating to exceptional and non-exertional activities and impairments.

5. Any corroboration by third parties of Plaintiff's impairments.

6. The testimony of vocational experts, when required, which is based upon a proper hypothetical question which sets forth Plaintiff's impairments.

Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1185 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Brand v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 1980)).

The review by this Court is limited to a determination of whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 383, 384 (8th Cir. 1992). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). However, "[the substantial evidence test employed in reviewing administrative findings is more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the [Commissioner's] findings." Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1987). "`Substantial evidence on the record as a whole,' . . . requires a more scrutinizing analysis." Id. In reviewing the administrative decision, "`[the substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'" Id. (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)).

In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute its own judgment or findings of fact. Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). The possibility that the Court could draw two inconsistent conclusions from the same record does not prevent a particular finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939. The Court should not reverse the Commissioner's finding merely because evidence may exist to support the opposite conclusion. Mitchell v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 1994). Instead, the Court must consider "the weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory." Gavin, 811 F.2d at 1199.

The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her entitlement to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a), 416.912(a); Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir. 1991). Once the claimant has demonstrated he or she cannot perform prior work due to a disability, the burden of proof then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in some other substantial, gainful activity. Martonik v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 236, 238 (8th Cir. 1985).

II. THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW

A. The ALJ's Findings of Fact

Plaintiff was born on September 7, 1957 and was forty-one years old at the time of the administrative hearing. (R. 17). Plaintiff has a high school diploma and training in business micro-computing. Plaintiff has two children and previous work experience in computer assembly. (R. 144, 151). Plaintiff alleges a complete inability to work due to obesity, degenerative disc disease with herniated disc and depression. (R. 143, 176, 180). Plaintiff has not engaged in work activity since January 2, 1997. (R. 31). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to Supplemental Security income under §§ 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act. (R. 17-27). The ALJ based his decision on the following findings:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since January 2, 1997.
2. The claimant has severe, low back pain with lower extremity radiation due to degenerative disc disease, obesity status post gastric bypass, two hernia repairs, and an affective disorder of depression, (sic) impairments do not meet or equal individually or cumulatively the criteria of an impairment contained in Appendix 1 to Subpart P, Part 404.
3. The distant history of chemical dependency to amphetamines and cocaine is in long term remission and is not severe at the present.
4. The claimant retains the residual functional capacity for work which does not involve lifting or carrying more than 10 pounds occasionally or 5 pounds frequently. She requires an hourly position change but otherwise has no limitations on her ability to sit or remain on her feet. She can occasionally twist, climb, stoop, kneel and crawl but should only very occasionally bend. She requires low stress work which does not require high production goals. Work should be repetitive and routine and involve only brief and superficial contact with the public.
5. The claimant's subjective allegations are only partially credible due to significant inconsistencies in the record as a whole.
6. The claimant was born on September 7, 1957 and is a younger individual.
7. The claimant has a high school education and vocational training in microcomputers.
8. The claimant has semiskilled relevant work as a PC board assembler which provides no transferable vocational skills.
9. The claimant cannot perform her past relevant work.
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, past work history and residual functional capacity, other work existing in significant numbers in the regional and national economy (sic) that can perform, in Minnesota such work includes 2,200 jobs as an inspector, with representative jobs in protective medical devices, 3,000 jobs as a cashier II and 1,200 to 1,500 jobs as a surveillance system monitor.
11. The claimant has not been disabled since January 2, 1997 as alleged.

(R. 31-32).

B. Application of the Five Step Process

The ALJ made the following determinations under the five-step procedure: At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 2, 1997. At the second step, the ALJ found Plaintiff was severely impaired by low back pain with lower extremity radiation due to degenerative disc disease, obesity status post gastric bypass, two hernia repairs and depression. At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments do not meet or equal any listed impairment. At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is precluded by her impairments from performing her past work as an assembler. At the fifth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff maintains the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a variety of other occupations existing in significant numbers in the regional economy such as inspector, cashier or a surveillance system monitor.

On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in determining her RFC by not according proper weight to the opinions of her treating physicians thus erring in the fifth step of the analysis by not including all of Plaintiff's impairments in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert.

III. ISSUES UNDER REVIEW

A. RFC Determination

Once it has been determined that a claimant cannot perform past relevant work, step five of the sequential analysis requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") or range of work abilities enables him/her to perform alternative work. In the present case the ALJ determined that Plaintiff maintained the following RFC:

"lifting or carrying more than 10 pounds occasionally or 5 pounds frequently. She requires an hourly position change but otherwise has no limitations on her ability to sit or remain on her feet. She can occasionally twist, climb, stoop, kneel and crawl but should only very occasionally bend. She requires low stress work which does not require high production goals. Work should be repetitive and routine and involve only brief and superficial contact with the public." (R. 31-32).

Plaintiff disagrees with this RFC determination, arguing that the ALJ failed to consider and incorporate the recommendations of her treating physicians. The ALJ declined to accord controlling weight to the opinions of Plaintiff's physicians because he found them unsupported by the evidence.

The social security regulations provide that "a treating physician's opinion regarding an applicant's impairment will be granted `controlling weight,' provided the opinion is `well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] record.'" Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Plaintiff was first seen by Dr. Garry Banks for back and leg pain on February 4, 1997. (R. 220). Prior to the visit, Plaintiff underwent an MRI of herback in January 1997, which revealed disc bulging in her lumbar spine region, but also indicated that neither condition resulted in significant narrowing of Plaintiff's spinal canal or nerve root impingement. Despite her pain, Dr. Banks reported that Plaintiff was able to walk heel-to-toe and her sensory motor function and deep tendon reflexes were normal. (R. 220 — 21). Dr. Banks suggested that Plaintiff's pain was due to disc degeneration and protrusion and nerve irritation in the lumbar region. Dr. Banks recommended Plaintiff receive an epidural steroid injection to assist with her pain. (R. 221).

On April 29, 1997 Plaintiff was seen again by Dr. Banks to review her progress after a series of three steroid injections. At this time, Dr. Banks noted that Plaintiff's gait was slow but otherwise normal and she continued to demonstrate normal motor and sensory function as well as normal reflexes in her lower extremities. (R. 216). However because Plaintiff's range of motion was limited in the lumber spine area, Dr. Banks recommended she become more involved in a physical therapy program. (R. 216).

On February 12, 1998 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Banks to re-evaluate her condition. Dr. Banks noted that by increasing her tolerance for walking from 5 minutes to over 15 minutes, Plaintiff's overall condition was improving. (R. 202). Plaintiff reported that she continued to experience some ongoing back pain as well as decreased sensation in the right calf and foot and weakness in the right ankle. (R. 212). Plaintiff indicated that she was able to tolerate the pain on a day to day basis, and Dr. Banks saw no evidence of spinal stenosis or forminal narrowing. Dr. Banks recommended that Plaintiff continue her back exercises. (R. 209).

Spinal stenosis a narrowing of the lumbar or cervical spinal canal, which causes compression on nerve roots; forminal narrowing is a condition in which part or all of the soft, central portion of an intervertebral disk is forced through a weakened part of the disk, resulting in back pain and nerve root irritation. See National Library of Medicine: Medline Health Information at http://medlineplus.gov.

On February 17, 1998 Plaintiff underwent a second MRI of her lumbar spine region. Consistent with Dr. Banks' opinion, the MRI showed degenerative disc disease with a small midline disc herniation. (R. 198).

On June 26, 1998 Dr. Banks sent a letter to the SSA on behalf of Plaintiff confirming she suffered from a low back problem for which he has recommended permanent work restrictions. Dr. Banks recommended that Plaintiff be limited to lifting ten pounds and avoid bending and twisting activities. (R. 224).

On February 5, 1999 Plaintiff was seen again by Dr. Banks for lower back pain. Plaintiff reported back pain and right lower extremity pain, as well as problems sitting for more than 45 minutes to an hour at a time. (R. 326). Dr. Banks noted that Plaintiff was experiencing decreased sensation over her right lateral calf and foot, however she continued to demonstrate normal motor function. (R. 326). Dr. Banks recommended Plaintiff try a medication called Naprosyn over the next 30 days to deal with her pain. He also recommended that Plaintiff increase her involvement in physical therapy to three times a week over the next three to four weeks. (R. 326)

Naprosyn is a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug used to relieve some symptoms such as inflammation, swelling, stiffness, and joint pain.See National Library of Medicine at http://www.medline.gov.

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Banks on March 21, 1999 to evaluate her condition. Dr. Banks suggested that Plaintiff either undergo a pain clinic evaluation to learn to accept some ongoing pain or consider surgical intervention. (R. 324). To accommodate Plaintiff's condition, Dr. Banks recommended Plaintiff's work activities be restricted to lifting a maximum often pounds, include hourly changes in position and involve no bending, twisting or kneeling. He further restricted Plaintiff to a six hour workday. (R. 324).

On May 21, 1999, at the request of the SSA Dr. Banks completed a "Report of Workability" form detailing the extent of Plaintiff's impairments and her work related restrictions. In the report, Dr. Banks limited Plaintiff's lifting and carry capacity to five pounds. (R. 324). He opined that Plaintiff was capable of sitting three hours, standing three hours and walking three hours during a normal workday. He added that Plaintiff should be restricted to a six hour workday and need only change her position once every four hours. (R. 304).

The ALJ declined to accord controlling weight Dr. Banks' recommendation restricting Plaintiff to a lifting capacity of five pounds because he found the recommendation unsupported by the evidence. Initially, in June of 1998 Dr. Banks permanently restricted Plaintiff to lifting and ten pounds. This recommendation is consistent with the ALJ's RFC determination. (R. 224). Subsequently, in May of 1999 Dr. Banks reduced Plaintiff's lifting and carrying capacity to only five pounds. However, there is no indication from Dr. Banks' treatment notes that Plaintiff's condition significantly deteriorated between June of 1998 and May of 1999 to warrant this reduction. Likewise, the MRI's taken of the lumbar region of Plaintiff's back in January of 1997 and again in February of 1998, also fail to demonstrate a noticeable change in Plaintiff's condition. (R. 201, 211). As such the record fails to present an objective medical basis to support Dr. Banks' opinion reducing Plaintiff's lifting and carrying capacity to five pounds.

Similarly, the record fails to provide support for Dr. Banks' recommendation restricting Plaintiff to a six hour workday. Dr. Banks' initial opinion regarding Plaintiff's work capabilities failed to restrict the length of Plaintiff's workday. However in May of 1999 Dr. Banks further restricted Plaintiff to working no more than a six hour workday. There is no evidence in the record t explain Dr. Banks' change in position. Further there is no evidence in the record that suggests Plaintiff's condition prevents her from working more than six hours a day.

Without any record evidence to support the recommendations limiting Plaintiff to a five pound lifting and carrying capacity and a six hour workday, the opinions of Dr. Banks are not entitled to controlling weight. The ALJ was therefore reasonable in declining to incorporate these physical restrictions into Plaintiff's RFC determination.

B. Psychological Restrictions

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining her RFC by failing to accord controlling weight to the opinions of her treating psychologist Dr. Boutacoff. The ALJ declined to incorporate Dr. Boutacoff's psychological restrictions into Plaintiff's RFC because he found them to be unsupported by objective medical findings.

In May of 1997 Plaintiff underwent an evaluation with Dr. Lana Boutacoff for psychosocial problems related to her pending gastric bypass surgery. Plaintiff denied experiencing difficulty with concentration, memory or low energy. (R. 191). Dr. Boutacoff noted that Plaintiff demonstrated normal eye contact, clear well modulated speech and exhibited an estimated intellectual functioning level in the low to average range. (R. 191).

After her gastric bypass surgery Plaintiff was seen again by Dr. Boutacoff in August and September of 1998. (R. 261). During this time period, Dr. Boutacoff noted that Plaintiff exhibited signs of depression such as lack of energy and appetite as well as sleep disturbance, slowed speech, tearfulness and slouched posture. (R. 264). Plaintiff indicated she was under multiple stressors including the recent unexpected death of her mother and tension with her child's father. Dr. Boutacoff diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder and assigned her a global assessment functioning of 42. (R. 264).

A Global Assessment Functioning or ("GAP") of 42 indicates serious symptoms or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. American Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. 1994).

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Boutacoff on February 3, 1999. Plaintiff reported that she was "tired and worn" after restarting the Welfare to Work Program. (R. 270). On February 22, 1999 Dr. Boutacoff sent a letter to the SSA detailing Plaintiff's RFC. Dr. Boutacoff stated Plaintiff was compliant, able to follow rules and directions and capable of dealing with the public when not stressed. (R. 259). She added that Plaintiff exhibits good judgment when provided data or basis of knowledge upon which to make her decisions. Dr. Boutacoff added that Plaintiff experiences difficulty with concentration and attention when overwhelmed by expectations, obligations or quotas. (R. 259). Based on these observations Dr Boutacoff recommended that Plaintiff receive social security benefits for one year after which she should resume the Welfare to Work Program on a part-time basis. (R. 260).

The ALJ declined to accord controlling weight to the recommendations of Dr. Boutacoff because he found them to be inconsistent with her opinions and unsupported by medical evidence. Dr. Boutacoff's recommendations that Plaintiff be given social security benefits for one year and then resume the Welfare to Work Program on part-time basis are not supported by the evidence. In her letter to the SSA, Dr. Boutacoff stated that Plaintiff is capable of following rules and directions as well as interacting with the public as long as she is not stressed. She further stated that Plaintiff becomes stressed when under the pressure of quotas and high expectations. The psychological limitations placed on Plaintiff's RFC by Dr. Boutacoff are not consistent with the capabilities of individual who is incapable of working for a one year period or on a full-time basis. Further, At no point during her course of treating Plaintiff do Dr. Boutacoff's treatment notes suggest that Plaintiff's impairments render her incapable of working or that she must be restricted to only part-time work. The record fails to present any evidence to support these recommendations. As such the ALJ was reasonable in declining to incorporate Dr. Boutacoff's recommendations into Plaintiff's RFC.

The ALJ restricted Plaintiff's RFC to low stress work which does not have high production goals, or frequent contact with the public. The vocational expert testified at the hearing that despite these limitations there exists alternative work existing in substantial numbers in the local economy that Plaintiff can perform. (R. 81-83).

The ALJ considered the record in its entirety in determining Plaintiff's RFC. Limiting Plaintiff's lifting and carrying capacity to five pounds was not incorporated because of a lack of record evidence to support this finding. The evidence also fails to support that Plaintiff is incapable of working for a year and thereafter only on a part-time basis. There exists substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination regarding Plaintiff's RFC.

IV. QUESTION TO THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT

Step five of the sequential analysis includes the inquiry of whether the claimants impairments prevent her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity other than past relevant work. If they do not, she is not disabled. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to include reference to her treating physicians opinions that she is limited in her lifting and carrying capacity to five pounds, cannot work more than a six hour day and cannot work for a one year period.

A vocational experts testimony in response to a hypothetical question which accurately reflects all a claimants credible limitations, constitutes substantial evidence of an ALJ's determination that a plaintiff is not disabled. A hypothetical question that sets forth all impairments substantiated by the ALJ is sufficient. Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 420 (8th Cir. 1996).

The ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the vocational expert with Plaintiff's same age, education and experience, as well as the following limitations:

". . . impaired by alcohol and drug abuse in long-term remission. She's had treatment for what has been described as moderate depression, lower back pain with lower extremity radiation, obesity that has been treated with a gastric bypass, and status post two hernia repairs . . . I would limit it to sedentary lifting level, which would be up to 10 ponds occasionally, 5 pounds frequently. The limitations on sitting or time on feet, would be the ability to change positions on an hourly basis, or have occasional twisting, climbing, stooping, kneeling or crawling. Only very occasional bending. And the work duties should be at low stress level, not requiring high production goals or high stress. And further limited to brief superficial contact with the public." (R. 81-82).

Based on the above-mentioned limitations, the VE testified that the hypothetical individual would be able to perform jobs such as sedentary unskilled inspection, cashiering jobs that do not require high traffic and surveillance system monitor positions. (R. 82-83). The VE testified that approximately 5,400 such jobs exist in the state of Minnesota. (R. 83).

The ALJ was not required to incorporate the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physicians into the hypothetical question. The ALJ determined that opinions of Dr. Banks and Dr. Boutacoff were not entitled to controlling weight because they were not supported by objective medical evidence. As such the ALJ was not required to incorporate Dr. Bank's opinion concerning Plaintiff's reduced lifting capacity and length of workday into the hypothetical question. Likewise, the ALJ was not required to incorporate the opinion of Dr. Boutacoff precluding Plaintiff from work for a year and thereafter only on a part-time basis in the hypothetical question.

The hypothetical question posed by the ALJ to the VE accurately reflects Plaintiff's physical and psychological limitations as determined by the ALJ. Accordingly the VE's response to the question constitutes substantial evidence that Plaintiff is not disabled.

RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 16] be denied. It is further recommended that Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment [Docket No. 18] be granted.

Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(c)(2), any party may object to this Report and Recommendation by filing with the Clerk of Court, and by serving upon all parties on or before November 27, 2001 a copy of this Report, written objections which specifically identify the portions of the Report to which objections are made and the bases for each objection.


Summaries of

Thurber v. Masanari

United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Nov 8, 2001
NO. 01-132 (ADM/JMM) (D. Minn. Nov. 8, 2001)
Case details for

Thurber v. Masanari

Case Details

Full title:Julie A. THURBER, Plaintiff, v. Larry G. MASSANARI, Defendant

Court:United States District Court, D. Minnesota

Date published: Nov 8, 2001

Citations

NO. 01-132 (ADM/JMM) (D. Minn. Nov. 8, 2001)